Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 29th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Dinton, with his vast experience of Whitehall and the formation of policy.

I want to concentrate on Clause 5 and a legal issue at the very heart of the Bill: whether a Minister should be able to refuse to abide by an interim order of the European Court of Human Rights, made under its Rule 39 procedure. The president of the Strasbourg court, in a media interview given only last week, asserted that her court has the power to grant interim relief and that member states have an obligation to comply. However, the contrary position had been powerfully presented only the previous evening by Professor Ekins, giving the 37th Atkin lecture in this city.

The present Rule 39 dates from 2013 and provides that the full court or a single duty judge may

“indicate to the parties any interim measure which it considers should be adopted”.

That does not sound like a legal obligation, and that is for a simple reason. The 1950 convention contains no provision for a single judge, or even the full court, to grant interim relief to any person. That omission was not an oversight. There was an attempt in 1950 to give the court such a power, and that attempt was rejected. On every subsequent attempt to give the court that power, the member states have refused.

That is not to say, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, that a power to grant interim orders might not be useful, sensible or desirable, but that is not the question. The question is whether the court has that power, and the member states repeatedly decided that it should not. For a time, the Strasbourg court agreed that it did not have a power to grant interim relief. It so ruled authoritatively in 1991, and ruled to the same effect a decade later, in 2001. However, in 2005, the Strasbourg court performed a jurisdictional U-turn. It held that, by failing to comply with an interim measure ordered under Rule 39 to prevent a deportation, Turkey had breached Article 34—that is the article which provides that member states must not hinder the right of an individual to access the court. Perhaps that case was rightly decided on its own facts, although I doubt it. If the deportation was a breach of Article 34 then whether there was a breach of Rule 39 as well does not really make any difference. That decision became the slender basis for the court to assert, in a later case in 2009, that any non-compliance with a Rule 39 order necessarily also amounted to a breach of the convention.

Why the change of heart by the court in 2005? It appears to be what one might call judicial envy: the International Court of Justice had held a few years earlier, in 2001, that states had to abide by its interim measures, and it seems that the ECHR court considered that what was good enough for The Hague was also good for Strasbourg. But there is a critical difference. Article 41 of the statute establishing the International Court of Justice specifically provides for “provisional measures”. In other words, the ICJ statute contains in terms precisely the power that the member states had consistently refused to agree to give to the Strasbourg court.

As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, explained, there are also severe procedural problems with the approach that the Strasbourg court takes. Those problems are not my concern this evening; I welcome the fact that the Strasbourg court is trying to address those procedural problems. But none of that addresses the underlying jurisprudential issue, which is whether the Strasbourg court has the legal power to issue binding interim relief in the first place.

In the absence of locating that power in the convention itself, it has been suggested that, over the years, state practice has given the court this power. I do not find that argument persuasive. I do not have the time now, but that state practice is neither uniform nor consistent. The details are set out between pages 35 and 41 of Professor Ekins’s paper on this topic for Policy Exchange, which repays reading in any event. I am sure that we will come back to it in Committee.

So far as the UK specifically is concerned, we have said, rightly and for good political reasons, that compliance with Rule 39 orders is our usual policy. All other things being equal, so it should be. But accepting compliance as our usual policy is quite different from accepting a Rule 39 direction as a legal obligation, which we should not do, because it is not.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 14th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, aware of the hour, I rise very briefly, having attached my name to Amendment 81 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. I am now very clear that the noble Viscount’s Amendment 82 is an ingenious way of addressing the issue of temporality, which we have been circling around again and again. However, I shall simply address Amendment 81.

As I think the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, today we have been introduced to a phrase, “the court of Parliament”, that many of us, certainly myself, were not familiar with. Amendment 81 goes to the sovereignty of Parliament and ensures that Parliament remains sovereign in decision-making. Like other Members of the Committee on this side of the House, I will avoid venturing too far into the internal pains of the Conservative Party, but I think that a section of the party that has recently arrived in your Lordships’ House is very concerned with sovereignty, and it has never been terribly clear whether we are talking about parliamentary sovereignty or Executive sovereignty. Another phrase for Executive sovereignty, of course, might be “the exercise of arbitrary power”. The amendment overcomes that problem, makes it very clear and ensures what kind of country we want to live in.

There is another point I want to raise briefly, because what the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, said on the financial issues was very interesting. I must admit that I have not ventured into those issues because, quite frankly, I have been concerned with stopping the whole thing happening, so the financial aspect, the money, has already been thrown away and that is where we are. However, the point the noble Lord made about commercial confidentiality being allowed to cloud any sort of transparency about what is happening is an issue of concern. Those in other sections of your Lordships’ House will know that I and the Green Party have very strong views about the use of services provided for private profit for what should be care; after all, what we are supposed to be talking about is caring for refugees. Will the Minister say, without going into too much commercial detail, what percentage of profit the Government have allowed for in that contract? If that is said to be still too commercially confidential, what would the Government consider a reasonable level of profit for someone to make from the housing of these refugees in Rwanda?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I also note the Clock and I will make points on the two headings. The first is on Amendment 81 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. The basis for it, according to the Member’s explanatory statement, is that

“This amendment replaces … (an executive act), with a parliamentary trigger”.


The proposal is that instead of having an executive fiat, Parliament and parliamentary sovereignty would be put in its place. Unfortunately, the amendment does not do that. What it does is to take the pen away from the Minister and hand it to the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The reason is that the way this amendment is drafted is that two requirements need to be met. First, the Joint Committee on Human Rights has to report its belief that Rwanda is safe; in other words, if it comes to the conclusion that Rwanda is not safe, or might not be safe, then proposed new subsection (1A)(a) is not satisfied, and it falls there. The second requirement is that

“a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament”.

If, for example, both the other place and this House were to take the view that the Joint Committee on Human Rights had got it totally wrong and, in fact, contrary to its view that Rwanda was not safe, it plainly was safe, Parliament could do nothing about it. I am sure that is not what was intended, but it is a fundamental problem in the drafting and in the scheme if what is intended is to hand power to Parliament.

Just to make it clear, if that amendment were made to this amendment, I would still oppose it. The responsibility should lie with the Secretary of State. Let us be very clear about what this amendment would actually do. It would take the pen away from somebody who is elected and responsible to the electorate and hand it to the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I have the greatest respect for the JCHR—I appeared before it when I was a Minister—but it is wrong in principle that it and it alone should have the right to stop this legislation in its tracks. That is the first point I wanted to make.

The second point I want to make arises out of Amendments 35 and 90 and the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, earlier that this is retrospective legislation. As we are in Committee—although many of the speeches seem to be Second Reading speeches—let me pick up one drafting point on Amendment 35. As I understand it, it would prevent a decision-maker making a decision relating to the removal to the Republic of Rwanda of somebody who arrived in the UK before the Act received Royal Assent. The words

“a decision relating to the removal”

are very broad. Would they include, for example, a decision about how old somebody is? That is a decision that will be needed under the current legislation and under this legislation. I would have thought that it cannot be intended that Amendment 35 would stop decisions which have, so to speak, that dual purpose. That is a drafting point.

The more fundamental point is whether this is retrospective legislation at all. I listened very carefully, as I always do, to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. With respect, I fundamentally disagree with him that this is retrospective legislation. What is retrospective legislation? The House of Commons Library puts it in these terms—this is from a paper it published in June 2013, but these are fundamental principles that do not change over time—citing Craies on Legislation, ninth edition. It says that retrospective legislation is generally defined as legislation which

“takes away or impairs any vested right acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already past”.

The two classic examples are, first, that conduct which is lawful when you do it is not later made unlawful; and, secondly, that the penalty for unlawful conduct when you do it is not rendered greater retrospectively. It is right to say that we have legislated retrospectively in the criminal context—rarely, but we have. The War Crimes Act 1991 and the International Criminal Court Act 2001 are examples of that. However, none of this is retrospective legislation. The example the noble and learned Lord gave is that somebody might have an argument which they could put in court that, for example, “I’ve got a brother here, I’ve got somebody here”. That is not a vested right.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

No. The noble Lord has misunderstood my argument. You are in this country before the Act. You have a right in the sense that you are, in fact, subject to persecution. You would have to advance the argument to get the right, but your right is a right to stay here, and a right to stay not on the basis that you may be exported to Rwanda. That is a right. It might not be viewed by the law as a “vested right” in the sense that he is referring to, but it is plainly within the spirit of retrospective legislation.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

A very good touchstone of when lawyers realise that—if I may respectfully say—the argument does not quite work is when they start referring to spirits of things. With great respect, that is not a vested right. If you have a right to asylum, you have a right to asylum. Under this Bill, you also have a right to asylum. What this changes is where you have the right to asylum.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

The person who would have a right to asylum in the UK under this Bill would no longer have the right to asylum in the UK. It is completely different. They may have a right to asylum in Rwanda, but that is not the right that they had when they were here which is going to be taken away from them.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

Will the noble Lord explain why if I come here and am entitled to asylum that is not a right?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The right is to make a claim for asylum. That is the vested right absolutely. The right is the right to asylum.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

In the UK.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

It does not work if the noble Lord shouts at me when he is sitting down. I am happy to give way. I hear what he says—that it is the right to asylum in the UK, and I am respectfully suggesting that is not the case under the law. The hour is late, and we will no doubt come back to this.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

A right to have possession of my property requires me to go to court and get it. It is still a right, even though I have to ask for it.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am sorry; that is totally different, because the courts—I will give way to the noble Baroness.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I think we have got to the heart of this. I am concerned about the time, not just for Members of the Committee but for the staff, just before the one-day half-term. I think perhaps the noble Lord opposite is indicating the difference he sees between, for example, property rights and humanitarian rights to refugee protection, which have been rights recognised in this country for a very long time.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Of course they are rights that have been recognised for a very long time, but that was not the point being put to me, as I understood it. On the property point, if you have property, you have a vested right in property. The court is declaring that you always have that right. First, you do not have a vested right in asylum; it is not a right vested into you. Secondly, the Bill does not take away a vested right you have. You still have the right of asylum.

I think the noble Viscount is saying that it changes it. The question was of retrospective legislation, which is a fundamental point raised by the noble and learned Lord. The question is whether this is retrospective legislation. For the reasons I have set out, I submit that it plainly is not. I apprehend that we will come back to this. I do see the time. Unless there are any other interventions, I will pause there.

Debate on Amendment 35 adjourned.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I thank the noble Lord. I said that the court issued a press release; I did not say it made a judgment by press release. I think that is taking it a little too far.

The noble Lord states that the domestic judicial processes had been concluded, but the court said that they had not. All I am relaying to the Committee is the decision that was made. In my view it is reasonable, but I am not a lawyer, as the two noble Lords are. That was the reason the court made the decision, and the Government accepted it.

The point I wanted to make is that there were five other cases that day, which are not referred to as frequently. The requests for two interim measures were granted in order for the court to consider the cases in greater detail. That is correct, yes? Two were refused, which has not been mentioned so far, and one was withdrawn because the Home Office had changed policy in the meantime. Looking at the consideration of cases on that day, I do not think you would come to a conclusion—with three accepted, two refused and one withdrawn—that there was some deliberate blocking of the measure.

That prompted me to ask what the record of the UK has been on interim measures over the last years. There have been 178 applications overall, with most of them withdrawn, since 2021. We have fared fairly well against Germany with a total consideration of 264. That compares with 478 cases for France. We are doing quite well as far as cases against the UK go. If this is judicial blocking, and therefore the motives are to empower the courts to stop what the Government want to do, we need to look at the record of the decisions.

In 2021 five interim measures were granted against the UK and nine were refused. In 2022, five were granted against the UK and 12 were refused. In 2023—the most recent data—one interim measure was granted against the UK and 13 were refused. Far from this being judicial blocking—these cases are all to do with expulsions and relocations; this is not just in general terms—the UK’s system has worked really rather well, especially when compared with those of Germany and France. I would have thought that this is something that the Government would want to protect.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, the ancient court known as the Sanhedrin, at its full complement, sat with 71 judges and had a rule that the most junior judge would give judgment first. I understand the reason was that, if the senior judges had spoken and the junior judge disagreed, that would be arrogant; if they agreed, it would be impudent. I find myself speaking after the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hoffmann and Lord Etherton, who disagreed. Therefore, whichever side of this argument I take, it seems I am going to be guilty of both. I ask forgiveness from each of them.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, I will spoil any questions as to which way I will go by saying that I respectfully agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, and the reasons he gave for supporting Professor Ekins’ paper. It was interesting that, in opening the debate, the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, said that for about 20 years the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has been clear. That is true, but it begs the question: since the European Court of Human Rights has been there for rather longer than 20 years, why did the noble Lord limit his position to 20 years? The answer is that if he had said “for 23 years” the jurisprudence would have said something completely different.

What is remarkable in this area is that this is not a new question. As I said at Second Reading, the question whether the European Court of Human Rights should have the jurisdiction—and this is a question of jurisdiction—to issue interim injunctions or interim measures was specifically debated by the contracting parties back in 1949, and it was deliberately not put into the text in 1950. It was a deliberate omission, not an oversight. The states considered whether the court should have the power and, no doubt for reasons similar to that set out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, decided that it should not. That caused no problem at all.

Year after year, the court operated perfectly well without this power. It ruled, in terms, that it did not have this power in 1991 and, a decade later, in 2001, it upheld that ruling. As I said at Second Reading, you then have a judicial volte face in 2005, and the judgment from which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, quoted. It is an open question, and it is interesting to consider why there was this volte-face by the European Court of Human Rights. I suggested that it might have been “jurisprudential envy”, because the International Court of Justice held that it had the power to issue interim injunctions. But, of course, that is different, because the statute of the ICJ, particularly the French version, provides a basis in the foundational document of that court for it to have that jurisdictional power.

With respect, question of whether the court has a power to issue these interim measures rests on very slender foundations. How is it now said that the court has the power, and we are bound by it? The primary argument put this evening has been based on Article 32, which provides that the court has jurisdiction to decide on the operation of the convention. What is interesting about that argument is that it is not used by the court itself, which, so far as I am aware, has not based its jurisprudence on the fact that Article 32 gives it the right to say, “This is what our jurisdiction is, and this is what we are doing”. It is outside commentators who have tried to find a proper basis—because Article 34, which the court does rely on, is not one—for the court’s jurisdiction. It is rather like the archer who scores a bull’s-eye not by firing the arrow at the target, but by firing it and then drawing the target around it.

One comes to the conclusion that people would like the court to have the jurisdiction and then say, “Ah, well, there must be a basis for it—what about Article 32?” But it is not an argument that the court itself uses, and it is also a false argument. Article 32 is about disputes about the convention and its operation; they are to be resolved by the court. It is not a grant of unlimited jurisdiction to the court to defy the express terms of the convention, including Article 46.1, which says that states are bound only by final judgments and therefore, by implication, nothing else—and by the history of the convention, which, as I have set out, is contrary to the court having these powers.

Article 32 is not the “get out of jail” card. This is not a new point. A similar point came before the Supreme Court in the case of Pham in 2015—what would happen if the European Court of Justice exceeded its jurisdictional powers? The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, dealt with that issue in paragraph 90. I do not need to go through the answer, but it certainly was not, “Well, the European Court of Justice has a power to interpret the treaties, and if it says it has the power to do this, that or the other, necessarily it does”, which would be the analogue to the Article 32 argument.

With the greatest of respect, Article 32 simply will not do as a basis on which to found the jurisprudence of the court. Of course, there are other points to be made as to the process of the court, and those have already been set out by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. For those reasons, the point underlying many of the amendments in this group—that the court has jurisdiction to issue these interim measures and they are binding in international law—is wrong. Therefore, these amendments ought to be resisted.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 62 in the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker would ensure that a Minister of the Crown making a decision on an interim injunction consults the Attorney-General. This would ensure that, before making a decision on compliance with any interim measures issued by the ECHR for the purpose of blocking a person’s removal to Rwanda, the relevant Minister consults the Attorney-General, creating an additional safeguard. The noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, introduced his speech by saying he was not going to be arrogant or impudent, so I will adopt the same approach in my speech, which will be brief. I am not going to go into the legal arguments—many eminent lawyers have done that—but I am going to go into the politics and address what seems to me to be the question that has been left hanging in the air.

Yesterday morning, I watched the television and Mr Michael Tomlinson, the Illegal Migration Minister, was on our screens and he was absolutely explicit: he said that the flights will take off as soon as the Bill becomes an Act and the treaty comes into force. He said they will be going pretty much immediately. There was no question of the niceties of Rule 39 and all the other things we have been talking about; the subject simply did not come up. That is the politics of it: when the Bill becomes an Act, the treaty comes into force and those flights will be taking off.

My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer went into how the decision on Rule 39 might be made. The question he, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, asked, was, would it be subject to judicial review? To me, that is the question hanging in the air, and I look forward to the Minister’s answer, because as far as I can see it will be for the Attorney-General to make that decision, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, and she will be doing that as a law officer. Today’s Daily Telegraph said—I do not know how it knows this—that when Mr Tomlinson was Solicitor-General, he had written legal advice saying that it would be illegal to go against Rule 39. I know it is private advice; nevertheless, that was in today’s Daily Telegraph.

So, there are two issues. First, the Illegal Migration Minister was explicit about the flights taking off on the conclusion of proceedings on the Bill. Secondly, what is the status of judicial review of any Rule 39 decision?