Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Bill [HL]

Lord Whitty Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & 2nd reading (Hansard)
Monday 27th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Whitty (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her comprehensive introduction to the Bill. I apologise to her for not coming to her briefing meeting, but I hope that nevertheless she can answer some of my points.

Broadly speaking, I support the intentions of this Bill. I guess I have two interests to declare. One is that I am vice-president of BALPA. That does not mean I have the expertise of my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe or others in this House, but I am taking on board many of the points that it wishes to raise.

My second interest is slightly more tenuous, in that I inherited from the noble Baroness, Lady O’Cathain, who was here for the earlier part of the debate, responsibility for chairing the committee that produced this report in 2015 with many recommendations. In those days, we called drones “remotely piloted aircraft systems” but we all know what we are talking about. When I took on responsibility for following up the report, I found that Ministers were somewhat reluctant to take much action in the early days. Luckily, that has now changed. There was a Bill that was aborted in the last Parliament and there has been an extension to the protection of airfields, with 5-kilometre geofencing around them—a protection that now applies to many other secure sites. Therefore, we have made progress.

I will concentrate largely on the drone aspect of this subject. I recognise that nowadays we have to accept and support the technology for the many applications of drones that affect our lives and our security, but there is also the key issue of safety in the use of drones in the air and on the ground. In addition, a range of issues raised in the report produced by the committee of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Cathain, have not been fully addressed and they are not really addressed in this Bill. Some relate to the safety of other users in the air and on the ground, but there are also the issues of insurance, licensing, privacy and liability, and indeed there is the question of how far the multiple operation of drones by one programme and one operator is compatible with our current regulations.

The Gatwick incident and the anxieties that it raised have obviously increased the public profile of drones and the level of concern. Those concerns relate not just to an individual collision, disastrous though that might be, but to a total system being threatened by a drone being operated wrongly, whether it be the deliberate endangering of the operation of an airport or airfield, terrorism or simply a number of kids getting hold of these machines and causing disruption for a laugh. We have to develop a regulatory system that deals with both the big security issues and an individual drone being used in the wrong way.

The design and the use of unmanned and manned aircraft, and the components of manned aircraft, are important considerations and things that we need to follow through in this legislation. For example, limited testing has shown that the collision between a medium-sized drone and a screen could be catastrophic—for the screen, the flight crew and, potentially, for the passengers. The incursion of a medium or large drone into a jet engine could also be catastrophic. As I understand it, the limited testing that there has been has not turned into a fully fledged test of new aero engines, or indeed a way of ensuring the resilience of existing in-service engines. The certification process for aero engines is therefore not yet in place.

Standard testing is urgently required so that the ingestion of a drone, which could be much more damaging than the ingestion of a bird—which is part of the standard testing and certification operations—is taken fully on board. Certainly at the larger end of drones, very serious damage could be done to an engine, as well as to the body of an aircraft. However, even a small metallic drone could do serious damage, particularly to the operation of helicopter blades and so forth. It is the responsibility of the aerospace industry internationally but also of the Government to ensure that we mandate drone ingestion as part of the certification of aero engines.

We also need some changes in the air traffic control regulations to ensure adequate separation. That has long been a key feature of air traffic control between aircraft to mitigate the effects of turbulence, but it can also apply in relation to the relationship between aircraft and drones. Again, the interrelationship between helicopters and drones is probably the most acute in this respect; it could cause damage to both the helicopter and the drone as well as, potentially, damage on the ground. I hope that all these things can be addressed in the technical detail of the Bill.

I also have a number of points relating to enforcement. In recent years we have seen a big increase in the use of drones in all sorts of quite legitimate commercial operations. We have also seen the use of drones effectively for pleasure and some criminal use of them. I would like to consider in the course of the Bill strengthening the enforcement side so that not only are all operators licensed but—in my view—they have to be over 18, they have a clear record, they are not under the influence of drink or drugs and the way in which they operate and treat those drones is built into the enforcement and checking system and the police powers over them.

There is the question of, for example, deliberately removing in-built safety features from drones such as the geofencing requirements, the requirements for lights on larger drones and the telemetry features of the transponder that allow the drone to respond to the geofencing. If we remove some of those, the drone becomes a much more dangerous machine and, for all sorts of reasons, it is possible that users might be tempted to use it. Indeed, in the extreme case, there is the deliberate weaponisation of drones: terrorists or others might add blades or other damaging features to the drones or use them for carrying arms or explosives. Those are very serious breaches of safety and security, not only of a single aircraft but of a whole aircraft system and the whole area.

I also suggest that the individual machines as well as the operators need to be licensed. That is after all the situation regarding vehicles both in the air and on the ground, and there is no reason why it should not apply in this case.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

Does my noble friend agree that one of the problems is that we have such a successful drone industry that it has been loath to allow regulation to take place, but it really has to do so because there is now such a dangerous risk?

[Lord Whitty]

I agree entirely with my noble friend, and I think there are elements within the industry itself that recognise that. As with other new technologies, an industry begins to come of age when it begins to accept and contribute to better regulation to mitigate the problems in its sector.

I will also be suggesting that we need to look explicitly at the police powers in this area. The powers to ground an aircraft are not clear. The ability to enter premises or stop and search for an aircraft or for elements of an aircraft are also not yet clear. While I recognise the need for FPN for minor offences, it needs to be clearer what those offences actually are. I would also be grateful if the Minister spelled out a little how far we are getting with counterdrone technology and how rapidly we might see that in place.

I had a couple of points on Parts 1 and 2, but my voice is giving out. I hope the Minister can respond to the points that I have made.

Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Bill [HL]

Lord Whitty Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard)
Wednesday 12th February 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Trefgarne]

My Lords, I am not without sympathy for the thoughts behind the amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, but there are some important complications, which were referred to by my noble friends Lord Tebbit and Lord Goschen. For example, electronic identification for each and every drone would be a considerable undertaking. It may in the end prove necessary, but it is not straightforward.

[Lord Whitty (Lab)]

My Lords, unnecessary conflict has developed in this debate. I declare that I am the vice-president of BALPA, whose position, broadly speaking, is to support this Bill as far as it goes and strengthen it where we can, but also to recognise that there will be subsequent information and knowledge, and that regulation will be required as the impact of the technology changes. The noble Baroness’s amendment—building into this legislation the fact that we continuously review the specifics that she outlines, but also any other changes in technology—is the most sensible way to do it. We are not going to complete in the next few days a Bill that will last very long in its totality.

The noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, with whom I sat on the same committee, knows that five years ago the technology was very different. Some of the concerns were the same; some have been overcome. Hopefully, we can develop a situation in which we have a continuous review, but the request that that should be built into this Bill does not seem to me unreasonable. For the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, and my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours spelled out, and as I spoke about at Second Reading, we already know about the lack of testing on the effect of drones going into jet engines. We need that testing before we can effectively legislate. It is a potentially serious issue. We need a next stage built into the legislation. If the noble Baroness’s amendment is not accepted in total, I hope that its spirit will be taken on board by the Government.

[Lord Rosser]

My Amendment 35 in this group is on much the same theme as the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, except that it calls for the Secretary of State to,

“prepare a strategy for reviewing legislation relating to unmanned aircraft.”

At Second Reading, my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe, referring to the rate at which technology surrounding drones has developed, said:

“It is possible that this legislation already falls behind recent developments. It seems to ignore the dangers that could arise from drones that fly beyond lines of sight. Ultimately, this legislation must be prepared to deal with the drone technology of the future”.—[Official Report, 27/1/20; col. 1270.]


My noble friend Lord Whitty referred at Second Reading to the Select Committee report from 2015 on drones—or, as I think they were known then, remotely piloted aircraft systems—and said that a range of issues raised in the report had “not been fully addressed” and were not really addressed in the Bill. Some related to the safety of other users in the air and on the ground, but there were also issues of insurance, licensing, privacy and liability and the question of how far the multiple operation of drones by one programme and one operator is compatible with our current regulations. He also spoke about changes in the air traffic control regulations to ensure adequate separation; strengthening the enforcement and checking system; removing built-in safety features from drones; the deliberate weaponisation of drones; and licensing of individual machines. The Airport Operators Association has called for mandatory geofencing software in drones and the mandatory identification of drones to help airports to identify genuine threats to safety.

I am sure that the Government recognise the need to keep reviewing legislation relating to unmanned aircraft. The incident at Gatwick Airport in December 2018 and other incidents and the subsequent emergence of the Bill suggest that someone or somebody had not kept their eye fully on the ball regarding the relevance of legislation by ensuring legislation continues to reflect current realities and technological developments. It is not unreasonable to suggest that a strategy should be drawn up for reviewing legislation to ensure that that does not happen again. At Second Reading, the Minister, speaking for the Government, said:

“Of course, the world of drones and airspace change never stops, so we will continue to review the legislation to ensure it remains fit for purpose, particularly for drones.”—[Official Report, 27/1/20; col. 1292.]


As I said, I am not sure that that has been the case in the light of the Gatwick incident in the sense of updating the legislation in time.

Will the Government’s strategy for reviewing legislation relating to unmanned aircraft be conducted in a piecemeal manner, responding to problems and issues as they come to light, or will we have a comprehensive review of all aspects of legislation relating to unmanned aircraft, as some have called for? The Airport Operators Association says in its briefing—which I am sure a number of noble Lords will have received—on Part 3 of the Bill on unmanned aircraft: “We are, in addition, disappointed that the Government have not taken the opportunity to include other elements called for by the majority of the industry and achieve one comprehensive piece of legislation on drone safety and usage.”

The piecemeal approach would appear to be in vogue at the moment. Even with this Bill, the Government have taken the line—and it has been repeated today—that this is about police enforcement powers and that, in their view, it is inappropriate to use this Bill for further unmanned aircraft regulation. There are also the Henry VIII powers in the Bill, which we have discussed. They provide for the creation of new offences by the Secretary of State, by regulation on an ad hoc basis, and for the addition of offences by the Secretary of State by regulations on an ad hoc basis. That again suggests a piecemeal approach by the Government to their continuous review of the legislation on unmanned aircraft to ensure that it remains fit for purpose. If legislation affecting unmanned aircraft is reviewed on a piecemeal basis, then when a problem or deficiency is exposed, we risk the equivalent of a second Gatwick incident.

This amendment calls for a strategy for reviewing legislation relating to unmanned aircraft—a strategy which, based on the evidence, frankly, is needed—and for that strategy to be prepared by the Secretary of State. I await the Government’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Whitty]

33A: After Clause 16, insert the following new Clause—
“Unmanned aircraft safety features
After article 94(5) of the Air Navigation Order 2016 (S.I. 2016/765) insert— “( ) The person in charge of a small unmanned aircraft must not fly the aircraft if its inbuilt safety features are inoperable or have been disabled.””Member’s explanatory statement
This would provide that a drone should not be flown if its inbuilt safety features, such as geo-fencing, lights, transponder etc, are broken or have been deliberately disabled.

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 33A, I will speak also to Amendments 33B and 33C in this group. I declared earlier that I am vice-president of BALPA. It will come as no great surprise that these amendments emanate largely from BALPA. It supports the general direction of the Bill and wishes to see it enacted. It recognises that there are additional issues that will have to be addressed by the Government subsequently, but in the immediate term some of the enforcement measures, and the description of what needs to be enforced, can be clearer and more effective, and these three amendments pick out three of those. They do so in a way that does not leave to secondary legislation a description or an invention of another criminal offence. They would put it in primary legislation in the context of this Bill and of the various Acts, such as the Air Navigation Order and the police powers Acts, that already exist.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, for tabling these important safety amendments. I will take a moment to rebut the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, who seems to imply that, for some reason, the Government do not care about safety. Continually her remarks seem to imply, “Well, we see the danger and the Government do not.” The Government do see the danger and are looking at all ways to mitigate it, while not crushing an industry that could be incredibly important to our nation and its future.

I shall address in detail the three amendments tabled by the noble Lord, but I want to reassure him and noble friends on the Benches behind me that the Government feel that maintaining the highest standards of safety is a top priority, in relation to both manned and unmanned aircraft. That is why failing to meet requirements such as being reasonably satisfied that a flight can safely be made are already offences under the Air Navigation Order. More serious offences such as endangering the safety of an aircraft could also apply.

For example, Amendment 33A refers to “inbuilt safety features”. They are not necessarily defined, but I take it that we should talk about the thrust of the amendment rather than the detail. As has been covered several times today, the EU regulations being transposed into UK law cover much of what is covered by the noble Lord’s first amendment. The inbuilt safety features to which I think he is referring, such as electronic conspicuity, are within that. The noble Lord mentioned that they could not be turned off—indeed they cannot, because should they be turned off that would be illegal, as the devices would then not have electronic conspicuity. Under the regulations in place—we are in the transition period—those things would have to be on and functioning. Turning them off would not be an option, because that would then be illegal.

On being under the influence of drugs or alcohol, again, this is a really important area. Under the Air Navigation Order, for any remote pilot—that is, the person flying it rather than the person who takes responsibility for it or owns it—who flies a small unmanned aircraft without being reasonably satisfied that the flight can safely be made, perhaps because they are under the influence of drugs or alcohol, there is a potential fine on conviction of up to £2,500. For further, more serious cases of unsafe flying, a pilot found guilty of recklessly or negligently causing an aircraft to endanger a property or person could be sentenced to up to two years in prison, which is quite a significant sentence for being over the limit.

However, I want to bring to noble Lords’ attention more specific regulation: that is, the implementing regulations. I have talked a lot today about delegated regulation today; there is also the implementing regulation, which is also coming from the EU. That states specifically that a remote pilot must not fly an unmanned aircraft when under the influence of psychoactive substances or alcohol.

Therefore, while I accept that the noble Lord’s intention is to make safety changes—and safety is our highest priority—I hope that I have been able to convince the noble Lord, at least for the time being, that we already cover the issues that he hoped to raise.

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her support for the intention of the amendments. On the third amendment, on alcohol and drugs, whether or not the matter is covered by EU regulations in one sense, it is important that operators of drones understand that they should be under the same degree of discipline and self-control as pilots. It is therefore important that it appears in the same place in primary legislation. I am grateful to the Minister for spelling out that there is implementing legislation as well as the initial transposed EU legislation, which may make that clearer—but, even so, it is important that people on the ground do not regard themselves as being in a different category from those in control of aircraft in the air. I do not therefore completely accept that the matter is already covered.

On the first amendment, I say in reply to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, that, clearly, we are talking about the legally required safety regulations. Again, I hope that the Minister’s assurance that this matter is already covered stands up and I would welcome that being spelled out in letters that I could share with my colleagues. We will see whether we need to come back on that.

On single operatives, I accept, as I said in opening, that technology may get us to a situation where, for certain specific purposes, there is a single controller of a number of machines. I think that that should be dealt with as an exception, however, so that if an inspection company for a pipeline or a navigation, or for land management purposes, wants to use a single controller for several drones that are all doing the same task, or different aspects of the same task, that should probably be dealt with under an exceptional licence.

The principle should be that there should be one pilot for one machine, which is what this would require. The Minister did not comment in great detail on that: no doubt she can have another look at it. I am pleased that there seems to be general support for the principle, even if some of it may already be indirectly on the statute book through European legislation. I am very grateful, of course, for the Government’s endorsement of retaining that European legislation, in this field at least. For the moment, however, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 33A withdrawn.