European Union Referendum Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Wallace of Saltaire
Main Page: Lord Wallace of Saltaire (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Wallace of Saltaire's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(9 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we have had a very interesting and constructive debate.
I will just comment on the “ever closer union” issue, having first studied how the European Union treaties were negotiated as a graduate student. Originally in the treaty it was,
“ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”,
because those who had come through the war, often spending the war in London while their states were occupied, wanted to go beyond the nation state. They left the nation states out because Belgium had failed under occupation, as had France, Germany and Italy. The reinsertion of “states” into “ever closer union” was a later recognition that actually you needed to retain the nation state. It was a shift back, away from the original emotional, enthusiastic, idealistic federalism of those who came through the resistance and the war to a recognition that legitimacy depends on states as well and that there are limits as to how far one can go beyond the state. So while we are looking at the history of the evolution of all of this, that is part of this very wonderful phrase “ever closer union”, which means so many different things to so many different people. That is why it is an ideal phrase; we can interpret it in so many different ways and perhaps we should not get quite so hung up on it.
I am most grateful to the noble Lord. It is a very interesting theory about this development of the “ever closer union”. Why did the original draft of the Maastricht treaty, before it was amended at the request of John Major, talk about “towards a federal union”?
It is not a theory; I am actually giving the noble Lord some history. I have great admiration for him and his wonderful interventions —he is the best Commons debater in the Lords, I have to say. There were those of the original generation who really did want to build a United States of Europe and they followed the American lead in this. After the war, the Americans had wanted to press on Europe the idea that the Europeans should follow the American lead and build our own United States on their model, as the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, has hinted. All of us resisted American pressure because we did not want to go anywhere near that degree of integration.
Forgive me for interrupting, but I would also remind the noble Lord that the United States, in order to achieve a single currency, actually required a civil war to do it, which is scarcely a model that one wishes to follow.
I should remind the noble Lord that, when I have given talks in Washington and elsewhere on European integration, I have often said—sometimes years ago—that, if we ever achieved a United States of Europe, I had no doubt that the policy process would work almost as well as the policy process in Washington. I hope that the noble Lord understands the point.
We have teased out of this debate what issues we have to deal with in Committee and on Report. We are now agreed that there is to be a referendum; the question is now settled; and the date is beyond Parliament’s control, except when the negotiations have been agreed and the Government come back to us. Therefore, we are left with a number of manageable issues.
On the question of purdah, clearly, if we have a long campaign, the Government have to go on negotiating with their partners in the European Union, and Ministers will have to say some things. In that area we will need to explore what the correct outcome is.
On the franchise, on which a great deal has been said, it is quite clear that the current British franchise is a mess. It is a historical, imperial legacy which means that someone who was born in Rwanda or Mozambique and moved to London last year can vote on whether we stay in the European Union. When we are in London, we stay in Wandsworth, where you hear French spoken extensively in the streets, which has been the case for 20 to 30 years. However, French people who have been working and living in London for 20 or 30 years, paying taxes here, contributing in every sense to our economy, cannot vote. There are a whole set of issues there which we need to explore in detail. This is not an ordinary vote. As has been said during this debate and elsewhere, this is a vote about the future of this country, and therefore we need to look at the franchise for this exceptional vote in exceptional ways.
The noble Lord, Lord Norton, and other noble Lords raised the question of threshold, which clearly we will have to explore a little, although it is a very difficult issue. Whatever happens at the end of it, if we have a narrow majority, either with a low or a high turnout, it will not settle the issue. However, we all know that referendums do not settle the issue. Six months after the 1975 referendum, the Labour Party was still arguing against staying in the European Union, and look at what happened in Scotland, where the referendum did not settle the future of that country.
The issue of the provision of information is extremely important and very difficult, and again we need to spend some time on it. We have to ask for a White Paper; certainly we need to look at the implications of leaving and, if possible, the prospect of staying. However, I bear hard scars from the problems of having to try to create dispassionate evidence on Britain’s relations with Europe. I spent two years in government negotiating 32 reports on the balance of competences between Britain and the European Union. Some 2,500 pieces of evidence came in; the Conservatives put that in the coalition agreement because they were convinced that this would provide the evidential basis for knowing what sort of powers we would want to repatriate from Brussels back to Britain. The overwhelming evidence submitted to the balance of competences review—from business, universities, financial and legal services—was that they think the current balance of competences is pretty good, thank you. The evidence submitted by easyJet began: easyJet would not exist if it were not for the single market in the European Union.
How did the press and No. 10 react to this? They did their best to bury the balance of competences reports in full. They were usually published at the beginning of the Christmas or the July Recess, just to make sure that the press were looking somewhere else instead. That is part of the problem in trying to get dispassionate evidence into our debate: myths float by us, undisturbed by reality.
I saw in a Church of England blog, which the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London referred to yesterday, that a lay member of the synod of Canterbury said that one of the reasons why the BBC is so biased in favour of Europe is because it receives so much significant funding from the European Union. I look at that with amazement. That is clearly going round in some circles as part of this wonderful phantasmagoria of the EU as a monster, reaching across the Channel to seduce honest Englishmen, strangle our free institutions and reduce us to serfdom under German—and perhaps also French—domination. Therefore, we will struggle between evidence and myth as we go on through this debate.
I will remark on one of the myths, which I have heard several times in this debate: “We thought we were joining a Common Market, and no one ever told us that this was a political project”. Indeed, the Prime Minister himself, in his speech to the Conservative Party conference last week, said:
“When we joined the European Union we were told that it was about going into a common market, rather than the goal that some had for ‘ever closer union’”.
Last night, therefore, again I dug out Sir Alec Douglas -Home’s speech on 21 October 1971, on the first day of the Commons debate on the issue of principle of joining the European Economic Community. He said that,
“when Germany, France, Italy and the rest sit down to talk about their problems of security, and their attitude to world problems … it is vital that we should be in their councils. During the last year I have … been in the councils of the Ten, because they have anticipated the larger Community. Matters are talked about there which concern the defence of Europe and the defence of Britain. Matters are talked about—for example, the Middle East—which have the greatest implications for our country. It is essential that we should be in the councils when these questions are discussed, and that a decision should not be taken without us”.—[Official Report, Commons, 21/10/71; col. 922.]
I say that for all those who think that we would be better off as a sort of Switzerland with nuclear weapons, which I think is what—
The noble Lord intervenes on NATO. If you go to Washington now, you will discover that they think that NATO is a European organisation, and they argue very strongly that NATO and the European Union should work more closely together, because they see them as parts of the same outfit. There is not a sharp difference between the EU and NATO, and the overwhelming majority of members of NATO are also members of the EU. It is not a contradiction. The two go together; they complement each other.
The argument has also been made throughout this debate that the EU has changed beyond all recognition since 1975. That is partly because of British initiatives and efforts: Margaret Thatcher’s initiative on the single market; national deregulation and European reregulation, which of course meant different regulations as we negotiated some of them, but not an overall increase in regulation; and eastern enlargement, which Margaret Thatcher pushed for, with the unintended effect that of course when Poland came in, as she wanted it to, a large number of Poles decided that they wanted to move here, which was one of the interesting unintended consequences.
The world has also changed enormously since 1975. We are in a different global economy; the national companies that used to exist have become multinational; we have integrated production models in which every Airbus sold by the French has over 30% of British parts in it, and every car built in Britain and Germany has parts from other countries throughout Europe; and similarly, we have cross-border financial services, legal services and the like.
Britain has also changed. The noble Viscount, Lord Ridley, said, powerfully, “We want our independence back”. I would like to have back our regional economies. I spent much of my life in the north of England; in Yorkshire you used to have textile mills and building societies. He is from the north-east; we had ICI and Northern Rock. He will remember Northern Rock—it was quite a good building society in his time and did quite a lot for the regional economy. However, these things have all changed. Now Nissan keeps the north-eastern economy going, and I much regret that we no longer have regional banks. The bank that my father used to work for, Barclays, which used to do a lot of useful regional investment, has just chosen an American investment banker as its chief executive. That is rather different from the sort of national economy in which I grew up.
Therefore, we all have to adjust to a global world in which independence and sovereignty have gone. After all, sovereignty goes most easily with protection. Free trade requires international co-operation. Globalisation means global regulation, or regulation by the world’s leading economy, which so far, of course, has been the United States. If we wish to co-operate with others in managing a global economy, we should surely start by co-operating most closely with our neighbours, and if we cannot do that, we should not hold to the illusion that we would find the Chinese, the Russians, the Saudis and the Indians easier partners than the French or the Germans.