Great British Energy Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 22nd January 2025 Grand Committee

This brings us back to the argument that I was making earlier in Committee about the use, for instance, of oil-seed rape to produce aviation fuel, where CO₂ is involved all the way along. There is growing concern about the Drax power station, which sits there belching out smoke all the time, polluting the atmosphere and producing CO2 emissions—all in the name of renewable energy. We have to think seriously about this in the future, because it makes no sense to talk about renewables when, at the same time, we are polluting the atmosphere and producing the CO₂ emissions that we are trying to control.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I wish briefly to comment on and support the intent of Amendments 122, 123 and 124 tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Russell. At the risk of sounding like a stuck record, the basic problem with the Bill is that it includes absolutely nothing about what GBE will actually do. Yes, there are the objects in Clause 3 but, as we debated at some length previously, they set out only what GBE is allowed to do, not what it is intended to do.

What it is intended to do—its objectives, if you like —will be set out in the statement of strategic priorities in Clause 5. We have not seen those and it would appear that we will not see them for a while—certainly not before the Bill passes. As the Constitution Committee pointed out, that key document will not be subject to any parliamentary scrutiny—in fact, the Constitution Committee referred to it as “disguised legislation”—nor is there anything in the Bill to prevent GBE starting its activities before that statement has been published.

As I say, we have had several debates on this, so I will try not to repeat myself. There are a number of ways to do this: the new amendments in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Russell, may or may not be the right way and we have had other amendments previously. However we do it, it is critical that at least some substantive level of parliamentary scrutiny should be available on how GBE intends to spend its £8.3 billion before it starts to spend significant amounts of money.

[Lord Offord of Garvel (Con)]

I thank the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for moving his amendment and all noble Lords who made contributions or comments. Perhaps I may take them thematically, starting with the importance of oversight. As regards the amendments in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Russell, we on these Benches are in favour of the sentiment of Amendments 122 to 124.

As mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, the strategic priorities for GB Energy are not included in the Bill. Indeed, we have not had sight of those most important principles; we simply do not have any concrete examples of what GB Energy as a company will be trying to achieve. I must therefore ask the Minister: how can we support the Government if we do not even know what the proposed investment vehicle will put taxpayers’ money into? This House and the other place must have sight of the strategic priorities of GB Energy so that we can assess its goals, what it intends to achieve, how these goals will be achieved, in what order they will be prioritised, and how much money will be spent on those goals and priorities.

I turn to Amendment 125 in my name, which ensures that the Bill cannot come into force until a financial framework document has been laid before Parliament. Much like the noble Earl, Lord Russell, I am deeply concerned that we have not yet had sight of this most important information. I do not feel it is possible to move forward with the Bill, or GB Energy itself, until we have understood its financial structure. I therefore strongly urge the Government to produce a financial framework for GB Energy and let us examine it.

Amendment 126, in the names of my noble friends Lord Hamilton of Epsom and Lord Trenchard, requires the Secretary of State to publish an assessment of the impact GB Energy will have on the number of jobs in Aberdeen. The Government are already putting at risk 200,000 jobs in the North Sea oil and gas sector in the UK but, of course, this will hit the city of Aberdeen particularly hard, as it is the centre of the UK domestic oil and gas industry. None of us would object to the Government looking to bring a more diverse range of sovereign energy sources online, but we should not be sacrificing hundreds of thousands of jobs or people’s livelihoods in the process.

The transition to green energy, if it is managed correctly and done in an orderly fashion—not on an artificially accelerated basis—has the opportunity to provide a swathe of new well-paid jobs. We must therefore hold the Government to their word that GB Energy will create 650,000 jobs, which is a big number and target. It is for this reason that the Secretary of State must publish an assessment of the impact GB Energy will have on the number of jobs in Aberdeen. That will show noble Lords whether the Government are keeping their word, whether these jobs are created and will be of benefit to Aberdeen, and whether we have indeed seen the transition talked about.

Finally, I turn to Amendment 127 in the names of my noble friends Lord Hamilton of Epsom and Lord Trenchard. That amendment will ensure that the Bill cannot come into force until the Secretary of State has published a report on the cost and viability of the Government’s net-zero targets. We should transition away from the use of fossil fuels and reduce the volume of greenhouse gases we emit into the atmosphere, but it must be done in an economical and sustainable manner. I hope that the Minister has listened carefully to these concerns.

Great British Energy Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 15th January 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who spoke in this debate, both today and in our deliberations on Monday. It seems quite a long time ago since then, and I am looking forward to a very constructive engagement today and welcome the contributions that all noble Lords are going to make.

Let me say at once that I very much understand the importance of information being provided in order to judge the performance of GBE and of it being held to effective account. There is no disagreement at all between me and other noble Lords on this. Noble Lords will know, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, explained very clearly in her remarks on Monday, that her Amendment 88 requires GBE to file its annual reports and accounts within six months from the end of its accounting reference period. As she said then, and as noble Lords have repeated, this aligns with the Companies Act 2006 for public companies whose shares are publicly traded. Of course I agree that a six-month filing period is appropriate for public companies. Financial markets need up-to-date and timely information on the performance of a company, as do its range of stakeholders and shareholders, to help them make informed decisions when companies are seeking to raise capital.

I also understand why noble Lords wish this discipline to be applied to GBE, but it is a private limited company owned wholly by the Crown. It is not unreasonable for the Government to say that, on that basis, we should be in line with the Companies Acts requirements, which set a nine-month filing period for private limited companies. I should also say that this is an arrangement applied to most government-owned companies: for example, the National Wealth Fund, the National Energy System Operator and the Low Carbon Contracts Company. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, was concerned about the filing deadline, but it is also the case that the vast majority of these organisations, government-owned companies, file their accounts well in advance of the statutory requirement.

I understand the point that the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, made about public interest in Great British Energy, and I welcome that. Indeed, I want GBE to be well-known and seen as spearheading the drive we wish to see in relation to Clause 3 and the statement of priorities in Clause 5. We wish GBE to be as successful as possible.

My point is that, in a sense, what is in statute in relation to the Companies Act is a minimum requirement because, as GBE is owned by the Secretary of State, it will be subject to the usual mechanisms that apply in the public sector. They are put in place to ensure that the public interest is discharged and proper public accountabilities are in place.

On Monday, the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, made an interesting point: one of the concerns some people have is that, because of GBE’s structure and because it is publicly accountable, it will be subject to a considerable number of the controls put in place for bodies that fall within public accountability. The key question is: can we ensure that GBE has sufficient operational independence to perform effectively in its work? There are a number of issues here around the way it will work in future.

I should also say that the annual report and accounts are not the only means of scrutinising the funding allocated to GBE. All funding to GBE must be voted on by Parliament; because of that, it will be scrutinised through the supply and appropriations debates in the other place.

Amendment 89 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, proposes specific topics to be included in the annual reports and accounts of Great British Energy, as well as the granting of an additional power to His Majesty’s Treasury to require further information. I can confirm that much of the proposed content will already be included and publicly available in the annual report and accounts, as required by Clause 7, and will be laid before Parliament. As an example, the financial assistance details under new paragraph (a), proposed by this amendment, will be included in the accounts of GBE. Details are likely to include issued share capital and items on the balance sheet of the company, such as borrowing from government if that method has been utilised.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and my noble friend Lady Young of Old Scone were concerned that Great British Energy would need only to follow the provisions of the Companies Act in preparing its annual report and accounts. However, I can assure them that that is not the case. GBE will adhere to the additional reporting requirements for government-owned companies over and above the reporting requirements under the Companies Act. These include the obligation to follow the Treasury’s directions on accounts through the powers extended in the Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000, laid out in the government financial reporting manual and related “Dear Accounting Officer” letters. The most recent of these account direction letters requires bodies to give a true and fair view of the state of affairs, including net resource outturn, the application of resources, changes in taxpayers’ equity and cash flows for the financial year.

Furthermore, GBE will be required to report on its governance around exposure to and risk of climate-related scenarios in its operations, as set out by the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures. Finally, any future funding of GBE will be subject to agreement through a government spending review, or another mechanism, as the Government see fit.

Amendment 92 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, proposes to require the Comptroller and Auditor-General to be the external auditor of Great British Energy; I think she said on Monday that it is a probing amendment. I am very happy to reassure noble Lords in this case. It is already the case that the Comptroller and Auditor-General will be the external auditor of Great British Energy. The company will also need to comply with the provisions set out in the Treasury’s Managing Public Money document, which requires the Comptroller and Auditor-General to be the external auditor for non-departmental public bodies such as Great British Energy. The requirement will also be set out in the framework document for Great British Energy, which we will debate shortly.

Amendment 90A, in the name of my noble friend Lady Young, seeks to require additional reporting from Great British Energy. Again, I assure her that much of the information that she seeks will be provided in GBE’s annual report and accounts, as a matter of course. The annual report and accounts will include key achievements and milestones, general business information relating to its strategic direction, a review of the company’s performance, challenges and future outlook, as well as financial statements and resourcing levels. It will also include reporting in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures.

GBE may also make more information available through reporting, such as when projects or investments are announced. We want to set this company up to be transparent and accountable, with a reporting regime appropriate to its company basis and status. The accountability of Ministers to Parliament for its performance will also be in place.

We very much take the point about the need for this organisation to be transparent and accountable. In the light of this debate, I will set out how this all comes together in detail and send a note to noble Lords. I hope that provides some greater reassurance.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I realise that Monday is quite a long time ago now and that the noble Lord has probably forgotten this, but I asked a specific question then. The impact assessment for the Bill says that, because the Bill does nothing but create the company, “no quantification of benefits” and costs

“has been provided at this stage”,

and that those benefits and costs

“will be subject to future spending reviews and business cases”.

I asked whether those future spending reviews and business cases would be made public.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

I am not sure that I can answer that point in detail. The impact assessment is built around the legislation, rather than the future activities of GBE. May I take that specific question away? Clearly, the funding that the Government provide Great British Energy will have to be in the public domain and part of the normal process of dealing with a spending review and the financial consequences and flows of money that follow it. I am happy to look into that in more detail, if the noble Lord would like.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

That would be very kind. The issue is that, if the Bill had been done in the normal way and included the detail of what GBE was going to do, the impact assessment would have covered those activities. However, those things are not included in the Bill so are not covered by the impact assessment. When the statement of strategic priorities and the detail of what the company will do are published, there will be no impact assessment on them, other than the spending reviews and business cases. It is important that they are made public, as if they had been part of the impact assessment that would have happened if this had been done in the usual way.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, as I said, I think we have acted properly with the impact assessment, which is based on the Bill. GBE has yet to commence its work. I have said that I will write to noble Lords detailing how we see GBE being held to account, in terms of its reporting and accountability, and I will add some more information about how that relates to the statement of strategic priorities in Clause 5.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, regrets that she is not able to be here today, because this was scheduled after she already had other commitments, so, with the leave of the Committee, I will channel the noble Baroness to wrap up. I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this constructive debate and the Minister for his constructive response.

Common themes are emerging throughout our discussions on the Bill, and the subject of transparency and accountability is probably the major one. I know that the noble Baroness will be disappointed by the response to shortening the reporting deadline to six months, which does not seem overly onerous. I was encouraged, I think, by what the Minister said about the reporting requirements and I look forward to receiving the letter he has spoken about. However, he did not refer in his answer to a couple of things that were in the amendment and are really important.

First, it is important that GBE reports on the investments it has made, and I do not think he mentioned that. Secondly, as a number of noble Lords mentioned, the key issue is that of additionality—in other words, what impact GBE is having on crowding-in private investment alongside the public investment. As I said on Monday, anyone can spend money. If this is to be in any way positive, it needs to attract private investment that would not otherwise have happened. It is really important that that is measured in the same way as it has to be by the National Wealth Fund. I think it is true to say that the National Wealth Fund, because it has the obligation to report on additionality, is actually performing rather well on additionality.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, I think I said by implication that I consider those matters that I would expect the company to report on.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I am reassured to hear that and I look forward to receiving the letter. We may need to come back to this, and I hope the noble Lord will be willing to sit down, discuss the overall questions around accountability and transparency and, I hope, put something forward himself that will strengthen what is, if I am honest, a somewhat thin Bill. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 88 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

93: After Clause 7, insert the following new Clause—
“Framework document(1) The Secretary of State must prepare a framework document which sets out the principles underpinning the relationship between the Secretary of State, Great British Energy and any other relevant public sector bodies.(2) The framework document must cover the operating and financial principles through which Great British Energy will pursue its strategic objectives and may include such other matters as the Secretary of State determines.(3) Relevant public sector bodies are public sector bodies and government departments which the Secretary of State considers will or may have a relationship with Great British Energy.(4) The Secretary of State may amend the framework document at any time.(5) The Secretary of State must consult Great British Energy before preparing or amending the framework document.(6) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the framework document or any amended framework document before Parliament as soon as practical after it is finalised.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to prepare and publish a document setting out the operating and financial principles which Great British Energy will use.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, with the leave of the Committee I shall move Amendment 93 at the request of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, who, as I say, is unable to attend today. I will speak also to Amendment 121A, also in her name.

Amendment 93 says:

“The Secretary of State must prepare a framework document”


to cover

“the relationship between the Secretary of State, Great British Energy and any other relevant public sector bodies … The framework document must cover the operating and financial principles”,

at least, to be adopted by Great British Energy. Once finalised, the framework document must be laid before Parliament.

Amendment 121A goes a little further and would defer commencement of the Act until the framework document has been laid before Parliament. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and I have several times contrasted the parliamentary passage of the UK Infrastructure Bank Bill with that of this Bill. In particular, she has raised the absence of a draft framework document for Great British Energy. All we know in relation to GBE is that the founding statement published for it last July said that a framework document would be established in due course. The Minister has not yet given any indication of the timing for that framework document.

I would not normally expect a Bill establishing a public sector body to contain a requirement for a framework document. That is because it is a document routinely put in place between the Government and public bodies, and there should be no question of a body commencing operation until all the details are in place. Hence, when we scrutinised the UK Infrastructure Bank Bill, an advanced draft was made available to those of us taking part in the Bill, which was extremely helpful in our debates. We knew the detail of what the Government were planning, and how they were intending to deliver it, which is missing from this Bill.

Although framework documents have no legal force, they set out in some detail what the Government expect of the new body. Sometimes they cover detail that could have been included in primary legislation, but usually the detail is of a nature likely to change over time and, hence, is inappropriate for statute. The important point, however, is that considerable thought and work are put into the contents of that document.

As we have discussed, it is clear that with GBE, the Government have not yet put in all the hard work on how it is to operate in practice, and what rules and restrictions will be necessary. The Minister has confirmed that this is under way and explained the thinness of the Bill on the basis that the Government had to get on with legislating, and that details would follow. That is not a sound basis for legislating, and failure to provide fuller details on things such as the framework document or strategic priorities treats the process of legislative scrutiny in a somewhat disrespectful manner. We have already discussed the concerns raised in that respect by the Constitution Committee.

I will quickly run through the key contents of the framework document for what is now the National Wealth Fund—what was the UK Infrastructure Bank—which will illustrate the things that we should have expected to see advanced drafts of by now. It sets out the strategic objectives for the National Wealth Fund. These might, or might not, be the same as required by Clause 5 of this Bill. We have seen no draft or even an outline of the strategic priorities that the Secretary of State will set under Clause 5, so we do not know whether to expect strategic objectives in the framework document. Objectives and priorities ought to be different things, but we are completely in the dark at the moment.

There are a number of operating principles, which are extremely important. They include the requirement to make a positive financial return over time, and a double bottom line—a phrase used frequently during passage of the UK Infrastructure Bank Bill, another complicated Bill—of achieving both the strategic objectives and financial return. We ought to know the financial objectives of GBE by now, especially in view of the open-ended financial assistance power in Clause 4, which might mean that GBE will not be required to make a financial return.

Another operating principle is that of additionality, by prioritising investments where there is an undersupply of private sector finance. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, asked whether additionality applied to GBE at Second Reading but did not receive a suitable answer, and I have raised this principle a number of times, including in the previous group. It would be helpful if the Minister spoke a little about the expectations for additionality for GBE. It is another fundamental question that Parliament ought to be informed about before allowing this Bill to become law.

Another section of the framework document sets out investment principles. It describes the kinds of investment that are to be undertaken and those which are not allowed. Not only must individual investments support its core objectives, they must also be intended to deliver a positive financial return, and to crowd in significant private capital. We have no idea what the guiding principles for investments made by GBE are. There is also a lot in the framework document on governance and other matters.

The key questions are whether we will see a framework document and when. I would not go as far as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in Amendment 121A, which would delay commencement, but it is essential that we see a framework document as early as possible. Given the lack of detail in the Bill, it is important that the company should have to do that. I beg to move.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to follow the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, in speaking to Amendment 93, which he moved on behalf on my noble friend Lady Noakes. I have also added my name to this amendment.

As has been said several times in our debates, this is in essence a framework or enabling Bill but one that gives a large number of Henry VIII powers to the Secretary of State. A requirement to produce a framework document setting out the operating and financial principles that GBE will use would be a significant improvement to the Bill, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, explained so eloquently. It is essential that the principles underpinning the relationship between the Secretary of State and GBE should be publicly understood and supported. The arguments that I have previously used in relation to my Amendment 86A also apply here; other relevant public bodies, as mentioned in that amendment, clearly include GBN, NWF, NESO, Ofgem and Mission Control.

I also support my noble friend Lady Noakes in her Amendment 121A, which I think is justified in the circumstances, but I would certainly like to hear the Minister’s view on it. Amendment 121A would ensure that the framework document is laid before Parliament before the Act comes into force.

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The framework document is therefore focused on the corporate governance of the public body to ensure it aligns with the best practice set out in Managing Public Money and is clear on its expectations to be fully accountable to the department. This is a commitment from the Dispatch Box by the Minister who is taking the Bill through that there will be a framework document and it will cover the areas that I have mentioned. I cannot give an exact timing; it is simply not possible. We do not yet know. We do not know how long it is going to take. Clearly, we want it to be done as quickly as possible, but it needs to be done thoroughly and it will take a matter of months. I am afraid that that is as far as I can go on that.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

In effect, under the Bill GB Energy will take a chunk of the activity of the National Wealth Fund—approximately a third of the total value, in fact—and put it into another entity. As I said, the National Wealth Fund’s framework document includes quite a lot of information around requirements to make financial returns and, in particular, the additionality principle. Therefore, because we are, in effect, moving a chunk of the National Wealth Fund’s activities into a different entity, it would presumably be appropriate that that remains subject to fairly similar levels of governance and control. Could the Minister perhaps say a little about the expectation on financial returns and additionality, which he has not mentioned in his response so far?

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, by implication, we would expect the organisation to be as transparent as possible and to cover the sort of areas that the noble Lord mentioned. It is also fair to say that, given the comparisons being drawn between Great British Energy and the UK Infrastructure Bank, in the case of the UKIB, the framework document was published before Royal Assent. The point is that the organisation was operational before Royal Assent, but this Bill is being brought to Parliament before we have operationalised the company, so there is a distinction. As I said, noble Lords can be reassured that there will be a stringent framework document to ensure proper accountability. I am searching to find something else to say to give comfort, but I have to say that this is as far as we can go. Having said this from the Dispatch Box, it has to happen.

Returning to the part of the amendment that would require the relationship between GB Energy and other relevant public bodies to be included in the framework agreement, noble Lords will know that that is not typically part of a framework document, but GB Energy’s relationship with relevant public sector bodies will of course be part of delivering its objectives. Again, the partnerships will be undertaken in accordance with GB Energy’s operating principles and, where appropriate, we will provide definition to those relationships in the upcoming statement of strategic priorities. As part of its annual reports and accounts, we will of course expect GB Energy to report on activities undertaken as part of its public sector partnerships. We expect it to enter into a number of partnerships or relationships with other public bodies, but that is not appropriate for the framework document.

The other point to make here is that GBE will be accountable to Parliament, with a statement of strategic priorities laid before Parliament, and the accounting officer of Great British Energy, and Ministers, will be accountable to Parliament for the work and performance of the company. Members of your Lordships’ House will be able to ask questions and debate, and I have no doubt that Select Committees will wish to examine the chair and chief executive of the organisation from time to time, which seems wholly appropriate and will provide the public accountability that needs to go alongside the normal accountability that a private company would expect to operate, within the legislation that it will be covered by. We need to remember that it is also publicly accountable alongside the accountability that it needs to discharge as a private company.

The issue I come back to is that we have to ensure that it has enough operational independence. A push-back from noble Lords might be to ask: will it be overly constrained? We have to get the balance right between proper accountability and reporting and—dare I say it —what I hope will be an entrepreneurial approach to the formidable task it is being given. That is why the appointment of the incoming chair has been so important —to give us that expertise and experience.

As noble Lords will see, it is very difficult for us to agree to Amendment 121A, which would defer commencement of most of the provisions in the Bill until a framework document had been laid before Parliament. We do not think it possible to produce a framework document without the active involvement of the company itself. That is probably as far as I can go on this interesting area, but I can assure noble Lords that there will be a fully fledged framework document, which I think will cover all the issues that noble Lords are concerned about.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate, and the Minister for his response, which is helpful and encouraging—I understand his point. However, I think he put his finger on the fundamental problem with the Bill, which is precisely what he said: the company is being established before we really know what it is going to do and before it starts to operate. Therefore, there is no scrutiny of those things at the moment. When he says that there is accountability through, for example, the statement of strategic priorities, it is not strictly true. It gets laid before Parliament, but there is no debate, approval or anything. The framework document will not even be laid before Parliament.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, of course, that is a fair point but, equally, I would say, as a Minister accountable to Parliament, that the opportunity for noble Lords to ask questions and take part in debates is considerable. I would expect that GBE and any statement of priorities will be fully part of the rough and tumble of life in Parliament. Anyone who has been involved in a company organisation such as that will know that parliamentary accountability really does bite and is effective.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

The Minister is right on that—I cannot disagree—except, again, that accountability is only as good as the information on which one bases it. If there is no information, or if it is really thin, it is hard—

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, I do not want to intervene constantly, but I think noble Lords will be awash with information about GBE, its performance and activities.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I am very encouraged to hear that but there is nothing in the Bill that says that. If one is honest, what tends to happen is that if something is really successful, we will be awash with information telling us how successful it has been. If it is less than successful, I wonder how much information we will see. Fair enough, but there is a wider discussion to be had between now and Report on transparency and accountability, and I hope the Minister will be open to that. With that, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 93.

Amendment 93 withdrawn.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 103, and thank the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Dillington and the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, for their support. As we have heard, once again we are returning to transparency and accountability.

Amendment 103 is similar to Amendment 94, which has just been introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Offord, but with some important differences. As we have discussed before, and as the noble Lord, Lord Offord, has just mentioned, most of this Bill has been copied across from the UK Infrastructure Bank Act, but with most of the transparency and accountability provisions removed. In particular, Section 9 of that Act, which provides for independent reviews of the effectiveness and impact of the bank—now the National Wealth Fund—has been omitted.

The Minister has previously explained that the reason for this omission was that no such reviews were included in the Energy Act in respect of Great British Nuclear, and he feels that this is the precedent which should apply here. That argument holds no water at all. Great British Nuclear is a completely different entity, with completely different activities. It has a clearly defined and specific role initially to administer the process to select which small modular reactor technology the UK will choose. It has a relatively small budget—I think it was £157 million initially—and it is not intended to invest directly in those technologies. Great British Nuclear has an important role, but it is very different to what is apparently planned for GBE.

GBE will, in effect, take over a substantial and important area of the National Wealth Fund’s activity, investing directly in projects and businesses. It has an initial budget of £8.3 billion, which is nearly a third of the National Wealth Fund’s budget. It is worth reminding noble Lords that there is no limit in the Bill on how much public money GBE can spend. Indeed, the activities of GBE and the National Wealth Fund are so close that, initially, the National Wealth Fund will carry out the activities of GBE on its behalf, so let us drop this pretence that GBE is like Great British Nuclear; it is not. GBE is taking over a part of the National Wealth Fund’s activities and has a substantial budget. A body with the ability to spend billions of pounds of public money should be subject to rigorous transparency and accountability, and not just to the Treasury and the Secretary of State. It must, therefore, be appropriate for GBE to have to follow at least equivalent accountability disciplines to the National Wealth Fund. It is doing very similar things.

Amendment 103 is an almost direct copy of the independent review process that the National Wealth Fund is subject to. That arose from lengthy debate during the passage of the UK Infrastructure Bank Act and was supported by the Minister’s party at the time. It is not clear why, in government, they have decided to omit it from the Bill. Accountability seems to be a good thing, so long as it does not apply to them.

For GBE, I have changed the provision slightly from how it is in the UK Infrastructure Bank Act, in two ways. I have limited the scope to reporting only on how GBE has met its objectives and how well it has encouraged private sector investment alongside its activities. This latter point—additionality—is critical, as I have mentioned before. I do not have time to get into the details of crowding-in and crowding-out theory, but if all that GBE does is invest in projects which could easily have been financed by the private sector, that would be a complete waste of taxpayers’ money. Indeed, it would be actively damaging, as it would undermine the emergence and growth of a thriving industry providing the finance for our move to net zero.

We had lengthy discussions around the additionality principle during the passage of the UK Infrastructure Bank Act. I asked the Minister to comment on it in a previous group. He has still not commented in any detail, but it is critical. I would like to hear from the Minister what the expectations of GBE are in that respect. The Government have stressed the importance of it, and I have referred previously to the £1 of public money capitalising £3 of private investment that has been claimed. Crowding in is fundamental to its success, so it should be part of the measurement and review of GBE’s performance.

The second tweak I have made to the section from the UK Infrastructure Bank Act is on timing. The 2023 Act requires that the first independent report should be after seven years and then every five years. Infrastructure is by nature long-term, so those timeframes made sense in that context. However, GBE is intending to have decarbonised the power sector by 2030, in just five years’ time, so we should logically be reviewing progress before then. I have suggested reporting every three years; that is probably the major difference between my Amendment 103 and Amendment 94 of the noble Lord Offord, which proposes an independent report every year. I think an annual independent review is probably unduly onerous, but we need an independent progress review before the end of the target period of 2030, so I hope that three years is an acceptable compromise. However we do it, as currently drafted, the Bill falls woefully short on transparency and accountability.

I hope that the Government look seriously at having an independent review of effectiveness. It was hard-wired into the UK Infrastructure Bank Act for good reason: routine annual reports and accounts are simply not a good vehicle for a deep dive into the effectiveness of what are often quite complex investments and other financial activities. A separate, independent review was a good idea for what is now the National Wealth Fund, and I cannot see how a valid distinction can be made between the two organisations. The Government should want to ensure that they both operate equally effectively. Again, I would be very happy to discuss this further with the Minister and I hope that he is receptive to strengthening these aspects of the Bill, just as he and his party, when sitting on the other side of the Chamber, were on other Bills including the UK Infrastructure Bank Bill.

I say in passing that I support Amendment 102 of the noble Earl, Lord Russell, which requires a biennial report on GBE’s relationship with other public sector bodies. We have talked about this previously and it is another example of the opacity that currently surrounds GBE. In particular, I have no idea what its relationship with the Crown Estate means in practice, as well as that with Great British Nuclear and the UK Infrastructure Bank. It would be very desirable to have reports on how those relationships would work.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Offord’s Amendment 94, to which I have added my name. I have also added my name to Amendment 103 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Cameron, and my noble friend Lady Noakes.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, made the same point that I tried to make on Monday much more eloquently than I did: GBE and GBN are not comparable institutions. Unfortunately, it seems that the Minister’s department does not recognise that. I refer to the Explanatory Notes at page 6, paragraph 22. The power to give directions in the hands of the Secretary of State

“is consistent with the power that the Government has to direct comparable institutions, for example: the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero has a statutory power to direct Great British Nuclear, although, to date, this has never been used”.

I repeat the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that, despite what this says, I cannot think that they are comparable institutions.

Both Amendments 94 and 103 require an independent person to carry out a review of GBE’s effectiveness. Of the two, I prefer Amendment 103, which requires the independent person to review the extent to which investments by GBE have encouraged private sector investment in those projects. Amendment 94 requires an annual independent review, whereas Amendment 103 requires such a review only once every three years. Perhaps we could compromise at two years.

I have also added my name to Amendment 102, in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Russell. This requires GBE to report on its relationships with other connected bodies and is, to some extent, similar to some of the other amendments we have debated. It is obviously a requirement of working together on strategic objectives and directions that GBE should maintain excellent relationships with its stakeholders. One of the ways to achieve that would be by adopting the noble Earl’s amendment, and I look forward to hearing him speak to it and to hearing the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Earl. This was lifted directly, almost word for word, from the relevant legislation, the UK Infrastructure Bank Act.

[Earl Russell (LD)]

I thank the noble Lord. I would be keen to hear what the Minister has to say in response to that amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Frost on his two amendments in this group, which deal with the governance of GBE. There is, as has been said in previous debates, almost nothing in the Bill about the corporate structure of GBE or how it will be managed. I welcome my noble friend’s proposals to require that the chair should be full time and be required to attend the office in Aberdeen, from which it follows that he must be based there. That would also ensure that the person will be fully committed and be a real check on the powers of the chief executive, who may need oversight in interpreting the priorities and actions needed in response to directions received from the Secretary of State. My noble friend’s proposal that the board must comprise at least five and no more than eight directors makes perfect sense and provides for the assembly of a group of people with the appropriate skills and experience.

I have also considered and support Amendment 101 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Russell, which requires scrutiny of any proposed appointments by the Energy Security and Net Zero Committee of another place. That committee should ensure that an appropriate balance of skills and experience among the directors is maintained at all times.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I was not going to speak on this, but I just point out very quickly that the other Act that has a clause that is not quite the same but similar to Amendment 99 is the UK Infrastructure Bank Act. As I have already pointed out, that is the really analogous organisation to Great British Energy, so it must be appropriate, I think.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Frost, for initiating the debate on his Amendment 98, where he proposes to place a number of requirements on the role of the chair of the board of Great British Energy. I agree that the chair, the board and the chief executive officer have major responsibilities. I must say to him though that I do not recognise GBE as being an executive arm of my department. It is very interesting that he said that, because the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, made the interesting remark on Monday that there is a risk in having too many controls and reporting arrangements in relation to GBE, detracting from what we need it to do. We do want it to have operational independence, albeit working within the context of Clauses 3 and 5 of the Bill, the requirements under the Companies Act and the accountability arrangements I have already referred to. We need very highly skilled people at the top of GBE to find their way through this in order to ensure that it actually delivers on the things we want it to deliver on.

At the risk of inviting the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, to intervene, I take his point about winners and Governments: this is the whole point of having an organisation that is not part of government—but, of course, it is owned by government—and being able to really get on with the job that needs to be done.

I will address pre-appointment scrutiny of the chair in relation to Amendment 101 soon. Amendment 98 requires the chair to be a full-time position based at the headquarters of Great British Energy in Aberdeen. I must say that it would be highly unusual to specify that a company’s non-executive chair should be full time or based formally at an organisation’s headquarters. Looking at the Grand Committee, almost all noble Lords here have taken roles as chairs or non-executive directors of organisations that can be based very far from where they are resident. Frankly, if we were to adopt this principle, we might inhibit the appointment of high-calibre people, notwithstanding that Aberdeen is a very fine place to live and work, as I know from the experience of having a family member working in the offshore oil and gas industry from there.

I do not think that a full-time chair is appropriate; I think it is perfectly appropriate to have a part-time, non-executive chair in that role, as the noble Lord, Lord Frost, has already remarked. Having an interim chair does not preclude having a very lively presence—and a jolly good thing too. I do not think we should insist that that should be a full-time role.

My main board experience is in the public sector, in the National Health Service, and I have been around in the NHS for long enough to know the problem of chairs who come in on a daily basis and inhibit the proper role of the chief executive. I would be wary of encouraging that development in GBE; I am sure that it will not happen.

Again, in relation to the annual review of the chair’s performance by external auditors, which is to be laid before Parliament, first, we will of course ensure that there are annual performance reviews for Great British Energy’s chair. This aligns with best practice followed by other public bodies, and my department is well used to doing this in relation to a number of the bodies it oversees. The review will typically be performed by a senior official in the sponsoring department, supported by the senior independent director on the board, who will have deep insight into the chair’s performance over the year.

Of course, there will also be regular meetings between the responsible Minister and GBE, as there is in my department between Ministers and other organisations, as would be expected. In a sense, these are also part of the accountability mechanism. However, I acknowledge the expectation of the noble Lord, Lord Frost, that Parliament will have a strong interest in the chair’s performance. I fully anticipate that the relevant Select Committees will call on them on a regular basis to provide evidence and, of course, I fully expect the chair of GBE to accept those committee’s invitations.

Amendment 99, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Frost, would place certain requirements on the composition of Great British Energy’s board. As noble Lords have said, it largely replicates provisions in the UK Infrastructure Bank Act. We made clear in our founding statement that GBE will be an operationally independent company, overseen by an independent board. We do not think that it is necessary to legislate these provisions, since established governance documents, such as the UK Corporate Governance Code and the Governance Code on Public Appointments, already apply.

The UK Corporate Governance Code, published by the Financial Reporting Council, sets out best practice in relation to corporate governance. Although it applies formally to listed companies only, it is standard practice for government companies to comply with it or, where they do not, explain why. The Governance Code on Public Appointments provides clear guidance for ministerial appointments, which are regulated by the Commissioner for Public Appointments and should be followed even where roles are not formally within the scope of the commissioner. I can give an assurance from the Dispatch Box that Great British Energy will comply with these codes, ensuring best practice in corporate governance.

GBE will also be required to follow corporate governance best practice to help guide the composition of its board. This will have an impact on the number of directors required at each stage of GBE’s development and operation. We think that, having given those assurances, there needs to be a degree of flexibility at this stage about how GBE goes forward in relation to the composition of its board. The noble Lord’s amendment would also place standard requirements on when an individual should cease to be a director. I can assure him that such provisions already exist, including in the Companies Act 2006, and that they will, as is common practice, be replicated in GBE’s articles of association.

Amendment 101 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Russell, proposes to require all appointments by GBE to be scrutinised by the Energy Security and Net Zero Committee in the other place before they come into effect. This is similar to new subsection (1), proposed by Amendment 98. Noble Lords will know that Cabinet Office guidance on pre-appointment scrutiny by House of Commons Select Committees provides clear guidance on the criteria and process to be used in these circumstances. It sets out that decisions on the scrutiny of individual posts should be made between the Secretary of State, the chair of the relevant committee and the Cabinet Office. It is not common practice for this to be set in primary legislation.

The guidance gives the criteria of the types of roles which may be in scope. Importantly, it sets out the principle that the posts which require pre-appointment scrutiny are, most typically, the chair or equivalent of the organisations. None of the roles identified in the guidance as requiring pre-appointment scrutiny are in government-owned companies of the kind that GBE will be. No public body currently appears to have its full board subject to pre-appointment scrutiny. Where individual roles are scrutinised, it is done following agreement between the Secretary of State and the committee chair.

From our point of view, the calibre of Great British Energy’s director appointments will be of great importance. We want GBE to succeed, so we want the highest calibre of people to be appointed as chair, to non-executive positions and to the chief executive officer role. We anticipate that recruitment for the substantive board will begin over the course of this year, and we will ensure that recruitment is undertaken in a manner which aligns with best practice. I can assure the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and the noble Lord, Lord Frost, that in line with Cabinet Office guidance, any relevant public appointments to Great British Energy will be discussed with the appropriate Select Committee chair. I hope that I have been reassuring regarding this.

Great British Energy Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 13th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, we now move to some more technical aspects of the Bill, compared to some of the really significant issues we have been debating in recent groups. I am sorry that the Minister dealt with these recent groups in such a perfunctory way. We did not get a response of substance at all to the very significant points that my noble friends have been making, and I think it is right that the Government think again about their attitude to whether or not they are prepared to accept proper legislative scrutiny in your Lordships’ House. I hope that we can move to a more constructive phase going forward.

I shall also speak to two other amendments this group. I have Amendment 92, to which the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, has added his name, and I have added my name to his Amendment 89.

Great British Energy will be a company formed under the Companies Act 2006, an Act imprinted in my memory. At the time, in 2006, it was the longest Act ever produced, and it took many months of my life. Under Section 442 of that Act, private companies are given nine months to file their accounts, while public companies have only six months. I am assuming that Great British Energy will be a private company, as there is no ability for its shares to be offered to the public; it will therefore have nine months to file its accounts, and my Amendment 88 changes that to six months, in line with public companies. GBE will be a substantial company, with upwards of £8 billion flowing through it, and it ought to be subject to the same degree of scrutiny that large public companies have.

Many public sector bodies manage to get their accounts out and laid before Parliament before the beginning of the Summer Recess, which gives them nearly four months, which should be plenty of time. Listed companies generally get their accounts out very much quicker, mainly because it makes no sense whatever to spend a long time in the new financial year looking backwards.

I would not normally have thought that an amendment like this would be necessary, but I was shocked to discover this autumn that the National Wealth Fund’s report and accounts for 2023-24 were not signed off until 21 November 2024. I was even more shocked to find that the previous year was only about four weeks better than that, with the report and accounts being signed off on 23 October 2023. I do not think we should tolerate such a laid-back approach to putting the only regular accountability document relating to Great British Energy into the public domain. If six months is good enough for plcs, it ought to be good enough for GBE and, indeed, any other public sector body.

The Government have been very unresponsive to calls in the various other amendments that we have been considering during this Committee for extra reporting going above and beyond what is included in the annual report and accounts. This underlines the need for a very timely approach to the one accountability document that the Government are prepared to concede will exist for Great British Energy—namely, its annual report and accounts.

My other amendment, Amendment 92, is more of a probing amendment. It would require the Comptroller and Auditor General to be appointed as Great British Energy’s auditor. Allowing the Comptroller and Auditor General to do company accounts was, incidentally, one of the minor achievements of the Companies Act 2006, reflecting the trend at the time for increasing use of limited liability companies to carry out public sector activities more extensively. I hope that the Minister will confirm that the Comptroller and Auditor General will be appointed as Great British Energy’s auditor. He is the auditor to the National Wealth Fund, and I cannot see that there could possibly be a case for not using him.

As I said earlier, I also support Amendment 89 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. I will not steal his thunder, but I highlight the importance of proposed new paragraph (d) of his amendment, which would require Great British Energy to report on the extent to which its investments have crowded private sector money in. There will be many other measures of success for Great British Energy, but this is a key one. The Government have been very quiet about exactly how Great British Energy will work with the private sector. It is essential that there will be good public reporting to shed light on this area as Great British Energy moves into its operational phase. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, once again we return to the issue of accountability and transparency. I hope the Minister is starting to hear the trend. In this group we are looking at the annual reporting requirements that apply to Great British Energy, and I hope at least that the Minister will agree this time that Clause 7 is the right place to talk about reporting.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Dillington, and the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, for their support on Amendment 89. First, however, I state my complete support for Amendments 88 and 92, tabled and just introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. We are talking about a company that is going to be spending £8.3 billion over the next five years, so it must be right that at least the discipline that applies to public companies should apply to GBE in terms of providing timely information and its audits.

The Minister said earlier that he thinks the Bill includes the appropriate levels of accountability and transparency. I find that quite hard to understand. As the Bill is currently drafted, the only reporting that GBE will be required to provide publicly—or to the Secretary of State—is the annual accounts and reports referred to in Clause 7, which need to comply only with Section 441 of the Companies Act 2006, as we have just heard.

The contents of such accounts are quite limited, and they do not have to include much information that will allow Parliament—or other parties—to scrutinise the performance of GBE against its objectives. Indeed, it is not impossible—depending on how the Government choose to finance GBE—that it might even be able to take advantage of small or medium-sized company exemptions to the information it must provide in its accounts, especially given the increase in the limits for those that are going to take effect this April.

The impact assessment that accompanies this Bill says:

“Future benefits will depend on GBE’s future activities and spending decisions which are not in scope of this impact assessment. Therefore, no quantification of benefits has been provided at this stage. All investment into and expenditure of GBE will be subject to future spending reviews and business cases, which will set out in detail the monetised and non-monetised impacts of GBEs activities”.


It says exactly the same in respect of the costs. My first question for the Minister is therefore simply whether, and in what form, those spending reviews and business cases that the impact assessment talks about will be published and reported on. I asked the same question at Second Reading, but I am afraid I did not receive a reply at that point.

In the absence of those spending reviews being published—which I suspect will be the case—and any reporting on actual performance against them, we need something more than the limited information that must be published in the accounts in accordance with Section 441 of the Companies Act. My Amendment 89 seeks modestly to expand those requirements for publishing information by which the success, or otherwise, of GBE can be measured.

Great British Energy Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 17th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, this is a very interesting set of amendments, and I am grateful to all noble Lords who tabled amendments and have spoken in this debate. Clearly, as we said before, the overarching aim for the statement of strategic priorities is to ensure that Great British Energy operates in line with, and delivers on, the priorities set out by the Government. That is proper for the Government to do.

It is clearly important that we have a means through which to influence the strategic plans of Great British Energy. Equally, we want Great British Energy to have as much operational independence as possible within the parameters of Clauses 3 and 5. Inevitably, that makes me cautious about a number of the amendments proposed during this debate, which one way or another seek either to constrain the powers of GBE or to direct where it ought to focus its priorities and energies.

Amendment 46 tabled by my noble friend Lady Young proposes an addition to Clause 5 to ensure that Great British Energy will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, improve energy efficiency, ensure security of supply and include community ownership. As she said, we debated some of those matters on our first day in Committee. I agree with her about the vagaries of groupings, which after 27 years of membership of your Lordships’ House remain an eternal mystery to me, as we are enabled to repeat many of the debates already held. Indeed, the noble Earl, Lord Russell, has promised to come back to the very issue of community energy when we meet again on some distant future date in mid-January.

The Bill clearly provides a statutory basis for facilitating and encouraging the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, improving energy efficiency and ensuring the security of supply of energy under the objects set out in Clause 3. Clearly the statement of strategic priorities must be consistent with these objects. I understand the point that the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, made about prices; there was an Oral Question today on the impact these are having on UK businesses. He will know that, as I said then, the highest price for energy was achieved under his Government’s watch.

The noble Lord, Lord Offord, also spoke on that topic, and talked about security of supply. I think he very much reinforced what the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, said when the latter raised the issue of the sun not shining and the wind not blowing, and the resulting reliance on gas. In our aim to move towards clean power by 2030 we envisage using renewables much more than currently. However, we also need nuclear as an essential baseload for our energy generation, and gas as the flexible energy generation which you can turn on and off. Currently gas is unabated, but with CCUS it will largely become abated. That is the way we see ourselves going forward, along with having long-term energy storage as set out in our clean power action plan.

On North Sea oil and gas—again, the noble Lord, Lord Offord, has raised this with me a number of times—I repeat that we are committed to a just transition, working with industry and the workers involved themselves to recognise the importance of the sector, which will operate for decades to come. We remain in close engagement with the industry on these matters. Like the noble Earl, Lord Russell, my essential response to these issues about energy price reductions and the need for long-term price stability is that reliance on international fossil fuels, and the markets that operate in the way they do, is simply not the way to solve them.

I turn to the specifics in Amendments 47 to 50 and 51A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Offord, my noble friend Lord Whitty, and the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, although he did not speak to them. These amendments would require the statement of strategic priorities to include targets relating to consumer bills, jobs and supply chains, and to include reference to community energy schemes.

On the general principle, we want Great British Energy to operate independently. The Bill is focused on making the minimum necessary provisions to support establishing the company—that is why the Bill is constructed in the way it is. Normally, Governments are accused of trying to micromanage the institutions they are responsible for, but here the Government are saying that GBE needs to have as much operational independence as it can within the constraints of Clauses 3 and 5. However, some noble Lords wish to constrain, in one way or another, what Great British Energy should do. We are resistant to that as a general matter of principle.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I am rather baffled by the Minister’s argument. The Government are going to publish a statement of strategic priorities, but if Great British Energy is going to be independent why does it need such a thing? Presumably the statement of strategic priorities will point the company in the right direction, but the implication of the Minister’s argument is that it is going to be incredibly thin. Is that correct?

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

I do not really know why the noble Lord is baffled by what I said. I thought I clearly said that we wish Great British Energy to have as much operational independence as possible, within the constraints of Clauses 3 and 5. At this stage, I cannot tell him what will be in the statement of strategic priorities, because it is being worked on, but it will have sufficient detail to make absolutely clear the Government’s priorities within the constraints I have suggested, while allowing Great British Energy the breadth and room to move in the way it thinks best.

On the issue of jobs, which my noble friend Lord Whitty was absolutely right to raise, all the organisations he mentioned have a role to play to ensure not just that we create the required jobs but that we can fill them. The issue is not so much lacking jobs for the future but enabling enough people to come forward to be given the right training and skills to fill them as effectively as possible. There is a clear message in the action plan we published last week:

“The wider transition to net zero is expected to support hundreds of thousands of jobs, with Clean Power 2030 playing a key part in stimulating a wealth of new jobs and economic opportunities across the country. These jobs will cross a range of skill levels and occupations, including technical engineers at levels 4-7 … along with electrical, welding, and mechanical trades at levels 2-7, and managerial roles including project and delivery managers at levels 4-7. Many of these occupations are already in high demand across other sectors”.


We have within the department the Office for Clean Energy Jobs, whose role is to co-ordinate action to develop a skilled workforce to support and develop our clean power mission.

I should mention the nuclear industry. I am at risk of repeating myself, but other noble Lords have enjoyed doing that during our deliberation. The Nuclear Skills Taskforce calculated that we need 40,000 extra people working in the nuclear sector—civil and defence— by 2030. That is in five years’ time. That goes up into the 2040s. There is a huge job to be done, and I believe it is my department’s role to work with industry and all the other organisations to spearhead that.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

51: Clause 5, page 3, line 8, at end insert—
“(1A) The Secretary of State must comply with subsection (1) within the period of six months beginning with the day on which this Act comes into force.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would introduce a time limit by which the Secretary of State must prepare and publish the statement of strategic priorities.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 51, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, for their support on this.

In many ways, this group addresses the key problem with this Bill: namely, that it includes no detail at all as to what GBE will do. There are no objectives of any sort in the Bill. We have discussed previously the difference between objectives, of which there are none, and the objects in Clause 3, which simply restrict the company’s activities. There is absolutely nothing in this Bill against which success can be measured or the use of public money measured and scrutinised.

The last group was about what the statement of strategic priorities required under Clause 5 should include. That debate demonstrated clearly how much better it would be if we had the statement of strategic priorities before the Bill finishes its process through this House. The Minister said clearly on the last group that that is not going to happen, which makes this group much more important.

This group is about the process by which the statement should be published and scrutinised. In response to some of the concerns that have been raised in this respect, the Minister said at Second Reading:

“On the structure of the Bill, noble Lords will know that this was laid in the Commons very soon after the election as an early priority of the Government. Because of that, we have focused, inevitably, on the provisions that are fundamental to the establishment of Great British Energy. Clearly, we are still working through some of the policy issues on which we need to come to a view”.—[Official Report, 18/11/24; col. 98.]


Others have described that as meaning, “We will make it up as we go along”. It is quite hard to disagree.

The Minister referred earlier to having found the right balance. I find that a difficult concept, given that there is no balance. There is nothing at all about the strategic objectives of Great British Energy in this Bill—that is not a balance. However we look at it, we are being asked to scrutinise a Bill when we have no information as to what the Government are planning and no meaningful impact assessment on those plans.

This Bill looks rather like a skeleton Bill: a Bill where most of the detail is added by the Government at a later date. This Government, when in opposition, were rightly critical of the use of skeleton Bills by the last Government. I agreed with them then and I agree with them now. However, there is an important distinction between this skeleton Bill and the more usual skeleton Bills that we have seen in the past. In a typical skeleton Bill, the Government give themselves the ability to add the missing detail by means of statutory instruments. We all recognise that the scrutiny of statutory instruments is not that strong, but parliamentary scrutiny does take place and there is at least the theoretical ability for Parliament to decline them. In this Bill, no such scrutiny of the strategic priorities is available. The Government will simply publish the statement of strategic priorities at some unknown future date, and there will be no opportunity at all for Parliament to debate it, and certainly no opportunity for Parliament to amend or decline it.

That is clearly unsatisfactory, and your Lordships’ Constitution Committee said so in its report dated 28 November, in which it pointed out that,

“in the light of the centrality of Great British Energy to the delivery of a significant policy initiative, we are concerned that clauses 5 and 6 amount to ‘disguised legislation’”.

It went on to say:

“We are concerned that clauses 5 and 6 do not offer an adequate degree of parliamentary oversight”.

I cannot disagree with any of that.

--- Later in debate ---

Amendment 119 would seek to defer the commencement of other provisions in the Bill until the statement of strategic priorities under Clause 5 has been laid and approved before Parliament, and Amendment 128 would defer commencement of other provisions in the Bill until the expiry of the 40-day period referred to in Amendment 52 from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. We would be worried that this, in effect, would hinder our ability to act as quickly as we wish. However, I have listened very carefully to the debate, and I respond directly to the noble Earl, Lord Russell: we are obviously considering carefully the Constitution Committee report on the Bill and are committed to appropriate parliamentary oversight, but this is without commitment, and we also think there are very strong arguments for the way the Bill has been constructed at the moment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

There was one other question I asked the Minister which he has not answered, which is whether the strategic priorities document will be accompanied by an impact assessment. The impact assessment we have with this Bill basically says that there are no benefits or costs because all it does is create the company, so we are effectively going to go through this process of creating something that can spend £8.3 billion with no impact assessment if that does not happen. Will there perhaps be an impact assessment that accompanies it?

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, at this stage, I cannot answer that because it is still to be decided as part of the work that we are taking forward in relation to drafting the statement.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. Before I sum up, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Howell, that I am not against this Bill. The problem we have here is the lack of any detail in it and the lack of any scrutiny once we have that detail, which is what the Constitution Committee pointed out. As the noble Earl, Lord Russell, pointed out, there is a high degree of unanimity around the House that the current situation set out in the Bill in that respect is really not adequate and that we need a greater level of parliamentary involvement in what will be the core element of this Bill: what GBE is going to do.

I take on board the points that the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, made about secondary legislation. I agree, but it is what we have at the moment, so we have little choice but to work with it. I would love to see a change to the way secondary legislation is debated, and it should be amendable, but we have a way to go before we come there.

There were plenty of ideas in this group as to how we might improve the scrutiny. I do not think any of us are wedded to any one of them. I am encouraged by what the Minister says about listening to the Constitution Committee and his belief in parliamentary scrutiny. I therefore hope that we can have some useful and constructive discussions between now and Report on this subject and come up with something that we can all agree on as an appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny on this most critical aspect of the Bill. If we do not, I am absolutely confident that we will come back to this on Report. For now, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 51.

Amendment 51 withdrawn.

Great British Energy Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd December 2024 Lords Chamber

I am pleased to be able to open this group and look forward to the corresponding debate over the course of today. The designation of a company as Great British Energy and the ownership of the company are central to the Bill and, as such, they should be central to the deliberations of our debate in this place. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 4, 6 and 7 in my name. I start by reminding the Committee of my interests as a micro-generator of hydroelectricity.

Amendments 4, 6 and 7 are designed to probe—a bit like Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Offord—whether it might be desirable to allow Great British Energy to accept minority equity finance. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Dillington, for his support on this. As these are simply probing amendments, I will try to be brief.

As the Bill is currently drafted, Great British Energy can be designated as such only if it is wholly owned by the Crown and will lose its designation automatically if that changes. It follows, therefore, that none of its shares can be owned by another party, and therefore no equity finance could be raised, at least at the Great British Energy level, from parties other than the Crown.

I can imagine situations where being able to introduce external capital into GBE could be a good thing. Clearly, I can understand why the Government would wish to retain control, which is why in my amendments I have set a required level of ownership of at least 75% of the issued share capital. Shareholders with more than 25% have the right to block special resolutions; so as long as the Crown controls 75% or more, it would still have full control of the company.

In that aspect, Amendments 4, 6 and 7 are more restrictive than Amendment 3 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Offord of Garvel, although they are probing the same question. Can the Minister explain why the Government feel that they need GBE to be wholly owned and why they would not want the flexibility to raise external equity finance in future, while retaining control?

I am also interested to hear the answers to the questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Offord, on his Amendment 1 on the relationship with the former UK Infrastructure Bank, now called the National Wealth Fund. I see from the letter that the Minister kindly sent us after Second Reading that the activities of GBE will in fact be carried out, at least initially, by the National Wealth Fund,

“in line with the NWF’s investment and operating principles”.

The letter goes on to say:

“This will enable GBE to invest quickly and draw on the NWF’s experience and existing pipeline of projects”.


That raises a serious question as to why we really need GBE at all. If the National Wealth Fund’s investment and operating principles and its existing experience already cover what GBE is being set up for, as the Minister’s letter confirms, and if it already has an existing pipeline of projects, would it not make more sense simply to provide the National Wealth Fund with the additional finance and resources to carry out the activities that are envisaged for Great British Energy—whatever those are, given the lack of detail in the Bill—and to leverage the experience and scale already built up in the National Wealth Fund? Are we in danger of duplicating responsibilities and adding another unnecessary layer of cost and bureaucracy with the Bill?

We could go further. The Bill carves out an area of activity that is currently already covered by the National Wealth Fund’s objectives and activities—again, as confirmed by the Minister’s letter—and puts that into a vehicle that has substantially less clarity on the way it will behave and substantially less accountability for what it does, as both your Lordships’ Constitution Committee and the noble Lord, Lord Offord of Garvel, have pointed out. One wonders what the Minister would have said if the previous Government had tried to do that—I suspect we know.

While Amendment 1 is a probing amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Offord, might have hit on a very neat solution in proposing to make GBE a subsidiary of the National Wealth Fund, where it would be subject to the accountability regime that already exists, which has already been accepted by Parliament. It would not in any way prevent Great British Energy meeting its objectives, but it would solve a lot of the issues that will come up later around accountability and transparency, as well as reducing the possibilities of cost duplication and ensuring that the expertise already built up in the National Wealth Fund is fully utilised. It would streamline the way the two organisations work together, removing the potential for future conflicts. There is no reason why the subsidiary could not still be separately located in Aberdeen as planned. In fact, ownership by the National Wealth Fund would not stand in the way of any of the plans that the Government say they have for Great British Energy.

The more I think about it, the more it seems that a simple change of ownership from direct to indirect would solve a lot of the issues that we will debate as this Committee goes forward, with no obvious downside for the Government or their plans for Great British Energy. I strongly encourage the Minister to give Amendment 1 serious consideration.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I support what both my noble friend Lord Offord of Garvel and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, have said about the confusing overlap between what is now the National Fund Wealth and Great British Energy. I am one of those sad people who look at annual reports and accounts, and I was anxiously waiting for the UK Infrastructure Bank’s reports and accounts, which finally dropped last Monday. Through that, I discovered that it had legally changed its name to the National Wealth Fund two or three weeks ago, although no announcement seems to have been made about that at the time.

I agree that Amendment 1 is a very neat way of tucking Great British Energy into a more satisfactory set of governance and oversight arrangements, which we wrestled with when the UK Infrastructure Bank was set up. But my main reason for speaking today is in connection with Amendment 3 in the name of my noble friend Lord Offord of Garvel and Amendments 4, 6 and 7 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux.

I do not support these amendments, because I think the concept of minority stakes in government-controlled companies is a complete nonsense. Over the whole history of nationalised industries and publicly owned corporations and companies, there are relatively few examples of entities in which minorities held equity stakes. The exceptions are normally accidents of history—such as in the case of RBS/NatWest—rather than acts of conscious design.

I cannot think of a single good reason to encourage the Government to seek private capital in Great British Energy, as opposed to seeking to leverage private capital alongside public investment in projects that need public involvement to help to de-risk them. Equity is always more expensive than debt, and minority holdings in illiquid shares are even more expensive. The Government do not need to pay that premium. They can borrow money, to the extent that GBE needs it, by issuing government debt. That will be much cheaper than raising equity for GBE, even after the post-Budget bond yield increases.

Equity costs more to raise than debt because it carries more risk than debt. It is the first bit of the capital stack to be wiped out in liquidation—at least, that is what happens in the private sector. But does anybody believe that minority holders would be wiped out if the state decided to liquidate an insolvent Great British Energy? The Secretary of State has so many powers over Great British Energy that in practical terms the Government will find it very difficult, if not impossible, to escape underwriting all the liabilities of Great British Energy, and that includes its minority holdings. If the Government did try to wipe out the minority holdings in a liquidation, I predict a decade or more of shareholder litigation.

Having minority holdings can also engage a lot of unnecessary legal problems around protections for minorities that are built into our company law to prevent minorities being treated unfairly. It can raise issues about dividends, which are not normally part of the regime for state-owned enterprises since retained earnings, if there are any—and history tells us that there are not usually any—are generally kept within the public corporation. I am not a fan of state-owned activity, but we should accept it for what it is, which is taxpayer or debt-funded activity, and not try to mimic the real world where equity investors genuinely do take on risk.

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[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, it was more than two. I can quote Prime Minister May, and I acknowledge her leadership in this country being the first to enshrine the 2050 net-zero carbon target. Prime Minister Johnson only recently addressed COP 26 in Glasgow; I think we all acknowledge the leadership the noble Lord, Lord Sharma, showed there. The noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, announced to the UN the £11.6 billion in international climate finance for the period 2021-22. Although we are having this friendly discussion about future energy policy, there is still some consensus on the need to decarbonise our energy supply, and Great British Energy is part of the way we are going to do it.

The key thing in the structure of the Bill is the objectives set in Clause 3. They will be informed by the statement of strategic priorities that Great British Energy will operate in, making sure that it will be aligned with the Government’s priorities. We have been clear that the first statement, which will be published in 2025—after due consultation and discussion with the devolved Governments and with Jürgen Maier, the chair of Great British Energy—will ensure that GBE is focused on driving clean energy deployment to boost energy independence, create jobs and ensure that UK taxpayers, bill payers and communities reap the benefits of clean, secure, home-grown energy.

Of course, the issue of energy bills is very important. We are relying strongly on the advice of the Climate Change Committee, of which the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, is probably not a great fan—but none the less, over 14 years his party listened to it. The committee said that a clean energy future is the best way to make Britain energy independent, protecting bill payers, creating good jobs and tackling the climate crisis.

The independent National Energy System Operator confirmed a few weeks ago that our 2030 clean power goal is achievable and can create a cheaper, more secure energy system. More broadly, the OBR—another body to which the previous Government paid great attention; they ran into trouble when they did not—highlighted that delayed action on reaching net zero will have significant negative fiscal and economic impacts. The Committee on Climate Change has said that the net costs of the transition, including upfront investment, ongoing running costs and costs of financing, will be less than 1% of GDP over the entirety of 2020 to 2050—lower, it said, than it concluded in its 2019 Net Zero report.

I have already said that we will publish the statement of priorities in 2025. How will GBE be judged? It will be judged on its performance against the statement of priorities within the context of the objectives set by Clause 3.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

The Minister has said again that the objectives of the company are set out in Clause 3. I am afraid that is not correct. The objects of the company are set out in Clause 3. As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said, those objects restrict the activities—they do not set out the objectives. Nowhere in the Bill are the objectives of the company—what it is trying to achieve—laid out. I have not yet heard an argument from the Minister as to why that is.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

I really do not read Clause 3 in that way. Subsection (2) says:

“The statement must provide that Great British Energy’s objects are restricted to facilitating, encouraging and participating in”.


One way to read that is that Great British Energy’s objects are around the following four paragraphs, informed by the strategic priorities and plans that the Secretary of State will prepare over the next few months.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

There is only one way to read the words the “objects are restricted to”. That is what the clause says.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, may not be as familiar with company law as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. The object of a company, which is what the clause refers to, is a constitution document, and it restricts what a company can do. That is what company law sets up for it. The Minister is trying to read “objects” in a broader sense. It is very clear that the clause refers to the legal documentation that will surround the full legal implementation of Great British Energy as a company. It does not have any other meaning.

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Moved by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

10: Clause 3, page 2, line 14, after “storage” insert “, trading”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would add energy trading to the allowed objects of Great British Energy.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, given the relevance of this amendment, I remind the Committee of my interests as a generator of small-scale hydro.

Before I get on to the specifics of the amendment, I will try to clear up a confusion that crept into the debate on the previous group, at the risk of reopening the mini debate we had at the end of the second group. There is still confusion between “objective” and “object”, and the Minister is still guilty of falling into that trap. The objectives are what the company has to try to achieve. The “objects” in Clause 3 are what the company is restricted to being able to do. If it is not in the objects, the company cannot do it—it is not allowed to. If it is in the objects, the company is allowed to do it but does not have to. Therefore, putting something into Clause 3 does not mean, as the Minister has suggested, that we specify what GBE should be doing or making, or in any way restrict its ability to make its own decisions. That is a really important difference. I suspect that a number of noble Lords who tabled amendments to Clause 3 think that they are adding an objective. They are not.

That said, my Amendment 10 is designed to allow GBE to do something, not to tell it to do it. Since the removal of the feed-in tariff system, of which I am a recipient, there has been only a very limited incentive for people to install greater domestic renewable generation capacity than the amount that covers their own usage. Own usage brings quite a substantial return because it replaces the cost of buying electricity from a main supplier plus the VAT, but the only way to be paid anything for any excess you send into the grid is the smart export guarantee, and the rules around that are simply that the amount has to be positive. That can be, and in many cases is, as low as a penny per kilowatt hour. That is not much of an incentive to add an extra couple of panels on to your roof, or whatever it might be beyond your own needs.

There are now some higher smart export guarantee rates but they can be reduced at will by the electricity companies. There is no guarantee of them, so when you consider installing solar panels or any other renewable generation there is no incentive to install more than you want to use yourself. The cheapest and easiest way of increasing renewable generation—because you already have the scaffolding up and the builders—is to add two or three more panels, but you will do that only if there is a return from doing so.

So would it not be a great thing if you were able to sell your excess to your neighbours, at a discount from the full retail price but at more than the smart export guarantee? That way, both the generator and the consumer would win. At the moment, the only way to achieve that is to hardwire your neighbours into your system, and that is an extremely expensive and not very practical thing to have to do.

One potential solution to that problem is peer-to-peer trading, which would allow neighbours to buy your excess electricity over a trading platform. With trading via peer-to-peer networks, neighbourhoods, districts or entire towns can join forces and trade their self-produced electricity. This is not just a theoretical concept; there are projects all over the world investigating the possibilities of this approach in field trials. There are working examples as far afield as Spain, Switzerland, Bangladesh, the Netherlands and many more. There are also studies in the UK, such as the one by Repowering London, UK Power Networks and EDF in Brixton. The technology is available now.

The huge advantage of peer-to-peer trading is that it can incentivise greater installation of solar and other technologies at no cost to the Government or to the consumer. GBE can take a role in this process as a trading hub, or it could support local trading hubs. The trading operations themselves could be financed by taking a fee for using the trading platform. It is also a great way to create community energy networks. There are wider advantages than the purely financial. Peer-to-peer networks can improve resilience, improve energy access and reduce losses from long-distance transmission.

That links quite nicely, I think, to the Amendments 11 and 15, tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Russell, which would add community energy to the objects, and to Amendment 20, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, which looks at local energy planning. I would support both of those amendments, alongside Amendment 10, as I believe they are highly complementary.

All that Amendment 10 does is add the trading of electricity to the allowed objects of GBE. This would allow it to create, manage or support peer-to-peer trading arrangements, for all the reasons that I have given. I hope, therefore, that the Minister will look favourably on it. It would be odd and rather sad if this interesting and relatively new technological way of incentivising small-scale generation was not allowed under GBE’s objectives.

I shall not comment on the other amendments in this group as the tablers have not yet spoken to them, but a number certainly appear to be very sensible and constructive suggestions. I look forward to hearing more detail. I beg to move.

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to two amendments in this group: Amendments 11 and 15. Before I do so, I want to thank the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, for his amendments. They fit well with the amendments on community energy. I was thinking about this subject myself. It is an essential system that needs to be put into place as part of that broader community energy scheme so that people can trade their energy; that would be better for all of us.

Amendments 11 and 15 both seek to include community energy in the objects of the Great British Energy company. It would be

“restricted to facilitating, encouraging, and participating”.

One of our key aims in debating this Bill is to work to ensure that community energy is both in the objectives for GB Energy and on the face of the Bill. The development of community energy has ground to a halt since the end of the feed-in tariff here in the UK. In Europe, by contrast, it is a very different story, where these systems are far wider, better understood and embedded in local societies. They are championed by their Governments and they are bringing great local benefits.

Community energy accounts for only around 0.5% of the UK’s electricity, but it has been estimated by the Environmental Audit Committee and others that it has scope for exceptional growth and could generate up to 8 gigawatts in combination with local power networks. Power for People, which has been supporting these amendments, estimates that community energy could power 2.2 million homes, save 2.5 million tonnes of CO₂ and help to create some 30,000 jobs. Community energy programmes are good ways of providing local jobs and are a useful means of addressing local fuel poverty. This is a continuation of the work that was started by Pippa Heylings in the other place; I have promised her that I will continue that work here as the Bill progresses.

Our view is quite simply that there is no Great British Energy without Great British community energy. Our vision for this Bill is that there should be an “out of the box” system, whereby every hamlet, local parish, town council and small village can pick up the phone and find an end-to-end system for creating a small-scale community energy programme.

GB Energy is perfectly placed to provide this tailored service. It is a one-stop shop turning ideas into reality, helping with systems choices, design, planning, building, local grid connections, finance arrangements, shared part ownership, et cetera. GB Energy should crowd in finance and not crowd out private investment, and this is one area where development is well suited to that. The big players and big companies are not investing in community energy; this stuff will not get off the ground unless GB Energy does it. There is no other market here; there is no competition.

Local community energy should be included in the energy transition, and communities should benefit from the local energy that they host or generate. We have tabled a forthcoming amendment on community benefit, which will be published shortly and debated in January when we come back for the second day of Committee. It seeks proposals for ensuring that local communities benefit from the renewable energy projects undertaken by Great British Energy.

We can make the national grid more resilient; it saves wasting energy in unnecessary transmission. We are currently transmitting energy from far up north to down south, losing a third of it on the way. As has been said, a trading system should be established so that local communities can sell excess energy. These systems make the grid more resilient, more robust and more stable. They help our communities to prosper and to benefit from that which they host.

The energy transition affects us all, in much the same ways that the Industrial Revolution did. We all need to make changes to the way we heat our homes, the way we travel and many other aspects of our daily lives. Such societal-level changes require broad and continuing levels of community engagement, participation and support if they are to be successfully enacted and carried through to completion, especially when the changes needed must take place at the speed and scale that is required here.

My personal view is that too much of what has been done to date is overly centrally controlled; it is much more “done to” than “done with”. We need community buy-in. We need to provide ways and means for our local communities to both participate in and benefit locally from the changes that we require them to make. Without this sustained local support, the whole net-zero project is in danger of being derailed by a lack of common purpose and want of determination to be part of the change that is required. Community public support is the key factor for the success of the whole project.

In some ways, this has been a strange task. There is broad cross-party support for the need for community energy. This was shown quite clearly in the other place, with many MPs supporting a Motion on this issue. There have been reassuring words of support in the other place, particularly from the right honourable Ed Miliband, the Energy Secretary, who said:

“I know that many Members of the House are passionate about the issue of local power, so let me reassure them that the Government are committed to delivering the biggest expansion of support for community-owned energy in history”.—[Official Report, Commons, 29/10/24; col. 776.]


Equally, here in your Lordships’ House, the Minister responded positively at Second Reading to the issue of local community energy. He has already spoken about his involvement in Birmingham and I know that he is passionate about the work that he did. He knows the difference that this makes.

The founding statement for GB Energy itself also has strong words of support for the principle and objectives of community energy, saying that

“we will be investing in community-owned energy generation, reducing the pressures on the transmission grid while giving local people a stake in their transition to net zero”.

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[Lord Hamilton of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I have always been a great supporter of small nuclear reactors, because it strikes me that they have the enormous advantage of supplying a locality and not getting involved, as the noble Earl, Lord Russell, said, with massive transmission costs. That would be all cut down, which has enormous advantage. Of course, Rolls-Royce is making small nuclear reactors to go into submarines, so we are probably better on the technology than most other people might be.

I have always had a worry that local people would react adversely to a planning application for a small nuclear reactor, because they would see it as devaluing their houses. Despite all-party support in Parliament, this will not stop local concerns raising their heads. I refer back to what the noble Earl, Lord Russell, said on that. I thought the answer was quite simply to offer people in the locality free electricity, and so immediately they would have an advantage. But from what the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said when speaking to his amendment, that would not actually work. That is why I want to be absolutely clear about this. He seemed to say that wiring up all the local houses to the nuclear reactor—oh, he is shaking his head. Now I am confused. Could the noble Lord intervene and explain what he meant?

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

The nuclear reactor would just pump into the grid, which will be attached to everybody’s houses. The network I was talking about was one with the ability for house A, which has solar panels, to sell its excess electricity to house B, which does not. But a nuclear reactor would pump electricity into the grid and be available to all the houses.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom (Con)]

That is enormously reassuring. I will support his amendment, even though that was a concern I had.

I think the answer to getting small nuclear reactors planning permission is to offer free electricity to people in the locality. When they come to sell their houses, they will find that any depreciation in the price from being near to a nuclear reactor will be off-set by the fact that they have free electricity written into the sale of the house. That would balance things out. That is very reassuring, and I am glad we cleared it up. I am grateful to the noble Lord and thank him. I very much support his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, I cannot give the noble Lord chapter and verse today but will certainly write to him with what we can say in public.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who took part in this interesting debate and the Minister for his fairly fulsome answer. On Amendment 10, I am not totally convinced that trading is covered by the objects as they stand but I will read his answer in Hansard to see whether I can convince myself that he is right. As he says, the issue is that if it is not in the objects, it is not allowed. I want to make sure that it is allowed—not that it has to happen—in the same way that he argued the other way around on the security definition. That said, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 10 withdrawn.

Domestic Solar Panels

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Monday 25th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, of course, I cannot guarantee that the majority of solar panels between now and 2030 are going to be built in this country. What I can assure noble Lords is that, as part of the work we are taking forward, we will look at the UK supply chain. However, the essential point here is that we must strive towards clean power. I do not discount the positive impact of heat pumps. The Government, in their warm homes plan, are as committed to heat pumps as they are to solar.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, one of the best ways of increasing solar panels on the roof is to incentivise people to put excess capacity over their own usage requirements. What assessment have the Government made of peer-to-peer trading arrangements, which would allow people to sell their excess to their neighbours at a price higher than the smart export guarantee but lower than the retail price? I hope the noble Lord will agree that would be a win-win situation.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

The noble Lord has raised this with me, and I think mentioned it at Second Reading of the GBE Bill, so we are giving it consideration. Of course, one should say that in terms of the incentives for people to invest in solar panels, we already have the smart export guarantee, which is a payment for excess electricity generated. However, as part of the warm homes plan, we are looking at the role of incentives and the use of private finance to find a way to help people with the upfront cost, which—even though solar is cheaper than other renewable energies—is always one of the main problems in relation to people being able to invest in their own solar panels.

Great British Energy Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 18th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a small-scale generator of hydroelectricity. I welcome the intentions behind the Bill: an affordable, secure and decarbonised power system must be a good thing. I suspect that the stated timeframe of the next five years is rather overoptimistic but, again, I commend the intention. I caution against rushing the transition too much. We must ensure that we do not undermine our energy stability, and rushing could create that risk, make it more expensive than it might otherwise be and undermine the intention of reducing energy costs over the period. Again, the intention is good.

However, the Bill does not do anything beyond allowing for the creation of the company. It sets out only some very broad parameters as to what it may do. In that, as we have heard, it is quite similar to the UK Infrastructure Bank Act 2023. Indeed, whole clauses of the Bill seem to have been copied verbatim from that Act, and I suspect that we will have many of the same debates that we had then. I seriously considered taking my Second Reading speech on that Act and changing the name, but I decided against that.

However, there are important differences between this Bill and that Act. First, like the UK Infrastructure Bank Act, there is a requirement in Clause 5 for the Secretary of State to

“prepare a statement of strategic priorities for Great British Energy”.

In the case of the UK Infrastructure Bank, the then Government provided a detailed draft of that statement, along with the detailed framework document referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. We were able to see what the bank was intending to do and the assumptions around, for example, whether it would be required to make a positive return. That was extremely helpful. In this case, I understand that the Government have no intention to provide such a draft before the Bill is passed. I hope that that is wrong, but it sounds as if we will be having these debates rather in the dark, which is deeply unsatisfactory but, rather depressingly, becoming something of a theme.

The Government have made many claims about the benefits from GBE, which the Minister has repeated today. Being something of a finance nerd, it was therefore with great excitement and enthusiasm that I turned to the impact assessment. Let me give your Lordships some highlights from that. The total net present social value from GBE is given as not applicable; the business net present value is not applicable; the net cost to business per year is not applicable; the CO₂ equivalent change in greenhouse gases, which is its core purpose is—guess what?—not applicable. In fact, in every single section of the impact assessment, it says not applicable. But I read on, and it goes on to say that:

“This legislation is not expected to have any direct benefits associated with it”.


Which is, I suppose, straightforward. We are being asked to scrutinise a Bill where we are not going to be allowed to see the statement of strategic priorities and for which there is no meaningful impact assessment for what the Government are planning to do.

That makes my next point even more important. Apart from a requirement to publish a report and accounts that simply comply with the Companies Act 2006, there is absolutely no reporting and accountability required for Great British Energy in the Bill. Given that we know nothing about the strategic priorities, that has to be unacceptable. It is in stark contrast with the UK Infrastructure Bank Act, where there is a whole section requiring an independent report to be laid before Parliament on,

“the effectiveness of the Bank in delivering its objectives, and … its impact in relation to climate change and regional and local economic growth”,

and, importantly,

“(including the extent to which its investments … have encouraged additional investment … by the private sector)”.

That references the additionality concept that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and others have referred to. With the UK Investment Bank, that report is to be laid before Parliament, and is carried out initially after seven years and then at five-yearly intervals.

It is surprising that the Government do not feel that something similar should apply here and that they actively excluded that clause from their copy-and-paste exercise. They have made all sorts of claims about what GBE will achieve but seem unwilling to have the actual performance measured and reported on. I confess to finding that rather shocking. Can the Minister please explain why the Government felt they should copy the UKIB Act but exclude all meaningful accountability aspects, especially given their own support in opposition for the independent review clauses in the UKIB Act? This is something of a change of tune, I think. Infrastructure is, by definition, long-term, so the UKIB timeframes were long—seven years. GBE is talking about completing the decarbonisation within five years, so it must be the case that shorter duration performance-reporting periods should apply.

The impact assessment says that:

“All investment into and expenditure of GBE will be subject to future spending reviews and business cases, which will set out in detail the monetised and non-monetised impacts of GBE’s activities”.


That sounds promising. Can the Minister explain how and when those spending reviews and business cases will be published, and whether they will be made available for scrutiny by Parliament? Perhaps more importantly, how will the actual performance of GBE against those business cases be reported on and scrutinised? I am absolutely certain that we will have many more debates on this element, especially if we do not see the statement of strategic priorities.

During the debates on the UKIB Bill, we had many discussions about how important it was that the activities of the bank should be aimed at crowding in private investment and avoid crowding out private investment. I said during those debates that,

“if the bank simply ends up becoming a cheaper form of subsidised finance in situations where private finance is already available, we will have failed”.—[Official Report, 14/6/22; col. 1555.]

The same sentence applies with bells on in this case. The Government keep repeating the mantra that every £1 of public investment will generate £3 of private investment. I wish it was that simple. If done badly, it can have the opposite effect, so it is critically important that the reporting that I have said we need covers that aspect of additionality. It must be about not just how much we have spent—anyone can spend money—but how effectively we have spent it and what the real impact on private investment has been. Does the Minister agree?

Speaking of the UK Infrastructure Bank—now rather misleadingly called, as we have heard, the national wealth fund—there is clearly quite considerable overlap between the activities of the two entities. Indeed, the UK Infrastructure Bank was set up originally to do quite a lot of what this entity will do. Can the Minister please shed some light on how that overlap will be managed and how duplication between the two entities will be avoided?

The UKIB Act includes details on the composition of the board; this Bill does not. Can the Minister please explain what the Government have in mind about the composition of the board of GBE?

The Bill includes some very broad financial assistance provisions. We have heard that it is intended to provide equity finance of £8.3 billion over this Parliament. However, other forms of finance appear to be completely unlimited and subject to no obvious scrutiny. Can the Minister please explain what is intended in that respect, and what accountability and controls will exist around it? How will any borrowing by GBE be treated within the UK debt figures?

Somewhat related to that, GBE can be designated only if

“it is wholly owned by the Crown”,

and the designation will terminate automatically if it ceases to be wholly owned. That would preclude the possibility of raising any external equity finance into GBE, although I suppose it might be possible into a subsidiary entity. Has the Minister considered whether some flexibility—perhaps allowing minority external equity into GBE—might be advantageous?

Finally, on a different subject, I have a proposal to add an element to GBE’s objects. Since the end of the feed-in tariffs, the only way that domestic generators of electricity can receive any income from any excess electricity that they generate above their own usage requirements is through the smart or export guarantee. Although there are now some better export rates, most are still very low compared with the retail price of electricity. There is little incentive for people to install excess capacity over and above their own usage requirements—for example, putting another two or three panels on their roof. It would surely be a good thing to incentivise people to install more than they need.

I believe there is a way that that can be done at zero cost for the Government, through a peer-to-peer trading facility that would allow generators to sell any excess, perhaps to their neighbours. The only way of doing that at the moment—which I know to my cost—is to wire them in, which is extremely expensive. This facility would allow the generator to earn more than the smart export guarantee rates, so providing a greater incentive to install more capacity, and would allow the neighbours to obtain the excess power at a discount to their own retail cost—a win-win situation. All that is required is a trading company to stand in the middle, and perhaps to take a cut of the trade to cover the costs of the activity. That is a role that GBE could easily undertake, thereby incentivising people to increase domestic renewable generation at, as I said, no cost to the taxpayer. In order to do that, I think that “trading” should be added to the objects in Clause 3(2)(a).

I support, in concept, what the Government are trying to do, but there is an awful lot to do to improve the Bill, especially around the areas of accountability, where it is woefully lacking.