Budget Resolutions and Economic Situation Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Tyrie
Main Page: Lord Tyrie (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Tyrie's debates with the HM Treasury
(10 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is my job to take away the political punchbowl, just as the party was just getting going. What we have just heard is the most difficult speech that anybody has to make in the House of Commons, and I am sure we will all read it with interest.
First, I should like to say a few words in a personal capacity about what has been announced on savings. They look extremely interesting and long-term reforms. For a start, the ISA reform is resonant of PEPs; that goes right back to the beginning, as those introduced the savings allowance. It was a tremendous idea. I am really pleased that the cash and equity ISAs have been merged and that we have raised the cap. The Treasury Committee will have to look at the provisions. I hope I will not have to come to the House and say that it has a different view.
Getting rid of the defined contribution rules that force people into annuities is a tremendous achievement—a very far-sighted announcement. The last Labour Government were also looking at that for a while, but they could not find a way to do it. This Chancellor has found a way to do it, and we should commend him for that.
Before I say a few words about some of the other measures in the light of past Treasury Committee recommendations, I should like to say a few personal words about the deficit. When the Chancellor set out his initial Budget judgment on behalf of the new coalition, many thought that the coalition would collapse—that the political strains of implementing spending cuts would be too great and shake the coalition Government apart. Well, the opposite has been the case. The coalition has stuck with it and the deficit reduction plan has become the cement of the coalition.
Both sides deserve credit for the fact that the coalition is still going and dealing with the deficit. Particular credit goes to the Liberal Democrats. If I may say so—I hope they do not mind—I never thought they had it in ’em. But they have, and they have stuck with it.
May I make a bit of progress?
The deficit is down from the stratospherically high figure of 11% of gross domestic product to just below 7%, and next year it is forecast to fall to 5%, as we have just heard announced by the Office for Budget Responsibility. The consolidation is already significant. It has been achieved despite a massive external shock which was not built into the forecast four years ago and which I do not think the Chancellor mentioned—the eurozone crisis and the economic stagnation in our largest export markets. It was primarily that crisis that forced the deficit reduction plan to fall behind schedule. The key question for the Government a couple of years ago was whether to relax fiscal policy sharply in response to the almost 4% loss of forecast GDP, most of which was a consequence of the eurozone crisis.
Rightly, in my view, the Government showed considerable flexibility within the overall framework, in two important ways. First, they authorised the Bank of England broadly to double the quantitative easing programme; and secondly, equally importantly, the so-called economic stabilisers—the falls in tax receipts and rises in public expenditure that come with lower growth—were allowed to kick in.
To give an idea of the importance of the stabilisers and QE on policy, it is worth reminding ourselves of the numbers. Since the election, an additional £175 billion has been put into the economy through QE and £140 billion has been put in through the automatic stabilisers. The latter figure is based on Institute for Fiscal Studies estimates; no one knows exactly, but it is of that order of magnitude. These are very large numbers. That showed flexibility by the Government.
Does my hon. Friend agree that the Government’s flexibility included putting public spending up every year in cash terms over the period and relying on higher tax receipts to get the deficit down, which is how they maintained political agreement to the policy?
I do not know about the political agreement point, but of course the effects of the stabilisers operate on both the tax and the spending sides. I think the Government were right to do what they did.
The Government have also been right to see off calls fundamentally to alter fiscal policy by sharply relaxing deficit reduction and increasing public spending. One of the main reasons it was important that they did not listen to those calls is that credibility in fiscal policy is hard won. It is built up over time—over many years—and it can easily be squandered. The Government resisted that temptation.
I will say a few words about the historical context. Looking to the 1930s, when stagnation set in and the agony was prolonged, partly because automatic stabilisers were suppressed and partly because far from engaging in QE, the then coalition Government did exactly the opposite: they lengthened the maturity of the debt and sucked money out of the economy. That is why the 1930s were so painful.
Now that we have a recovery, some are complaining that it is not the one we ordered. They complain that the recovery is consumer-led or uneven across sectors, regions and income groups. Well, of course it is. All recoveries of any value trigger a reallocation of resources, and therefore all recoveries change the shape of the economy. A recovery rarely takes root where the jobs were lost or the firms failed; it was ever thus and it will be the same this time. As the Chancellor stressed in his speech, jobs are being created at a record rate, but we cannot expect those jobs to be in exactly the same places as the jobs lost in the downswing. I am confident that, as in all previous recoveries, if we can sustain this recovery—and even if it is uneven, as it will be—it will, in time, deepen and spread through the whole economy. The figures for previous upswings support that.
The crucial question now, though, will be whether we can sustain the deficit reduction plan. A threat to deficit reduction will come from siren voices who say, “With the recovery under way, we can go back to spending money we haven’t got.” We are already hearing that. We need to remind ourselves that we are still spending about £7 for every £6 we collect in tax. It is true that we are in better shape, but with a deficit of about 6.6% of GDP, as the Chancellor announced today, we will remain vulnerable to economic shocks unless we do more to tackle it.
Another risk to deficit reduction is one of simple arithmetic caused by ring-fencing—something that the Treasury Committee has flagged up on several occasions. It will become increasingly difficult to find cuts to an ever-shrinking share of non-ring-fenced departmental spending. In other words, with ring-fencing of nearly half departmental expenditure, finding these savings will get tougher year by year. The Chancellor has argued, rightly, that polling evidence shows that that ring-fencing reflects public preferences. I think that is true for health and education, but it is not supported in the area of overseas aid. Spending on aid has risen by over a third in real terms and will rise even more because it is linked to GDP. Politics always points to ever-more ring-fencing; economics to less. Eventually, ring-fencing will have to be revisited, however difficult it is for all political parties.
Perhaps I should say a little about the risks—