Iran

Lord Turnberg Excerpts

Monday 25th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I thank the noble Lord for his comments and agree entirely with them. We recognise that diplomats spend an awful lot of their time working on negotiations that do not lead anywhere and trying to support compromises that are attacked on all sides. This is one happy example—we hope—of when diplomacy will have succeeded.

[Lord Turnberg (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, add my congratulations to all who have been involved in this development. I will ask two short questions. First, is there a mismatch between the time at which sanctions may be partially released on the one hand and the nuclear inspections on the other? Is there a problem with starting this programme only in January, which would give time for the Iranians perhaps to do more mischief in the interim period? On the question of the percentage at which enrichment is to be allowed, I have heard figures of 5% and 20%. Can the noble Lord clarify which of these is correct?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, the timing of sanctions release is very carefully calibrated. The sanctions that will be lifted are extremely limited—the majority of them will remain in place. Incidentally, I asked the briefing team how far humanitarian sanctions would include some relief of the controls on medicines and medical supplies for Iran. I know that that is one of the things that has hit Iran particularly hard. I, personally, welcome the provision of repairs and spare parts for Iranian airlines, because it has become increasingly unsafe to fly within Iran, as the noble Lord will know. On the gap between now and January, we cannot put that immediately into operation. However, the sanctions relief does not go into immediate operation either. We need to work through the details. On 5% and 20%, the latter is the point at which it becomes dangerous and relatively easy to carry through the further enrichment to weapons-grade uranium. Therefore the Iranians have agreed to dilute half of their current, rather large stockpile of 20% uranium back down to 5%, which is the point at which it is useful for civil nuclear power but not for very much else, and to convert the other half into uranium oxide, which also makes it useful for civil nuclear power but not for weapons.