Defence: Continuous At-sea Deterrence Debate

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Department: Ministry of Defence
Wednesday 23rd June 2021

(3 years, 5 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Asked by
Lord Trefgarne Portrait Lord Trefgarne
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To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether continuous at-sea deterrence remains central to their defence policy.

Baroness Goldie Portrait The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness Goldie) (Con)
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My Lords, the nuclear deterrent will remain essential for as long as the global security climate demands. No alternative system is as capable, resilient or cost effective as a continuous at-sea deterrent capability based in four nuclear-armed submarines. As stated in the Government’s integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy, we will maintain our four submarines so that at least one will always be on a continuous at-sea deterrent patrol.

Lord Trefgarne Portrait Lord Trefgarne (Con)
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My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for that reassuring Answer. Is she aware that such knowledge as I have in these matters was learned a very long time ago at the feet of the then Mr George Younger, whose son now sits on the Government Front Bench in your Lordships’ House? Can my noble friend confirm that the number of warheads necessary to maintain this deterrent in an effective form are definitely to hand?

Baroness Goldie Portrait Baroness Goldie (Con)
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Yes, I can confirm to my noble friend that, to maintain the credibility of the deterrent and the minimum destructive power needed to guarantee that it does remain credible and effective against a whole range of state nuclear threats from any direction, an assessment has been made. The UK will move to an overall nuclear weapons stockpile of no more than 260 warheads—an increase of 15% from the previous ceiling of 225. I make it clear this is neither a target nor the current number of warheads, but it represents the upper limit of what we think we might need to maintain the credibility of the deterrent.