Housing and Planning Bill

Lord Tope Excerpts

Thursday 10th March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Cookham]

I understand the point that the noble Lord is making but he may recall an intervention that I made on Tuesday: the trouble with the alternative means of funding the commitment is that it increases the PSBR. There, you hit another real constraint from the Treasury in delivering the Government’s overall macroeconomic policy.

[Lord Tope (LD)]

My Lords, we have very many reasons to be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kerslake, but I suspect that in years to come he may well be remembered most for giving us the term “manifesto fundamentalism”. I was going to attempt to define it, but the noble Lord has just done so in a very much better way than I could. Maybe it is something like “the irrational adherence to a manifesto detail when there is a demonstrably better way of achieving the greater policy objective in that manifesto”. I am sure that, over time, others will be able to refine that definition more, but I think that that is what we are talking about—an irrational adherence to a clearly poor way of achieving the objective.

My noble friend Lady Bakewell at the beginning of the debate—

[Lord Young of Cookham]

Does the noble Lord think that the commitment on tuition fees may possibly fall into that definition?

[Lord Tope]

It may well do, my Lords, but I will resist the temptation to be distracted in that direction.

At the beginning of the debate my noble friend Lady Bakewell set out the Liberal Democrats’ view on this; a view which is clearly very widely shared—dare I say it?—right across the House. We accept that the Government have a manifesto commitment to give people the right to buy their own property. However, it is the funding of that that is the problem we are debating. We are being very gentle in referring to it always as a levy, rather like the way some people used to talk about a community charge. But calling it a levy does not make it any less of a tax—and that is exactly what it is: a tax. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Young, for making it very clear that it is a tax and that it does not necessarily bear any relation at all to the realities of the sale of so-called high-value properties. It is simply a tax. It is there to achieve a financial objective, not to relate particularly to the sale of high-value properties. I am not sure that the noble Lord, Lord Young, is optimistic, but perhaps he is hopeful that it might not necessarily mean the sale of high-value properties, or indeed of so many high- value properties.

I make particular reference to London. It has been recognised many times in the process of this Bill that there are very particular problems in London, not least the number of so-called high-value properties, however one defines “high value”. But an added problem—certainly a welcome problem if it is achieved—is having not a one-for-one replacement but a two-for-one replacement. However, experience thus far in London has been that the previous one-for-one replacement programme has not exactly been an outstanding success. In fact, it has not really been achieved at all. Therefore, to double that and look for a two-for-one policy—which would be welcome if it is achievable—must be doubly difficult.

Let us look for a moment at what that could mean. As has been said so many times in this debate, we again await crucial detail on how this is going to be implemented. I do not actually know whether the definition of “high value” will apply on a London-wide basis—in which case, good luck to Westminster and to Kensington and Chelsea. When we first thought that that would be the case, my own borough of Sutton thought that it probably would not have to sell any properties, but, demonstrably, that is not going to be what happens. However, we await confirmation in London of whether this will be done on a borough-by-borough basis, some sort of subregional basis or what basis at all. What is the definition of a “high-value property” in that context? There is a huge difference between, in my case, the London Borough of Sutton, or that of Barking and Dagenham, and, at the other extreme, Westminster, Kensington and Chelsea, Camden and so on. So we are going into the dark in London, with no idea what this will actually mean.

London Councils, which represents the 33 London authorities, has said that,

“it is critical that this policy delivers: An increase in housing supply … A net increase in affordable housing … No loss of London’s social mix … London’s funds reinvested in London”.

I pause for a moment on the issue of the social mix. A little while before the general election, I talked with the then chairman of Westminster Property Association, a major property developer in the City of Westminster. He wrote his own manifesto, expressing considerable concern about what he felt was happening in Westminster—his city. Before the general election and before the introduction of this policy, he said that before very long Westminster would be a city for either the very rich or the very poor, and that the great number between those two extremes—whether we call them the middle classes or whatever; the people who make up and who are active in the community—would be driven out and have to leave Westminster. That is a social conclusion with a profound effect.

This policy is not just about whether the sale of high-value properties will produce a two-for-one replacement in Sutton or somewhere else in outer London where land values are less but, crucially, whether it produces the same replacements in the City of Westminster, in Kensington and Chelsea, in Camden and so on and maintain the same social mix that is rapidly being lost. Or are we in fact accelerating the drive of people ever further away from the centre of London and therefore further away from the places where many of them have to work? Indeed, central London, as anywhere else, is dependent on people on low incomes to support our many services.

A similar problem is that the replacement homes need to be provided swiftly—not in years to come, although that would be welcome, too, but swiftly. There is inevitably a gap between the sale of the property and its replacement either by one or two similar properties. They need to be similar properties and they need to be in the same area. Again, what is the definition of an area when applied within Greater London? Does it mean a borough? Does it mean a particular part of the borough? Does it mean south London, north London? What does it mean?

I hope that the Minister will be able to give us greater clarity on when we will get those definitions and when we are going to know, because London borough councils—and I am sure this applies to local authorities throughout the country—are really worried about the effect of this policy in their area and their inability, simply through lack of knowledge and lack of detailed information, properly to be able to plan for what is to happen, however unwelcome it is. I hope that the Minister will able to go some way, if not all the way, to clarifying those important details.

[The Earl of Lytton (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise to the Committee for being late on parade this morning due to my travel arrangements.

It is tempting from these Benches to have a bit of a dig at manifesto commitments, bearing in mind that I made my maiden speech in this House in my previous incarnation here on what became known as the poll tax, so I know that political expediency often overrules practical reality.

Your Lordships will know that I come to this matter with a certain area of technical expertise in relation to development matters. It seems to me that there is more than a hint of evidence that a sale by a housing association of a property at a 20% discount is not a self-sustaining model without the cross-subsidy, notwithstanding the fact that many housing associations are involved at the commercial end of residential property development and are in competition with other private sector operators in the market for the same sites—therefore, one can reasonably suppose that they are making some developer-type profit out of that.

Given that most local authorities now no longer operate on that basis—your Lordships’ Select Committee on National Policy for the Built Environment had evidence brought before it that indicated the sharp fall-off in local authority construction of new homes; the evidence from the graphs that we were shown was incontestable—it follows that the sale of a local authority house on whatever level of value is also unlikely to be self-sustaining. More to the point, it does not have the cross-subsidy from the allied sector—or any sector really. There will either be an attrition in the numbers replaced—not one for one—or an attrition in quality, AKA size; whatever way you want to do it. It might be both. That might result in a cheapening of the housing stock to the potential detriment of the built environment and the long-term value and therefore sustainability in terms of people’s willingness to maintain and look after these places.

The noble Lord, Lord Tope, referred to something that I know as market drag, which is when something is sold and there is a period when one tries to organise where to reinvest the money and things happen. The market may move forwards or backwards, as the case may be, financing arrangements may change, opportunities that may have been counted on may disappear or new ones may arise. One therefore cannot easily say that £20 today will give £20-worth the day after tomorrow. It does not work like that because of the very high number of price-sensitive factors involved in the development world. In any event, we do not know how many high-value council house sales will take place, and we have heard that we do not know what high value is intended to mean. Is it in absolute terms—the largest four-, five- or six-bedroom house in a council’s stock? Or, more disturbingly, could it be a relative test by reference to a series of sub-categories of housing? We do not know.

When the Minister held a series of meetings before Second Reading of the Bill—and I give great credit to her for organising those—it became clear that there was a great deal of unfinished business in terms of getting the information back from local authorities about how this would work in practice. We do not have a worked model and I wonder what that means in practice. I remain to be convinced that reinvesting in social housing is more than a short-term fix. I mentioned at Second Reading that the precedents are not that great. I referred to the proceeds of council house sales. First of all, councils were able only to spend the interest that arose on the capital sum. Then they were not even able to use that and finally the Government of the day in 2000, as far as I could see and this may be an oversimplification, popped the lot into the Consolidated Fund. Thereafter, we had the business of developers somehow funding this social element because the entire stock of billions had disappeared. I do not know what it was spent on because of course the Consolidated Fund does not tell us that. The Treasury does not like hypothecated figures in its Consolidated Fund: it wants a big bank account on which it has great flexibility. I can understand that.

I feel that smoke and mirrors are involved here. What I am really getting at is that if there is a 20% discount at every turn—so that a house is sold at a discount and the money is reinvested in something else that is then discounted at another 20%—I do not see that that is viable. I would really like the Minister to ask her officials whether we could see a worked model of how that would function in practice because I strongly suspect that what is involved is forward guessing on increases in property and land prices.

As a registered valuer and thus being subject to all sorts of things that registered valuers are subject to, I absolutely proscribe forward guessing future rises in value: the value is what it is today. If I am reviewing a value the day after tomorrow, it is the value for the day after tomorrow, but on day one and on any accounting basis, to forward guess an increase in value is an extremely risky and perilous operation. But I sense that that is what lies behind this, because the numbers do not seem to add up. I fear that that is what is implicit in this. I ask the Minister again: I would really like to see a worked example of how it will be done.

I am not against the principle of the Government’s manifesto commitment, but I sure do not want to be here trying to sort out the debacle that might arise if we get into a situation of relatively static house price increases and land values, which we might. Then the year-on-year increase that might implicitly be built into this model evaporates and it fails. While I do not wish to say whether I am necessarily for or against this series of amendments, they raise a very important point about the underlying financial principles that are involved.