Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL] Debate

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Department: Department for Business and Trade

Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL]

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Portrait Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
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My Lords, I, too, welcome the Bill, but there is one matter we should have at the forefront of our minds as we work through it: that it must be implemented and carried through by SMEs and individuals. Regrettably—and I say this as a lawyer—lawyers have become far too expensive. We must appreciate the need to draft legislation and regulatory regimes that are as easy as possible to operate without the benefit of legal advice. If we cannot achieve that, it must be incumbent on the Government and the regulators to set out clearly what the position is, in a way that people can understand. We do not want our SMEs and individual traders to enter into operating under this new regime without being able to understand the law. I fear that this Bill, by its very length, is a good example of how we can overcomplicate things.

The second issue is the protection and transferability of data. The Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Markham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, have all spoken about the importance and value of data, its transferability and the need to balance correctly the protections and rights of the individual against the importance of being able to use it in research. I want to say a word about the contrasting positions we face in the transferability of data between us and the European Union, and the slightly more difficult and unpredictable situation that may arise between us and the United States. They are the same problem, but they may need addressing in different ways. On the first, I need to be slightly technical, but as the adequacy of our data regime is such an important issue, I hope that noble Lords will forgive me.

I am going to ask the Minister a question, but it is not for answer today; I think it will require a bit more than that. It takes us back to the battles and debates we have had over the last six years in relation to the manner of our withdrawal from the European Union. When we left the EU, we left in place retained EU law. We got rid of the charter, because it was said that all that mattered and was important was embodied in retained EU law. That was almost certainly right, but the problem that I believe has arisen—it is partly complicated by advice contained in the Government’s human rights memorandum attached to the Bill—arises from the effect of the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act. I can hear, almost visibly, the sighs—“Are we back to that again?”—and I am so sorry to be dredging this up.

I have looked at various things—I am particularly grateful for the help I have had from Eleonor Duhs of Bates Wells—and I believe there is a problem we need to address. As data adequacy is so important, I will say a word about the detail. At the moment, I think we proceed on the assumption that the UK GDPR, with its numerous references to the data subject’s rights and freedoms, is adequate. The last Government, when dealing with the matter, passed the Data Protection (Fundamental Rights and Freedoms) (Amendment) Regulations, which said that all the many references in the UK GDPR to these rights are to be read as referring to

“the Convention rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act”.

The difficulty that has arisen is in paragraph 47 of the Government’s human rights memorandum:

“Where processing is conducted by a public authority and engages a right under the ECHR, that authority must, in accordance with section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, ensure that such processing is not incompatible with a convention right”.


Then comes the important sentence:

“Where processing is conducted by a private body, that processing will not usually engage convention rights”.


The important point is that it is generally understood that, save in specific circumstances, the Human Rights Act applies only to state entities and not to private companies. If and where data is being processed by private entities, as the Bill and the market largely envisage, how are we to be sure that our references in the UK GDPR refer to the human rights convention but not to the charter? Having lost EU retained law, how are data privacy and data protections protected when processed by private companies?

I raise this point because it is important that we clarify it. If there is an issue, and I hope the Government will look at this carefully, we will need to amend the Bill to make sure that there can be no doubt that, where data is processed by private companies, the data rights are properly protected as they would have been if we had retained EU law, or if the charter applied. It is a very narrow point but one of fundamental importance as to the Human Rights Act being directed at state actors, by and large, and not private entities. I am sorry to take up a little time on this very general subject, but data protection is so important, and retaining our data adequacy status is, as I have learned over many years, essential to our industry.

We know that, provided we can get our law in order, there is no problem as regards the EU, I hope. We face a much more difficult problem with regard to data dealings with the United States. First, the law is much more complicated and developing at an enormous pace. It is partly federal and partly state. Of course, we have no idea—and I am not going to speculate, because speculation is pointless—what may happen under the new Administration in the United States. One thing we have learned from the EU, particularly the EU AI Act, is that legislating in terms that are hard can produce results that very quickly get out of date. It seems to me that we have to look constructively at finding a way to adapt our legislative framework to what happens in the United States as regards transferability and, more importantly, the protection of our data in respect of the very large American companies. How are we to do this? Do we give Ministers very broad statutory powers? There may, I regret to say, be a case for doing that. It is something that I do not favour. If Ministers are to have such broad statutory powers, how is that power to be made properly accountable to this House?

As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, demonstrated, there is no use delaying these decisions until we know what the US regime may be. Maybe the US regime, unlike the EU, will change very rapidly. Bureaucracy has some advantages when you are dealing with it from the outside, but someone who believes in constant change and turmoil is much more difficult to deal with from our legislative point of view. It is a very important aspect of this legislation that we look at how, in the transnational market in data, which is of immense value and importance to us, we protect the British public.

There are loads of other points that one could raise, but I will raise only one, to follow what has just been said. It is of fundamental importance that we examine automated decision-making with the greatest care. Some very good principles have been developed both in the United States, under the current regime, and in Europe. When a decision is made by a machine—that is a rather facile way of describing it; it is made as a result of an algorithmic process—how do we ensure that, first, there is some right to a human intervention and, secondly, and equally importantly, that the person affected understands why the decision has been made? The point that has just been made is very important, because when you get a decision from an individual, you normally have it accompanied by an understanding of the human, plus reasons. This is a very important part of the Bill; it is so important to give confidence about the way forward.

There are many other detailed points, but those are the three principal points I wanted to make. Let us keep it simple, look at the transnational aspects and look at automated decision-making.