Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill Debate

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Department: Home Office

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Portrait Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]
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My Lords, I, too, warmly welcome the Lord Advocate and congratulate him on his first speech. It is good to have another Lord Advocate from Scotland, with its own distinct legal system. I also congratulate the other two noble Lords on their excellent speeches.

I warmly support the idea of putting the power of these matters on a statutory basis. I wish to raise three points: first, the role of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner; secondly, the process for immunity; thirdly, the position of bodies other than the security services and the police. The observations that I wish to make on those three points have been drawn from my own experience of sitting on a large number of cases involving CHIS, the setting up of what is now the Mitting inquiry—formerly conducted by Sir Christopher Pitchford—and the setting up of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office. One of the difficulties in making observations is that, in all the hearings on which I sat and when setting up the Mitting inquiry, either the information provided to me was in circumstances of the strictest confidence or the hearings were closed.

It seems to me that three issues require further detailed consideration by this House. First, I would like to understand the reasons why we cannot follow the interception regime, with the IPC having a clear role in approving in advance except when urgency prevents. Obviously, it would have been of great advantage to know what had happened in the many years being investigated by the Mitting inquiry, but I can bring some of my own experience to bear and say that there are strong reasons for a very tight regime, particularly where the authorisation would go hand in hand with immunity. A regime for reporting a few days thereafter, put forward in the excellent speech by my noble friend Lord Anderson, would obviously need detailed consideration but, before we get to that stage, it is necessary to see whether there is justification for moving from a pre-authorisation system. There are real difficulties if the IPC says that the authorisation was wrong.

The second point can be put more briefly: I would like to see the justification for the change from the position where the CPS makes its decision on immunity. There are strong constitutional reasons for the CPS, an entirely independent prosecutor, making decisions on whether someone should be prosecuted. That is the proper constitutional route and entirely consistent with the rule of law. It would be inimical to the rule of law for immunity to be granted by an agency of the Executive, and it would be a bad example to other states.

Finally, if powers are to be granted in broad terms to the police and security services, I would like to understand the justification for granting these powers to the other bodies. It is important that these issues are examined carefully to protect confidence in the security services. We too easily forget the damage that can be done when officers, even fairly senior ones, do not do things properly. The damage, from my own experience in such cases, can be considerable indeed.