Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 16th June 2020 Lords Chamber

As a former Chief Whip, I accept that it is understandable that my noble friend the Minister could not have come forward today with something like Amendment 88, given the limited time his department would have had for consideration of the Select Committee’s report. Even though the Select Committee worked at tremendous pace in this world of fast-tracked legislation, the report was not available until last Wednesday afternoon. It is certainly one of the problems that the Government will face when they present any fast-tracked legislation, but they have time to rethink their plans on Henry VIII powers, in particular the ones that are the subject of Amendments 87 and 88. Whatever the Government decide to be the right route ahead, it has to be the right route to ensure that the legislation will deliver the policy that businesses need around the country, but in a way that the Constitution Committee too can describe as appropriate. Whatever happens, I am sure that we will return to these issues on Report.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak briefly on the rulemaking powers. I first draw attention to my interests in the register, in particular that I am chairman of the Financial Markets Law Committee, which is interested in clarifying and making certain the law.

It seems that there is a clear dilemma. The Bill is needed very urgently. It is sensible to make the changes to insolvency law that have been consulted on for some time and to provide for a new form of reconstruction, but these are needed now and they cannot sensibly be left to a later time. However, the Bill is of such complexity and, in some areas, of such novelty that more time is needed to sort out the many technical points that continue to arise, despite all that is being done by the Minister, his department and the insolvency services.

Points are being identified all the time. I will give just one example that possibly illustrates the interrelationship between new points and the scope of the delegated powers. It is unclear whether financial service creditors with super-priority have a claim on assets charged to secure debts without super-priority. The Minister might say that these can be dealt with under new Section 174A(3) to the Insolvency Act on page 108 of the Bill, but it is not clear that that power is wide enough. I take that illustration because it shows two points: first, that areas of uncertainty remain, and, secondly, that it is not clear that the delegated powers are drafted in wide enough terms.

Normally, I would absolutely deprecate extensive Henry VIII powers, but I really feel that these are needed in the circumstances of the Bill. It is absolutely essential that uncertain points can be clarified, I hope while the Bill goes through its remaining stages over the next week, but if not by swift rulemaking changes or regulatory changes to it. Points will go on being spotted—some have already been spotted and not rectified—but certainty is essential if we are to weather the problems that will undoubtedly arise over the coming months. We obviously need safeguards. I do not wish to add to the length of what I wish to say by going through the various solutions put forward by the Delegated Powers Committee and the Constitution Committee, so ably explained by my noble friends Lady Taylor and Lord Blencathra.

However, I will emphasise that we cannot escape the need for delegated powers, we cannot escape the need for speed and we should make sure, because it is the reality, that we can iron out points of uncertainty as quickly as possible.

We might say that the courts can do this. I have no doubt that they can, but there are two things that one should say. First, there are issues of policy here which ought to be decided either in this House or by the Executive, and, secondly, there are bound to be mistakes which it is not possible for the courts to rectify.

The courts will of course have extra work, as people have acknowledged, and they may require additional resources. Amendment 62 suggests that there be a report on how the courts are managing and whether training is under way. My understanding is that a significant amount of training has taken place, but the adequacy and the scope of it is under the Constitutional Reform Act a matter for the judiciary and not for the Executive or for this House.

[Lord Howarth of Newport (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, as a fellow member of the Constitution Committee, I am delighted to follow my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton, the noble Baroness, Lady Fookes, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness. I also endorse warmly the powerful points made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the noble Baroness, Lady Northover.

Amendment 66 would enable Parliament to “keep … under review”—a phrase we hear endlessly—the manner in which the Secretary of State keeps under review the use of the very broad Henry VIII powers to change the law on corporate insolvency by regulations which Clause 18 empowers him to make. As many noble Lords have said, if we are to have Henry VIII powers, which are in principle constitutionally offensive, a special and convincing case must always be made for their creation by the Government. If they are to be legislated for, they should be as narrow as possible to meet their specific purpose and they should not last a minute longer than—as far as this legislation is concerned —the emergency requires.

As has been noted, the powers in Clause 18 expire on 30 April 2021, but regulations already made under that power can be extended. Moreover, the Henry VIII power itself can be extended by regulations under Clause 22 for another year, and again and again thereafter. That being so, these clauses give the Government a blank cheque. So Amendment 70, which sets a final expiry date, is the very least that is required.

I am very attracted to the robust and no-nonsense approach of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe: simply abolish the clause. Clause 39, to which she spoke, is a wicked piece of legislation in constitutional terms. It creates a power for the Secretary of State to change the duration of temporary provisions and to keep on doing so, ad infinitum. It is the most self-indulgent of Henry VIII powers. It is constitutionally offensive, and it really should not stand part of the Bill.

I accept, as do members of the Constitution Committee and, I think, all other noble Lords, that there is an emergency which needs urgent legislative action and that, as long as the emergency persists, we will need provisions in place to protect as far as we can businesses that are vulnerable to the coronavirus crisis and of course the jobs of those employed by them or dependent on them indirectly. However, as has been noted also by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, in an emergency—and this applies especially in a prolonged emergency—the more important it becomes for Parliament also to be vigilant and to protect the principles of the constitution.

The Bill, which the Government are fast-tracking, is huge. It has 47 clauses, 14 schedules and 234 pages. Like Henry VIII clauses, fast-tracked legislation should be rare. It should be specifically and convincingly justified and its scope should not extend beyond the minimum necessary to achieve its purposes, although the scale of this legislation makes even more questionable the appropriateness of the fast-track process.

The Government are tracking the Bill so fast that the House of Commons barely saw it. Its Second Reading and remaining stages all took place on the same day; the remaining stages were transacted in half an hour. The Bill was gone in a blink and the House of Commons did not perform its proper responsibility, I regret to say, of scrutinising it. If the House of Lords steps in where the House of Commons fears or has failed to tread, and if we seek to advise and to do so by way of passing amendments, Ministers and even Back-Bench Members of Parliament are wont to express some resentment. But we have a responsibility to scrutinise and improve important legislation. What else is Parliament for? Noble Lords have made a large number of important observations and criticisms of flaws in the Bill today, particularly in the very long debate on the first group. What we need to do, I suggest, is to separate policy for the emergency from policy for the long term.

This brings me to my second objection, beyond the inappropriate fast-tracking of some of this legislation. As many noble Lords have noted, the Government should not smuggle in permanent changes to policy and law via fast-track emergency legislation. There are three sets of permanent changes, as I understand it, in the Bill. There is a procedure for a new moratorium on enforcement action against companies in financial distress, even though this procedure may be detrimental to creditors and investors, and therefore be potentially as damaging as allowing the debtor companies to go to the wall. The Bill also provides for permanent new arrangements for restructuring companies that are in financial distress, and for restrictions on contractual supplier termination clauses.

In winding up on the first debate the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, argued that the Government had previously consulted on the permanent measures. Indeed they did, but that is no excuse for seeking to bypass full parliamentary scrutiny of important changes to the law on insolvency. We are not making a fuss about the dignity of Parliament. We are complaining about the Government outflanking a process which actually enables them to get difficult changes right and give democratic legitimacy to changes in the law. In another context, the Minister was very keen to restore full law-making rights to this Parliament. I wonder how he justifies what I would regard as this two-fold abuse of Parliament: fast-tracking such a vast law and using emergency legislation to enact permanent changes.

If the Covid-19 effects should, unfortunately, persist in a very damaging form, Parliament should return in new primary legislation to the question of what emergency powers the Government should continue to be able to exercise. I was attracted by the proposal made earlier by my noble friend Lord Liddle: that there should be post-legislative scrutiny of the Bill. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, put it to us that delegated powers are essential in the emergency. Yes, they may be, but there should be proper sunset clauses attached to all the powers that the Bill creates, and especially the ones that are intended to be permanent, which should never have been in a Bill creating powers for an emergency. At the least, as the DPRRC has recommended, these powers should be amended to limit their use to a period only so long as the Secretary of State judges that the effects of Covid-19 require them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Adonis [V]]

I have nothing to add on this group.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd [V]]

I put my name down to speak on these amendments because of the very wide terms in which they were drafted. From the perspective of legal certainty and the importance of the London financial markets, it seemed that the Government’s overall policy of excluding financial service contracts was completely the right one, and the suggestion of these amendments was to remove part or all of that protection. However, from what has been said in this debate, it is clear—at least, I hope it is clear—that what gives rise to the concern really relates to the position of pension funds. It seems to me that this is a much narrower subject and it turns on the question of the priorities that will need to be clearly spelt out in the event of an insolvency.

Earlier, I raised the rather difficult issues that relate to priorities. This debate seems to underline the importance of that. I hope the Minister will have the opportunity to clarify precisely the way in which the priorities as between financial service contracts and a pension fund are to be resolved in the event of an insolvency.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow many speakers with great experience in the pensions world. As the Minister said in speaking to the first group of amendments, the objective of moratoriums in this legislation is that they will succeed and that companies with a hope of surviving will do so. But that will not always be the case. Insolvencies or other arrangements may follow. The moratorium structure rewards those who continue to supply, with an enhanced priority in a subsequent insolvency. It rewards financial institutions in a particular way that is identified as giving priority to creditors, including those who would have just ranked alongside pensions as unsecured creditors but are promoted above them.

As has already been mentioned, the Minister said in responding to the first group of amendments that some change will be made to exclude accelerated debt from super-protection. That does not sound like even as much as was covered in the group 1 amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, which I signed, but it is a start. Nevertheless, I am still concerned that it elevates all financial debt above pensions, as explained by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake. If I heard the Minister correctly, he implied that without being given priority, in return for none of the things that bind other companies, banks would not play ball—I paraphrase what was actually said. The reason why the banks will play ball is to get benefits. That still means that they will make greater demands and ask for bigger fees. They will still accelerate payments even if they do not get priority, but that will still suck funds out, because banks do not have a payment holiday.

I am attracted somewhat to what the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, said on whether the PPF will survive. I note that having to stand behind pensions actually comes from European legislation. I believe the UK was taken to court on this subject. Do the Government still stand behind legislation protecting pension benefits, or is that a piece of EU legislation headed for the dustbin of broken promises?

Like other noble Lords, I think that the Government need to think further about the legislation’s effects on pensioners, the Pension Protection Fund, the Pensions Regulator, pension trustees, companies contributing to the PPF, which will face elevated contributions, and those self-same companies facing deficit repayment schedules that will need to be greater to compensate for the actions in this legislation, as well as the fact that many schemes are much further in deficit because of the current crisis situation that we are in.

Also, what does this blackmail change—I call it “blackmail” because that is what it sounded like when the Minister explained it—to the insolvency waterfall say about the stability of legal agreements and contracts in the UK, if securities that have been pledged to pension funds can be sold from under them through a retrospective law change made without any warning or notice? That is what this priority change is. “Moratorium” might have been trailed, but “moratorium” means delay, not a change of priorities and the inclusion of financial institutions in special arrangements for no consideration—for that is what it is: no consideration. It is more than simply consequential to the running of a moratorium.

Various amendments in the group aim to prevent harm to pensions, and my probing Amendment 118 suggests that the PPF should be consulted in any compromise arrangement. It could or probably should be made stronger and require consent, but then I do not really need to speak to it because the noble Baronesses, Lady Drake and Lady Altmann, have come up with extremely sound, detailed amendments. I support them and commend them to the Government.

I realise that the Minister indicated in his email last night that some movement in this direction will happen. He has also said that the Government will give creditor rights, which is the issue covered by Amendments 63 and 64 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, but the extent and effect of those rights is important. I therefore remain concerned. Changing the ranking of creditors also opens up questions about, “Why just that change?” There are arguments, with which I have a lot of sympathy, that say pension deficits should have a higher ranking in insolvency anyway, given their origin as deferred pay. We will come to other provisions on that in the next group.

I am now quite glad that we have not finished the pensions Bill because, if these new priorities are enacted, they will take a wrecking ball to the difficult consensus that was being reached on the speed of paying down deficits, and other provisions coming from the regulator regarding its powers and what it would do to make sure that deficits were paid down. We will certainly have to take into account these new circumstances in this Bill and seek follow-on protections if it proceeds largely in the format it is in at the moment.

In summary, this group has four sensible proposals, independently made from across the House, that have significant overlap: scrap the financial institution priority, which weakens the position of pensions; ensure that pledged securities are not sold without the consent of the PPF; amend the Pensions Act 2004 so that a moratorium is an insolvency event and triggers a PPF assessment period; and have the PPF involved, with vetoes, in restructuring arrangements. I commend a composite of those arrangements to the Minister and I hope that productive discussions can follow because, welcome though the moves already flagged are on the PPF having creditor rights, we need to make sure that they fit the bill and that pension deficits do not still face significant losses.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Mendelsohn [V]]

My Lords, I am encouraged by the Minister’s indication during the debate that the Government are open to amendments and it is useful to hear that they have published material relating to insolvency practitioners, even though I am yet to find out where we can get hold of it. However, I am not entirely satisfied by the Government’s assurance that they appreciate how to deal with some of the complexities that they have put forward. That is not least the case in this group of amendments. I would like to understand not the entire effect but the assumption of which particular cases and how many of them these amendments are likely to affect, and whether they are just technical or do in fact change some of the current core financing arrangements for larger companies.

While I welcome the progress towards a more flexible insolvency regime and appreciate the need for temporary arrangements to help to navigate the current emergency, this legislation, as necessary as it may be, ends up asking a lot more questions than it answers. The truncated process is of course, as many noble Lords have mentioned, wholly unsatisfactory not just for scrutiny but to allow the Government to consider these matters and others as they should. It defies logic that the process was done fully in one day in the other place.

It is not just that the impact assessment is based on out-of-date data and contradictory calculations; the permanent provisions were consulted on, although in their previous form they were never going to be implemented in such a piecemeal fashion. It appears to be widely accepted that it is not just the flaws but the time required to adjust this regime that will be complicated. The permanent measures will take longer to implement, and it will take time for people to get used to how they operate. The temporary measures are a bit too limited to operate in their own guise.

However, the Government cannot have it both ways. They cannot claim that these measures are to get things working in an emergency and at the same time widen the number of options, the required skills, the number of participants and the variety of arrangements required where practitioners or courts will need to be trained or practised in. And, of course, this omits some of the most significant elements that will still need to be addressed, such as whether HMRC will have a preference or take an active role in this, as well as the role of the pre-pack regime and others. It is not just a question of all the delegated powers that noble Lords have spoken so eloquently and raised such meaningful and compelling objections and warnings about. It is also that the regulatory regime is weak and unclear, and so much of this should be in the Bill.

However, we are where we are, and the Government are going to do this whatever we say. Bluntly, this is not this House’s first rodeo, but it is our job to be realistic. This legislation will require further regulation and change, and much work is already taking place in a number of the agencies or in other places that is likely to lead to measures being added to the legislation at a later date. Therefore, we should address how this will work best in the future.

The most important element here is to receive proper reassurance from the Minister of an enhanced process to deal with the implementation, review, secondary legislation and regulation of this legislation, so any clear statements and undertakings in this regard would be important, whether given here or on Report. Will the Government create a post-legislative scrutiny process or, for example, would they be keen for this House to establish a process or a committee that could provide a meaningful role? Will the provision of information be sufficient, and what sort of information will be provided to this House? What will be measured by government, so that we can properly evaluate the operation of the legislation?

What other reviews or agencies, from the professional bodies to the Insolvency Service or the courts, are currently being consulted? What part of these discussions can we be told now, and what will be made available in the future to help resolve concerns or help us to have a debate prior to legislation or regulation being brought forward? Can clearer statements be made by Ministers about how they expect it to work, so that the courts have a clear indication on what to make rulings on and how they should do so? I suspect that the courts will be slightly busier than the Minister anticipates, not least because financial indemnity insurance will provide a very adequate target for people to exercise some degree of accountability in the courts.

Of course, the affirmative procedure for regulation is all that we have, but will the Government look at how this process can be enhanced with a greater provision of information, and possibly consultation, prior to the regulations being tabled? Any such assurances on how we will deal with where we are, and how we might deal with what might evolve into a better and more robust system, would be gratefully received.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd [V]]

In view of the course that the debate has taken and the statements by the Minister, I can be very brief. I welcome Amendments 92, 104 and 106, which ensure that unsecured bonds are caught by the exclusions of the moratorium and ipso facto provisions. However, there are many other technical issues to address, and I very much hope that this can be done by further government amendments before Report. That would certainly be preferable to making changes and correcting errors through the regulation-making powers. I welcome what the Minister has said so far and very much look forward to seeing the further amendments dealing with these technical problems.

[Lord Fox]

My Lords, the belated arrival of these amendments is further indication of the half-baked nature of this Bill. We were assured that the insurance for the permanent parts of this Bill was that they had already been through an extensive consultation period, which I guess they have. However, these important amendments have arrived in a lump afterwards, so that consultation process must have been flawed. I was looking forward to the Minister’s piece-by-piece description of each one. I can understand perhaps why he has decided not to do that, but at the very least, to paraphrase what was said earlier, we need to know how Her Majesty’s Government view these measures working. What problem are they intended to solve and what was the process by which these amendments arrived in the Government’s purview?