Lord Taylor of Goss Moor
Main Page: Lord Taylor of Goss Moor (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)That is as it stands.
Amendment 136B proposes restricting those who may be specified in regulations as eligible to make community nominations. The majority of responses in the consultation which has just closed agreed with our initial proposal for groups and individuals to be eligible to make nominations. However, a large number of respondents experienced serious concerns about the risk of individuals—a point which has been made again today—and, therefore, we are sympathetic to Amendment 136B. We shall look at that issue further before Report. We will have nearly the whole Bill to come back to on Report.
Amendment 136BZA tends to assume that the term “person” in the Bill refers to an individual and has been brought forward alongside the earlier Amendment 136A. In fact, “person” is a legal term which can refer to either an individual or group of individuals forming an unincorporated body or an incorporated body such as a company. So adding “persons” does not add materially to the scope of the power to make regulations that define who can make community nominations. I shall consider whether it is sufficient for the legislation because sometimes legal definitions are totally misunderstood. It may perhaps be helpful if we consider whether it should be “person” or “persons”.
Amendment 126C would add detail to those who may be specified in regulations as being able to make a community nomination. The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, mentioned two categories: first, those with a particular interest, disability or—the amendment states “advantage”, but I presume it means “disadvantage—and, secondly, people or bodies with a common right to use land because they own or occupy neighbouring property. We do not consider it necessary to specify either category. While we fully intend for the community rights to buy to be inclusive, we do not want to be too prescriptive on the kinds of organisations eligible to list land. It will be a broad list anyway and we would rather not have specific organisations on the face of the Bill.
Amendment 136BZC would add the local authority to the list of those eligible to make community nominations. We are not sure about the local authority being able to make nominations to itself because, effectively, it would have to go through the process and would have to be the promoter, the decision-maker and the final arbiter. We think it is for local community associations to make the bid and not the local authority. The tension we are talking about is better served by the existing provisions in Clause 76(3)(b), which enables regulations to be made that specify that local authorities can list assets on their own initiative, thereby avoiding pointless bureaucracy. So there is a provision there that local authorities can do this but not that they have to go through the nomination process; they can list of their own will. We have already made it clear that we intend to include this in regulations.
Amendment 139A would require a local authority, when considering a community nomination, to assess whether the nominator has the intention and the capacity to be treated as a potential bidder to buy the asset. This would make the consideration of a nomination much more burdensome and bureaucratic—a point which has been heavily laid around us today—for the local authority, requiring it to consider the merits of the nominator in addition to whether or not the asset is of community value. Such a requirement might be more appropriate where a right of first refusal is provided to the nominator subsequently. However, in a situation where the nominator will still need to compete with other potential buyers to take on the asset, such a requirement is, in our view, disproportionate because if they cannot raise the money and they have not got the financial security, they are not going to be able to bid.
With those explanations, I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw the amendment.
I declare my interest as both chair of the Rural Coalition and chair of the National Housing Federation. I do not think the latter is particularly relevant, but it might be.
Having listened to the Minister’s response, I have a niggling concern that the Government are creating a vastly overcomplicated system for doing something very simple. Individuals and organisations in a local community ought to be able to nominate and there should be a simple process for then deciding whether it is appropriate. I am not clear why there have to be decisions by any bodies about who those nominators are. If they are local individuals or organisations, surely they should be able to put forward a nomination. If we turn it round the other way, I am not clear about who we are trying to rule out. If they are in, or active in, the community, who are we saying should not be able to put a nomination forward? If there is not an obvious group of individuals who should be excluded—and I cannot think of any—why do we have to have a decision-taking process at the local level on who should or should not be able to make such nominations? Complexity is the last thing we need because it does not empower communities. Arguments about whether or not a nomination has been made by a relevant local individual, group of individuals or organisation misses the point; the arguments should be about whether it is a suitable nomination in the first place.
My Lords, the decision by the local authority would probably have to be made on only a very few occasions because it will be blindingly obvious whether or not an organisation is a community association under the terms of the Bill. It is just possible that there might be a body which no one has any idea about; a body which might have been suddenly thrown together and claims that it comes from the local community but does not, will fall outside the parameters of the Bill and it is reasonable that the local authority should be able to say, “I am sorry, you do not fulfil the requirements” and be able to turn it down. It is expected that any body which is understood to be a community body or people of the local community will find themselves nominating quite happily.
I still find think this is overcomplex. At the point at which an organisation has nominated something within the community for this purpose, is it really worth having an argument about whether it is a community organisation or a part of the community? Would it not be easier to say whether or not it was a suitable asset? That process would surely trump any issues about who is eligible to nominate it provided that they can show they have a community connection.
My Lords, we are not trying to make this overcomplicated. I am trying to simplify the local authority’s role in identifying a community body. One is trying to rule out a very large body which does not have any particular community interest but would like the asset, coming in through the back door and the local authority being unable to stop it. That is how the Bill stands. I hear what the noble Lord says.
My question on Clause 83 has turned into a short supplementary to the questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. The Minister has told us that the order-making power in Clause 83(7) will be used to deal with matters of inheritance and partnership. Can she give the Committee an assurance—I am sure she can—that the order-making power will not be used to alter the principal definitions of relevant disposal, which are already contained in the Bill? As subsection (7) is set out, it could, on the face of it, actually change the 25-year term or the definition of disposal in Clause 83(2). Those are quite fundamental points.
My Lords, I welcome much that the noble Baroness said about the Government’s willingness to look at the particular circumstances that may arise, for example, in the sale of going concerns and where the community asset is a small part of a larger concern. These issues have certainly raised great concerns, and I would like to add another.
I am not sure that I need to declare an interest but I shall do so just in case. I chair the eco-town strategic partnership in the St Austell area, a wide area of mining land which was mined formerly by English China Clays and more recently by Imerys. Over many years the policy of past and present mining companies in the china clay area has been to open large areas of land to community access, but always with the proviso that it might be worked in future. That is not a bad example of the concern that I want to put to the Minister about the deterrent effect that this policy—a policy which, broadly, I very much support—could have on landowners of that sort in opening up land to community use, whether for walking, riding, cycling and so on, if it were severely to limit their ability to sell and dispose of the land as part of the operation of their business. My fear is that, as things stand, it will simply freeze in aspic the current position on community access as people would be able to argue that access already exists and to list it. Equally, in terms of new community access, it is in the nature of mining land that the areas which may be accessed by the public will change over time depending on where the workings are and where land restoration has taken place following tipping. I can see this creating a substantial block to opening up land for future community use. The same may well apply to the farmer who very willingly allowed a corner of his land to be used by the cricket club. That usage now exists and a listing could be applied for. It could also create a substantial deterrent to any landowner opening up land for such use in future.
I am very much in favour of the idea that we should register assets of community value—which clearly applies to things like village shops, community halls and so on—but I am concerned about how to ensure that the creation of new community resources is not blocked by the fear that these elements will be applied.
I have one more question; I should already know the answer to it, and no doubt there is an answer. What is the position when the sale of land options—which are usually bought because planning permissions might be granted—in practice trumps these proposals to register community assets? I wonder whether the purchase of an option in any sense triggers this process.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Taylor, for their interventions. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, had three questions. I have the answer to two of the questions but cannot remember the other one. Would he like to ask me again, if he can remember it? If he cannot then that is fine. Perhaps we should both read Hansard. I apologise—I was getting so excited about the orders that I forgot about the next bit.
The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, asked about the 25-year period. The land will qualify only if the lease is granted for 25 years, rather than having 25 years left to run at the time of disposal. If it is granted for less than 25 years and is therefore subject to renewal, I suspect that it will not qualify, because the lease will have to be for 25-plus years.
Of course, my Lords, it is a detail; it is an illustration. All noble Lords have said that they felt that the context of this debate was the influencing of all planning decisions. This planning section of the Bill deals with just those issues, when it comes to local decisions being made in the context of sustainability. That is why it is important to understand the implications of the detail of the amendment and why—without my arguing with the general principle—there may be deficiencies in it as it has been presented by my noble friend and supported by a number of noble Lords.
Amendment 147FD is formulated slightly differently but in essence applies the same set of expectations on plans, most—but in this case not all—decisions under the planning Acts, and policy or guidance issued by the Secretary of State relating to planning functions. The amendment, like Amendments 147FC and 147FE, risks pushing to and beyond the limits of planning. I have no difficulty with the five principles of sustainable development promoted by the previous Government, but they risk loading on planning more than it can deliver. Would all five have to be met by any development proposal? How would, for example, someone extending their home demonstrate that they are promoting good governance?
Amendment 147FE focuses on the planning regime for major infrastructure—the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, referred to a project here in London. It proposes a number of changes to the existing legislation, including extending the sustainable development duty currently applicable to the preparation of national policy statements to all decisions on applications relating to major infrastructure. In this, it is consistent with Amendment 147FC and mirrors Amendment 147FD. It therefore has the same pitfalls.
For example, applying the sustainable development duty at the decision stage could introduce great uncertainty, because it would require the decision-maker to second-guess policy in the national policy statements, which will have been scrutinised and secured Parliamentary approval. By applying the sustainable development duty in the way proposed, the amendment could unintentionally undermine our efforts to deliver energy security.
I remind the Committee that we already have sustainable development duties applicable to the planning system. These are as follows. For major infrastructure, the duty applies to national policy statements for good reason. These national policy statements set out the policy framework for decisions on major infrastructure and integrate the Government’s objectives for infrastructure capacity and development with its wider economic, environmental and social policy objectives, including climate change goals and targets, in order to deliver sustainable development. We also have a planning duty on sustainable development in the Town and Country Planning Act system. The duty applies to those preparing plans, which in turn bears on planning decisions.
The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, emphasised how important it was that we have a future debate on these subjects with the NPPF available to us. I am sure that it will inform such debates and will be greatly to our advantage. I have not seen any text on this document at present. However, we know that the current duties within the planning system work. They avoid the risks that these amendments pose to the Bill and I hope that my noble friend will feel free to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I have listened carefully to what the Minister had to say but, although I welcome the Government’s commitment to sustainable development, the longer he spoke the less I was convinced of the argument he was making.
I conducted a review of rural planning policy for the previous Government. The first chapter of the review was devoted to sustainable development because there are potential perverse consequences in the way in which it is interpreted by planners at the local level from time to time. Most typically they argue that the community is not sustainable because it lacks public transport and other facilities, or people have to travel into a town to do their shopping, and therefore no development should be allowed because it is unsustainable. This ignores the fact that no development will make the community less sustainable in the long term, and that change can improve the sustainability of a community even if it does not deliver perfection.
With his colleagues, the Minister has committed the Government to the principle that we should favour sustainable development—so much so that there will be a presumption in favour of such development in the absence of other policy. Yet the Minister argues now against these amendments on two grounds. The first argument is that the detail of the amendments is imperfect—and, indeed, most of the comments against have been around that. However, if we are to believe that we should incorporate policies that favour sustainable development as a default option, surely it is incumbent on us to have a clear idea—and, more importantly, that the Government have a clear idea—of what we mean by that. If the Government do not have a clear idea, the principle that we are in favour of sustainable development as a default option cannot possibly stand.
We may have our differences around this—I do not think it is that complex an issue—but if the Minister has doubts about these amendments, he and his government colleagues should come forward with what they believe is the right definition and establish it in the Bill so that we are clear what we are empowering to happen as the default option in planning.
The second argument against is that it will in due course be in the national planning policy framework. That is welcome. I am sure that it will elaborate the detail of it and, of course, those details over time will be able to shift within the framework. However, what is being proposed is not a mere detail but is central to the Bill. In the absence of policy, the Government want it as the default option that we will approve proposals that support sustainable development—yet they will not incorporate the fundamental answer of what that means into the Bill.
I am sympathetic to much of what the Bill is trying to do; I am a proponent of sustainable development. I have argued about the perverse consequences of the misapplication of this—the gold standard. The Minister referred to it in terms of heritage, but it can be reduced to absurdity whereby nothing is allowed because nothing ever meets perfection. It is precisely for those reasons that the Government in due course should come forward with their explanation and proposition in the Bill so that we understand what it is we are being asked to approve in this legislation.
My Lords, I completely agree with the noble Lord. I think that was a very eloquent exposition of the Government’s dilemma. The Minister addressed the amendment’s frailties in its language and definition, but perhaps the Government could be persuaded to agree in principle that there should be a definition of sustainability in the Bill, which we could debate. It could build on the NPPF definition of the presumption in favour of sustainability, which is not adequate, but it would be a good start for a debate. There is an opportunity now, which may not occur again, to have something which recognises—as so much else is recognised in climate change legislation, for example—that this is a very serious issue for the economic future of the country.