(3 days, 7 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Levene of Portsoken, not just on his thoughtful valedictory speech but on his outstanding contribution to your Lordships’ House over so many years, and of course to the defence of the realm for such a long period as well.
The report on the UK-EU relationship that we are debating today is titled The Ukraine Effect but, as we have heard many times this afternoon, it should now perhaps be called “The Ukraine and Trump effect”, since the result of the US presidential election has thrown the issues raised by the report into even sharper relief. The Russian war in Ukraine has finally opened the eyes of many who, for so long, were oblivious or blind to the threat that Putin poses to the wider safety and security of Europe. Now, the imminent return of President Trump to the White House has thrown into doubt the degree of American military power that might be available for the defence of this continent. Even the less contentious members of the future Trump Administration are very much focused on China and are looking to direct an even greater proportion of their national effort towards the Asia-Pacific region. The more contentious nominees regard the European members of NATO as little more than freeloaders.
The obvious—and by no means new—conclusion is that Europe must do much more to deter aggression and, if necessary, to defend itself. We need a far stronger European pillar within NATO, and we need it quickly. In particular, European nations must now look very carefully at how they might provide more of the strategic capabilities for which we have traditionally been overreliant on the US.
President Macron has talked about the need for the EU to achieve strategic autonomy. That seems to me overambitious, at least in the short term, but there are a number of important military capabilities where European nations need to make a greater contribution and where individual national efforts alone are unlikely to be sufficient—where co-operative efforts will be required. These include the exploitation of space; the provision of command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems; more extensive defensive and offensive capabilities in the cyber domain; and a much more comprehensive approach to cognitive warfare in the round. These are all areas where the UK has considerable expertise and can make a significant contribution to, or even lead, efforts to improve European capabilities.
For example, Scotland is one of the only places in the world which has an end-to-end development chain for small satellites. They can be designed and built there, and launched into polar orbit from SaxaVord spaceport. We also have 53% of Europe’s surveillance UAVs, 42% of its airborne early-warning and control aircraft and 38% of its intelligence aircraft. Our cyber capabilities are extensive and we have the potential to be a force in the developing field of AI. We also have significant capability and expertise in the application of soft power, so we have much to offer.
But if we are to work more co-operatively on such strategic defence programmes within Europe, we must have effective mechanisms for achieving this. We must be able to contribute jointly with partners to the formulation of policies and the development of strategic direction. As the report makes clear, however, existing EU processes and mechanisms make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for third-party nations to play a leading role in its work or influence its direction in any substantial way. Although we should seek to change this, I rather doubt that the EU would be prepared to make an exception for the UK, in which case one potential solution might be to develop new mechanisms outside the existing systems, where the UK’s participation could be built in from the outset. This might apply particularly to areas where we are trying to develop a new field, rather than expand an existing one: cognitive warfare springs to mind.
Failing that, we would have to look for co-operative arrangements that fall outside the EU entirely. Perhaps a distinct European arrangement under a NATO umbrella might be one way forward. The European Commission tends to be protective of its turf and might not look kindly on such ideas, but the scale and influence of the threat ought to outweigh such bureaucratic considerations. Can the Minister confirm that the Government will explore all avenues and innovative ideas to resolve this issue?
There is, however, another complication. Our Five Eyes intelligence arrangement, our other intelligence programmes with the US and our engagement in projects such as AUKUS could create some tension between the needs of our confidential undertakings with the US and greater European security development. If America is serious about Europe doing more to defend itself, there is surely sufficient incentive to find solutions to such challenges, but none of this will be possible without the necessary funding.
Setting out grand aspirations and developing effective mechanisms without providing the necessary resources would be hollow posturing—just so much hot air. It would certainly not persuade President Trump that we were shouldering our share of the security burden, nor would it do much to deter Putin from his programme of aggression. Given the scale, immediacy and seriousness of the challenge, European nations, including the UK, will need to invest 3% of GDP and upwards in defence if they are to meet the needs of such a changed and perilous international situation.
I see no sign that many Governments within Europe, and I include our own, are prepared to acknowledge this. Given the undoubted economic challenges they face, they are making some very modest increases in defence expenditure and hoping that the problem will go away. Well, it will not. Without the necessary expenditure, the strategic capabilities we need within Europe will not be developed. President Trump will continue to believe that the US defence budget is being used to permit greater European spending on social programmes, and NATO’s capabilities and cohesion will both be threatened. Far from learning the lessons from Ukraine, the EU and the UK will have allowed them to pass over their collective heads. Talk is cheap; effective deterrence is not. It is well past time that political leaders in Europe faced up to their responsibilities in this regard.
(1 month ago)
Lords ChamberClearly, the cost of insurance has been impacted by the activities of the Houthis. We have seen much shipping diverted around the Cape of Good Hope, which takes much longer and is more expensive. We are concerned about this. London is host to the International Maritime Organization, so we play a leading role in international maritime security. We continue to monitor closely the implications of this activity on the cost to shipping, which is one of the reasons why the action we have taken has been so decisive. We will continue to work as hard as we possibly can, using whatever levers are available, to prevent this danger to life and to stability in the region.
My Lords, one of the things that affect the security of the Red Sea routes, as we have discussed before, is security in the Horn of Africa. With the current inability of Ukraine to export its grain to that region—it is now almost exclusively going to western Europe—Russia has seized the opportunity to back-fill the provision of that grain to the region and to use food as a political tool to spread its malign influence. What are the UK Government doing to counter Russia’s activities in this regard?
The behaviour of Russia in this instance, as in many others, is deplorable. This shows how interconnected many of these conflicts are, meaning that our response to these issues and the posture that we adopt need to be carefully calibrated so that we work very carefully, consistently and with some effect—although we want to achieve far more to make sure that aid can get into Yemen and that the people of Somalia and Ethiopia get the support they need. The activities of Iran and Russia have been devastating to the lives of many people living in those countries.
(1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful to my noble friend the Chief Whip. With absolute respect for the long experience of the noble Lord, Lord Robathan, and the conviction and passion that he brings to his question, there were several points in there. We have discussed Storm Shadow at length in this Chamber. The only person who benefits from us discussing it in this way is Vladimir Putin. I will not say any more than what I have already said on Storm Shadow, but I absolutely agree with the noble Lord that this is further evidence of Russia’s hypocrisy, as he alluded to, its recklessness and its absolute disregard for international peace and security.
My Lords, we read and hear a lot about the military pressure Russia is exerting on Ukraine, but are not the increasing numbers of North Koreans involved in the conflict, along with the widening of the pool of prisoners from which Russia seeks to recruit soldiers, evidence that the pressure is far from one-sided? Does this not underscore the importance of sustained resolve on the part of the West?
The noble and gallant Lord is correct, and that is what we will have. We have gone over this ground very many times, but it is always worth repeating that the defence of Ukraine is the defence of Europe. The consequence of the West doing anything other than showing the resolve that the noble and gallant Lord recommends would be to send a deeply worrying message that we fail to stand up to aggressors such as Putin. That must never, ever be something we can tolerate. We stand united in this House, in the country and with our allies.
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend makes an important point. He is a far more experienced parliamentarian than me, and I am sure that he is able to navigate the powers that be to enable such an opportunity, which I would very much welcome.
Is the Minister satisfied that the UK is marshalling its soft power in a sufficiently coherent way to promote stability and combat malign influences throughout the Horn of Africa?
That is an important question, and I will consider it further. I think we sometimes underestimate the impact soft power can have. We are well placed to act in that way, given our historical links and the community in the UK. If the noble and gallant Lord does not mind, I will take that away and give it further consideration.
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberThe United Kingdom’s position is consistent and clear that, notwithstanding our long-term relationship with Somaliland, it is absolutely an issue for Somalia to resolve. I cannot be clearer about that. We respect the territorial integrity of Somalia and the steps that it will take to resolve this issue itself.
My Lords, in our helpful debate on Sudan just before the latest Recess, it was generally agreed that the maintenance of a degree of stability in the Horn of Africa was important to the security of the Red Sea routes, which are of key importance to the UK. Can the Minister therefore assure the House that the Government will approach this region on a strategic basis as a whole, rather than treating the different crises piecemeal?
That is a very important point and is what I have been trying to get across—that you cannot separate some of these disputes, whether long-standing or more recent. As the noble and gallant Lord said, they need to be dealt with strategically and holistically, because the security and stability of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa more generally depends on us taking that approach.
(2 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the defence of Ukraine is the defence of the United Kingdom. For two and a half years, Ukrainians have bravely and fiercely defended themselves against Russia’s full-scale invasion. Putin’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity began with the illegal annexation of Crimea 10 years ago. He did not stop there, and he will not stop until he leaves Ukraine. On the issue of funding, which the noble Baroness is right to raise, she will know that a strategic defence review is under way. Her comments are noted as part of that, but it would be wrong of me to pre-empt it. My noble friend Lord Robertson will be providing information at the appropriate time that will help answer her question.
My Lords, several months ago, President Macron said that Europe must do whatever is necessary to ensure that Russia does not succeed in Ukraine, irrespective of political decisions in America. What evidence is there of that aspiration being given any substance—or is the security of Europe to rest upon the whim of the American electorate?
My Lords, I do not think that it is helpful to speculate on the US election at this time, but I commit to the noble and gallant Lord and to the House that our support for Ukraine, regardless of what may or may not happen in the American election, is ironclad and unwavering.
(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I completely accept my noble friend’s right to challenge, disagree and ask questions, both in this Chamber and outside it. I am very glad that we live in a country where that is encouraged and is possible with no consequences. It is for Ukraine to decide when it wishes to negotiate and on what terms.
My Lords, does the Minister not find the wording of this Question rather odd, referring as it does to Ukraine and “its war with Russia”, as if there were some moral equivalence between the two? Further, in any discussions that the Government have with other European countries, will they please stress that, in combat, the only real alternative to dominant firepower is to throw more bodies into the battle? Restrictions for whatever reason on the nature and scale of weaponry supplied to Ukraine will not only imperil its tactical situation but will almost certainly ensure that even more of its citizens are killed in Russia’s war of aggression.
I share the noble and gallant Lord’s thoughts on the wording of the Question from my noble friend. I too noted the emphasis on Ukraine’s “war with Russia” and I disagree with that way of looking at this conflict. The UK has provided £7.6 billion-worth of support, including £3 billion for 2024-25, and we are proud to stand alongside Ukraine as it defends its territory.
(2 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord will know that we cannot comment on operational matters, but I note his question and what lies behind it. He asked about the shadow fleet. The UK has so far sanctioned 15 ships of the Russian shadow fleet, which is enabling Russia to evade international sanctions. In the margins of the European Political Community summit, 44 countries and the EU signed our call to action to tackle this issue.
My Lords, whatever the outcome of the conflict in Ukraine, it is clear that, in the longer term, we will face a hostile and aggressive Russia with expansionist ambitions that go well beyond Ukraine, and which is clearly more than willing to use force in pursuit of its objectives. In light of this, is not the recent trailing of potential cuts to the UK’s defence capabilities because of budgetary pressures irresponsible, irrational and extraordinarily dangerous?
My Lords, noble Lords will be aware that we have made our commitment to 2.5%. A review of all departmental spending is happening and we all know the reasons for that, but our commitment to the support of Ukraine is steadfast and non-negotiable. We have committed £3 billion annually until 2030-31.