Nova Kakhovka Dam

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 13th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, the basis of what the noble Lord says is important: we need to ascertain what the needs of Ukraine are and to meet them. If boats are required, as I said in my first Answer, we will seek to provide them.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the consequences of the breach of the Nova Kakhovka dam have been described as “generational” in their impact. Does the Minister agree that this underlines the importance of next week’s Ukraine Recovery Conference and the need for it to address ecological issues as well as infrastructure and economic development matters?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I totally agree with the noble and gallant Lord. In preparation for this Question, I saw the mapping made of the flooding, which is on both sides of the Dnipro river; half is on the Russian side. Even organisations such as the ICRC cannot access the area, and people are suffering. I agree with the noble and gallant Lord that there are issues concerning agriculture and the natural habitats, which will be impacted, but as the waters recede we will be able to make a better assessment. However, we will not be able to make that assessment unless Russia allows access to its side of the river.

Sudan: Civilian Population

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 18th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, our country has a long tradition of ensuring that we are a sanctuary for those fleeing persecution. I know that my colleagues in the Home Office are monitoring the situation very closely to ensure that we are able to respond effectively to this crisis.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, what assessment have the Government made of the growing involvement of the Wagner Group in Sudan? We are only too well aware of its appalling track record on a great many issues, not least the treatment of civilians in conflict areas. How soon can we expect the Government to proscribe that repugnant organisation?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, the noble and gallant Lord will know that I cannot speculate on his final question. However, we are fully aware of the work of the Wagner Group from emerging reports about possible activities in Sudan and wherever there is a gap, as I have said before at the Dispatch Box. We have seen that the Wagner Group is operating very effectively in the Sahel too, particularly in Mali. There is an added element: this is not just an ordinary mercenary group—it does a deal with whoever is governing or controlling a particular area, so there is a direct economic benefit. I agree with the noble and gallant Lord that this is a very dangerous development, and we certainly do not need the Wagner Group emerging as another threat in Sudan.

Ukraine: Ceasefire

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 15th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I totally concur with the noble Lord. I thank him once again for both his support from the Front Bench and that of Her Majesty’s Official Opposition for the Government’s position. That is important: whether we talk of the Liberal Democrat Benches, the Labour Benches, the Government Benches or indeed the Cross Benches, the unity of purpose and action in standing up with and for Ukraine is very clear.

The noble Lord raises the important issue of sanctions. I agree with him. We need to articulate more clearly. Let us be absolutely clear: every sanction has within it—[Interruption.] I welcome those sound effects, which, I believe, amplify the voice of this Chamber. Every sanction the United Kingdom applies in this respect has a carve-out for humanitarian support. We have articulated that. On Saturday, I was pleased to receive an invitation and attend as part of His Majesty’s Government a meeting with our European partners and those in the Indo-Pacific. I was delighted that, as part of one of these sessions, we were addressed by Foreign Minister Kuleba from Ukraine, who underlined the importance of unity not just within Europe but elsewhere in the world.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I welcome the support being offered to Ukraine, including the training of pilots, but the truth is that we have had a hard enough time over the past few years training our own pilots with the capacity we have. Have the Government finally learned the lesson that we need to retain sufficient military capacity and resilience in our own country if we are to be secure in the years ahead? This is something they have signally failed to do in recent years.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I recognise the valuable insights of the noble and gallant Lord, and I assure him that we are doing just that by ensuring that we replenish any support we are giving to Ukraine in terms of ammunition, missiles and other equipment, because the first responsibility of the Government is the security of our own nation.

Integrated Review Refresh

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 14th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, an effective strategy requires a sensible balance between ends, ways and means. The integrated review refresh is certainly better than its predecessor on ends and ways. I welcome the sharper focus on Europe and the Russian threat and the more coherent and robust approach to China. Unfortunately, the refresh fails signally when it comes to means. Does the Minister recall that as recently as 2010, we were spending 2.6% of GDP on defence? Given the accounting changes that have occurred since then, that probably equates to something like 2.8% in our present terms. The integrated review refresh is saying, in essence, that we face a more dangerous world than we have seen for many a year, and the Government’s response is a vague aspiration to increase our defence expenditure at some indeterminate point in the future to a level still well below that which we had in 2010. Could he have a go at explaining the logic behind that?

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

My Lords, it is not true that these are vague aspirations. I think I said in response to the noble Lord, Lord Collins, that we are committed to investing £5 billion over the next two years to replenish our ammunition stocks, modernise our nuclear enterprise and fund the next phase of the AUKUS partnership. We are committed to spending at least 2.5% of GDP in the longer term. As I said, I cannot provide a precise timeline on that, but there is pretty clear evidence of our intent in the commitments that have been quantified and given a timeline.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness is right that a Foreign Office Minister made representations before the execution took place. I think it would be wrong to exaggerate the power we have as a country; we cannot command countries not to take decisions of the sort that Saudi Arabia took, but it is right that Foreign Office Ministers made representations. We will always continue to do so. It is a long-standing policy that we oppose the death penalty.

We use every opportunity we can to promote the values we hold dear: freedom of speech, freedom of religion and democracy. I do not think anyone questions our commitment to those values. Equally, we work with countries all around the world that do not share all those values. If we were to work only with countries whose values aligned entirely with ours, we would be pretty isolated on the world stage. It is right that we should have a constructive relationship. We are working closely, for instance, with the UAE as it makes preparations for COP 28. We will be a very strong partner to ensure that all the commitments secured at previous COPs are followed through and strengthened at COP 28, which is being hosted by the UAE.

On climate change, the noble Baroness is right, but this is a refresh. It is an additional document, almost an appendix to the IR, and does not replace it. Although there are many ways in which the threat of our abusive relationship with the natural world can be seen to have increased over the last two years—or at least our understanding of the threat has—the emphasis in the IR on the need to prioritise global environmental protection, restoration and tackling climate change was pretty much front and centre. Therefore, by definition, it remains front and centre. The refresh does nothing to diminish that commitment.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, can the Minister make a clarification? In his answer to my question, he said that the Government had a firm commitment to increase defence expenditure to 2.5% of GDP. The integrated review refresh says it is an aspiration. I would be very pleased indeed if the Minister were able to say that his remarks were the accurate statement of the Government’s position.

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

I think what I said was that the firm commitment related to the £5 billion over the next two years. Did I use the term commitment in regard to the 2.5%?

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

Yes.

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

In that case, it is a goal. The language that has been used is that it is a goal to get to 2.5%, but the commitment I was referring to is the £5 billion over the next two years.

UNCLOS: The Law of the Sea in the 21st Century (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 28th November 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, this report makes it clear that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and crucially the instruments that fall within its overarching framework, have helped to bring a welcome degree of certainty to the governance of the world’s waters, which, of course, cover the larger portion of the planet’s surface. It also underscores the ongoing importance of the convention and outlines how it continues to be crucial in addressing a range of important and difficult new maritime issues.

However, at the moment, UNCLOS does not answer all questions, nor does it provide a resolution to all issues. The report highlights the current gaps and challenges that are likely to emerge in the years ahead. As a maritime nation that relies on predictable and equitable rules at sea, it is important that the UK continues to take a leading role in the maintenance and development of UNCLOS and its subsidiary instruments.

At the same time, we must recognise that, no matter what we do, there will be issues that UNCLOS will not—or will not be allowed to—resolve. This is not an excuse for slackening our efforts to strengthen maritime governance, but it is important to recognise the limits of what is likely to be achievable and to think about how we manage the consequent challenges to international order. That is what I will focus on today.

The principal difficulty characterises international law more generally: there is no global government, so international law is essentially what the most powerful members of the international community decide it should be. We should not, therefore, be surprised that UNCLOS relies on consensus. This of course limits its scope when there is disagreement among the major players in the system, although we should note that, where there is consensus, we tend to get a high degree of compliance. However, compliance can also be a significant challenge. Just as there is no global government, there is no global enforcement mechanism that can be brought to bear on those who contravene international agreements. China’s repudiation of the 2016 UNCLOS ruling in favour of the Philippines regarding activities in the South China Sea—already mentioned several times this afternoon—clearly demonstrates the limits of the system.

Today I will highlight two challenges where in future UNCLOS may find itself constrained or even neutered. The first concerns the crucial issue of resource exploitation. The report covers the difficulties in regulating the development of deep seabed mining and fisheries management, but these will be greatly exacerbated by another factor, which is also discussed in the report and has been mentioned this afternoon: climate change.

The availability of an ice-free northern sea route from the east to the west will dramatically increase the commercial viability of maritime exploitation of the Atlantic by powers such as China, and this will have serious implications for fisheries. China’s demand for fish far outstrips its current supplies. Once its trawlers can access the Atlantic, we are likely to face a huge assault on fish stocks in that region. When I say “trawlers”, I am not talking about the sort of vessels that we can see sailing in and out of Brixham harbour; these are ships that are at sea for six months at a time and operate on an industrial scale.

We are likely to see a similar assault on non-living seabed resources. Despite the recent declarations made at COP 27, to which the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, referred, I suspect that the availability of strategic minerals will be like a magnet to resource-hungry nations, and the scale of China’s requirements will drive it to exploit the seabed wherever it can. Indeed, its activities in this regard have more than once been referred to as ocean rape. The International Seabed Authority will no doubt do its utmost to regulate such exploitation, but we have seen with the South China Sea how the PRC reacts to rulings that run counter to what it regards as its national interests. While we should continue to support such international governance mechanisms, we should also prepare now for an ice-free, Arctic route and the challenges this will bring. We should discuss with partner nations how together we might respond to those challenges in cases where international agreements prove powerless.

The other problem I want to highlight, already referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, is the security of subsea cables. The committee’s report emphasises their importance. Around 95% to 97% of global communications depend on them, and around 25% of the UK’s electricity is delivered through such cables. UNCLOS contains important provisions for their laying, maintenance and repair, but there are no comprehensive rules protecting maritime cables.

The report highlights areas where the UK should work to improve the regulatory environment in this regard, which of course is important. Better domestic legislation and closer co-operation with the International Cable Protection Committee are necessary steps in this regard, but, as with resources, we must recognise the likely limits of international law.

Subsea cables are crucial to our security and prosperity, but at the same time they are vulnerable. While accidental anchoring, fishing and natural disasters are the main threats to those cables in normal times, they are also obvious targets for hostile military action or, in future, for terrorist attack. UNCLOS will be of no help in the face of such risks. We need to develop comprehensive plans for the defence of subsea cables, but we also need to recognise that no defence can ever be perfect. This underlines the importance of developing sufficient resilience to be able to cope with successful attacks on those crucial assets. But that, as they say, is a whole other story.

In essence, the committee’s report confirms that UNCLOS, along with its subsidiary instruments, has on the whole been a huge success story, and it goes on to argue persuasively that the UK should work to develop the convention’s usefulness in the face of future challenges. I say amen to that, but, as I have argued, we must also be aware of the limitations that are inherent in any aspect of international law, UNCLOS not least, and prepare our responses to the inevitable and serious challenges that will face us as a consequence.

China: Security and Trade (IRDC Report)

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 20th October 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the International Relations and Defence Committee’s report The UK and China’s Security and Trade Relationship contains much material and covers a lot of ground, but the central thrust of its argument can be identified from the second part of its title A Strategic Void.

The Government’s integrated review contained many aspirations and listed many activities, including in the section on China and the Indo-Pacific. But lists are not strategies. They do not aid clarity; indeed, they often confuse. The committee’s report, like that of the Foreign Affairs Committee in another place, called on the Government to produce a strategy which would set out a framework for dealing with China, and indeed it suggested what such a strategy might look like.

In their response, the Government seem to suggest that they have a strategy but are not going to tell us what it is for security reasons. This, if it is more than just camouflage, is unconvincing. No one expects the Government to reveal exact plans, specific means and tactical details—if indeed they exist—and I for one certainly acknowledge that intentional ambiguity can be useful in certain situations. But businesses wishing to engage with China need to have a clear idea of the risks they might be running. Academic institutions, too, need to have a good idea of how the Government might react to certain developments on the international scene. They do not need to know exactly what those reactions would be, but they need to be aware of where the Government set their priorities.

The issue of Taiwan, already mentioned this afternoon, is clearly the most dangerous aspect of our engagement with China. Supporting that country’s independence, while avoiding a general war over it, should be our top priority. President Xi’s recent statements have only added to the tension. The Government’s response to the report acknowledges the importance of the issue, but it does not say what assessments have been made of the risk of the likelihood of conflict and its possible consequences. This is not an area where I would look for detail, but I do look for an assurance that such work is in hand.

Beyond that, it is clear that China is, as one inquiry witness put it, out to make the world safe for autocracy. For those who have not read it, the special report in the latest edition of the Economist sets this out in stark terms. The Government’s response to the committee’s report admits that:

“Aspects of China’s approach to the multilateral system run counter to UK interests and values”,


and goes on:

“We will continue to take targeted action with international partners to defend universal human rights, free and fair trade, and ensure that in areas, such as emerging technology or space, that new rules, norms and standards enable freedom and democracy to survive and thrive.”


This is woefully inadequate. It makes the whole thing sound like a piece of peripheral business.

In fact, we are, or certainly should be, engaged in a fierce contest to determine the rules of the international order under which we will have to live and operate for most of the rest of this century. Very few things could be more central to our future welfare and prosperity; securing the right outcome should be one of the highest foreign policy priorities for the UK. It certainly is for the United States. President Biden has made his Administration’s position very clear on this and has set about assembling the necessary international economic, technological and military weight to counter that of China.

None of this is to argue against the desirability of business, academic and cultural links with China, but setting out the UK’s priorities in this regard would make it clear that those other areas of engagement would all be contingent upon the pursuit of our objectives regarding the international order. It is hard to see how spelling this out would endanger our security. It would, however, give those in business and elsewhere a clearer idea of the downside risks associated with such engagement.

As it is, if one reads the Government’s response regarding Huawei, for example, one gets the clear impression that this company would now have a substantial hold over our 5G network had the Americans not rather annoyingly imposed additional sanctions on it. A little earlier, the Government’s response says that the National Security and Investment Act is “country agnostic”. That might be true with regard to the wording of the Act, but to suggest the same is true of its application seems to me breathtakingly complacent.

The principal risk for UK business is of course the likely adverse Chinese reaction to our opposition in the contest to determine the future rules of the international order. The committee called on the Government to conduct an impact assessment of such an outcome. The Government’s response is a fine example of departmental waffle:

“The … relationship … is multifaceted”;


they will

“manage disagreements and defend our values while preserving space for cooperation in tackling transnational challenges … and … continued pursuit of a positive trade and investment relationship in line with our national security and values.”

It is cakeism at its best. But what do we do if somebody takes away the cake? We are given no answer.

This Panglossian approach is also evident in the Government’s response on higher education. They say:

“We will also ensure that Chinese students are treated equally to all British and international students, including protecting them from any undue pressure on political issues.”


Really? How? Are we going to ensure that their families in China are protected from official pressure or sanction? Are we going to monitor all their interactions with their own Government? Or perhaps these matters do not fall under the heading of “undue pressure”.

The Government’s response on supply chain resilience is little better. We are told:

“The Foreign Secretary has been clear that it is important that the UK does not become strategically dependent, and that, particularly in areas of Critical National Infrastructure, we work with reliable partners.”


So what action has followed? What exercises have been undertaken with a range of scenarios to give us a better idea of critical vulnerabilities and how these might be reduced? What specific command and control processes have been set in place to train for and respond to threats to our national resilience? Once again, we are given only vague reassurances.

The Government could and should do much better. We are dealing with an increasingly autocratic regime in China. I would have thought that our experiences with Russia over the past decade would have taught us what we should never have forgotten: how dangerous such regimes can be, especially when they are militarily powerful and, most especially, when they have nuclear weapons. We need a long-term strategy for dealing with them.

The Government should set out such a strategy. They should give some shape and sense of priority to their otherwise all too comprehensive and sometimes contradictory aspirations with regard to China. The committee has proposed such a shape. Finding a satisfactory but peaceful outcome to the Taiwan issue is at the top, but close behind it comes our pursuit of an international order that is fair to all and helps to protect the world from autocracy. Trade and wider engagement with China should be pursued, but not at the expense of higher-priority objectives, and in the knowledge that such prioritisation will at times lead to Chinese retaliation and all the associated risks.

In its leader article on China this week, the Economist said that

“handling the most powerful dictatorship in history was always going to require both strength and wisdom.”

It is not at all clear to me at the moment that we see enough of either. I hope that we can get more from the next Prime Minister, whoever that will be.

Russia: Tactical Nuclear Weapon Deployment

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 11th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

My Lords, I am not aware of an assessment that has been made by government, so I do not want to provide an answer which would, I am afraid, be off the hoof from my point of view, but I will look into this and ask the appropriate Minister and department whether such an assessment exists and, if it does, I will make sure it is made public.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, expanding on a point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, one of the most effective ways of minimising the risk of the use of nuclear weapons in this conflict would be for the Chinese leadership to send an unequivocal message, albeit privately, to the Russians that such use would be unacceptable to them. What diplomatic measures are in hand to pursue such an outcome?

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

The noble and gallant Lord makes an extremely important point. While I cannot go into the details of diplomatic engagement with China on this issue or many others, the point he has made has been absolutely heard and understood and is entirely valid.

Her Late Majesty Queen Elizabeth II

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Friday 9th September 2022 Lords Chamber

In Northern Ireland, like other parts of this great United Kingdom, we will never forget Her Majesty’s steadfast support for and encouragement of our people through dark days and, gladly and wonderfully, brighter days in recent times. Thank you, Ma’am. God save the King.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, my earliest memory goes back to the moment when I had just turned the age of two. I can be certain of the date because my parents had moved house and I clearly remember the removal men in their dustcoats delivering our furniture. The date was February 1952 and Queen Elizabeth was just acceding to the throne. So, until yesterday afternoon, my entire conscious life had been exactly coincident with the second Elizabethan age.

That age has now ended. I have fond memories from its latter years of many meetings and discussions with the Queen, both professional and social, and I shall always be grateful for her kindness, her wisdom, her support and her great sense of fun, which I am happy to say was just as evident when I last spoke with her only a few weeks ago. Like the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury, I also remember the winter barbecues at Sandringham, and I am proud of having been the co-producer, with my sovereign, of a particularly successful salad dressing.

The Queen was, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, observed, the head of the Armed Forces. She took an intense interest in their activities—their difficulties and challenges as well as their successes—but particularly in their people. She had formal affiliations with a great many formations and organisations, all of which valued the association highly. I think that over the next few days and weeks many stories will be told and memories exchanged, with that strange and piercing mixture of sadness and joy that I suspect we all experience today.

I want to focus on just one incident from several years ago. One of the Queen’s military affiliations was as the honorary air commodore at RAF Marham, a station very close to Sandringham. I commanded RAF Marham over the first Gulf War. When we started to lose aircraft over Iraq, the Queen was immediately in touch, wanting to know how she could help, and in particular how she could support the families. She came and had private meetings with the next of kin of those who were missing in action. She spoke with the families more widely. She listened to them, empathised with them and made them understand how much she cared. That is just one small incident in a very long reign, but for me it epitomises it all.

The nation has lost a Queen. The people have lost one of the best servants they have ever known in this or any other age.

[Lord Polak (Con)]

My Lords, I pay tribute to all the speakers before me, particularly the noble Lord, Lord True, who is not in his place. On an occasion like today, I think I speak on behalf of the whole House when I say we miss the late Lord Sacks, who would have known exactly what to say.

On hearing of someone’s passing, the Jewish tradition is to say “Baruch dayan ha’emet”, which means “Blessed is the true judge”. In my earliest memories of going to synagogue on a Saturday morning, there was only one prayer that was said in English, and that prayer will be said tomorrow in synagogues up and down the country. I will read it as it was done last week: “He who giveth salvation unto kings and dominion unto princes, whose kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, may he bless our sovereign Lady Queen Elizabeth and all the Royal Family. May the supreme King of kings, in his mercy, preserve the Queen in life, guard her and deliver her from all trouble and sorrow.” In synagogues up and down the country tomorrow we will say it as usual for His Majesty King Charles.

I have been listening to so many personal stories of how Her Majesty touched the lives of so many, even just for a fleeting moment, and that will forever be etched on the memory of those people. In 1971 my mother and my late grandmother were at Royal Ascot. My grandmother at the time thought she was part of the Royal Family and we did not tell her that she was not. On the way back from the paddock to the enclosure, my grandma Leah touched the back of the Queen Mother and said, “Ma’am, you look beautiful.” As the heavies suddenly came round to where my mum—who was deeply embarrassed—was, the Queen Mother said, “Hang on”, and turned to my grandmother and said, “And, if I may say so, you look beautiful too.” At this point both embarrassed daughters, Her Majesty the Queen and my mother, turned round at the same moment and said, “Oh mummy.” This moment, this 10-second encounter, stayed with my late grandmother her whole life, and has stayed with my mother to this day.

The tributes to Her Majesty have all been magnificent, but I listened particularly carefully to Sir John Major, the former Prime Minister, whose tribute included the line, “There was almost no part of the world she had not visited.” Sir John was right. I will concentrate for a moment on the word “almost”. On 22 June 2016, the night before the EU referendum, I was at a small dinner with a few people raising a little bit of money for Gordonstoun at the home of the Princess Royal. As I was leaving, I said to the headmaster that I would happily come up to the school and speak to the students about politics. Princess Anne turned round and said, “I think they’d be more interested in your previous work.” We had a conversation and discussed how the Royal Family were prohibited by the Foreign Office from visiting Israel. We agreed that it was and is sad that the Queen, as someone who was deeply religious and God-fearing, never walked down the Via Dolorosa into the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, visited the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem or experienced the peace and tranquillity on the shores of the Sea of Galilee.

At a Jewish funeral, Psalm 116 is often recited in Hebrew. In translation, it ends:

“You will make known to me the path of life;

In your presence is fullness of joy,

at your right hand bliss for ever more.”

Yehi zichra baruch—may Her Majesty’s memory be for a blessing.

Ukraine

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Wednesday 13th July 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord will not need to wait too long to see what happens with the leadership of the Conservative Party and our country. There are some very able candidates for Prime Minister and leader of the party. But, on the more substantial point, the Ministry of Defence and the FCDO are fully equipped, engaging diplomatically and militarily. As I said, we have made an additional commitment of £1 billion in support and defence of Ukraine.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, as this conflict in Ukraine is unlikely to be over quickly, what discussions are Her Majesty’s Government and European colleagues having with the Government of Ukraine about a sustainable economic model for Ukraine, particularly in the agricultural sector and with regard to agricultural exports?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, the noble and gallant Lord raises an extremely important point. We are working closely with Ukraine and are one of the leading donors. Our total commitment is £3.8 billion, including £1.3 billion in guarantees for EBRD and World Bank lending to Ukraine. This is coupled with £220 million of humanitarian support. The noble and gallant Lord is right to draw attention to the food crisis. From a global perspective, an estimated 300 million people will suffer because of the war in Ukraine by the end of this year. We are looking towards working with key allies, including Turkey, to seek alternative routes to shift that grain from Ukraine.

Ukraine: Defence Relationships

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 9th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, in this most welcome debate on the impact of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine we have heard some very thoughtful contributions. It has been made clear that the Ukraine war is not a little local European difficulty; it is a global crisis. The effect of food shortages and the associated price increases threaten widespread famine in Africa. The destruction of energy supplies is contributing to increased global inflation and the overall economic shock will affect living standards around the world.

However, its significance goes beyond the economic. It goes to the heart of how the world is to be ordered in future, how nations are to deal with one another in the years ahead, and how much stability we can expect to see in the international community. This should condition our thinking about the UK’s role in the crisis. Our strategic objective should be to ensure that Putin’s invasion is widely seen to have failed and that such an illegal use of force is fraught with uncertainty and danger for the aggressor. This will not, of course, entirely eliminate the threat of future conflict, but it will at least give pause to those who contemplate starting one. The question then becomes, how is that strategic objective to be achieved? The answer is in two parts—military and economic—but in the time available today I shall restrict myself to military issues.

We must of course continue to support the Ukrainians in their valiant efforts to deny Putin his objectives in their country. They have already defeated his attempts to seize their capital and split their nation in two, and they must now frustrate his latest goal of achieving total control of the entire Donbass region. President Zelensky naturally wishes to regain control over all his nation’s territory. That may not be a realistic short-term objective, but neither is it necessary in order to deny Putin his aims. Given continued Ukrainian resistance, Russia will be unlikely to advance much further and will be tied down in an attempt—almost certainly doomed —to pacify the area it occupies. However, this relies on the Ukrainians continuing to receive the military wherewithal to counter the kind of artillery-heavy attritional attacks that the Russian forces are now mounting.

More widely, we need to relearn some old lessons. The first, as I have remarked before, is the unbounded capacity of the future to surprise us, usually in very unpleasant ways. International crises and the armed conflicts that sometimes flow from them have seldom been anticipated, nor have we been well-prepared to meet them; and every time such a crisis comes to an end we seem to assume—or we certainly act as if we assume—that it will be the last. It never is. Not long ago, some observers were questioning the continued relevance of NATO. They usually did so without considering what sort of organisation might replace it, bearing in mind that we had long ago forsaken the idea of national defence in favour of collective security. Occasionally the EU has been put forward as an alternative focus for European defence, despite the fact that many European nations have declined to make the level of investment necessary to sustain NATO itself, let alone to develop independently the very expensive strategic capabilities currently provided by the United States.

The UK’s recent integrated review, while acknowledging the challenge still posed by Russia, indicated a tilt more towards the Asia-Pacific region, but it was less than clear what that actually meant. How great a tilt? How much of that tilt was to be diplomatic, how much economic and how much military? We have now been rudely reminded that the peace and security of our own continent should always be our top priority. It is also clear that those European nations most directly threatened by Russia put their faith in NATO for their defence, not in the EU. Therefore, at least for the foreseeable future, NATO must remain the bedrock of European security. However, to be credible, NATO must ensure that it has the plans and capabilities to defend its peoples effectively. It needs to be able to operate in the so-called grey zone of warfare but it also needs hard combat power, and power that can be sustained.

The war in Ukraine has reminded those who may have forgotten of the appalling rate at which munitions are expended in high-intensity conflict. For too many years, we and other NATO nations have taken too much risk with our weapon stocks. They were already inadequate and they have, rightly, been depleted further because of the need to supply Ukraine. We now need a concerted effort to bring our munition stocks, across all three services, not just back to where they were but to where they should have been in the first place, and we must press our NATO partners to do the same. That will mean careful planning and much greater investment, not just in defence budgets but in the wider industrial capacity to provide and sustain those weapons, which is currently inadequate. That will not be easy in a period of economic stress but, while the conflict in Ukraine has created great human suffering and threatens to cause much more, it has also changed the world that we have known for the past two decades. We cannot now return to business as usual. We must recognise as much and adapt accordingly.