Sudan

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Friday 13th September 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton of Upholland, who brings great expertise to these proceedings. Indeed, the number and experience of all noble Lords assembled here for this debate, on a Friday on the eve of recess, are perhaps an indicator that, in this place at least, Sudan is not a forgotten war. I am grateful to the Minister for giving us the opportunity to demonstrate as much.

We have heard many moving speeches today about the terrible situation in Sudan and the plight of its people, with 50% of the population in need of humanitarian assistance and 8.5 million people at emergency levels of food insecurity. Nearly three-quarters of the country’s health facilities are out of service and 19 million children are out of school, 7.4 million of them without access to safe water. Simple human feeling ought to provide sufficient motivation to do all that we can to alleviate that suffering, and to bring an end to the conflict, which, of course, is a necessary precondition if such alleviation is to be really effective.

I want to go beyond that. Picking up some of the strands that have already emerged this morning, I want to set out some of the harder-headed—some might even think cold-blooded—reasons of national self-interest why the people of the UK ought to be greatly concerned about what might seem to many of them to be a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing.

First, Sudan is degenerating into a large, chaotic and ungoverned space. We have learned to our cost the consequences of letting such areas develop and fester, and we have learned how extraordinarily difficult they are to tackle once they do develop. They become breeding-grounds for extremist groups whose malign influence spreads far beyond their own borders and can all too easily affect, both directly and indirectly, the security of this country.

A failed Sudan could provide an ideal environment for criminal and terrorist networks. It is already a route for arms smuggling, and it could become a major exporter of violence. The instability that creates such conditions could well spread to neighbouring states. Ethiopia, Eritrea and the states of the Sahel are already fragile polities, and such stability as they do enjoy, limited though it may be, could be significantly undermined by the knock-on effects of the Sudan conflict.

All this poses serious risks to the UK. Al-Qaeda and Islamic State are on the lookout for just the kind of opportunities that Sudan now provides. There are reports that the Houthis have been in discussions about co-operation with al-Shabaab, and there is scope for a widening and deepening of jihadist movements in the region. This should alarm us all.

Secondly, as we have heard, there is the potential impact on the security of the Red Sea routes. The Houthis have already demonstrated how easily commercial traffic through that area can be disrupted, and they forced us, in concert with others, to respond militarily. The conflict in Sudan could make these recent challenges look like small beer. An article in a recent edition of the Economist quotes a senior member of the Sudanese Armed Forces as saying:

“If Sudan collapses, the Horn of Africa collapses. It will be a great economic hindrance for Europe and America … Navigation will be impossible”.


The source of this quote may not be a disinterested observer, but the view expressed has been supported by others. If it is accurate, the consequences for this country would be so severe that some kind of response, probably military, would be inevitable. Even if the risk is only moderately likely, surely it would be better for us if we could pre-empt such a situation before it has a chance to develop. Surely the promotion of stability in the Horn of Africa is an important strategic objective for the UK. If so, the conflict in Sudan becomes a matter of strategic importance too.

Thirdly, there is the question of refugees. A fifth of the population has been made homeless, and they face the prospect of a deadly famine that could kill millions. At the moment, staying put looks like a death sentence, and the surrounding countries are probably not that appealing to them either. Europe would seem a much better bet and, as we have heard, some reports suggest that already 60% of the refugees in the camps around Calais are Sudanese. Can the Minister comment on that? Even if the exact figure is in question, we have heard from the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury that there is other evidence of growing numbers of Sudanese migrants. So the people-smuggling routes are likely to see—indeed, they are already seeing —a great upswell in business as a consequence of the war, and the traffic in human misery will increase yet further.

All this will put further pressure on European countries, including ours, that are currently struggling and failing to deal with illegal migration and its consequences. The rise in right-wing extremist parties will continue as a consequence, and the strains on our political and social fabrics will increase further. Surely such a prospect makes the war in Sudan a crucial issue for us, as well as for France, Germany and the other countries of the EU.

So, the demands of conscience and humanity apart, there are pressing reasons why the UK should view the war in Sudan as a strategic threat and should respond accordingly. But that response must, of course, be part of a wider and coherent international effort on both the aid and diplomatic fronts. Getting sufficient help to the population to stave off famine, and to dissuade them from putting themselves into the hands of the people smugglers, must be the immediate priority.

Beyond this, though, we need to help, encourage, develop and support the involvement of a group of international actors, including the United States and the EU, that will be sufficiently powerful to force an end to external support for, and involvement in, the war. Without such support and involvement, the internal factions would find it much more difficult to prolong the conflict.

Of course, the UAE is the principal, but not the only, culprit here. Russia is reportedly obtaining what is referred to as an “outpost” in Port Sudan in exchange for fuel and arms. Iran, too, is seeking a naval base on Sudan’s coast, which would certainly alarm Saudi Arabia and perhaps lead to the sort of proxy conflict that we have seen in Yemen. There are credible reports of Iranian and UAE drones being used in the conflict.

Dealing with such a complex set of issues will not be easy, but we cannot afford not to try. There are many other problems, from Ukraine to Gaza, that demand our urgent attention and that tend to distract us—but we cannot afford to be distracted. I indicated at the start of my speech that the conflict in Sudan is often referred to as the “forgotten war”. I am certainly not a fan of Leon Trotsky, but a slight adaptation of one of his maxims seems to me to be particularly apposite in this situation. So, in conclusion, I will plagiarise him just this once: you may not be interested in the war in Sudan, but the war in Sudan is interested in you.