Scotland

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 4th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)]

I think my noble friend hits the nub of the issue. Yes, he is right, and I am happy to agree with him: it is the largest real-terms Budget settlement for the Scottish Government in the history of devolution. It is £1.5 billion in this financial year and will be £3.4 billion in the next. The point he made is that how that money is spent is really important. We have seen poorer outcomes in Scotland for people in the National Health Service, with longer waiting lists, and educational standards have not increased as they should. This is where that money should be focused—to deliver real benefits for the people of Scotland.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, would the Leader agree that the presence of one of the RAF’s main operating bases on the Moray Firth and one of the Navy’s at Faslane, along with a number of Army units, reflect the strategic importance of Scotland within the union? They bring significant economic benefit to those areas, a situation that would be greatly enhanced if this Government could ever get around to funding defence of the realm adequately.

Taiwan

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 17th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

There are two questions there. The first is: what is our relationship with the People’s Republic of China? It is one of co-operation, particularly when we need to address those global issues, but we will confront China, when we need to, particularly on human rights issues, which the noble Lord has raised on repeated occasions. On Taiwan, we are quite clear about the need for peaceful dialogue to resolve these issues. The Taiwan Strait is of interest globally, but particularly to the United Kingdom in terms of our trade routes. Dialogue is what we will try to seek to ensure that we have a peaceful approach to these issues.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the Chinese are placing great emphasis on, and putting great effort into, what is known as cognitive warfare, which seeks to undermine the structures, processes and will of the West—not least through AI. This is a serious threat to our society; we are playing catch-up, and we are playing it too slowly. With that in mind, will the Minister remind the Foreign Secretary, before he goes to Beijing, of Virgil’s famous line:

“Timeo danaos et dona ferentes”,


although, in this case, it is the Chinese, rather than Greeks, bearing gifts whom he should fear?

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

Well, I think I understand the point of the noble and gallant Lord’s question. The fact is that Taiwan’s biggest trading partner is the People’s Republic. Trading across the globe with China is huge; it is its second biggest economy. It is also vital in terms of addressing those challenges that we face on climate. We therefore need to ensure that we have dialogue and co-operation. But we understand the other issues that the noble and gallant Lord has raised, which is why we committed to in opposition—and will deliver in government—a complete audit of our relationship with China as a bilateral and global actor to improve our ability to understand and respond to not only the opportunities but the challenges that China poses.

Sudan

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Friday 13th September 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton of Upholland, who brings great expertise to these proceedings. Indeed, the number and experience of all noble Lords assembled here for this debate, on a Friday on the eve of recess, are perhaps an indicator that, in this place at least, Sudan is not a forgotten war. I am grateful to the Minister for giving us the opportunity to demonstrate as much.

We have heard many moving speeches today about the terrible situation in Sudan and the plight of its people, with 50% of the population in need of humanitarian assistance and 8.5 million people at emergency levels of food insecurity. Nearly three-quarters of the country’s health facilities are out of service and 19 million children are out of school, 7.4 million of them without access to safe water. Simple human feeling ought to provide sufficient motivation to do all that we can to alleviate that suffering, and to bring an end to the conflict, which, of course, is a necessary precondition if such alleviation is to be really effective.

I want to go beyond that. Picking up some of the strands that have already emerged this morning, I want to set out some of the harder-headed—some might even think cold-blooded—reasons of national self-interest why the people of the UK ought to be greatly concerned about what might seem to many of them to be a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing.

First, Sudan is degenerating into a large, chaotic and ungoverned space. We have learned to our cost the consequences of letting such areas develop and fester, and we have learned how extraordinarily difficult they are to tackle once they do develop. They become breeding-grounds for extremist groups whose malign influence spreads far beyond their own borders and can all too easily affect, both directly and indirectly, the security of this country.

A failed Sudan could provide an ideal environment for criminal and terrorist networks. It is already a route for arms smuggling, and it could become a major exporter of violence. The instability that creates such conditions could well spread to neighbouring states. Ethiopia, Eritrea and the states of the Sahel are already fragile polities, and such stability as they do enjoy, limited though it may be, could be significantly undermined by the knock-on effects of the Sudan conflict.

All this poses serious risks to the UK. Al-Qaeda and Islamic State are on the lookout for just the kind of opportunities that Sudan now provides. There are reports that the Houthis have been in discussions about co-operation with al-Shabaab, and there is scope for a widening and deepening of jihadist movements in the region. This should alarm us all.

Secondly, as we have heard, there is the potential impact on the security of the Red Sea routes. The Houthis have already demonstrated how easily commercial traffic through that area can be disrupted, and they forced us, in concert with others, to respond militarily. The conflict in Sudan could make these recent challenges look like small beer. An article in a recent edition of the Economist quotes a senior member of the Sudanese Armed Forces as saying:

“If Sudan collapses, the Horn of Africa collapses. It will be a great economic hindrance for Europe and America … Navigation will be impossible”.


The source of this quote may not be a disinterested observer, but the view expressed has been supported by others. If it is accurate, the consequences for this country would be so severe that some kind of response, probably military, would be inevitable. Even if the risk is only moderately likely, surely it would be better for us if we could pre-empt such a situation before it has a chance to develop. Surely the promotion of stability in the Horn of Africa is an important strategic objective for the UK. If so, the conflict in Sudan becomes a matter of strategic importance too.

Thirdly, there is the question of refugees. A fifth of the population has been made homeless, and they face the prospect of a deadly famine that could kill millions. At the moment, staying put looks like a death sentence, and the surrounding countries are probably not that appealing to them either. Europe would seem a much better bet and, as we have heard, some reports suggest that already 60% of the refugees in the camps around Calais are Sudanese. Can the Minister comment on that? Even if the exact figure is in question, we have heard from the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury that there is other evidence of growing numbers of Sudanese migrants. So the people-smuggling routes are likely to see—indeed, they are already seeing —a great upswell in business as a consequence of the war, and the traffic in human misery will increase yet further.

All this will put further pressure on European countries, including ours, that are currently struggling and failing to deal with illegal migration and its consequences. The rise in right-wing extremist parties will continue as a consequence, and the strains on our political and social fabrics will increase further. Surely such a prospect makes the war in Sudan a crucial issue for us, as well as for France, Germany and the other countries of the EU.

So, the demands of conscience and humanity apart, there are pressing reasons why the UK should view the war in Sudan as a strategic threat and should respond accordingly. But that response must, of course, be part of a wider and coherent international effort on both the aid and diplomatic fronts. Getting sufficient help to the population to stave off famine, and to dissuade them from putting themselves into the hands of the people smugglers, must be the immediate priority.

Beyond this, though, we need to help, encourage, develop and support the involvement of a group of international actors, including the United States and the EU, that will be sufficiently powerful to force an end to external support for, and involvement in, the war. Without such support and involvement, the internal factions would find it much more difficult to prolong the conflict.

Of course, the UAE is the principal, but not the only, culprit here. Russia is reportedly obtaining what is referred to as an “outpost” in Port Sudan in exchange for fuel and arms. Iran, too, is seeking a naval base on Sudan’s coast, which would certainly alarm Saudi Arabia and perhaps lead to the sort of proxy conflict that we have seen in Yemen. There are credible reports of Iranian and UAE drones being used in the conflict.

Dealing with such a complex set of issues will not be easy, but we cannot afford not to try. There are many other problems, from Ukraine to Gaza, that demand our urgent attention and that tend to distract us—but we cannot afford to be distracted. I indicated at the start of my speech that the conflict in Sudan is often referred to as the “forgotten war”. I am certainly not a fan of Leon Trotsky, but a slight adaptation of one of his maxims seems to me to be particularly apposite in this situation. So, in conclusion, I will plagiarise him just this once: you may not be interested in the war in Sudan, but the war in Sudan is interested in you.

Military Interventions Overseas

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 25th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, the Cabinet Manual is actually under review at the moment. The noble Baroness rightly refers to the 2011 manual, but even that says the convention would be observed

“except when there was an emergency and such action would not be appropriate”,

and there are occasions when it might not be appropriate. The Defence Secretary issued a Written Ministerial Statement in April 2016 that elaborated on the manual, and that is the Government’s position.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, does the Leader agree that His Majesty’s Armed Forces place great importance on having the support of the British people, not least expressed through their representatives in Parliament, for the difficult and dangerous actions that they carry out on their country’s behalf, but that at the same time they need to retain the elements of surprise and security that are essential not just to their success but to their safety, and that therefore a degree of flexibility is important in this regard?

[Lord True (Con)]

I strongly agree with the point made by the noble and gallant Lord. I certainly agree with the first part—wherever possible, Parliament should be notified, involved and informed, and every Government of whatever colour should remember that they are stronger when they have the people’s Parliament behind them—but the second part of his intervention is paramount.

NHS: General Medical Practitioners

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 20th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Evans of Rainow (Con)]

The noble Baroness is absolutely right. GP practices’ premises vary throughout the country but, as I said earlier, there is capital funding available for new practices. From my own experience, when GP practices merge it gives an opportunity for them to have a purpose-built building. When I was a Member of Parliament there was a very good example of that where four GP practices throughout the constituency came together to form an outstanding modern GP practice with a new GP practice building.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, it is the turn of the Cross Benches.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, it is clear that allowing doctors to spend more time with their patients would permit more searching diagnoses, leading to fewer unnecessary referrals and helping to take some of the pressure off secondary care waiting lists. What allowance has been made for this in the calculation of the total GP requirement?

[Lord Evans of Rainow (Con)]

The noble and gallant Lord raises a very important point. The delivery plan for recovering access is backed by a major investment in primary care services, up to £645 million over two years, to expand services such as community pharmacies. Getting more people to use community pharmacies and other such facilities enables GPs to focus on exactly what the noble and gallant Lord is talking about: those people who need to have diagnoses and very quick scans in hospitals.

Long-Term Strategic Challenges Posed by China

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 19th October 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, welcome this important debate, but what a pity that we could not have held it a year ago, following the report of your Lordships’ International Relations and Defence Committee on the UK’s security and trade relationship with China, rather than the meagre and truncated affair we had in the Moses Room at the time. The passage of a year has, however, not diminished the report’s arguments. Its central thrust remains as valid today as it was then, and is reflected in the second part of its title: “a strategic void”.

In his opening remarks, the noble Earl made frequent reference to the Government’s integrated review and its subsequent refresh. That review contained many aspirations and listed many activities, including in the sections on China and the Indo-Pacific, and it is difficult to disagree with them. But lists are not strategies; nor, frankly, are the pillars to which he referred. They do not aid clarity; indeed, they often confuse. A fundamental aspect of a strategy is a clear sense of priority. The International Relations and Defence Committee’s report, like that of the Foreign Affairs Committee in another place, called on the Government to produce a strategy which would set out a prioritised framework for dealing with China, and, indeed, suggested what such a strategy might look like.

In their response, the Government seem to suggest that they have a strategy, but that they are not going to tell us what it is for security reasons. This, if it was more than just camouflage, is, to say the least, unconvincing. No one expects the Government to reveal exact plans, specific means and tactical details, if indeed they exist. I for one certainly acknowledge that intentional ambiguity can be useful in certain situations, but businesses wishing to engage with China need a clear idea of the risks they might be running. Academic institutions, too, need a sense of how the Government might react to certain developments on the international scene. They do not need to know exactly what those reactions would be, but they need to be aware of where the Government’s priorities are.

The issue of Taiwan is clearly the most dangerous aspect of our engagement with China. Supporting that country’s independence while avoiding a general war over it should be our top priority. President Xi’s statements in recent years have only added to the tension over Taiwan. The Government’s response to the report acknowledged the importance of the issue, as did the noble Earl. However, the Government have not said what assessments have been made of the risk of likelihood of conflict and its possible consequences, particularly for the UK. This is not an area where I would look for detail, but I do look for an assurance that such work is in hand.

Beyond that, it is clear that China is, as one of the inquiry’s witnesses put it, out to make the world safe for autocracy. Events over recent months have served only to reinforce that judgment—witness President Xi’s comments at the belt and road forum in Beijing yesterday. Meanwhile, as we have heard, the head of the Security Service has said that China is engaging in an “epic scale” of espionage. The fact that he was making common cause with the heads of security of the other members of the Five Eyes partnership at an unprecedented public event should give us pause.

The Government’s response to the International Relations and Defence Committee’s report admitted:

“Aspects of China’s approach to the multilateral system run counter to UK interests and values”.


The response went on:

“We will continue to take targeted action with international partners to defend universal human rights, free and fair trade, and ensure that in areas, such as emerging technology or space, that new rules, norms and standards enable freedom and democracy to survive and thrive”.


This is woefully inadequate. It makes the whole thing sound like a piece of peripheral business. In fact, we are—or certainly should be—engaged in a fierce contest to determine the rules of the international order under which we will have to live and operate for most of the rest of this century. Very few things could be more central to our future welfare and prosperity. Securing the right outcome should be one of the highest foreign policy priorities for the UK. It certainly is for the United States. President Biden has made his Administration’s position very clear on this and has set about assembling the necessary international economic, technological and military weight to counter that of China.

None of this is to argue against the desirability of business, academic and cultural links with China, but setting out the UK’s priorities in this regard would make it clear that those other areas of engagement would all be contingent upon the pursuit of our objectives regarding the international order. This would be a much clearer and harder-edged statement of intent than a general reference to our national interest. It is difficult to see how spelling this out would endanger our security. It would, however, give those in business and elsewhere a clearer idea of the downside risks associated with such engagement. As it is, if one reads the Government’s comments regarding Huawei, for example, one gets the clear impression that this company would now have a substantial hold over our 5G network had the Americans not rather annoyingly imposed additional sanctions on them. The Government’s response to the committee’s report said that the National Security and Investment Act is “country agnostic”. That might be true with regard to the wording of the Act, but to suggest that the same is true of its application seems to be breathtakingly complacent. I welcome the fact that the noble Earl was somewhat more robust on this point today.

The principal risk for UK business is the likely adverse China reaction to our opposition in the contest to determine the future rules of the international order. The committee called on the Government to conduct an impact assessment of such an outcome. The Government’s response was a fine example of departmental waffle. Let me offer some examples:

“The … relationship … is multifaceted … We will … manage disagreements and defend our values while preserving space for cooperation in tackling … positive trade and investment relationship in line with our national security and values”.


It is cakeism at its best. But what do we do if somebody takes away the cake? We are given no answer.

This Panglossian approach was equally evident in the Government’s response on higher education, which said:

“We will also ensure that Chinese students are treated equally to all British and international students, including protecting them from any undue pressure on political issues”.


Really? How? Are we going to ensure that their families in China are protected from official pressure or sanction? Are we going to monitor all their interactions with their own Government? Or perhaps these matters do not fall under the heading of “undue pressure”.

The Government’s response on supply chain resilience was little better. We were told:

“The Foreign Secretary has been clear that it is important that the UK does not become strategically dependent, and that, particularly in areas of Critical National Infrastructure, we work with reliable partners”.


The noble Earl repeated such assurances in his opening remarks today. What action has followed? What exercises have been undertaken with a range of scenarios to give us a better idea of critical vulnerabilities and how these might be reduced? What specific command and control processes have been set in place to train for and respond to threats to our national resilience? Once again, we have been given only vague reassurances.

I hope that the Minister might be a little more forthcoming when he winds up this debate, because the Government could and should do much better. We are dealing with an increasingly autocratic regime in China. Our experiences with Russia over the past decade should have taught us what we should never have forgotten: how dangerous such regimes can be, especially when they are militarily powerful and most especially when they have nuclear weapons. We need a long-term strategy for dealing with them.

The Government should set out such a strategy; they should give some shape and sense of priority to their otherwise all too comprehensive and sometimes contradictory aspirations with regard to China. The International Relations and Defence Committee proposed such a shape: finding a satisfactory but peaceful outcome to the Taiwan issue is at the top, but close behind it comes our pursuit of an international order that is fair to all and helps to protect the world from autocracy. Trade and wider engagement with China should be pursued, but not at the expense of higher priority objectives and in the knowledge that such prioritisation will at times lead to Chinese retaliation and will give rise to associated and sometimes severe risks. How much longer must we wait for some clarity on these issues?

In a leader article on China last year, the Economist said:

“handling the most powerful dictatorship in history was always going to require both strength and wisdom”.

It was not clear to me then, and it is not much clearer to me now, that we see enough of either.

British Army: Troop Size

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, through history, the same effects have been delivered by fewer and fewer people due to the smart employment of new technology. In our own day, robotics and artificial intelligence play into exactly the same trend: in reconnaissance, one drone can do a job done by scores of people in the past. So this emphasis on the integration of emerging technology will make an enormous difference to the capability of the Army and indeed across the Armed Forces.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Earl made reference to Future Soldier. Can he tell the House by what date this country will be able to field a full fighting division, with all of the necessary attendant capabilities, including combat and logistics support and adequate weapon stocks?

[Earl Howe (Con)]

The noble and gallant Lord is well aware that we are not in a place that we would wish to be in, which is exactly why Future Soldier has defined the path over the next few years. The Army is designed to fight; it will remain that way, and we will ensure that it is equipped to do so.

Afghanistan

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Wednesday 18th August 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I will make just three points. First, the strategic purpose of our engagement in Afghanistan, for which so many brave people sacrificed life and limb, was to prevent that country being, or becoming again, a safe haven for international terrorist groups. This remained our purpose right up until these last weeks. It was not, as President Biden has implied, about educating girls or supporting other civil reforms. Worthy though such objectives are, they were, in a strategic sense, ways of achieving the end, not the end itself. Now, it seems, that strategic purpose is at risk. The Taliban leaders have said they will not allow terrorist groups to re-establish themselves in Afghanistan—but, judging by the rapidity with which they have ignored other undertakings, we must surely assume that this one will be equally ephemeral. Perhaps the Minister can say where this leaves our counterterrorism strategy.

Secondly, President Biden has suggested that the Afghans are not prepared to fight for their own country. But this ignores two facts. The first is the very large number of Afghan security forces personnel who have been killed on operations over the past two decades, and the second is that Afghan society has always placed much greater importance on loyalty to family, village and clan than to a central Government. In such a society, a military force modelled on the US army could never, in the short term, endure without the logistical, technical and moral support of the US armed forces. Once that was withdrawn, its collapse was both predictable and predicted. In another two or three decades it might have been different, but not today.

Thirdly, President Biden purportedly wishes to withdraw from Afghanistan in order to concentrate on China. Yet his actions have immediately benefited China on several fronts. China is increasingly engaged commercially in Afghanistan and has been negotiating with the Taliban. Taken together with Pakistan’s increasing reliance on China, this creates a disturbing nexus of power in the region. Even more important is the perception of other countries. If the western powers are to resist China’s assault on the current rules-based international order, they will require strong political, economic and technological allies in the Indo-Pacific region. Who now, though, will be prepared to throw in their lot with a US-led effort, when that country’s leadership has proved such a fickle friend to Afghanistan? Perhaps the Minister can say what the implications are for the UK’s own tilt to the Indo-Pacific, which was such a prominent feature of the recent integrated review.

For now, though, we must concentrate on fulfilling our moral obligations to those Afghans who have supported us so well over the years. We owe them no less. The Government have said that they will be generous in this regard; I trust that their actions will match their fine words.

House of Lords: Remote Participation and Hybrid Sittings

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 20th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, pace the noble Earl the Deputy Leader, I hope that I will not be thought too tiresomely repetitive if I start by adding my thanks to the staff of the House, who have worked so hard and to such good effect, putting in place, maintaining and operating the systems and processes that have enabled us to continue to function over the past year. Their ingenuity and perseverance have been remarkable.

However, for all their efforts, we should not imagine that our current modus operandi is anything other than a necessary but uncomfortably restrictive contingency. “Why should this be so?”, some ask. “Surely, in the second decade of the 21st century, we should be updating our processes to take account of new technology. Is this not what is happening in other fields?” Well, to some degree.

Many enterprises are indeed allowing, and will continue to allow, a degree of remote working—but this is not the same as holding virtual meetings. These do of course take place; I have had experience of them over many years. They can bring considerable benefits: most importantly, the ability to annihilate space and bring people together virtually when they cannot be present physically is particularly useful.

Nevertheless, it has also been my experience that, even in the wider world, virtual meetings have significant drawbacks. They are very good for the passing of information—for delivering reports and briefings—but, when it comes to the consideration and debate of difficult issues, their utility tends to decline significantly. They do not permit the to and fro of discussion that is crucial to a thorough examination of issues and views, and they tend to mute, if not eliminate, body language. Watching the reactions of listeners can be most instructive—if any noble Lords doubt that, I recommend looking around this Chamber some time.

Nor should we underestimate the impact of personal presence. I see many instances where the benefits of virtual proceedings have had to be abandoned because personal contact has been necessary to resolve difficult issues. Human interactions go beyond things that can be transmitted electronically—so technology can be a boon, but it can also severely hamper communication.

I formed these conclusions several years ago, but they have only been strengthened by my experience of the past 12 months. Yes, we have been able to sustain wide involvement in the proceedings of the House—but those proceedings have lost the spark of spontaneity. Yes, we have been able to make our views heard—but we have not debated. Yes, we have been able to follow pre-planned paths of discussion—but we have not been able to challenge assertions or explore newly opened vistas, and this has been true in Questions as well as in debate.

The noble Earl the Deputy Leader mentioned another unfortunate consequence: it has become harder for the Government Front Bench to assess the mood of the House. This is not just about numbers: there is something a little remote about dissenting views expressed on screen, no matter how strongly they are put. But a Minister facing a Chamber well peopled with noble Lords expressing their opposition, not just in individual speeches but in the atmosphere they generate, is left in no doubt of the position—as indeed many have acknowledged in the past.

Committee work too has become more difficult. The lack of agility that online hearings have imposed on us has, in my view, made it harder to interrogate witnesses satisfactorily or discuss their evidence in a properly dialectic way. However, I acknowledge the benefit of hearing from witnesses who are too distant to be able to participate in person—not least those from overseas.

Like other noble Lords, I believe that remote participation has led to a diminution in the power of Parliament as against that of the Executive. The demands of the current crisis have of course been the main driver behind this trend, but remote participation has made the problem worse. If we are to slow, let alone reverse, this unwelcome process, we need to return as quickly as possible to more normal proceedings.

There is still the question of whether some aspects of the present system might be retained in the longer term in order to improve efficiency. Well, it is difficult to see much scope for this if we are to adhere to the principle that all participants are to be treated equally. For my part, I rather like the system of electronic, as opposed to remote, voting, although I understand that many noble Lords are opposed to continuing with it. However, this is one innovation that would fit neatly into our previous practices.

We should be grateful for hybrid proceedings and for the way that they have allowed us to continue our work—after a fashion. But I strongly believe that the health of our parliamentary system requires a return to physical presence in your Lordships’ Chamber and in committees as soon as possible.

Integrated Review

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 23rd November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Evans of Bowes Park (Con)]

My noble friend is absolutely right. That is certainly what we intend to do. On AI, for instance, the MoD is working with partners across government, UK industry and academia, and will invest in AI hubs to test and develop new models of collaboration and co-creation. On space, Space Command will be staffed jointly from the three services, the Civil Service and key members of the commercial sector, and will bring together three functions: space operations, space workforce generation and space capability. Such working together, as my noble friend set out, is at the centre of our approach, particularly in these new and emerging technologies.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

Although the UK will still be spending a smaller percentage of its GDP on its defence than at the end of the previous decade, I welcome the financial settlement and the commitment to new and emerging technologies. However, conflict tends to bring with it rather unpleasant surprises. Will the noble Baroness the Leader therefore confirm that the four structures and processes that will be set out in the integrated review will retain the necessary agility and adaptability to enable us to respond effectively to those things that we did not or could not foresee?

[Baroness Evans of Bowes Park (Con)]

The noble and gallant Lord is absolutely right. Flexibility and being able to adapt to emerging threats are certainly at the heart of what this review will look to do. A lot of our investment in new technologies is based on the very issues that he raises: that we need to be able to adapt, because what we face now may not be what we face in years to come. We are all cognisant of that.