Sudan: Ceasefire Talks

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 20th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

The noble Lord knows that has been my clear ambition from the contributions I have made in this House, and certainly from the contact we have made with all civilian groups in trying to bring them together to plan for a Sudanese country free from military rule and led by civilians. He also knows that both warring parties have announced or attempted to set up Governments. We are avoiding any efforts to do that. We want a unified Sudan under a legitimate Sudanese civilian Government. In the meantime, we need to focus on ensuring that we can establish a process for ceasefire, peace and, of course, humanitarian access.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, at yesterday’s summit the UK and the EU undertook to engage and co-operate further on priority regions such as the Horn of Africa. Can the Minister confirm that this will include, as a matter of priority, acting together to counter the malign and destabilising influence of Russia in Sudan and the region more widely?

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

I can confirm that. The noble and gallant Lord knows better than most that Russia’s actions, particularly in Sudan, have been to ensure the war continues. It has been actively engaged in both sides. He is absolutely right; we know what Russia is doing, and we are ensuring that we focus on those institutions through which we can develop a way forward that supports African-led and civilian-led Sudanese government. That is our priority.

UK Strategy Towards the Arctic (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 9th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to participate in this debate, which was so ably introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde, the excellent chair of the International Relations and Defence Committee during the period of the inquiry. It is also a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, who was the inspiration for the inquiry.

In the considerable time since the report was published, the two underlying issues that have driven so many of the conclusions have not changed. Polar ice is continuing to melt and, partly as a consequence of that and partly because of wider international stresses, the Arctic has moved from being an area of co-operation to one of contest and, potentially, conflict. This has to be of fundamental concern to the UK. Our geographical location means that instability in the Arctic threatens the security and prosperity of these islands, and we should therefore devote the necessary care, time and resource to protecting ourselves in this regard.

As the report makes clear, the Arctic is likely to see a dramatic increase in destination shipping over the coming years. There are two main reasons for that. The first is the increasingly accessible resources, particularly subsurface resources, in the area. The second is the geostrategic importance of the region, particularly to the nations that wish to reshape and then dominate the international order over the coming years.

Both issues have attracted the attention of the Chinese Communist Party, which has declared China a “near-Arctic state”. Although in 2013 Russia was reluctant to grant China observer status in the Arctic Council, events have moved on considerably since then. Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has left it increasingly beholden to the Chinese for their support. There seems little doubt that over the coming years China will increasingly leverage that alliance into greater involvement in the Arctic. That involvement may be, at least initially, in pursuit of scientific and economic benefits, but it would bring China into NATO’s backyard, with all the scope for misunderstanding, accident or even direct competition that this would involve.

Meanwhile, Russia, which owns some 50% of the Arctic littoral, retains a significant military presence in the region. The war in Ukraine has impacted its ground forces in the Arctic, but its maritime and aviation forces remain formidable. Of course, the accession to NATO of Finland and Sweden has added a new dimension to alliance challenges, as well as opportunities, in the Arctic. Competition for resources, tensions over environmental issues and the search by some for military advantage all create the conditions for instability and insecurity.

While most witnesses to the inquiry asserted that neither Russia nor China was likely to initiate a conflict in the Arctic, unlikely is not the same as impossible, especially given the risk of miscalculation. That risk is exacerbated by the much higher likelihood of grey zone operations in the region. For example, greater access to Arctic waters is likely to mean a considerable growth in undersea infrastructure there. We have seen from the recent incident involving the “Eagle S” tanker how aggressively Russia is seeking to disrupt such infrastructure. The report highlights several other grey zone activities that are possible or even likely in the Arctic. These in themselves are a threat to our security, but they could easily escalate into something even more serious. A conflict involving NATO which started elsewhere could, and almost certainly would, spread to the Arctic.

We have long had a close military relationship with our Norwegian partners. In my younger days I flew in many NATO exercises in the Arctic, guarding against a potential Soviet attack through the Finnmark gap. We also have newer but equally strong connections to Sweden and Finland. The Arctic is therefore not just an area of strategic importance to the UK but one where we have experience and expertise. This is reflected in our leadership of the Joint Expeditionary Force. Unfortunately, our partners in that organisation are becoming concerned about the weight of effort and the priority that we are according to this crucial role. They look to us to set a strong example and they are not seeing it.

The inquiry report also highlights the inadequacy of our air and maritime contributions to the High North, which is scarcely surprising given the small number of platforms available to the Navy and the Air Force and the many demands placed on them. These are all particularly serious consequences of our already inadequate military capabilities being spread too thinly. The security of the Arctic is crucial to the safety of the UK, so we have a vested interest in deterring conflict in the High North. To do so, we and our partners in the Joint Expeditionary Force need to demonstrate the capabilities and the will to counter Russian aggression effectively. We are failing seriously and falling short in that regard.

We also need the capabilities and will to deal with grey zone operations in a way that protects our interests and guards against escalation. The recent announcement that the UK will lead Operation Nordic Warden in response to the threat to undersea infrastructure is welcome, but where are the necessary resources to be found? The forthcoming defence review needs to set out the unanswerable case for an increase in the defence budget to at least 3% of GDP, but it also needs to take a much more ruthless and realistic approach to priorities than its recent predecessors did. It must make clear that the security of the Arctic is of fundamental importance to the UK and should therefore be resourced accordingly.

Scotland

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 4th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)]

I think my noble friend hits the nub of the issue. Yes, he is right, and I am happy to agree with him: it is the largest real-terms Budget settlement for the Scottish Government in the history of devolution. It is £1.5 billion in this financial year and will be £3.4 billion in the next. The point he made is that how that money is spent is really important. We have seen poorer outcomes in Scotland for people in the National Health Service, with longer waiting lists, and educational standards have not increased as they should. This is where that money should be focused—to deliver real benefits for the people of Scotland.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, would the Leader agree that the presence of one of the RAF’s main operating bases on the Moray Firth and one of the Navy’s at Faslane, along with a number of Army units, reflect the strategic importance of Scotland within the union? They bring significant economic benefit to those areas, a situation that would be greatly enhanced if this Government could ever get around to funding defence of the realm adequately.

Taiwan

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 17th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

There are two questions there. The first is: what is our relationship with the People’s Republic of China? It is one of co-operation, particularly when we need to address those global issues, but we will confront China, when we need to, particularly on human rights issues, which the noble Lord has raised on repeated occasions. On Taiwan, we are quite clear about the need for peaceful dialogue to resolve these issues. The Taiwan Strait is of interest globally, but particularly to the United Kingdom in terms of our trade routes. Dialogue is what we will try to seek to ensure that we have a peaceful approach to these issues.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the Chinese are placing great emphasis on, and putting great effort into, what is known as cognitive warfare, which seeks to undermine the structures, processes and will of the West—not least through AI. This is a serious threat to our society; we are playing catch-up, and we are playing it too slowly. With that in mind, will the Minister remind the Foreign Secretary, before he goes to Beijing, of Virgil’s famous line:

“Timeo danaos et dona ferentes”,


although, in this case, it is the Chinese, rather than Greeks, bearing gifts whom he should fear?

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

Well, I think I understand the point of the noble and gallant Lord’s question. The fact is that Taiwan’s biggest trading partner is the People’s Republic. Trading across the globe with China is huge; it is its second biggest economy. It is also vital in terms of addressing those challenges that we face on climate. We therefore need to ensure that we have dialogue and co-operation. But we understand the other issues that the noble and gallant Lord has raised, which is why we committed to in opposition—and will deliver in government—a complete audit of our relationship with China as a bilateral and global actor to improve our ability to understand and respond to not only the opportunities but the challenges that China poses.

Sudan

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Friday 13th September 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton of Upholland, who brings great expertise to these proceedings. Indeed, the number and experience of all noble Lords assembled here for this debate, on a Friday on the eve of recess, are perhaps an indicator that, in this place at least, Sudan is not a forgotten war. I am grateful to the Minister for giving us the opportunity to demonstrate as much.

We have heard many moving speeches today about the terrible situation in Sudan and the plight of its people, with 50% of the population in need of humanitarian assistance and 8.5 million people at emergency levels of food insecurity. Nearly three-quarters of the country’s health facilities are out of service and 19 million children are out of school, 7.4 million of them without access to safe water. Simple human feeling ought to provide sufficient motivation to do all that we can to alleviate that suffering, and to bring an end to the conflict, which, of course, is a necessary precondition if such alleviation is to be really effective.

I want to go beyond that. Picking up some of the strands that have already emerged this morning, I want to set out some of the harder-headed—some might even think cold-blooded—reasons of national self-interest why the people of the UK ought to be greatly concerned about what might seem to many of them to be a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing.

First, Sudan is degenerating into a large, chaotic and ungoverned space. We have learned to our cost the consequences of letting such areas develop and fester, and we have learned how extraordinarily difficult they are to tackle once they do develop. They become breeding-grounds for extremist groups whose malign influence spreads far beyond their own borders and can all too easily affect, both directly and indirectly, the security of this country.

A failed Sudan could provide an ideal environment for criminal and terrorist networks. It is already a route for arms smuggling, and it could become a major exporter of violence. The instability that creates such conditions could well spread to neighbouring states. Ethiopia, Eritrea and the states of the Sahel are already fragile polities, and such stability as they do enjoy, limited though it may be, could be significantly undermined by the knock-on effects of the Sudan conflict.

All this poses serious risks to the UK. Al-Qaeda and Islamic State are on the lookout for just the kind of opportunities that Sudan now provides. There are reports that the Houthis have been in discussions about co-operation with al-Shabaab, and there is scope for a widening and deepening of jihadist movements in the region. This should alarm us all.

Secondly, as we have heard, there is the potential impact on the security of the Red Sea routes. The Houthis have already demonstrated how easily commercial traffic through that area can be disrupted, and they forced us, in concert with others, to respond militarily. The conflict in Sudan could make these recent challenges look like small beer. An article in a recent edition of the Economist quotes a senior member of the Sudanese Armed Forces as saying:

“If Sudan collapses, the Horn of Africa collapses. It will be a great economic hindrance for Europe and America … Navigation will be impossible”.


The source of this quote may not be a disinterested observer, but the view expressed has been supported by others. If it is accurate, the consequences for this country would be so severe that some kind of response, probably military, would be inevitable. Even if the risk is only moderately likely, surely it would be better for us if we could pre-empt such a situation before it has a chance to develop. Surely the promotion of stability in the Horn of Africa is an important strategic objective for the UK. If so, the conflict in Sudan becomes a matter of strategic importance too.

Thirdly, there is the question of refugees. A fifth of the population has been made homeless, and they face the prospect of a deadly famine that could kill millions. At the moment, staying put looks like a death sentence, and the surrounding countries are probably not that appealing to them either. Europe would seem a much better bet and, as we have heard, some reports suggest that already 60% of the refugees in the camps around Calais are Sudanese. Can the Minister comment on that? Even if the exact figure is in question, we have heard from the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury that there is other evidence of growing numbers of Sudanese migrants. So the people-smuggling routes are likely to see—indeed, they are already seeing —a great upswell in business as a consequence of the war, and the traffic in human misery will increase yet further.

All this will put further pressure on European countries, including ours, that are currently struggling and failing to deal with illegal migration and its consequences. The rise in right-wing extremist parties will continue as a consequence, and the strains on our political and social fabrics will increase further. Surely such a prospect makes the war in Sudan a crucial issue for us, as well as for France, Germany and the other countries of the EU.

So, the demands of conscience and humanity apart, there are pressing reasons why the UK should view the war in Sudan as a strategic threat and should respond accordingly. But that response must, of course, be part of a wider and coherent international effort on both the aid and diplomatic fronts. Getting sufficient help to the population to stave off famine, and to dissuade them from putting themselves into the hands of the people smugglers, must be the immediate priority.

Beyond this, though, we need to help, encourage, develop and support the involvement of a group of international actors, including the United States and the EU, that will be sufficiently powerful to force an end to external support for, and involvement in, the war. Without such support and involvement, the internal factions would find it much more difficult to prolong the conflict.

Of course, the UAE is the principal, but not the only, culprit here. Russia is reportedly obtaining what is referred to as an “outpost” in Port Sudan in exchange for fuel and arms. Iran, too, is seeking a naval base on Sudan’s coast, which would certainly alarm Saudi Arabia and perhaps lead to the sort of proxy conflict that we have seen in Yemen. There are credible reports of Iranian and UAE drones being used in the conflict.

Dealing with such a complex set of issues will not be easy, but we cannot afford not to try. There are many other problems, from Ukraine to Gaza, that demand our urgent attention and that tend to distract us—but we cannot afford to be distracted. I indicated at the start of my speech that the conflict in Sudan is often referred to as the “forgotten war”. I am certainly not a fan of Leon Trotsky, but a slight adaptation of one of his maxims seems to me to be particularly apposite in this situation. So, in conclusion, I will plagiarise him just this once: you may not be interested in the war in Sudan, but the war in Sudan is interested in you.

Military Interventions Overseas

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 25th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, the Cabinet Manual is actually under review at the moment. The noble Baroness rightly refers to the 2011 manual, but even that says the convention would be observed

“except when there was an emergency and such action would not be appropriate”,

and there are occasions when it might not be appropriate. The Defence Secretary issued a Written Ministerial Statement in April 2016 that elaborated on the manual, and that is the Government’s position.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, does the Leader agree that His Majesty’s Armed Forces place great importance on having the support of the British people, not least expressed through their representatives in Parliament, for the difficult and dangerous actions that they carry out on their country’s behalf, but that at the same time they need to retain the elements of surprise and security that are essential not just to their success but to their safety, and that therefore a degree of flexibility is important in this regard?

[Lord True (Con)]

I strongly agree with the point made by the noble and gallant Lord. I certainly agree with the first part—wherever possible, Parliament should be notified, involved and informed, and every Government of whatever colour should remember that they are stronger when they have the people’s Parliament behind them—but the second part of his intervention is paramount.

NHS: General Medical Practitioners

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 20th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Evans of Rainow (Con)]

The noble Baroness is absolutely right. GP practices’ premises vary throughout the country but, as I said earlier, there is capital funding available for new practices. From my own experience, when GP practices merge it gives an opportunity for them to have a purpose-built building. When I was a Member of Parliament there was a very good example of that where four GP practices throughout the constituency came together to form an outstanding modern GP practice with a new GP practice building.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, it is the turn of the Cross Benches.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, it is clear that allowing doctors to spend more time with their patients would permit more searching diagnoses, leading to fewer unnecessary referrals and helping to take some of the pressure off secondary care waiting lists. What allowance has been made for this in the calculation of the total GP requirement?

[Lord Evans of Rainow (Con)]

The noble and gallant Lord raises a very important point. The delivery plan for recovering access is backed by a major investment in primary care services, up to £645 million over two years, to expand services such as community pharmacies. Getting more people to use community pharmacies and other such facilities enables GPs to focus on exactly what the noble and gallant Lord is talking about: those people who need to have diagnoses and very quick scans in hospitals.

Long-Term Strategic Challenges Posed by China

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 19th October 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, welcome this important debate, but what a pity that we could not have held it a year ago, following the report of your Lordships’ International Relations and Defence Committee on the UK’s security and trade relationship with China, rather than the meagre and truncated affair we had in the Moses Room at the time. The passage of a year has, however, not diminished the report’s arguments. Its central thrust remains as valid today as it was then, and is reflected in the second part of its title: “a strategic void”.

In his opening remarks, the noble Earl made frequent reference to the Government’s integrated review and its subsequent refresh. That review contained many aspirations and listed many activities, including in the sections on China and the Indo-Pacific, and it is difficult to disagree with them. But lists are not strategies; nor, frankly, are the pillars to which he referred. They do not aid clarity; indeed, they often confuse. A fundamental aspect of a strategy is a clear sense of priority. The International Relations and Defence Committee’s report, like that of the Foreign Affairs Committee in another place, called on the Government to produce a strategy which would set out a prioritised framework for dealing with China, and, indeed, suggested what such a strategy might look like.

In their response, the Government seem to suggest that they have a strategy, but that they are not going to tell us what it is for security reasons. This, if it was more than just camouflage, is, to say the least, unconvincing. No one expects the Government to reveal exact plans, specific means and tactical details, if indeed they exist. I for one certainly acknowledge that intentional ambiguity can be useful in certain situations, but businesses wishing to engage with China need a clear idea of the risks they might be running. Academic institutions, too, need a sense of how the Government might react to certain developments on the international scene. They do not need to know exactly what those reactions would be, but they need to be aware of where the Government’s priorities are.

The issue of Taiwan is clearly the most dangerous aspect of our engagement with China. Supporting that country’s independence while avoiding a general war over it should be our top priority. President Xi’s statements in recent years have only added to the tension over Taiwan. The Government’s response to the report acknowledged the importance of the issue, as did the noble Earl. However, the Government have not said what assessments have been made of the risk of likelihood of conflict and its possible consequences, particularly for the UK. This is not an area where I would look for detail, but I do look for an assurance that such work is in hand.

Beyond that, it is clear that China is, as one of the inquiry’s witnesses put it, out to make the world safe for autocracy. Events over recent months have served only to reinforce that judgment—witness President Xi’s comments at the belt and road forum in Beijing yesterday. Meanwhile, as we have heard, the head of the Security Service has said that China is engaging in an “epic scale” of espionage. The fact that he was making common cause with the heads of security of the other members of the Five Eyes partnership at an unprecedented public event should give us pause.

The Government’s response to the International Relations and Defence Committee’s report admitted:

“Aspects of China’s approach to the multilateral system run counter to UK interests and values”.


The response went on:

“We will continue to take targeted action with international partners to defend universal human rights, free and fair trade, and ensure that in areas, such as emerging technology or space, that new rules, norms and standards enable freedom and democracy to survive and thrive”.


This is woefully inadequate. It makes the whole thing sound like a piece of peripheral business. In fact, we are—or certainly should be—engaged in a fierce contest to determine the rules of the international order under which we will have to live and operate for most of the rest of this century. Very few things could be more central to our future welfare and prosperity. Securing the right outcome should be one of the highest foreign policy priorities for the UK. It certainly is for the United States. President Biden has made his Administration’s position very clear on this and has set about assembling the necessary international economic, technological and military weight to counter that of China.

None of this is to argue against the desirability of business, academic and cultural links with China, but setting out the UK’s priorities in this regard would make it clear that those other areas of engagement would all be contingent upon the pursuit of our objectives regarding the international order. This would be a much clearer and harder-edged statement of intent than a general reference to our national interest. It is difficult to see how spelling this out would endanger our security. It would, however, give those in business and elsewhere a clearer idea of the downside risks associated with such engagement. As it is, if one reads the Government’s comments regarding Huawei, for example, one gets the clear impression that this company would now have a substantial hold over our 5G network had the Americans not rather annoyingly imposed additional sanctions on them. The Government’s response to the committee’s report said that the National Security and Investment Act is “country agnostic”. That might be true with regard to the wording of the Act, but to suggest that the same is true of its application seems to be breathtakingly complacent. I welcome the fact that the noble Earl was somewhat more robust on this point today.

The principal risk for UK business is the likely adverse China reaction to our opposition in the contest to determine the future rules of the international order. The committee called on the Government to conduct an impact assessment of such an outcome. The Government’s response was a fine example of departmental waffle. Let me offer some examples:

“The … relationship … is multifaceted … We will … manage disagreements and defend our values while preserving space for cooperation in tackling … positive trade and investment relationship in line with our national security and values”.


It is cakeism at its best. But what do we do if somebody takes away the cake? We are given no answer.

This Panglossian approach was equally evident in the Government’s response on higher education, which said:

“We will also ensure that Chinese students are treated equally to all British and international students, including protecting them from any undue pressure on political issues”.


Really? How? Are we going to ensure that their families in China are protected from official pressure or sanction? Are we going to monitor all their interactions with their own Government? Or perhaps these matters do not fall under the heading of “undue pressure”.

The Government’s response on supply chain resilience was little better. We were told:

“The Foreign Secretary has been clear that it is important that the UK does not become strategically dependent, and that, particularly in areas of Critical National Infrastructure, we work with reliable partners”.


The noble Earl repeated such assurances in his opening remarks today. What action has followed? What exercises have been undertaken with a range of scenarios to give us a better idea of critical vulnerabilities and how these might be reduced? What specific command and control processes have been set in place to train for and respond to threats to our national resilience? Once again, we have been given only vague reassurances.

I hope that the Minister might be a little more forthcoming when he winds up this debate, because the Government could and should do much better. We are dealing with an increasingly autocratic regime in China. Our experiences with Russia over the past decade should have taught us what we should never have forgotten: how dangerous such regimes can be, especially when they are militarily powerful and most especially when they have nuclear weapons. We need a long-term strategy for dealing with them.

The Government should set out such a strategy; they should give some shape and sense of priority to their otherwise all too comprehensive and sometimes contradictory aspirations with regard to China. The International Relations and Defence Committee proposed such a shape: finding a satisfactory but peaceful outcome to the Taiwan issue is at the top, but close behind it comes our pursuit of an international order that is fair to all and helps to protect the world from autocracy. Trade and wider engagement with China should be pursued, but not at the expense of higher priority objectives and in the knowledge that such prioritisation will at times lead to Chinese retaliation and will give rise to associated and sometimes severe risks. How much longer must we wait for some clarity on these issues?

In a leader article on China last year, the Economist said:

“handling the most powerful dictatorship in history was always going to require both strength and wisdom”.

It was not clear to me then, and it is not much clearer to me now, that we see enough of either.

British Army: Troop Size

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, through history, the same effects have been delivered by fewer and fewer people due to the smart employment of new technology. In our own day, robotics and artificial intelligence play into exactly the same trend: in reconnaissance, one drone can do a job done by scores of people in the past. So this emphasis on the integration of emerging technology will make an enormous difference to the capability of the Army and indeed across the Armed Forces.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Earl made reference to Future Soldier. Can he tell the House by what date this country will be able to field a full fighting division, with all of the necessary attendant capabilities, including combat and logistics support and adequate weapon stocks?

[Earl Howe (Con)]

The noble and gallant Lord is well aware that we are not in a place that we would wish to be in, which is exactly why Future Soldier has defined the path over the next few years. The Army is designed to fight; it will remain that way, and we will ensure that it is equipped to do so.

Afghanistan

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Wednesday 18th August 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I will make just three points. First, the strategic purpose of our engagement in Afghanistan, for which so many brave people sacrificed life and limb, was to prevent that country being, or becoming again, a safe haven for international terrorist groups. This remained our purpose right up until these last weeks. It was not, as President Biden has implied, about educating girls or supporting other civil reforms. Worthy though such objectives are, they were, in a strategic sense, ways of achieving the end, not the end itself. Now, it seems, that strategic purpose is at risk. The Taliban leaders have said they will not allow terrorist groups to re-establish themselves in Afghanistan—but, judging by the rapidity with which they have ignored other undertakings, we must surely assume that this one will be equally ephemeral. Perhaps the Minister can say where this leaves our counterterrorism strategy.

Secondly, President Biden has suggested that the Afghans are not prepared to fight for their own country. But this ignores two facts. The first is the very large number of Afghan security forces personnel who have been killed on operations over the past two decades, and the second is that Afghan society has always placed much greater importance on loyalty to family, village and clan than to a central Government. In such a society, a military force modelled on the US army could never, in the short term, endure without the logistical, technical and moral support of the US armed forces. Once that was withdrawn, its collapse was both predictable and predicted. In another two or three decades it might have been different, but not today.

Thirdly, President Biden purportedly wishes to withdraw from Afghanistan in order to concentrate on China. Yet his actions have immediately benefited China on several fronts. China is increasingly engaged commercially in Afghanistan and has been negotiating with the Taliban. Taken together with Pakistan’s increasing reliance on China, this creates a disturbing nexus of power in the region. Even more important is the perception of other countries. If the western powers are to resist China’s assault on the current rules-based international order, they will require strong political, economic and technological allies in the Indo-Pacific region. Who now, though, will be prepared to throw in their lot with a US-led effort, when that country’s leadership has proved such a fickle friend to Afghanistan? Perhaps the Minister can say what the implications are for the UK’s own tilt to the Indo-Pacific, which was such a prominent feature of the recent integrated review.

For now, though, we must concentrate on fulfilling our moral obligations to those Afghans who have supported us so well over the years. We owe them no less. The Government have said that they will be generous in this regard; I trust that their actions will match their fine words.