Higher Education and Research Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Stevenson of Balmacara
Main Page: Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Stevenson of Balmacara's debates with the Department for Education
(7 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I briefly intervene in this debate to welcome the proposals that the Government have now brought before us. There is, as we recognised in debates at earlier stages, always a balance to be struck. On the one hand is protecting the interests of students, which must be paramount, and the reputation of British higher education as a whole. On the other hand, the fact is that most of the innovation and advances in higher education in England have occurred as a result of new providers coming in and doing things differently. The history of the growth in, and success of, higher education in our country has been that doing things differently from the start is easier than changing an existing body. The arrangements in the new clause today get that balance right.
If anything, the process will now be more rigorous and defined than the kind of process that we had when decisions on degree-awarding powers and university title were taken by, among other bodies, the Privy Council on advice. This is superior to what went before. I feel a bit wary of referring to the 1960s now that the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf, has referred to them. But the fact is that one of the most exciting experiments in the growth of higher education in this country in the 1960s was when universities got their title and degree-awarding powers from the very beginning. We should not be far more restrictive than we were then.
My Lords, it is worth reflecting that we had quite a long discussion of this issue in Committee, when opinions were more sharply divided than they are now. Amendment 116A, which has been spoken to and which we have put our name to, was originally drafted in slightly different terms. The balancing point between the end of the first part and the second part was that the new provider would have to be established for a minimum of four years with validation arrangements and that the QAC had to be assured that the provider could meet the required standards for the long term. We are listening and reflecting on what the Government say as much, I am sure, as they listen and reflect on what we say. We have decided to change our position on this and now align ourselves with the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf, who has spoken on this amendment. We are prepared to accept that it is a good balance. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, that we now have it about right. There is a route through which new institutions can come forward and receive degree-awarding powers: one of partnership and which has a minimum of four years. We would like to see that maintained because it has a value, but there is also the opportunity to be assessed and assured directly, without having to have a waiting period.
I am glad that, in all this debate, we have now lost the idea that there will in any sense be a probationary period; there will be no such thing as probationary degrees. We are talking about getting something up and started, which will have external value and be recognised by everyone in this country and abroad as a new institution that is of the standard required in UK higher education. We can therefore support this, which is why we are happy to sign up to the proposals in government Amendment 116. We acknowledge, although we did not sign up to them, that the new arrangements set out in the government amendments introduced by the Minister will be an effective and efficient way of carrying this forward. We support them but hope to amend the amendments that have been tabled.
The narrow point is about whether the Government’s proposals mean that new, innovative providers can come forward without what the Government allege has been a problem with trying to find validation, and the cost of that. Given that the information from the Minister’s department was that there were of the order of more than 400 new providers, of which just over 100 have degree-awarding powers already, there does not seem to be much of a problem here. We should not be too shaken into worrying about the status to which the higher education system in the UK might have fallen by having this new charge for innovation. I am a bit sceptical about that; it can be overstated. Nevertheless, I accept the general principles proposed here and we are therefore able to accept them. But the measures that are in place would be of value if the specific words in Amendment 116A, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf, were in place. I hope very much that, when it comes to it, she will invite the House to have an opinion on that.
My Lords, I have nothing against new providers coming in. I should declare that I taught for 14 years at the University of Essex, which was a new provider and which I think achieved very high standards. It was of course believed not to have done so until the first research assessment exercise, which revealed that it was doing very well.
However, the deep difference that we have not yet explored in this debate is that we used to assume that new providers, like old providers, would have a system of governance of a sort that we recognise in this country. We have talked quite cosily about the governing bodies of institutions, but it is not clear to me that that is an apt way of speaking about the full range of possible providers that might come forward under this more open scheme. In effect, the burden is being transferred from governing bodies to a regulator. A regulator may say that there are certain standards of governance that it thinks are important or even that it believes that university councils should undergo some sort of fit and proper person test. That would be a reasonable thought, but that is not in the Bill at present, so when we think about new providers, we must open our minds to the full range of possibilities, and we may wish to set some restrictions on the sorts of institutions that would be appropriate. I use the euphemism deliberately.
My Lords, my right reverend friend the Bishop of Winchester is unable to be in his place this evening, but I bring before your Lordships his Amendment 119A. I am grateful to the Minister for the constructive discussions we have had with him and his officials, and for co-sponsoring this amendment.
One of the features of the rich diversity of higher education provision is the power exercised by the Archbishop of Canterbury to confer degrees under the Ecclesiastical Licences Act 1533. It may help your Lordships to briefly recapitulate the background to this power. Lambeth degrees, as they are often colloquially termed, are now issued in one of two distinct ways.
The first of these is following examination or thesis under the direction of the Archbishop’s Examination in Theology, usually referred to as the AET. Since 2007, the AET has been offered as an MPhil research degree with the opportunity to extend to a PhD. This provision is already registered with HEFCE, and students following these programmes have access to the Office of the Independent Adjudicator, while the standards which apply are those which accord with the requirements of the QAA.
Archbishop Justin, the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury, places great emphasis on the rigour of the AET, and he is not alone in his belief that the course makes a valuable contribution to theological research. It enables those who may not otherwise be able to study for an English degree in any other way to do so. In particular, it opens up such opportunities to students across the Anglican Communion and makes a significant contribution to the development of further and higher education when those students return home.
The second route is the awarding of higher degrees—they are not always doctorates—in a range of disciplines to those who have served the Church in a particularly distinguished way and for whom an academic award would be particularly appropriate. Indeed, Members of your Lordships’ House have received such degrees, among them the noble Lord, Lord Sacks.
Although this is perhaps a less familiar part of the higher education landscape than some your Lordships have been considering, it is by no means merely a historical curiosity. These powers have been in active use ever since the passage of the 1533 Act and were recognised following the Education Reform Act 1988, by means of the inclusion of the Archbishop of Canterbury in the list of approved degree-awarding bodies in the relevant statutory instrument. Should your Lordships be eager for the reference, it is the Education (Recognised Bodies) Order 1988, No. 2036. These powers were left unaltered by the Further and Higher Education Act 1992.
The amendment ensures two things. First, it ensures that the Archbishop’s degree-awarding powers are appropriately safeguarded, both for those degrees conferred as a result of the submission of a thesis or the successful sitting of an examination or other form of academic assessment, and for degrees conferred on those who warrant an academic award for their scholarly or intellectual contribution to the work of the Church or to the place of faith in society. Secondly, the amendment properly brings within the new regulatory framework those awards—via the AET—which will now fall under the oversight of the Office for Students.
My Lords, I briefly express our support, as shown by the fact that we have signed up to those amendments on revoking degree-awarding powers, introduced by the Minister. We had a good discussion of this in Committee, and it was an area of concern to many noble Lords. We had thought of tabling an amendment to try to pick up on a couple of areas that seemed unresolved. However, after discussion and reflection with both the Bill team and the Minister we were able to sign up to the group and we are therefore happy with what is now before us.
We are also pleased that the amendment in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Winchester has been accepted by the Government. We have all had trouble when we have had to address right reverend Prelates in their place, and the idea that we also have to stumble over the words “holder of degree-awarding powers” when referring to the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury is another thought that will make it even more difficult to engage with them in future. We are very pleased that the Archbishop has these powers and, since 1533, an unbroken record of awards of degrees that we will recognise in future through this legislative process.
There is only one question left in my mind. The Government have been very good in bringing forward Amendment 196, which records in the Act that no provision of the Bill may be used to revoke an institution’s royal charter—with the rather weasel words—“in its entirety”. It does not mean to say that the Government will not revoke parts of the royal charter. I do not expect a response today, but perhaps the Minister might write to us with some examples of how that power might be used in future. I ask the slightly deeper question: since we are now fully aware of the powers of the Privy Council—which seem to include the ability to go and get from Her Majesty the Queen in Council changes to any royal charter, including that of the BBC, without much publicity ever occurring—why on earth have the Government decided to put this forward in the Bill at all? I would be very interested to receive that answer. With that slight aside, I am happy to support the amendments.
My Lords, first, I will be happy to write a letter to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, which I hope on this occasion will be a short one, to clarify some aspects of our Amendment 196.
I want to make some very brief remarks on Amendment 119A, tabled by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Winchester, and spoken to by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford, which we fully support. We fully recognise the unique position that the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury is in when he awards degrees to those who have served the Church. We agree that the Archbishop’s ability to award such degrees, which do not require a course of study, supervised research or assessment, should be left untouched by the OfS. This amendment achieves this, while being clear that any taught or research degrees awarded in the usual manner—for example, following a course of study as part of the Archbishop’s Examination in Theology—will remain covered by the Bill.
I am pleased with the progress we have made on these matters. With these amendments added, it leaves the Bill in very good shape by giving the OfS the powers it needs while being crystal clear that these are underpinned by strong safeguards. It strikes the right balance between institutional autonomy and protecting students, and the quality and reputation of our HE sector.
My Lords, they used to say that real tennis was the game of kings. I suspect that the game of Parliament is listening to noble and learned Lords tearing into a piece of badly drafted legislation. We have enjoyed that very much. I will add one point and make a concluding comment. Clause 46 is the first of two. I hope that the noble and learned Lord will accept that Amendment 123 to Clause 56 is consequential as it deals with exactly the same matter as Amendment 117. We do not wish to encourage noble Lords to repeat themselves—although that would be much more fun. Secondly, we were not able to sign up to this amendment because when it was tabled it was immediately snapped up by others. Therefore, we were not able to express our public opinion of it. However, should the noble and learned Lord wish to test the opinion of the House, we will support him.
My Lords, looking at the names on this amendment, it is certainly a gold star amendment, to use the language of the OfS. When I looked at it, I was relieved to see that the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay was not on it. Therefore, I was somewhat disappointed when he rose to his feet to lend his formidable support to the amendment.
I can see that these amendments stem from concerns that there need to be appropriate safeguards and checks on the OfS’s powers under Clauses 43, 44 and 54. We fully agree and have listened to the concerns expressed in Committee. As a result, we have tabled two sets of amendments. First, there is Amendment 116 after Clause 44 and related amendments, which we have just discussed in an earlier debate. These ensure that the OfS must seek expert advice before granting degree-awarding powers or varying or revoking them on quality grounds. Secondly, there are amendments to Clauses 43, 44 and 54, which we have just debated in the group with Amendment 107. These amendments clearly set out the limited set of circumstances where the powers of revocation can be used, such as in cases of serious quality concerns. These further strengthen already very robust safeguards, including statutory processes guaranteeing providers the opportunity to make representations and a right of appeal. By the way, there is nothing in the Bill to prevent further appeals to higher courts.
Noble Lords also suggested in Committee an annual report on how the OfS exercises its powers of revocation under Clauses 43, 44 and 54. I accept that this is a good idea and would contribute to greater transparency. I can therefore tell noble Lords that in respect of each year where the OfS has made use of its powers to revoke degree-awarding powers or university title, we will ensure that a report be laid before Parliament that includes information on how the powers have been used.
Turning turn specifically to the amendment, the grounds for appeal in Clauses 46 and 56 have been carefully chosen and are largely based on what a judicial review would take into account. Despite the noble and learned Lord’s disparaging remarks about judicial review, it is the way in which public bodies are held accountable. These are sensible and appropriate grounds which balance the need for a regulator to make robust and confident decisions using its unique expertise with the need to hold that regulator to account where it makes decisions that are not within the reasonable scope of its powers. The Bill as drafted achieves that balance.
An appeal can be brought on three grounds, as the noble and learned Lord outlined. The first is that the decision was based on an error of fact. This means that if the OfS based its decision on wrong or incomplete facts, it can be overturned by the tribunal. The second ground is that a decision was wrong in law. We have specified in our amendments, to which I referred a moment ago, exactly when the OfS can revoke degree-awarding powers and/or university title, and how it has to go about it. For example, if the OfS decided to take the step of revocation outside the circumstances we have now specified in the Bill, its decision could be overturned by the First-tier Tribunal. Likewise, Clauses 45 and 55 provide that the OfS must have regard to representations made. If it did not do so, this could amount to being wrong in law and would therefore be grounds for appeal. Lastly, an appeal can be brought on the grounds that the decision was unreasonable. A provider could appeal against the OfS on the basis that its decision was unreasonable, having regard to the facts of its case.
Those grounds for appeal are complemented by strong procedural safeguards, which, again, are clearly set out in the Bill. These ensure that any decision made by the OfS must be legally correct and factually accurate and reflect a reasonable judgment, the OfS having carefully considered the available facts and applied its expertise according to the law. That is a very high standard to which the Bill holds the OfS to account.
By contrast, there are real risks in taking the route mapped by these amendments. They propose a more general and much less clean-cut ground of appeal—namely, that an appeal may be brought when the decision of the OfS is “wrong”, as explained by the noble and learned Lord. That is far less certain for the provider, for the regulator and indeed for the tribunal. It would also expand the range of cases that could go to appeal. What is “right” from one angle might always be seen as “wrong” from another. For example, will a provider that has its degree-awarding powers revoked on entirely justifiable grounds ever see that as anything other than “wrong”? Surely that provider should not have an automatic right of appeal, with all the delay, uncertainty and cost that that involves. The amendment would appear to allow that, as the balanced limitations of factual and legal accuracy and reasonableness would have been dispensed with.
Furthermore, the amendment would require the court to decide whether it agreed with the expert judgment reached by the OfS. Such an exercise would allow—indeed, it would require—a tribunal to put itself in the regulator’s shoes and then substitute its judgment for that of the OfS. I have to ask whether that is really the right place for the tribunal to be—asserting expertise in higher education rather than, in a more focused way, looking at lawfulness, factual accuracy and reasonableness. I respectfully suggest that it is not. Changing the grounds of appeal in this way would risk creating a process whereby the tribunals, rather than the OfS, regulated the HE sector. That is a powerful argument which noble Lords have so far not addressed.
I do not believe that the amendments are the right way to go—although they are well meant, I do not think they will take us in the right direction. Therefore, with respect, I ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, to withdraw his amendment.
I was expecting the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, to speak to Amendment 118 in the group, if he wishes to do so.
My Lords, I did not understand why this provision is in the Bill. I was rather surprised when I first saw it, and when I raised the point at a meeting, those promoting the Bill seemed to be almost equally surprised. However, I have now found out exactly what it is for. It is intended to deal with situations where someone has gained a degree through various nefarious practices and that is discovered. Once you understand that, it is quite normal and certainly not unexpected that the same provision should apply to other arrangements. However, this is a special one for this particular situation. I am happy with the explanation and I shall not press my amendment.
My Lords, given that elucidation, I shall say much the same thing but in different words in relation to Amendment 119.
My name was attached to Amendment 117A and I have listened carefully to the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf. It is an offer to the Government to tidy up an area that needs more attention.
I turn first to a letter we received by email today just before we got into the Chamber. The Minister may have something to say on this point which may resolve the issue. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her support on Amendment 119. It was spoken to when we tried to link it to an earlier group of amendments in case, as has happened, the Bill was amended to reflect a situation where validation routes are twofold. One route involves working with another institution or provider for at least four years—some courses are longer than four years—and then applying for the powers at that time. The other route is by having a tougher assessment arrangement, which is done through the Quality Assessment Committee of the Office for Students and the designated body appointed in this area. In those circumstances, it does not seem necessary that there would be a requirement at any stage in the future for the OfS also to be a validator.
The amendment would remove the infelicitous possibility that the body which is now called a regulator, the Office for Students—I wish it had another name—would not only ensure that validation arrangements operated throughout the sector but would also be a validator and the regulator of those two processes. That does not seem appropriate. However, in the letter today there is an announcement, which I am foreshadowing, which deals with the fact that there will be a process of consultation on the precise way in which the OfS will provide a validation service. That seems to covers the point very well, so we will not press the amendment.
I am encouraged by what we have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. I think that there is a kind of logical structure here which the removal of Clause 48 would damage. We have currently a lively set of arrangements for validating degrees carried out by a range of universities. I was involved, for example, in supporting a programme to create a new higher education institution in Herefordshire. When it tried to find a validator, it had a queue of universities that wished to be the validator. We have a lively market at the moment, although there are concerns that it may not always cover every case and is not as open as it should be.
There is a proposal that it should be possible, if necessary, for the Office for Students to commission a validating body if it is concerned that validating is not being done properly. However, in cases where it has not been able to commission arrangements that ensure validation, in the last resort it may itself be the validator. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, is right that it is unusual for a regulator also to be the validator, but I hope we will hear from the Minister that the circumstances in which that became necessary are rather remote. Given what is already happening, one would expect either the current arrangements for validating to be satisfactory or for the OfS to be able to commission a body that will undertake validation.
The argument for Clause 48, which it is proposed should be deleted, is that it is the logical long stop in the event that it has not been possible to commission anyone else to carry out the arrangements. On the basis that it is unlikely the power will be necessary, but we can understand why it has to be held in reserve, I think Clause 48 is needed and the amendment to remove it would leave a potential gap in the system. I hope we will hear more on that from the Minister.