UK Defence Forces

Lord Soley Excerpts

Thursday 23rd November 2017 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Soley]

That this House takes note of the case for maintaining United Kingdom defence forces at a sufficient level to contribute to global peace, stability and security.

[Lord Soley (Lab)]

My Lords, in moving the Motion in my name, I should indicate that the amount of time available for the debate makes it very tight for speakers, so I will do my best to keep my comments relatively short. In doing so, I make clear that I do not intend to speak at any length on either weapons systems or troop numbers. Important as they are, there are many other speakers who are better equipped than me to speak on such matters. What I seek to do is talk about our defence strategy in relation to our foreign policy. We should start by recognising, as we always do, that defence is the handmaiden of foreign policy. I also recognise, because it is important to do so, that defence is important not only for war fighting but as a policy of war deterrence. That profoundly important issue is often underestimated.

My concern, like that of many others in recent years, is that we have a defence policy that seeks to be full-spectrum, but we are not putting up the necessary money to make that credible. History gives us plenty of lessons to show that there are few things more dangerous than the defence policy of a major power that has become incredible instead of credible. We are in acute danger of getting into that situation. In saying that, I echo comments made by many senior military experts in this country, and most important, those of many of our allies, not just the United States.

In recent years, we have seen a decline in our ability to fund our various systems to the level necessary to make them credible. I cannot overstate the importance of that point, and I know that many Members will speak to it in the debate. To put it bluntly, at the moment we are putting forward a defence posture for the United Kingdom that looks sophisticated, arguing—as the Minister has often done—that it is the fifth most expensive defence policy in the world, but we are not putting in the money to make it credible. One of the main messages I would like to get over in this debate is that although I look forward very much to the forthcoming strategic defence review, this is now such an important issue, particularly following Brexit, about which I shall say more in a moment, that we need to revisit it frequently over the coming year or two. This is a fast-moving situation and one to which we will not get a quick answer in one strategic defence review. I ask the Government to start thinking hard about how Parliament—indeed, the Government itself, most obviously—can think about this in the long term and be prepared to react to the changes that are taking place in the world.

The budget for defence should be increased. I know the Minister is likely to say that we aim to increase it to 2.5%, but if we are to maintain our current posture, we are more sensibly talking about 3%. My worry, which I will come back to, is whether we will be prepared to afford that with our economy, particularly in relation to Brexit. It is affordable, but will we be prepared to afford it? If not, we have to cut our defence posture to make it more relevant to what we are prepared to pay. I repeat: the most crucial thing is having a credible defence force, not one that people think is unlikely to be delivered effectively.

As I think most people have noticed, in recent years the world has become a much more unstable place, due to emerging new powers, which are rising very fast. To some extent, it is a success of the West that, over the years, we have seen a number of countries develop with good governance, even if it is not the type of government we would choose for ourselves. As a result, their economies are improving; as they do, they will spend more money on defence. That is one reason why we are unlikely to remain the fifth-largest spending nation in due course. Those new, rising powers are also challenging the status quo. History tells us that wars develop when there is a rapid change in the balance of power between nations. We know that, going back to the wars in Athens a couple of thousand years ago; we recognise that when there is a change in the balance of power between existing states, peace is at risk.

It does not follow that I am therefore full of doom and gloom that we are about to be launched into a major war. There are many checks now that did not exist before—on international institutions, the global economy and a range of such options—which make it less likely. Nevertheless, it is a serious danger; there is also a danger of major wars, in any event. We need look no further than the Middle East to see that, as sadly we so often have to do; the relationships there are changing very dramatically. If we look at the recent movement in Turkey, we see an example of a country moving away from its recent posture of close engagement with Europe and the West to a different role. Look at the development of the strange alliance emerging in the Middle East between Israel and the Arab states in the face of what they see as a greater fear—Iran. That conflict between Iran and the Arab states dates way back to the origins of the divisions in Islam, which caused so many problems for the Islamic community, just as the divisions in Christianity did. It would therefore be a mistake to put these problems down to any one religion; they happen in all religions. People do not always like it, but I often say that God is an idea but religion is an ideology and, like all ideology, subject to splits. Splits happen in religion and, unfortunately, people are prepared to fight and die for them. That is an important point that we sometimes forget.

The other reason to be concerned about instability is the rise of nationalism in the West, with the election of Donald Trump, Brexit in the UK, the situation in Turkey—as I have already mentioned—and other events. Nationalism is not something to be totally ashamed of, but it is something to be wary of. As someone born in the 1930s, although I do not remember the nationalism of that period, I am close enough to its history; having grown up during the Second World War, I have seen the effects of nationalism and how it can destroy communities, civilisations and nations. We need to be aware of that as another factor in change.

The third factor, which is incredibly important—I know that the Government take it seriously, but we will need to come back to it—is changing technology. We are all aware of cyberwarfare; we are increasingly aware of robots; we all know about drones; and we all know about intelligence, although the nature of that is changing rapidly. I shall give just a simple example. If I had longer, I might spell out others, particularly in robotic development. If we look at the use of drones, which I do not object to, in either Afghanistan or Syria, we see that they are effective in limiting civilian casualties, because otherwise air power or artillery are used less effectively. However, we should be aware that the technology that allows drones to be used in the way that we are using them can also be developed, and will be developed, by non-state actors, including by even very small groups. We should beware the dangers of such technology being used in existing civilisations and societies. In the age of George Orwell and Aldous Huxley, those early warnings were perhaps relevant to what we have to say.

I have already indicated that my preference would be for an increase in defence expenditure. I do not think there are any shortcuts to this. Some in my own party and elsewhere will say, “We need to get rid of Trident”. I have no problem with dealing with such issues multilaterally; I have every fear about doing so unilaterally, because major changes in the defence policy of a significant power inevitably have a knock-on effect on other powers. That is another factor that can increase the risk of war, which is why I say that defence is an important way of preventing war and not just of fighting it.

We need a radical review of our defence posture. One SDR will not be enough. Post Brexit, it is difficult to know what will happen. I have taken the view for a long time—since it happened, actually, although I think it was a mistake—that Brexit can be made to work, but we should recognise, first, that it will take a long time and, secondly, that we are underestimating its political impact. We all talk, quite rightly, about the economic impact, but the political impact is enormous. I had lunch with an old contact of mine in the Chinese embassy from quite a few years ago. He is now the first secretary, and he came along with the second secretary to meet me here. I asked him what China thought about Britain’s exit from the European Union. He gave a very quick and clear answer: “I think both the European Union and the United Kingdom have lost influence as a result of that action”. Whether we agree with him or not, let us please recognise that this view is common across the world. Let us bear in mind that it has been United States policy since the end of the Second World War to have Britain in Europe, because it saw Britain as a stabilising influence within it. It also saw it as a necessary bridge between the US and Europe. The problem, as I have said on a number of occasions, is that many Europeans, for very good historical reasons, with all the wars, occupations and defeats, saw the European Union as a politically emerging state—we might even say a superstate, although it is a wrong term—whereas the British always thought of it as a super-market. We did not see the commitment to the politics of Europe as they see it in Europe itself.

That change is profoundly important. It might mean that we have to accept that, in changing our defence policy, despite Brexit, we have to work much more closely with the European Union. I am not one who takes the view that Europe should not develop its own defence policy. It is important that we link it with NATO, but I do not believe that Europe will avoid developing the outlines—as they will be at first—of both a defence policy and a foreign policy. It is in our interest for it to do that; it is not in our interest to go back to a system where each state had its own arrangements. We often forget how relatively new the nation states are. The other day I saw that, until about 100 years ago, Poland was part of Austria. When we look at things like that, we should recognise that the way change happens in Europe can be dangerous.

I draw your Lordships’ attention to comments in the Library briefing on my debate made by Professor Chalmers, the deputy at the Royal United Services Institute. He points out that we need to look at,

“UK national security and requirements in the form of contributions, military and developmental”,

along with other allies. Secondly, and very importantly, he says that,

“a new SDSR would need to ask whether or not there should be a Pivot to Europe”,

the very point I was making a few moments ago. Thirdly, he says that,

“a new SDSR would provide an opportunity to review the case for, and against, a more global approach to foreign and security policy in the light of the exit deal”,

but also in light of the other issues I have mentioned.

I want a close relationship with the European Union—anyone in their right mind will want that—and it has to be political and economic as well. It does not mean that we do not have to exit the European Union, as the electorate have decided. What I want more than anything else from the next SDSR is a serious, in-depth look at the problems I have described. This is a major strategic crisis for the United Kingdom. “Crisis” may be too strong a word; it is perhaps more like what happened in the 1960s, as I remember well, when we looked, under Harold Wilson’s Government, at withdrawal from east of Suez and at cancelling advanced weapons systems, such as the TSR-2 and others, all of which we did because we were driven by the economics of it. The acute danger is that something similar is happening now but we are not facing up to it. We really have to get a strategy that works and that we have paid for. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Soley]

The noble Lord has just taken the words out of my mouth. I thank all noble Lords for their thoughtful and constructive comments. As usual, the noble Earl has made a thoughtful and encouraging response. But—and this is an important but—there is an acute danger that he and the Government are underestimating the concern that has been expressed for months now by very senior military officers, by various groups such as RUSI, the International Institute for Strategic Studies and others, and by many people among our overseas allies. That concern is real. If we duck it or ignore it, we will not do ourselves any favours.

Secondly, I simply make this point. I do not expect the defence review to give all the answers, certainly not to the questions that I raised in my opening speech, but I hope that it is a step on the road which we need to look at intensely carefully over the next year or two. We are in a bad place right now and we need to get into a better place.

Finally, I was pleased to hear the involvement of the noble Baroness, Lady Lane-Fox, because I would like to have talked more, as I did only a little, about the new technology. The reason Russia, China and North Korea—the three nations she identified—are using these technologies is precisely because they are still militarily weak in the face of the West. That will not last for ever. Russia still has a weak economy, but countries in that state use other technologies, which is what it is doing. It will not be just Russia, it will also be Iran fairly soon.

Motion agreed.