Occupational Pension Schemes (Administration, Investment, Charges and Governance) and Pensions Dashboards (Amendment) Regulations 2023

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Tuesday 28th March 2023 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Viscount Younger of Leckie) (Con)]

My Lords, these draft regulations were laid before the House on 30 January. Good investments are central to well-run pension schemes and decisions made by the trustees of those schemes have a significant impact on growing savers’ pension pots. Subject to approval, these regulations will help occupational defined contribution pension schemes—the so-called DC schemes—make greater use of performance-based fees, which are payable to investment fund managers when they deliver healthy returns on their investments. This will put DC schemes on an even playing field with other institutional investors such as insurers, investment companies, defined benefit pension schemes and overseas investors when it comes to accessing the same range of investment choices that come with fees.

The regulations also place new duties on the trustees of most DC schemes to disclose additional information about their investments. They are designed to ensure that trustees reflect on the investment decisions they make, as part of their ongoing fiduciary duty to create a diversified investment strategy that delivers for savers. These regulations continue the Government’s commitment to ensure that millions of hard-working savers in occupational DC pension schemes are receiving the best possible value. I am satisfied that these regulations are compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.

Let me take a step back and put this in a bit of context. Over the past decade, there has been a significant increase in the use of illiquid asset classes such as infrastructure, real estate and private equity within institutional investment portfolios globally. Meanwhile, DC schemes in the UK have relied on public markets to generate returns and diversify portfolio risk. Pension scheme trustees’ primary focus must always be on delivering an appropriate return to members. But by investing almost wholly in liquid investments such as publicly listed equity and debt, pension savers can miss out on the potential to achieve better returns from being invested for the long term. This is a particular concern in DC schemes, where decisions which reduce long-term returns will affect member incomes in retirement.

Currently, less than 10% of UK DC investments are estimated to be in illiquid assets. The Pension Charges Survey 2020 evidenced that two-thirds of DC schemes had no direct investment in illiquid assets within their default fund arrangements. This is at a time when the UK DC market is growing in scale and in ambition. DC pension schemes currently hold over £500 billion of assets, a figure that is set to double to £1 trillion by 2030. The Australian DC market, in comparison, invests somewhere in the region of 20% of assets, on average. This includes investment in major UK assets such as the King’s Cross redevelopment project and Manchester, Stansted and East Midlands airports.

The DWP has run several consultations to understand the reasons why DC schemes have largely avoided investing in private markets. The feedback received highlighted concerns that performance fees, typically associated with illiquid assets and levied by fund managers, would put schemes at risk of breaching the existing 75 basis-point regulatory charge cap. While the charge cap has successfully reduced costs, it has arguably led to more focus on costs than on the returns that different asset classes can provide. In January, the Minister for Pensions launched a consultation on proposals for a value-for-money framework, which aims to address this. These regulations continue that value-for-money theme. The essence of what we are trying to do here is to make it easier for DC schemes to access a broader range of investment opportunities that could generate higher return outcomes.

I will now say a bit more about the issues highlighted during the consultation. We listened carefully to earlier concerns raised during the consultation that this change to the cap could weaken existing saver protections, and we have acted on this feedback. Regulation 2 of this instrument sets out the criteria that “specified performance-based fees” must meet to be considered outside the charge cap. These include a requirement that fees must be paid only once returns to the scheme have exceeded a pre-agreed rate or amount agreed by trustees and the fund manager prior to investment.

The criteria include additional safeguards that trustees must also agree in advance, and that performance-based fee structures include mechanisms to guard against excessive risk-taking or fund managers being paid repeatedly for the same level of performance. The regulations provide for the use of high-water marks and fee caps, for instance, which are commonly applied in the investment market to give investors this extra level of protection.

The regulations are purposefully silent on what rate of returns or type of fee structure mechanisms must be applied. This is to allow trustees and fund managers to develop and negotiate terms that are in the best interests of savers. Provided that trustees and their advisers apply these terms, such performance fees will not erode retirement pots because they should arise only when savers have received a favourable return on their investments.

The DWP received positive responses to this change, particularly from larger DC pension schemes which said that the ability to remove these fees from their charge cap calculations will make it easier for them to consider new asset classes. The DWP has published statutory guidance to assist trustees with determining the criteria for performance-based fees that can be considered outside the charge cap. The guidance is very clear that trustees should seek professional advice on their investments where performance-based fees are prevalent.

To ensure transparency to members, performance-based fees incurred are required to be disclosed, and the value to members assessed, in the scheme’s annual chair’s statement. To be clear, these changes place no obligation on schemes to agree to investments that come with performance-based fee arrangements if this is not in their members’ best interest.

With any investment there is no guarantee of higher returns. In accordance with existing legal requirements, trustees must invest in a manner calculated to ensure security, liquidity and profitability, and have regard to the need to diversify investments. This provides that trustees are guided on assessing the risk of portfolios and, with this, managing the risk of lower as well as higher returns.

Regulation 3 of this instrument sets out new duties on DC trustees to include an explanation of their policy on investing in illiquid assets in their statement of investment principles. These explanatory statements, covered in the regulations, include whether investments in illiquid assets are held, the types of illiquid assets and why this policy is of advantage to members. Where investments will not include illiquid assets, trustees are expected to give reasons why, along with whether they have plans to invest in the future.

While some of our bigger DC schemes already provide this information, this is not the approach taken by all. Some master trust schemes also disclose information on the asset classes in which the scheme holds investments, but this is not commonplace and most members are not in receipt of this information. The regulations address this by placing a duty on trustees to disclose the percentage of different classes of assets held in the scheme’s default funds. Asset classes covering liquid and illiquid are prescribed in the regulations.

Greater understanding and accountability of the investment decisions made by trustees on behalf of their members will be key to improving value for members across all schemes. The industry’s response to these new duties was that the regulatory burden is reasonable and proportionate while still retaining the wider benefits these changes will bring. It is worth noting that asset allocation disclosure is already mandatory for Australian pension schemes.

The DWP will work with the Pensions Regulator to ensure that trustees are supported with the new duties. Information contained in chairs’ statements and statements of investment principles are monitored by the Pensions Regulator as part of its wider strategy on regulatory compliance.

We will also look closely to monitor the impact of our changes on investment performance. In addition, Regulation 7 of these regulations requires that a review of these regulatory provisions must be undertaken and published within five years of the regulations coming into force.

These regulations also correct a drafting error at cohort 1(b) of the staging profile in Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Pensions Dashboards Regulations 2022. The error relates to the staging deadline for master trust schemes that provide money-purchase benefits only. While we are not aware of any schemes being affected by this minor error, it is none the less appropriate to amend the Pensions Dashboards Regulations 2022 to resolve this issue as soon as practically possible. With that, I commend this instrument to the Committee and beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, as the Minister has said, this statutory instrument contains seven regulations. The first is to do with timings and commencement. We have no comment on this, except to ask why there will be a delay of 21 days in bringing the correcting dashboard regulation into effect.

Regulation 2 excludes specified performance-based fees from the charge cap, and the Explanatory Memorandum sets out the rationale. In paragraph 10.5, the Explanatory Memorandum speaks of

“sufficient safeguards for schemes and members to protect them from excessive charges”

consequent upon this regulation. This is clearly a critical area. The possibility of excessive charges is an obvious concern and was highlighted in the recent SLSC report on this instrument. Can the Minister set out what these safeguards are and on what basis and by whom they were judged to be satisfactory?

Regulation 3 will require schemes to include an explanation of their policy about investing in illiquid assets in their default statement of investment principles, as the Minister said. The taxonomy of asset classes is explained in detail in paragraph 25 of the statutory guidance and is given in Regulation 4(5). This has eight categories and does not attempt to define “illiquid”. In fact, I could find nothing in the instrument and its accompanying documents that approaches a definition. Of course, it may be that I have overlooked it somewhere; I would be grateful if the Minister could guide me on the matter, point to a definition and perhaps explain how it was arrived it and by whom. The chief purpose of this instrument is to remove barriers to investments in illiquid assets, and it would be rather odd if there were no criteria for assessing whether an asset was to be counted as illiquid.

Regulation 4 also requires trustees or managers to report on specified performance-based fees incurred by the scheme.

Regulation 5 requires such disclosures to be made public. This all seems very sensible, but nowhere is there any sense of an upper bound on these specified performance-based fees. In its report, the SLSC made this point.

Since the EM was produced, the DWP has published extensive statutory guidance—22 pages—which states that the rate or amount of these fees is for the trustees and managers of the scheme with support from their advisers and their fund manager to agree based on the nature of the investment proposed. At first reading, this seems a bit like an invitation to a fleecing. The Government were happy to install the charge cap in the first place. What consideration was given to capping these special performance-based fees? Paragraph 76 of the statutory guidance, “Volatility of returns and performance based fees”, states:

“The 2023 Regulations require that specified performance-based fees structures must include mechanisms that offer protections to pension schemes and their members. This is so fund managers are not taking excessive risk or being paid twice for the same level of performance or for performance which turns out to be impermanent.”


I cannot see where that is spelled out in the instrument as a must, and I would be grateful for the Minister’s help in clarifying the matter.

Regulation 6 corrects an error in the pensions dashboard, and we have no comment on that.

Regulation 7 provides for a review of the impact of Regulations 2 to 5 every five years, which seems sensible. We are particularly interested in seeing whether the modification of the charge gap and the disclosure requirements lead to an increase in investment in illiquid assets. The SLSC made this point in its formal recommendation to the House:

“As the fee changes made by these Regulations aim to encourage pension schemes to increase their investment in illiquid assets, the House may wish to ask the Minister how schemes’ subsequent exposure to an increased risk of lower, as well as higher, returns is to be monitored and how trustees are to be properly guided on assessing the risks to the portfolio.”


Those are very good questions, and I would grateful if the Minister could address them.