Medicines and Medical Devices Bill

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Tuesday 12th January 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

3: Clause 1, page 1, line 8, at end insert—
“( ) Regulations made under subsection (1) that introduce significant new policy or significant changes to existing policy are subject, in relation to regulations made by the Secretary of State, to the super-affirmative procedure set out in section (Super-affirmative procedure), in relation to regulations made by a Northern Ireland department, to section (Super-affirmative procedure: Northern Ireland), and, in relation to regulations of the Secretary of State and a Northern Ireland department acting jointly, to both.”

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, the amendments in this group are in my name and the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. I am grateful for their support and regret that the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, cannot be here today. He is currently chairing a meeting of the Economic Affairs Committee.

The purpose of the amendments is to replace the use of the affirmative SI procedure in Parts 1, 2 and 3 of the Bill with the super-affirmative procedure. This is to restore an element of meaningful parliamentary scrutiny to a Bill that so conspicuously lacks it. This is a skeleton Bill. Parts 1, 2 and 3 contain no policy detail and effectively give Ministers carte blanche to decide policy. They give the Minister almost unfettered power to remake our human medicines, our veterinary medicines and our medical devices regimes.

Our DPRR Committee and the Constitution Committee were extremely critical of this approach. On Second Reading, as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, has reminded us, the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, chair of the DPRRC, and speaking for it, said that

“the structure of the Bill is absolutely atrocious and an affront to parliamentary democracy.”

He went on to say:

“Parliament is effectively bypassed; that is a sick joke of good law.”—[Official Report, 2/9/20; cols. 415-16.]


Parliament is bypassed largely because the affirmative SI procedure does not allow for real scrutiny. We cannot amend SIs, and the House has voted down affirmative SIs on just four occasions in the last 70 years.

The Constitution Committee was clear in its 2018 report, The Legislative Process: The Delegation of Powers, when it said:

“Without a genuine risk of defeat, and no amendment possible, Parliament is doing little more than rubber-stamping the Government’s secondary legislation. This is constitutionally unacceptable.”


The affirmative SI procedure does not constitute meaningful parliamentary scrutiny.

By contrast, the super-affirmative SI procedure is designed and used to deliver a measure of real scrutiny. Erskine May, in part 4, paragraph 31.14, characterises the procedure as follows:

“The super-affirmative procedure provides both Houses with opportunities to comment on proposals for secondary legislation and to recommend amendments before orders for affirmative approval are brought forward in their final form. (It should be noted that the power to amend the proposed instrument remains with the Minister: the two Houses and their committees can only recommend changes, not make them.)”


In Committee, I set out at some length the details of how our super-affirmative procedure could work. In her response, the Minister helpfully summarised that the

“procedure would require an initial draft of the regulations to be laid before Parliament alongside an explanatory statement and that a committee must be convened to report on those draft regulations within 30 days of publication. Only after a minimum of 30 days following the publication of the initial draft regulations may the Secretary of State lay regulations, accompanied by a further published statement on any changes to the regulations. They must then be debated as normal in both Houses and approved by resolution.”—[Official Report, 19/10/20; col. GC 376.]

According to the Library, the last recorded insertion in a Bill from a super-affirmative procedure was by the Government themselves, in October 2017, in what became the Financial Guidance and Claims Act. In Committee, I noted that when they are not doing it themselves, the Government traditionally object to the use of the super-affirmative on all or any of three grounds. The first is that it is unnecessary, because the affirmative procedure provides sufficient parliamentary scrutiny; the second is that it takes too long; and the third is that it is cumbersome. The Government did not depart from tradition. In Committee, they used all three objections.

The first objection, that the affirmative procedure provides sufficient scrutiny, is plainly and simply wrong, unless of course the Government regard no effective scrutiny as sufficient. The second objection, that it takes too long, is to misread its purpose. It is the case that the super-affirmative procedure takes longer, but that is because it contains provisions for real scrutiny, which necessarily takes time. This is not a negative; it is the merit of a procedure and the point of it. I should point out here that any emergency or urgent need will not trigger the super-affirmative procedure. The Bill now allows for the “made affirmative” procedure to be used in such cases.

The third objection raised by the Minister was that the super-affirmative procedure could be cumbersome and involve a disproportionate use of parliamentary time. She gave the example of the minor change to the Human Medicines Regulations 2012 to illustrate the point. This was a very helpful observation, and we are grateful for it. It would obviously be wrong to take up parliamentary time on minor changes, but, accordingly, we have revised our amendments since Committee to take account of this. The amendments now before us apply the super-affirmative procedure only to regulations that introduce what the Secretary of State considers to be either significant new policies or significant changes to existing policies. All other SIs can be dealt with as currently specified in the Bill.

This is a skeleton Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, chair of our Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, had something to say about this type of Bill in a 4 January article in Prospect magazine:

“First and foremost, parliament should continue to be vigilant about the balance of power that is at the heart of our constitution. The right of the legislature (parliament) to resist any encroachment on its powers by the executive (government) is central to our democratic system. … parliament should continue to object to the use of ‘skeleton bills.’”


He proposes that the Government:

“Put the appropriate level of detail into primary legislation and avoid skeleton bills.”


It is obviously too late to do that with this Bill, which allows Ministers to take powers and make policy before they have decided what that policy is. Secondary legislation was never intended as a means of making policy. Using secondary legislation to do that, as the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, so clearly put it, bypasses Parliament.

Our proposal restores a measure of parliamentary scrutiny where there are proposed significant new policies or significant changes to existing policies. It is activated only by significant policy changes. It amounts to meaningful scrutiny without removing the final decision from Ministers. It does not get in the way of emergencies or urgent need, but it does prevent Parliament being bypassed. This is an important test of the balance between the Executive and the legislature and an opportunity for Parliament to assert its right, and its duty, to scrutinise. Subject to the Minister’s response, I intend to test the opinion of the House. I beg to move.

[Lord Judge (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I apologise to the House; this is the first time I have spoken on this Bill and I have not been able to speak earlier in the proceedings, so I will try to be brief. I also assume that, notwithstanding the recent vote on sunset clauses, the Minister’s response during the debate indicates that the Government will not be very interested in leaving it in the legislation.

This Bill’s importance is obvious. It is hardly regulation light; to the contrary, in the modern way, it has a banquet of regulation-making powers which would, as the debate has shown, enable the Minister to extend policy and create policy by statutory instrument. For that purpose, I need simply refer to the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Patel, in the previous debate.

In the 30 December debate on the Bill on the trade agreement with the EU, I suggested that, now that all that was done finally, we in this House at any rate needed to focus on the sovereignty not of the Prime Minister or the Executive but of Parliament over the Executive, and proper parliamentary control over the legislative process. We are, as has been discussed, no longer bound to implement EU directives—hence, in part, this Bill. We should decide now—and if not now, when?—to brake, or at any rate better to control, the damaging, wide-ranging, regulation-making powers which now regularly come our way.

Time and again, the cross-party committees of the House have complained about, for example, skeleton Bills, Henry VIII powers and inappropriate delegated powers. Time and again, in Bill after Bill, the pleas—convincing, constitutional and persuasive—have been totally ignored. A cascade of regulation-making powers continues its unabated flood in every Bill that comes before the House, and this Bill is such an example.

That is not the end of it. The consequences are vividly described in the report of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, dated 17 December 2020, just a few days before Christmas. It contains devastating criticisms of risks to proper scrutiny currently observed by that committee. I commend its reading to the whole House. In the first year of this Session, we had 901 statutory instruments. Of those relevant to this Bill, the number from the Department of Health alone was 126. No one in the report has suggested that the department’s work is exempt from its wide-ranging, broad criticism.

The wider use of the super-affirmative process would ensure better parliamentary scrutiny and control of the Executive, which for too long have simply ignored the constant urgings of the parliamentary committees in this House, in particular, as this Bill shows, the recently expressed concerns of the Constitution Committee and the Delegated Powers Committee. One day they will ask why they bother. They do so only in the hope that, one day, the Executive of the day will take notice.

As these pleas have been ignored and have failed, and, as is perfectly plain, as I indicated at the outset, the Minister’s reservations and distaste for consolidation and sunset clauses were absolutely manifest, this amendment will secure that, for this Bill and for this department, with these wide-ranging and important powers, the super-affirmative level of control should be exercised. The time to exercise it is now. It is time that the power is exercised more frequently.

--- Later in debate ---

I understand the arguments about parliamentary scrutiny. However, I strongly maintain that the Bill as amended in Committee strikes the right balance between effective challenge and scrutiny of our regulations, and is workable legislation. I hope the noble Lord has now received sufficient assurances, as well as understanding the challenges inherent in his proposed approach, and I hope that he will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

I am very grateful to all those who have spoken in support of these amendments. Skeleton Bills always limit parliamentary scrutiny, and this Bill is no exception. The Minister in his more than three-minute speech has exaggerated enormously the difficulties with the reach of our proposal. I disagree, for example, with the notion that our proposal blocks the use of the “made affirmative” procedure. It is clear that the Government are wedded to the idea of taking powers to make policy before they have decided what that policy is, and that is at the heart of the matter. This inevitably means bypassing Parliament and we should resist. I would like to test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

As I said to the noble Lord and the Bill team yesterday, these are probing amendments and I do not have any intention of pressing them. That is because I accept that the Minister and the Bill team have done a very good job of making this part of the Bill work much better.

It is always worth rehearsing in the Chamber some of the arguments that we have had outside the Chamber, because people often go back to the Hansard record to ask why we changed words from this to this. That is why the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, and I put down some of these amendments. We have had some extremely useful discussions outside the Chamber, as we should have done, so I hope the noble Lord understands that that is why these amendments are being put today.

Under my Amendment 5, the overarching objective in making regulations under Clause 1 must be safeguarding public health. This is a probing amendment on the difference between “public health” in the government amendment before us today and the “health and safety of the public”, which was the phrase used in the amendment introduced in Committee. It is worth explaining why we accept that that change was sensible.

It is my understanding that “public health” is a broader and more subjective concept that may encompass economic interests, or may relate to increased pharmaceutical investment and innovation, and other factors beyond health and safety, which may conflict with them in some circumstances. Does the Minister agree that we have to explain the less strong commitment that is included in the Bill? Safeguarding public health is also not the same as protecting the safety of medicines and medical devices. It is very important that we are clear about that in the powers given to the Secretary of State in determining what would contribute to safe- guarding public health.

I congratulate the drafters on changing “attractiveness” to “favourability” and “benefits” and “risks” in my Amendments 12, 34 and 48. These amendments seek to probe the criteria that determine whether benefits outweigh risks and require the assessment to be published. The government amendments in this group replace the consideration of UK attractiveness with reference to it being a “favourable” place in which to conduct clinical trials and manufacture and research new medicines, medical products and services. The theme that runs through the whole of this legislation, as has been mentioned by many noble Lords, is that that is the place we want to be in, and the country we want to be, as we move forward.

Proposed new subsection (3A) looks like an attempt to allay concerns, stating that, where regulations impact on safety, they may be made only if the benefits outweigh the risks. It is worth putting on the record the discussion that we had about benefits and risks. Risk and benefit analyses are a well-established feature of clinical trials regulations and ethics committees, but they normally have more well-defined parameters than simply a risk-benefit assessment, yet these are precisely the regulations that these powers will allow to be made. This is why we need to make sure that we are clear what we are talking about here. This comes back to scrutiny and the need for the ability to scrutinise the Government’s assessment of risks and benefits in making regulations. These arguments pertain to Clause 9 for veterinary medicine and Clause 14 for medical devices. That is why we wanted to have this discussion.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I welcome the amendments in this group. They add clarity to the obligations laid on the Secretary of State in making regulations under Clause 1(1) and its counterparts.

I particularly welcome Amendment 12 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and my noble friend Lady Jolly, as it seems particularly important. It requires the Secretary of State to publish the criteria used in determining the benefits and risks caused by regulation and to set out how they have been weighed against each other. This amendment touches on the whole issue of transparency in devising regulations. The level of transparency that Amendment 12 requires should certainly apply to the factors listed in the Minister’s Amendment 9. These factors, which the Secretary of State must have regard to, are the safety of human medicines, the availability of human medicines and the likelihood of the relevant part of the United Kingdom being seen as a favourable place in which to carry out research related to human medicines, conduct clinical trials, or manufacture or supply human medicines. These are all clearly important, and I am glad that the Minister has added manufacturing to this list, as I suggested in Committee.

The list contains three rather vague notions: “likelihood”, “favourable” and “being seen as”. For all these terms, we need to know what definitions will be used and what evidence will be required in support. For “being seen as”, the question arises: being seen as by whom? What weight will be given to different views from different sectors? If, for example, it turns out that academic researchers and pharma companies have different views about the favourability of the UK, how are they to be weighted? On “likelihood”, could the Minister say whether he considered the word “desirability” instead, which seems closer to what we want here?

I hope the Minister is able to give reassurance on the points I have raised and that he accepts the merits of Amendment 12 and its counterparts.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy (Con)]

My Lords, I will make three quick points about the government amendments in this group, which I broadly welcome. The first relates to Amendments 4 and 42, where the Minister has clearly listened carefully to the forceful arguments made by my noble friend Lord Lansley, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, and others in Committee. I am delighted that he has.

For those of us who have not been involved in the discussions, and following on from the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, made about why language from the European regulation has been adopted—“safeguarding public health”—it would be helpful if my noble friend could explain, on the record, why that language has been chosen. That is particularly the case given that he expressed some reluctance in Committee, bearing in mind that the regulations being referred to also had some relevance to operating the internal market, not simply medicines safety. It would be good to hear from him on that.

Secondly, on Amendments 8 and 44, unlike other noble Lords I did not believe that there was a suspect motivation behind the use of the word “attractive” by my noble friend and the Bill team, or any desire to reduce stringency to attract investment. But I would be grateful if my noble friend could confirm that the Government remain as determined as ever, if not more so, to grow the UK’s life sciences sector, and that it was never their intention to lower regulatory standards to achieve this.

Thirdly, on Amendments 9 and 45, I commend my noble friend on the subtle but important changes already referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, in Clauses 1(3)(c) and 14(3)(c), especially the inclusion of manufacturing and broader medical research. The salience of these two parts of our overall supply chain has come to the fore during the pandemic, which has demonstrated our strengths in basic science but, unfortunately, exposed our weaknesses in manufacturing resilience. It seems right that this should be explicitly recognised in the Bill and I commend my noble friend for making those important changes and for demonstrating, once again, his ample appetite for listening and acting.