The Role and Capabilities of the UK Armed Forces, in the Light of Global and Domestic Threats to Stability and Security

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Tuesday 15th September 2015 Grand Committee

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, this debate, which has been initiated by the Minister, is most appropriate, coming as it does shortly before the Government finalise their pending 2015 strategic defence and security review. Presumably it is designed to achieve the aims of the national security strategy. I hope that in his response the Minister will be saying rather more than he has so far about the national security strategy and the Government’s current thinking on the SDSR, and the extent to which it will or will not either repeat or add to what his party said in its recent election manifesto. I will also wait to see if the Minister takes up the challenge posed by my noble friend Lord Davies of Stamford over the alleged black hole, assuming of course he survives the ministerial cull advocated by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley. I also await with interest his responses to the powerful contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Burnett, on the case of Sergeant Blackman, as well as the points about the intended increase in our reserves and what will happen if that increase is not achieved.

One important point for a coherent strategic defence and security review is that it should set out both the thinking and the actual and anticipated developments which have led to the conclusions reached and decisions made. Without that, there will inevitably be doubts and uncertainty over the factors or pressures which have driven whatever proves to be the content and conclusions of the review. The SDSR, as has been said on more than one occasion in the debate, must be strategically driven. While there may be considerations or developments both actual and anticipated of a highly sensitive security nature which it may not be possible to disclose, I hope that the Minister will be able to give a commitment that the SDSR will be as open and transparent as it possibly can be in setting out the thinking and considerations which will have driven the conclusions and decisions reached, including the nature, length and extent of operations which our Armed Forces can be expected to undertake—including at any one point in time—in the light of the resources allocated.

The House of Commons Defence Committee published a report, I think last March, outlining a number of developments spelt out by the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, that it considered meant that the national security strategy was no longer adequate, along with the Future Force 2020 structure. The committee also felt that there was a need for a rebuilt conventional military deterrent against states such as Russia and for continuing investment in what it described as next-generation warfare, including strategic communications, cyber warfare capabilities and intelligence.

The Royal United Services Institute, in drawing attention to the shooting down of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 and the distribution of the Libyan Government’s stock of arms across North Africa and the Middle East, has referred to concerns about the security implications of the proliferation of advanced military capabilities in the hands of non-state actors. Others, including noble Lords in this debate, have raised concerns about the loss for an island nation such as ours of a maritime patrol aircraft capability and about our ability in the future to defend the Falkland Islands. Can the Minister say whether these issues are among those being considered as part of the SDSR and the national security strategy? It would be helpful if he could also say something more about the Government’s thinking on the way in which the nature of military involvement, not least our military involvement, may be changing. Considerable publicity was given to the announcement by the Prime Minister last week that two British jihadis fighting in Syria had been killed by an RAF drone strike, which was long-distance military involvement conducted, as I understand it, by Armed Forces personnel within our own country. Technology can and does change the nature of military involvement and action, but so too does political decision-making. The Government have been very specific recently that we are not going to be involved in the latest actual or likely areas of military involvement through putting boots on the ground. Does that continue to reflect the Government’s approach and is that approach—which we saw in relation to Libya and which now applies in relation to Iraq—likely to be reflected in the SDSR?

Is there a Government view that we should be less actively involved militarily in future in what some might describe as other people’s conflicts, or is it the Government’s view that that should not be our stance but instead that where there is British military involvement in other countries, it should not be by having British troops on the ground engaged directly in military action? If the latter approach is the Government’s position, does that in their view mean a change in the relationship within our Armed Forces of the roles of the Army, Navy and Royal Air Force, a change sufficient to have a significant impact on how total available resources should be allocated in future between the three services?

I believe the Minister said that our forces were involved in 21 joint operations in 19 nations. It would be helpful if, following this debate, the noble Earl could provide more information on where our Armed Forces are currently involved in joint operations, and the nature and objectives of that involvement.

One issue which has been the subject of discussion and debate in the Chamber on a number of occasions and again today is cyber security and the threat of cyber attacks. I remember going to one discussion on cyber security outside this House at which one of the experts said, in essence, that it was effectively impossible to guarantee yourself protection from such attacks. The maximum that you could and should do was to make it as difficult as possible for those seeking to make such attacks, so that they were much more likely to turn their attention away from you and towards potentially weaker targets. The extent to which that factor might come into play may be more questionable in the defence field, where cyber attacks are more likely to be state-organised and state-run or financed. There ought to be a requirement on every company working with the Ministry of Defence, regardless of its size or the scale of its work, to meet the terms of a cyber security charter in order to seek to reduce the risk of hackers using small suppliers to break into the systems of major defence companies or the department itself. There also needs to be a requirement for all private companies to report serious cyber attacks threatening our national infrastructure, and that obviously applies to defence as well.

I do not of course expect the Minister to start going into detail about our own capabilities, either offensive or defensive, in the field of cyber security and cyber attacks, but I hope that he will be able to say something in general terms on this issue when he responds, including on how the additional resources which the Government have previously said are being put into cyber security have been and are being used. One would like to think that those who seek to attack us in this way are as wary of what we can do to them as we may be of what they might be able to do to us.

The need for defence, security, foreign affairs and international development strategies to be co-ordinated and developed together rather than in separate silos has never been greater. We are faced with a Middle East where conflict increasingly seems to be the norm rather than the exception. With that comes the consequence of large and increasing numbers of refugees within the Middle East itself and those seeking to reach Europe in the quest for the basic human desire of safety and security, and a chance to lead lives free of fear. In the Middle East and beyond, we face the impact of extremist terror and intra-Islamist conflict. In Ukraine, we have the instability and uncertainty created by hostile military intervention from Russia, while in the Far East we see China flexing its military muscles and desire for domination and control, which will probably only intensify as it faces economic difficulties within its own boundaries. In some other countries we see the emergence of nationalist movements and populist parties with their associated calls for a more introverted approach rather than the internationalist approach which must surely continue to be the way forward. The emergence of such movements and parties is usually driven by domestic issues, whether economic or political, which are portrayed as putting at risk prosperity, stability and identity.

The wide interest in the forthcoming SDSR and national security strategy will be shared by our defence industry and all those whose jobs, either directly or indirectly, depend on that industry. What are the Government’s objectives under the forthcoming SDSR for maintaining or increasing levels of employment in this area and the need, if that is to be achieved and the skills base protected and developed, of providing a regular and steady workflow?

It is usual in debates such as these to take the opportunity to express gratitude and thanks to our Armed Forces for the vital work they do and the commitment they show and give, and this debate should be no exception; indeed, it has been no exception in that regard. In the last few years in particular, the commitment shown in protecting, defending and furthering the interests of our nation both at home and overseas has led on more than just a few occasions to loss of life, or life-changing or serious injuries, physical and mental, to members of our Armed Forces. The potential sacrifice they know they may have to make is not some remote possibility. It is real, and they deserve our respect and admiration for being prepared to accept that burden on our behalf. The noble Baroness, Lady Hodgson of Abinger, spoke forcefully on the need to support and help both those who make that sacrifice and their families.

The forthcoming SDSR and the national security review should set out what we require of our Armed Forces in the years immediately ahead. We need to be sure that they have the resources, including personnel, to meet those objectives. If we do that, we know that our Armed Forces will deliver in full.