European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 31st January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

My Lords, I have never heard the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, quote someone as left as Cromwell before. In my darkest moments during the referendum I would try to persuade myself that at least one of the benefits was the increasing awareness, familiarity with and affection for their European colleagues that would be engendered in the British people through the discussion. I was prompted in that by an incident that took place 25 years earlier during the 1992 general election, in which I was a candidate. A week before the election it looked as though Labour was going to storm to victory, but in the days leading up to election day our votes, according to the opinion polls, decreased. I was walking through Bellshill in my constituency when a chap came up and said to me, “John, how do you think it’s going?” I replied, “Well, to be truthful, I’m a bit worried about the polls”, at which he said, “Don’t worry about the Poles. Some of us have lived here all our lives and we’ll be voting for you”.

I am not sure that the referendum debate had the desired effect, but in the midst of it, because of the commonplace now of declaring our positions, I have to say that I was anguished at times. I was not decisive on one side or the other. I did not gravitate towards Europhiles or Europhobes. I was what was called a reluctant remainer. I can tell the House that, having watched the course of the negotiations, I have changed my opinion. I am no longer reluctant; I am now a very strong remainer. That is because I believe that we are heading towards a disaster—a halfway house. I think it was my noble friend Lord Hunt who asked earlier why the Government do not outline their objectives. I will tell you why. It is partly because it is a bad negotiating ploy and partly because it would split the governing party. By renaming some of the objectives they are hoping—I believe, and we will see it in a year or two—to get to a position where in all but name we remain in the customs union and the single market.

I say in all fraternity to my colleagues on the Government Benches: all they have to do is look at the Irish border question. It has been mentioned several times, for very good reasons and very emotionally. I, too, feel a degree of emotion but I want to look at it very simply. We all know about the border: 300 miles, more than 200 crossings, 30,000 people a day crossing for work alone and 400,000 commercial vehicles a month. The Government have said, “We pledge to plug that gap, but there will be no hard border”. So they contrive to do it by two promises. It is the implication of putting them together that the Government Benches should examine closely every day.

First, they promised in the framework agreement that there would be “complete regulatory alignment” between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Secondly, they publicly responded to the DUP—whom I do not blame—that there would be complete regulatory alignment between the British mainland and Northern Ireland. Let us follow the daisy chain of logic in this. It does not take a genius: my heavens, Jacob Rees-Mogg worked it out. If the British mainland is aligned with regulations in Northern Ireland, which is aligned with regulations in the Republic of Ireland, which is aligned with the rest of Europe—Ireland remains an EU member, noble Lords may remember—then Britain must be aligned with the rest of Europe. The only way to do that is by remaining in the customs union or in the single market. You cannot square the circle in any other way. That is why, within 24 hours of making the declaration, David Davis went on television to row back, saying “We didn’t really mean it”. By the way, David Davis does not think that anyone in Europe watches British television. He guaranteed that it would be written in blood legally when we get to that discussion.

I mention that because it is symptomatic of all the other discussions that are going on. We will end up in the worst of all worlds, because there is a difference between Ireland and Britain in that scenario: Ireland and Europe are making the decisions on the regulations, while Northern Ireland and Britain will be taking them. It is a classic example of the change in our status: everywhere we are free and yet in shackles. We will be shackled by regulations that we have no power to manufacture in the first place.

We all know the phrase, “power without responsibility”. This Government are contriving to give the United Kingdom responsibility without power. We will be, as near as you can get in the trade arena, a vassal state. This Bill can do nothing about that. But there are three things that we can do in the Bill that can shape the ability of the House of Commons to do it. The first is to make absolutely sure that the House of Commons has the ability not just to reject or accept but to shape, compromise, amend and exert the very sovereignty which, it is claimed, we are withdrawing from Europe to accomplish.

Secondly, we must involve the devolved Governments of the United Kingdom in that decision. Thirdly, we must not preclude the chance of going back to the people. I am not asking for a vote. I am not saying that that will be necessary. I think it was the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, who said last night that we have got into this mess via a referendum. I do not believe that we can get out of it by precluding the legitimacy of another referendum. There is no constitutional reason why we should not do it. Those three elements will greatly assist the elected Chamber in this Parliament to accomplish what is necessary.

Those elements, I remind the House, do not undermine our parliamentary sovereignty. The first represents the exercise of parliamentary sovereignty by enabling the Commons; the second will involve all the democratically elected organisations and institutions in this country; and the third, in the last instance, will give the people of this country the chance when there are new facts and information—new attitudes and explanations—to exercise their ultimate sovereignty. That is what this House can do, and if it does it, it will do a service to the country.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 14th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moynihan]

I know that the whole question of Royal Ascot and the timing of the Queen’s Speech last year was very much determined by Her Majesty. I know for sure—and all noble Lords will know—that the Government, I hope, are absolutely committed to resolving the issues, which are vitally important and serious for the horseracing industry.

On the wider sporting front, we need clarity and certainty over the EU-UK’s future relationship for the sporting industry. I urge the Government to set out clearly what this relationship will look like so that the sports sector can prepare for the future. We also need to look beyond the specifics of top-level elite and professional sport. While the issues of players and transfers in football are important, they should not be the only focus of government in seeking to negotiate the best possible settlement for the sector.

We also need to focus on the continued freedom of movement on a seasonal basis for particular sports. I hope that the Government will consider proposing sports-specific visas to allow players, fans and support staff to enter and leave the European Union easily.

We have been a very important and attractive destination in hosting many events, not least the London 2012 Olympics. However, there will be increased challenges for fans and players to come into and exit the UK which could not just reduce the pool of workers but risks making the UK a less attractive international destination to host events. I hope the Minister will address that point.

As far as the Premier League is concerned, I mentioned that football was at the pinnacle of the debate. That is because there are very important points about player transfers—Bosman issues are high on that list. I will focus the Committee’s attention today on one point, although there are many aspects of professional sport that will be need to be addressed and I hope are currently being addressed. FIFA has a relationship with the European Union under Article 19, which allows international transfers to be permitted only for players over the age of 18, save for limited exceptions. One exception is that the transfer takes place within the European Union or the EEA, when the age criteria is reduced to 16.

When we leave the EU, we could potentially lose the ability to utilise the exception in Article 19 and therefore be prevented from signing players at other EU clubs between the ages of 16 and 18. That is fundamental to how UK clubs acquire young, talented and cost-effective players. This sort of youth development issue is extremely important in light of UEFA’s financial fair play regulations. Naturally, losing the Article 19 exception would have adverse consequences for all UK clubs. It is crucial for clubs to sign talented players whom they have identified at the earliest possible occasion, not just to limit the acquisition cost but to develop the young talent that is vital.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

It is worth making the point that we are not talking about income for massive, rich clubs. We are talking about many clubs, which might be on the verge of insolvency in terms of their operations, having to seek through their scouting systems talented players within the EU who can not only contribute to the club by playing, but through their development can bring in later transfer fees.

[Lord Moynihan]

I completely endorse that point. This is not just about the top clubs in the Premier League; it is about the survival of professional football in the country. I am delighted to hear the noble Lord place his points on the record and I completely endorse them.

Briefly, when we look at the rugby football world, there are Kolpak players. I mentioned this at an early stage on Second Reading, so I will not rehearse the Kolpak agreement. Kolpak players, under the Cotonou agreement, have specific non-discriminatory rights once they are lawfully employed in the European Union. In rugby, this means that, once a player from a Kolpak country has legally entered the UK, they cannot be classed as a foreign player under the Rugby Football Union regulations. Currently, the RFU regulations are that there should be no more than two foreign players in a match day squad in the top four tiers of English rugby. There are some 165 contracted Kolpak players in the top four tiers.

This is a very important point. Negotiations will need to take place within the context of the European Union and the UK Government and also with the Rugby Football Union. There needs to be early engagement with the RFU so clubs have visibility and can make strong commercial decisions moving forward over a number of years. That is vital. Many noble Lords have made the point today that we need consistency, clarity and vision so that decisions in the world of sport can be made early rather than the day before the season starts.

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No one in this country, however they voted on 23 June 2016, voted to make either themselves or the nation poorer. No one voted to reduce the influence of our country in the world. These amendments, and the others, give a chance for Parliament to assert its proper position in the constitution of the nation, and I hope they will have strong support.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

My Lords, I rise to support Amendment 151, courtesy of my noble friend Lord Adonis, who is moving the next amendment. Amendment 151, in a word, is about sovereignty. That word is much used, much abused, perhaps overused, but anyone who lacks the feeling that the sovereignty of Parliament is in doubt need only, I fear, reread the first section of the Minister’s response at the end of the previous group of amendments. We are not speaking about the theory of sovereignty, abstract sovereignty, sovereignty as a slogan on the side of a bus, but what the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, referred to earlier as the practical application of sovereignty. That is what is supposed to be at the root of this whole debate.

When I spoke in the debate at Second Reading, I said that it was the responsibility of this House to make absolutely sure that the other House in particular—the elected House—had the ability not just to accept or reject but to shape, to mould, to compromise, to send back, because it is in that House, above all, that sovereignty lies. This amendment underlines that sentiment, as it seeks to ensure that the meaningful vote that was voted into this Bill by the other House comes to Parliament in a meaningful timeframe.

It is worth reminding ourselves why the amendment proposed by Dominic Grieve and accepted by the other House—Amendment 7—was so important. Whatever the Minister may now believe, Clause 9 of this Bill contains the power needed for Ministers to implement the withdrawal agreement. However, the Government had originally sought sweeping and virtually untrammelled powers to implement whatever they thought “appropriate”, with no substantive reference back to Parliament, with no real further scrutiny in either House and without the consent of legislators. The Minister will forgive us if we are sceptics whenever we are assured that the sovereignty of Parliament is respected by the Government. The track record does not suggest that to be the case, especially when a citizen had to go to the High Court in order to impose or reassert the sovereignty of Parliament.

As noble Lords are aware, the Government failed to convince MPs that carte blanche should be given to them in this way, and the Government were defeated on the amendment referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, which proposed that the powers in Clause 9 could be exercised only,

“subject to the prior enactment of a statute by Parliament approving the final terms of withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union”.

That amendment—known as Amendment 7 in the House of Commons—was passed and is now part of the Bill. That process started outside Parliament through the courts in order to reassert the primacy of parliamentary sovereignty. It means that the Government have to give both Houses of Parliament a legislative opportunity to vote on the final deal. For the purposes of my argument, I will refer to this as the Amendment 7 statute.

Let us remember the Government’s response to the defeat in the Commons. We now know that Ministers were hugely disappointed that this change was ever made. The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU maintain now that they will place a Motion before the Commons to gain in-principle approval for any deal reached. We do not know what options—if any—such a Motion would contain or when it would be brought to Parliament. We know that it would be a Motion only, with no statutory effect.

In a Written Statement on 13 December—the day Mr Grieve’s amendment was being debated—the Government stated that they would also bring forward a withdrawal and implementation Bill to implement “the major policies” of the withdrawal agreement. But again, we do not know when that Bill will be brought to Parliament. I hope that such a Bill will fulfil the requirements of the Amendment 7 statute fully and that the Government do not offer instead a rushed, after-the-fact rubber-stamp exercise.

[Lord Balfe (Con)]

Can I point out to the noble Lord that it is of course possible that the European Parliament’s consent could be given only on the basis that the Houses of Parliament had had a valid vote? It could withhold its consent to the agreement on the grounds that there had been no valid vote in the UK Parliament.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

With the noble Lord’s usual foresight he has accurately pre-empted what I am going on to say. That is precisely the point. The Government’s reassurances were not—for that reason among others—enough for the House of Commons and it proceeded to put the requirement of the statute in the Bill. My point about that is that, from beginning to end, that process was not the voluntarism of the Government reasserting the sovereignty of the House of Commons or Parliament; it was forced on them first by the courts and secondly by the House of Commons itself.

Further safeguards are needed and this amendment seeks to give one by ensuring that the Amendment 7 statute will be brought forward to Parliament in a fair, appropriate and, above all, timely manner. As the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, alluded to, as it stands, Britain could possibly face a scenario whereby the Government strike a sub-optimal deal with the European Union, then rely entirely on an “accept or reject” Motion in the House of Commons and delay the Amendment 7 statute and the regulations necessary to implement the withdrawal agreement right up until the 11th hour. This could take Parliament to the cliff edge and leave the legislature with no real alternative option. This would clearly not be in the spirit of the Amendment 7 statute which the Commons have sought, but, in the light of the Government’s record on the issue of parliamentary sovereignty, there are simply insufficient guarantees written into Clause 9 to ensure that we will see this statutory process in good time.

By ensuring that the Amendment 7 statute is placed before Parliament as soon as a deal is done—and every effort must be made to enact it prior to the parallel ratification stage in the European Parliament—we would enhance the rights of MPs and Peers to have such a “meaningful vote” in a meaningful way and at a meaningful time. We have been told time and again that Brexit is a matter of Britain taking back control. It is so loose in the current clause that it actually allows a huge gap in that control. That is what this amendment addresses. It would be preposterous if Ministers accepted a deal and UK legislatures were watching the televised proceedings from the European Parliament discussing our withdrawal agreement before this Parliament had the opportunity to make a decision itself. That is precisely what this amendment is about.

The Amendment 7 statute, passed in the House of Commons, is the only viable context in which MPs and Members of this House can express their views on the deal, and whether it should be rejected or, crucially, whether the Prime Minister should be requested to seek different or improved terms. In its simplest terms, this amendment is a protection for the will of the House of Commons, which it has already said it wants. If the Government are truly committed to a meaningful say for the British Parliament, if they truly believe in the British Parliament taking back control, surely they can accept this amendment today. I hope that they will.

[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 190 in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Llandudno. I warmly support what has already been said on the important amendments in this group. My amendment is framed to ensure that it is quite clear in the Bill what the implications would be of Parliament not approving the terms of a deal negotiated by the Government. If there is to be a meaningful vote by Parliament as opposed to a take-note Motion, which would be a total travesty of democracy on such a vital issue, then there are three possible outcomes. First, Parliament could endorse the terms of Brexit negotiated by the Government, which would clearly mean the UK leaving the EU on those terms. Secondly, Parliament could reject the terms negotiated. Thirdly, Parliament could resolve to refer the issue back to the people for a confirmatory referendum, something which I believe is raised in later amendments. I am excluding, for the purposes of this debate, the possibility that Parliament could tell the Government to return to the negotiating table and come back with a better agreement—a course of action which appears to be the subject of Amendment 199 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack.

Amendment 190 is essentially a reset amendment, meaning that if there is no deal at the end of the negotiating period then the UK falls back on to the status quo terms. On 7 February 2017 Mr David Jones, the MP for Clwyd West, then a Brexit Minister, said during a debate on the Article 50 Bill:

“There will be a meaningful vote. The vote will be either to accept the deal that the Government will have achieved—I repeat that the process of negotiation will not be without frequent reports to the House—or for there to be no deal. Frankly, that is the choice that the House will have to make. That will be the most meaningful vote that one could imagine”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/2/17; col. 273.]


MPs should not be put in a position where they can vote either for a really bad deal result from the negotiations or in a way that delivers a no deal outcome. There must be a reset alternative for MPs. In circumstances where the deal secured by the Government is transparently inadequate there must be an option provided for the UK to continue being in the EU on existing terms. If that is not an available option it is essentially telling MPs to vote with a gun to their head.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Report: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 30th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

The constitutional position has changed radically with the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act. My noble friend is implying that no Government would be prepared to suffer the embarrassment of staying in power. But on the record of this Government, they might be quite prepared to stay in power.

[Lord Grocott]

My noble friend knows perfectly well that the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act provides for a vote of no confidence in the Government. It would be the equivalent of a Motion of no confidence in the Government if they lost the support of the House of Commons for their central legislative plank.

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[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

I must insist—

[The Countess of Mar]

Noble Lords may get up only once, and the noble Lord has already done so.

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[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, it may surprise people who follow anything that I say in this House—there do not need to be many—that I am not opposed in principle to a further referendum. How could I be? I was on the losing side once in a referendum vote, in 1975, and I was very keen to have a second referendum. I certainly got one, but it took 41 years. I therefore have no objection to people who say, “Things can change; circumstances can alter, and maybe we should have another referendum” But to have another referendum in two years stretches it just a little. I shall not say, “Wait till 2057”, which would be a direct comparison with precedent, but it certainly needs to be much longer than two years. Anyone seriously arguing for this needs at least to be able to answer yes to one question, which is this: was that made clear when the referendum Bill was going through this House? I sat through nearly all of it—Second Reading, Committee and Report. I must have missed the speech of someone who said, “If this referendum that we all voted for”—we did; there was no opposition to the Bill at Third Reading—“results in a leave vote, we will need to have a second referendum in a couple of years’ time”. Anyone who said that, please ignore the rest of my remarks—I did not hear it. I shall happily give way to my noble friend, who I know is a very reluctant remainer.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

I was, until I saw the mess the Government are making of these negotiations. My noble friend makes a very good point on the referendum, but it would not be a second referendum on the same proposition. It is not just the facts that have changed; it is the proposition on which people will be asked to vote that will have changed in the light of the deal.

[Lord Grocott]

I am really grateful to my noble friend for pointing out that, if circumstances change, there is a case for a further referendum. During the 41-year gap between the 1975 referendum and the further referendum, the European Union became unrecognisable in comparison with the institution that was voted for in 1975. It went from nine members to 28; it introduced the single market; the powers of the Commission changed beyond all recognition, as did the circumstances in which the European Parliament met. Once again, if there was anyone in this House who during that period said, “Really, things have changed quite dramatically; it is now a different proposition”—to use my noble friend’s expression—“and we ought to have a second referendum now to see whether the people still agree with what they said in 1975”, I did not hear that. It is another speech that I must have missed; I keep missing speeches. There was no acknowledgement, so far as I could see, that, because circumstances changed between 1975 and 2016, there should be a referendum. On the contrary, every time a further referendum was raised, any remainer—if I can describe it in those terms—was vehemently opposed to it. Now we have the irony of people who are opposed to one referendum wanting two.

The argument frequently used—I do not know whether this was what my noble friend was getting at—is that when people voted leave, they did not really know the full details and consequences of what they were voting for. I have had the privilege of representing two parliamentary constituencies, both of them very large. I have spoken to thousands, maybe tens of thousands, of people. I never found anyone in either of those parts of the country who got confused by the meaning of the word “leave”. Yet for some strange reason, in the immediate vicinity of Westminster there are large numbers of able people for whom the meaning of the word tortures them. They go into paroxysms of uncertainty about precisely what is meant by leave.

I know what leave means: at the very least it means you do not have to continue to obey the rules of the organisation you are leaving. I would also argue that if you leave an organisation you do not have to carry on paying the subscription. My noble friend Lord Adonis supports me in the words I am saying: he left the Liberal Democrats and joined the Labour Party—an excellent move; I commend him for that decision—but I very much doubt whether he continues to pay a subscription to the Liberal Democrats. When you leave an organisation, you do not pay the subs and you do not obey the rules; it is pretty simple.

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[Lord Cormack]

My Lords, Amendment 52 is grouped with Amendment 62 and I will address most of my remarks to the latter. Although I hope that my noble friend Lord Hailsham will not be cross with me, Amendment 52 deals rather more succinctly with the subjects that were dealt with in Amendment 49. As your Lordships’ House has already passed that amendment by a substantial majority, and has therefore emphatically accepted the need to have a meaningful vote, and enshrined that in the Bill, it would be tedious of me to repeat the arguments or to ask your Lordships to vote. At the appropriate moment, I will say the appropriate words.

Amendment 62 is very important. It is a logical consequence of Amendment 52 or, now that we have put it in the Bill, Amendment 49. The meaningful vote must be underscored with a meaningful process. There is a great deal of uncertainty around what the meaningful vote will look like and what the consequences would be should Parliament decide—as I hope it will not have to—to vote against any agreement. Amendment 62 seeks to address the current uncertainty in the Bill around this process. It is possible that, if the withdrawal deal fails to get through Parliament, the UK could leave the EU with no deal at all and fall back on WTO terms, which the Government’s own assessment shows would be the worst option, reducing growth, according to some estimates, by 8% over 15 years. Parliament must therefore have the right to request that the Government get back to the negotiating table for a better deal if that is the outcome. Amendment 62 would ensure that, if Parliament declines to approve the Government’s Motion on the withdrawal deal, the UK would retain our current relationship with the EU and the Government would be required to request an extension of Article 50.

Amendment 62 is therefore a common-sense amendment, which would strengthen Parliament’s ability to consider the withdrawal deal effectively, both in good time and in a position to send the Government back to the negotiating table while providing a degree of continuity and stability for our economy. This is very much a common-sense amendment, and if it is not pushed to a vote later this evening, because it will not be reached for some considerable time, I hope that we will have the opportunity to look at these issues again. It is important that we have a good deal, and it is crucial that we do not have no deal. This amendment is therefore a constructive one, and I very much hope that the sentiments behind it will commend themselves to your Lordships’ House at the appropriate moment. I beg to move.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

My Lords, I will speak in favour of Amendments 52 and 62. Given the strictures on repetition, I will not rehearse again anything on Amendment 52, which would allow the British Parliament to have its say before the European Parliament is asked to approve any deal. I already made plain my views on that in Committee so I will stick to Amendment 62. With this amendment we are seeking to safeguard Parliament’s ability to have a “meaningful” vote. It would have been handy if it had been linked with Amendment 49, but I realise the conflicting pressures that are on the Front Bench to decide the groupings. Nevertheless, Amendment 49 has taken a huge stride tonight in underpinning a meaningful vote. However, it is by no means perfect, and it has gaps.

Parliament’s consideration of the withdrawal agreement will be a serious task—we all know that. Our debates this evening alone have shown the level of complexity and sheer number of issues which the withdrawal agreement will have to address in detail. Yet as the clock ticks onwards that exit day comes ever closer—it is now within a year—and if there is no withdrawal agreement, we lose guaranteed access to our biggest market, certainty on the Irish border, and confidence for British citizens living and working in the rest of Europe and for the European citizens who are here. Given the timescale, those are immense risks.

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[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

What evidence does the noble Lord have that you get a better deal when you go back to the table than the deal you have already got?

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

The noble Lord may be able to predict whether it will be better or worse, but any deal that is acceptable to the British Parliament would be better than the disastrous situation of no deal at all. But that may need time. Why have an artificial deadline cutting us off from the conclusion of a deal, which may be there in the bones or, in the famous words of the Brexit Secretary, as a “platform”—and deny ourselves the opportunity of having the alternative of a cohesive deal rather than no deal, which I think would be the worst of all worlds? This is an opportunity that we should take.

A lot of the debate on Amendment 49 was about the ideological motives of those who are handling this. As my noble friend and occasional protagonist Lord Grocott keeps pointing out, I was a reluctant remainer. I was sceptical about the eurozone and the bureaucracy and unaccountability of the European Union, but on balance I wanted to stay in because all the challenges that we face are global: cyber, terrorism, trade and the environment. Being part of a larger bloc is, on balance, worth it. Therefore, my approach to this is pragmatic, not ideological. I admit to being confused by the ideological positions of the leaders of the major parties. We appear to have the leader of one party who is ideologically inclined to remain in the European Union but doing her best to get us out of it, and a leader of the other party who is ideologically inclined to remove us from the European Union who appears to be doing his best to keep us in part of it. I am confused about the ideologies that are supposed to be driving this on all sides of the House.

I believe that we should take what the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, called a common-sense position. It is possible that the vote on the final deal could be little more than a deal or no deal choice, where a rejection of the Government’s Motion would mean the UK exiting the EU with no deal on WTO terms, which would be the worst possible option for the UK. That is not according to me, in my lack of wisdom, experience, depth and analysis, but according to the Government’s own impact studies. I believe that we must insure against that, which is what Amendment 62 seeks to do.

The Secretary of State told the House of Commons that the agreement will deliver the “exact same benefits” as our EU membership. That is basically what the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, said our objectives were. As it happens, that is also the commitment of the Opposition Front Bench, which has adopted it as one of its six tests. Amendment 62 simply safeguards this commitment by guaranteeing that we keep our current benefits until a withdrawal agreement has been reached that can match our objectives. As the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said, it is a common sense, pragmatic amendment. It has no political motivation and no ulterior motive, other than the objective of preserving the best for this country. That is what this whole debate is supposed to be about.

It is my great pleasure to support Amendment 62. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, for indicating that, if time constraints prevent us pushing this to a vote later tonight, we may come back to it at another stage.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, I do not think that this is really about the European Union. This is about parliamentary sovereignty. I have to say that I do not understand why it is that the Government do not want Parliament, in the end, to be in a position to make the decisions which these two amendments make possible. It seems to me, in any case, that that would be valuable to the Government in negotiation, because it would enable them to say that a deal, if both sides want a deal, is one that has to get through Parliament. However, I do not want to go down that route. I want to go down the route of parliamentary sovereignty.

This is the most important decision we have made for a very long time—perhaps the most important peacetime decision that we have made ever. There are people in this House on either side of the debate and I would not be able, even if I wished to, to pretend that I was not absolutely committed to one side. But I am also a parliamentarian, and it is clear to me that there is no reason why Parliament should not make sure that it is able to make a proper decision on this issue and to make a decision that does not leave the nation in an impossible position. All that these two amendments really do is to ensure that there is a sensible programme into which Parliament is “properly”—I use that word in almost a technical sense—conjoined.

Why should one not want this? Well, one might not want it because it is not properly drafted. Of course, the technique of Governments of all kinds is to say that they would be very happy to go along with something but unfortunately there is this or that technical reason why it does not work. Maybe that is so, but I would therefore ask the Government this: if it is technically wrong, would they come before the House with the amendments that would make it technically right? If they do not, they are saying that in this most important issue of all, the Executive are going to make the decision, and that they wish to leave themselves open to making the circumstances in which Parliament cannot make a sensible decision. They would be saying to Parliament, “Vote for us or total disaster and collapse”. This is the technique of dictators down the ages: “Me or chaos; me or something much worse”. This House should insist that the decision is in Parliament’s hands. That means avoiding circumstances in which it is possible for the Executive to say, “However bad this is, anything else would be very much worse”.

My noble friend Lord Hamilton is also arguing from a clear, previous position—so we are in the same situation. He asks whether we have any evidence that going back for a further negotiation would be better. I have been in business since I was 22, except for when I was a Minister, and I have never started by saying that if the negotiation was not successful I was not prepared to go back and see if I could do better. That is how you run businesses and make money. It is how you improve the circumstances. I do not know in advance whether I can achieve something better, but I would never say that I would never go back and put myself into a position in which I could not negotiate again.

So I say to my noble friend that all this amendment says is that if Parliament decides that a negotiated agreement is not satisfactory, then, and only then, the Government will have to go back and seek something better.

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[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, I am a great admirer of my noble friend Lord Reid and therefore, if he presses this to a Division later on in the evening or at whatever hour of the night we get to it, I will of course support him. I have nothing against the contents of the amendment because it is clearly desirable that, if we cannot support the Government’s treaty, the default should be that we stay in the EU unless the House of Commons has a better set of propositions that it wishes to agree to.

However, my concern is that there is a certain element of unreality to the proposals to try to bind the hands of the House of Commons as to what it may or may not do in the autumn. One of two things will in fact happen when the Prime Minister presents her treaty. The House of Commons will either vote for it or vote against it. There are no other alternatives. If the House of Commons votes against the treaty, that is, to all intents and purposes, a Motion of no confidence in the Government. There has not been an incident since Gladstone’s Home Rule Bill in 1886, which was rejected by the House of Commons, where the central plank of a Government’s policy was rejected outright by the House of Commons. The idea that there could be a further negotiation after that is entirely unrealistic. The negotiation would have been concluded with the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, and ratified or not by the European Parliament and so forth. It is not realistic in the real world to expect that there would be further negotiation.

In the eventuality that the treaty is rejected, there are only two things that could conceivably happen. Either there will be an election because the Government have been defeated on what is in effect a Motion of confidence—it might take a formal triggering Motion under the Fixed-term Parliaments Act to produce it—or there will be a referendum, which we discussed earlier. A referendum could happen if the House of Commons itself resolved that there should be one immediately after the defeat or perhaps as an amendment to the Motion that the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, has said would be tabled. Everything else beyond that seems to be superfluous. The policy of the Government will then be the outcome of the referendum or the outcome of that election. A Government will have to be formed after the election, which will have to have a European policy and that will then be the policy of the Government that they would seek to negotiate in Brussels. There would either be some amendments to the treaty, if that is possible or—as I hope there is a Labour Government—there will be a decision not to proceed with Brexit, or there would be a referendum and we would proceed with the outcome of that referendum.

I say all that mainly to my noble friend on the Front Bench and her colleagues in the other place. There is no point in engaging in this displacement activity at the moment and making it sound as if we are being very tough on Brexit by placing ever more elaborate manacles and handcuffs on what might or might not happen in the vote in October. The only thing that really matters is the attitude of the Labour Party when the Government present their treaty. Either we are in favour of it or we are against it. If we are against that treaty, I can assure my noble friend that everything else will take care of itself. If we are against the treaty and vote against it, we do not need all the protections in this Bill. One of two things will happen. Either there will be another referendum or there will be an election. If there is an election, what matters is the policy of my party in that election. Will we or will we not proceed with Brexit if we win the election? Very simple facts of political power come into play.

What happens in Parliament after that will depend on those decisions. Ever more elaborate provisions in this Bill are, I say respectfully, entirely beside the point because they miss the reality of political power. That is that there has to be a Government, they have to have a policy and that can come from only one of two ways. Either a new Government are returned if this Government are turned out on the treaty or there is a referendum that will determine it.

I am entirely in favour of everything in my noble friend’s amendment and I hope that it will be warmly welcomed from the Front Bench, but what really matters, I say to my noble friends, is the policy of the Labour Party when the Prime Minister presents her treaty. If we are against the treaty and we are successful, there has to be either an election or a referendum. I am afraid that there are no alternative options on offer.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

With the leave of the House—and the noble Countess, Lady Mar, if she is in—I want to say something. I used to say to a friend of mine—he was an acquaintance, really—in the Militant Group that I wished I was as sure of one thing as he was of everything. There is an unusual hint of that in what my noble friend just said. It is not true that you can ordain in the future in politics the inevitability of one or two courses. In the wise words of Harold Macmillan, when asked what he was most frightened of, “Events, dear boy, events”. I would therefore be very cautious about taking that view—although my noble friend is perfectly entitled to ask the Labour Front Bench what the party’s position is—on the inevitability of history. Great philosophers have made that mistake before. If I am correct and he is wrong, it would be wise to have some form of plan or safeguard for each contingency. All we are trying to do, in a non-ideological and non-partisan fashion, is say, “Let us have a common-sense plan for the contingency that Parliament votes this down”. There is a huge complexity about what might happen afterwards and none of it is unavoidable or predictable in advance.

[Lord Adonis]

My noble friend makes a very good point, but all of those further eventualities would be so much clearer if my party’s policy were clear in the first place.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, the case has been made that should Parliament fail to approve the Government’s withdrawal deal, the Government should pause the Article 50 process and go back to the negotiating table. That might appear to be a sensible, common-sense—in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack—possibly even essential proposal. Indeed, it was one of the arguments we used when we urged the Government to remove the fixed date for exit in the Bill—we will return to that next week but I am sure they are aware of that—to give the flexibility they may need in exactly those circumstances.

However, I fear that the particular route of Amendment 62 runs counter to the whole thrust of what we have just agreed in Amendment 49. Should the Government’s deal be voted down, the consequences of that failure to negotiate a satisfactory outcome and to win the support of Parliament for it would indeed be extremely serious. Amendment 49 says that in those circumstances it should be the Commons rather than the Government which starts to take charge. The Commons may well decide to take the route suggested in Amendment 62 with a quick letter to the EU asking it to consider an extension. It might consider as an alternative that it wants a referendum. It might decide that it wants to withdraw the Article 50 trigger altogether rather than just extend it, as set out in the later Amendment 57 from the noble Lord, Lord Wigley.

However, today is not the time to speculate which of those would be the right outcome for the House of Commons in those circumstances. We cannot know now and we certainly should not try to second-guess the correct option if there is not a majority in the Commons for the deal that has been negotiated.

It would be a shame if in any way the amendment appears to put the initiative back into the hands of Ministers, rather than the Commons. Amendment 49 said it was for the Commons, not the Executive, to take the next step should we find ourselves in that position. On that basis, we will be abstaining on Amendment 62—assuming that it is dealt with tonight, rather than early in the morning. Our reason is that it is tangential or even superfluous—rather than objectionable—and could be seen to conflict with what we have just agreed at 5 pm today in Amendment 49. It narrows, rather than widens, the options the Commons would have should the final deal be voted down.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

I welcome the constructive nature of my noble friend’s criticism, if you follow me. I am not sure that the two are incompatible. I am not sure that the House of Commons can actually, in international relations, speak for a sovereign state the way that a Government have to speak for a sovereign state. I take it from what my noble friend said that she is not ruling out the idea but objects to the imperative nature of it and the apparent conflicts with what was passed earlier. In that case, I hope that she and the Government will engage in seeing how we could reconcile those apparent differences.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Report: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 2nd May 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office and Scotland Office (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)]

My Lords, I had a five-page speaking note when I arrived here. I have now written more than 10 pages myself. I am not sure my speaking note will do the debate justice so I will set it aside.

I will try to capture the key elements of this discussion. I will turn, as I often do in matters concerning Ireland and Northern Ireland, to the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, who reminded us that we have heard the same words used many times about the Good Friday agreement, to the extent that earlier today we almost had to use a thesaurus to find a replacement for “steadfast” because we have said it so many times. As it happens, the word in the note is “unwavering”, if you are looking for a description of our support for the Good Friday agreement. But the noble and right reverend Lord is correct: we must give comfort and certainty to the people of Northern Ireland that they will not be abandoned, sacrificed, left behind, have their rights trimmed to suit a separate agenda or find themselves in a situation where what they thought they had they do not have at all. I had the pleasure of having a cup of tea yesterday with the noble and right reverend Lord and he spoke about what he called the Ballymena spade—where they call a spade a spade. We need to be clear that there can be no border down the middle of the Irish Sea. We simply cannot create a division between one part of our country and another.

Michel Barnier, the chief negotiator for the EU, has said that there needs to be some adjustment to particular rights and proprieties, that there needs to be some acceptance that we cannot have these things, and that some of the red lines themselves, as the Foreign Minister of Ireland has said, may need to be adjusted in the light of peace and prosperity. But they cannot be, that is the point. So if I was to give a message to Michel Barnier, it would be: “Ecoutez les deux communautés”—you must listen to the two communities in Northern Ireland. You cannot listen to only one of them. Both are integral to what we will be able to achieve on the island of Ireland, and any suggestion otherwise is fallacious and unhelpful. In truth, it risks creating greater uncertainty for this particular negotiation. I would advocate great caution on behalf of Michel Barnier in this regard.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

The Minister knows the respect in which I hold him and the job he is doing. I have no wish to have a border which differentiates Northern Ireland from the rest of the United Kingdom. But will he accept that the problem was not created by Michel Barnier? The promise to have complete alignment between Northern Ireland and southern Ireland was not made by Michel Barnier, it was made by the British Government. Michel Barnier is doing no more than holding the Government to the promise they made to Europe in the initial agreement, and it is not his responsibility that outside that the Government also promised the DUP—correctly, in my view—that there would be complete alignment between Britain and Northern Ireland. That is the essential problem, because if you have alignment between Britain and Northern Ireland, between Northern Ireland and southern Ireland, and between southern Ireland and Europe, you automatically have alignment between Britain and the European Union; in other words, staying inside the customs union.

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

I hear the noble Lord, Lord Reid. With the greatest respect, I recognise what he is saying, but the joint report did not have just one element in this regard, it had three elements. The important thing about the three elements is that each must be afforded the ultimate engagement to try to deliver a solution. If Michel Barnier has decided that the first and second are sacrificial elements and he must now focus only on the third, frankly, he is becoming part of a bigger problem.