Brexit

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Saturday 19th October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

My Lords, the House may not be surprised to know that I have not read every one of the almost 600 pages of this agreement this morning. I am not sure that it would have helped. I am reminded of Woody Allen saying: “I have been learning speed reading. I have just read War and Peace; it is about Russia”. However, I know enough to know that this is a bad deal. It is worse than remain and worse than Theresa May’s deal.

I will make three simple points. First, it will leave this country much weaker economically. Even on the Government’s own projections, made last year, a deal such as this will mean that, in 15 years’ time, we will be £130 billion worse off in GDP than we would have been had we remained. It is also worse than Theresa May’s deal, resulting in three times the reduction in national income than the deal she provided. This is not just a matter of graphs on an economist’s wall. This affects the prosperity of every citizen of this country, each of whom will be £2,250 worse off. That is a bad move, but it is a disaster because it will affect the poorest families most.

Secondly, it adds a threat to the stability of this United Kingdom. Speaking in this House on 3 July, I said that I was already worried that, for the first time in my lifetime, we were marching towards the prospect of the break-up of Britain. I see nothing in this deal that assuages my concerns. Indeed, the special provisions for Northern Ireland are likely to enhance those concerns in Scotland. I am sorry that the DUP Members are not in their seats today, because they have played such a role over the last year or two. Despite the assurances that I hear on Northern Ireland, I accept the judgment of two Prime Ministers—Blair and Major, who did more than anyone else to end an 800-year conflict on the island of Ireland—who have warned about instability. I accept their judgment far more than that of the present Prime Minister, who famously said that the consequences of the border in Ireland were no greater than moving from Camden to Islington. What ignorance that is of the history, culture and sentiment of the people of that Province to come from a British Prime Minister.

On those two aspects, I think that we are much worse off with this deal. I suggest that those who say we could rely on being bailed out economically and in Northern Ireland by our allies—particularly by the President of the United States, because he is a reliable man when he pledges his word—should have a word with the Kurds and perhaps decide to reflect on that.

My third point is one which is rarely mentioned: the strategic challenges which will face this country over the coming years. The world has changed dramatically, despite the post-imperial delusions of the Little Englanders who think we can do what we did 300 years ago. We now live in a world where multinational companies cross borders; where migration knows no borders; where cyber, by definition, is worldwide—it is the world wide web; where all global finance and commerce crosses borders; and where the environment does not recognise territorial distinctions. If we isolate ourselves from a large power bloc such as the European Union, we will be much less influential in the world.

In short, this deal will leave this country more impoverished, its citizens less well off; as a United Kingdom, we will be less united, and as a nation state, we will be less influential. That does not seem to me a great new deal. I do not know what will happen in the House of Commons today. I have difficulty understanding today’s politics: when my friend Jeremy is a potential Prime Minister and Boris is the actual Prime Minister, anything is possible. However, I know one thing: it will not be done today, as the right reverend Prelate said. There is a rocky road ahead of us for years, with sacrifices, negotiations, implementations, compromises and so on. We do not know the final destination, but at least the route is now clear. Because the route is now clear, in a way that it was not three years ago, we should put whatever solution we pass in this Parliament to the people. They have that right and we should do it.

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[The Minister of State, Department for Exiting the European Union (Lord Callanan) (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to close this historic debate on behalf of the Government. Before I get on with the main content, it is important to say that, as my noble friend Lord Lamont announced in his speech, the House of Commons has passed the Letwin amendment. Following the vote, the Prime Minister addressed the other place. For the benefit of noble Lords who may not have heard him, he said that the best thing for Britain and Europe is for us to leave with this new deal on 31 October. He went on to say that he will not negotiate a delay with the EU and neither does the law compel him to do so. The Prime Minister will tell the EU and member states exactly what he has told everyone for his 88 days as Prime Minister: further delay would be bad for this country, for the EU and for democracy. Next week, the Government will introduce the legislation needed for us to the leave the EU with our new deal on 31 October. The Prime Minister—

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

My Lords—

[Lord Callanan]

I will complete my remarks, then I will take an intervention. The Prime Minister said that he hopes our European colleagues will reject delay and, if they do, that honourable Members will change their minds and support this new deal in overwhelming numbers.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

I am grateful to the Minister. I followed his words carefully. The Prime Minister has said that he will not “negotiate” a delay with the European Union. Can the Minister tell us whether the Prime Minister will send a letter requesting an extension, as he is obliged to do by law?

[Lord Callanan]

As I have said a number of times, to the boredom of noble Lords, we will of course abide by the law. The requirement—

Brexit: Parliamentary Processes

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Thursday 3rd October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

The Government have in mind that we will attempt to negotiate a new and improved deal with the European Union that will enable the referendum result to be respected. Beyond that, we will abide by the law.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

Will the Minister do the House the courtesy of trying to answer the Question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack? How do the Government intend to reconcile the apparently irreconcilable positions of potentially crashing out of Europe on 31 October and adhering to the law that says that, if an agreement has not been reached by 19 October, then the Government must ask for an extension? I am sure that Downing Street has a cunning plan—or at least a Cummings plan—to reconcile the irreconcilables, but can the Minister at least give this House the guarantee that the Government will abide not just by the letter but by the spirit of the European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act? In view of the Supreme Court judgment, he should be in a position to give the House that very guarantee.

[Lord Callanan]

The noble Lord was obviously a loss to stand-up comedy. I repeat the assurances that I gave that the Government will of course at all times abide by the law. I have to say that, if the Opposition spent half as much time helping us to negotiate a better deal as they do undermining our negotiating position, we might be able to get a deal that we could all get behind and we would not have to go near obsessing about the provisions of the Benn Act.

Brexit: Appointment of Joint Committee

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

My Lords, for the first time in my life I fear that we are marching steadily towards the break-up of the United Kingdom. I want to spend some time today on the subject of Scotland and its place in the United Kingdom, and the implications of a no-deal Brexit for that relationship. To do that, I want to go back a number of decades to orientate ourselves to what might happen.

To state the obvious, Scotland is a nation. It is a nation with commonly recognised borders, a common thread of history and, above all, a national consciousness. Over the last few centuries Scotland has obviously been a nation inside a larger nation state—within the United Kingdom—so the question of national consciousness is therefore very complex, with the development over time of what Professor John Mackintosh MP once called the “dual consciousness” of the Scottish people: part-Scottish, part-British. That balance has varied from time to time, as might be expected, but it has always been a balance. Devolution did not create that national consciousness; it was the response to its existence.

Now, as we countenance Brexit, I want to ask two questions. First, why, as late as the 1950s and 1960s, was there such a significant feeling of Britishness in that balance and such an antipathy towards separation, especially in the populous west of Scotland, which acted as a block for many years on separatist ambitions but which, counterintuitively, contains the most significant number of the descendants of Irish immigrants, who might have been assumed to have the least affection for the Crown, the union and the union jack? Secondly, what has changed since, and what implications do those changes have as we countenance Brexit?

The answer to the first question, about the strength of Britishness in Scotland 50 years ago, is complex, but I suggest it included the personal experience and fresh memories of common struggle and sacrifice throughout the United Kingdom, especially in World War 2; the lingering suspicions, especially in that populous west of Scotland, of the right-wing and in particular the anti-Irish-immigrant origins of the SNP; the resultant fear that a separation would threaten the Ulsterisation of Scotland and the ascendancy of the majority over the minority; the self-interest in jobs provided by British-wide industries in coal, steel, shipbuilding and so on; the solidarity consequently arising through the Britain-wide trade union movement and fellow employees in these industries; and, above all, the recognition that for a nation of 6 million, a United Kingdom of 60 million provided the framework for economic opportunity, security and stability, in recent decades enhanced by membership of the European Union’s additional 440 million people.

That was the position 50 years ago. What has changed? Well, social, economic and political radical change has happened. The experiences of the common sacrifices during World War 2 have diminished decade by decade. Nationalism and the SNP have moved from the right to the centre-left of politics, abandoning the anti-Irish-immigrant leanings, towards a more inclusive nationalism. The massive expansion of educational provision, opened up by the Labour Governments of the 1960s and 1970s and made available irrespective of class or ethnic background, and the growth of white-collar jobs, both provided opportunities for social advance hitherto denied, and as a result of that came the growing confidence and diminished fear of the ascendancy of one group over another. I was a beneficiary of some of those changes.

Then, from 1979, the political, social and economic effects of Thatcherism, from massive unemployment to the experimental poll tax—remember that Scotland was chosen as the guinea pig—had a profound impact on the collective Scottish consciousness. The self-evident employment benefits of the great British industries disappeared. British Steel has gone, British Coal has gone, British shipbuilding has all but gone, and there are many others. With the disappearance of these industries and jobs went the Britain-wide solidarity which the employees and the trade unions afforded. Those changes are not comprehensive but they are significant, and they led to a referendum result in 2014 where almost 50% of people in Scotland voted to separate from the UK.

This is the warning that I give to this Chamber, and to my colleagues in all parties in the other House. There were only two things remaining that stopped that 45% becoming over 50%. One was devolution itself, which afforded the Scots significant control over their own affairs, but more important than anything else was—and remains—the perceived benefit of economic opportunity and stability from remaining inside the UK, a nation state of 60 million people, and a gateway to the 500-million market of the European Union. Economic opportunity, security and stability have been the crucial factor from 1707, when Scotland joined the union after the disastrous economic failings of the Darien scheme, to 2007, when the RBS went down with a greater loss than Scotland’s annual GDP. They are the crucial pivot on which the partnership of nations which constitute the United Kingdom now hinges, but it is that very pivot that is under threat from Brexit. Of course a Boris Johnson leadership would be bad for unity—that leadership with Brexit would be even worse—but a Boris Johnson leadership tied to a no-deal Brexit is a disaster waiting to happen for the unity of the United Kingdom, precisely because it threatens that economic opportunity and stability.

The Government can of course ignore what I say, what Gordon Brown says, what Professor Tom Devine—who knows more about Scotland than anyone in either Chamber—says, or what John Curtice says. They can even ignore—my God—what Liam Fox says. Today, her own Government can choose to ignore what the Prime Minister is about to say in Scotland. Indeed, it may be that the Conservative membership referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, simply does not care. In fact it is certain that it does not care: a recent survey suggested that the membership would prefer a no-deal Brexit to the retention of Scotland or Northern Ireland inside the United Kingdom. So be it. Be careful, however, what you wish for, and please take heed of the warnings. It would be a supremely tragic irony if a course of action nominally designed to restore the sovereignty of the United Kingdom were the very vehicle that ripped it apart. Let us think on the implications of that.

Brexit: Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Monday 14th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

My Lords, despite everything, our final Brexit destination remains a mystery—and, faced with a mystery, I am happy to take the suggestion made on Thursday to take the advice of that master of mystery, Sherlock Holmes:

“When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth”.


So let us try it. In the House of Commons there is a significant majority against the Brexit deal on offer. It looks like an impossible objective. Since the EU refuses to substantially alter the deal, it will remain an impossibility. It is impossible, geographically and physically, to wish away the land border across Ireland between the UK and the EU. In Parliament, there is also a significant parliamentary majority against no deal—another impossibility. Canada-plus has died a death and it is impossible to see how the PM could accept a Norway-style deal, which would encompass the free movement which she has sworn to oppose, and would leave us with no voice, no vote and no veto over EU decisions that would crucially affect us. When we have dismissed or ruled out all the impossibles, the only sensible course of action is to put the issue back to the people. If, as the Government say, the deal before us really is the best and only Brexit deal possible, the people should be asked whether this Brexit deal is acceptable to them—or whether, given all that we now know, they wish to remain in the EU.

I say “all that we now know” because it will be obvious to all noble Lords that the consequences of the 2016 referendum were known to very few at the time of that decision. Over the past few months alone, a vast amount of legal, economic and constitutional information has been released to Parliament. Why? Because parliamentarians rightly insisted that they would not be capable of making a meaningful and informed decision in the absence of that information. Yet none of this information was made available to the public at the time when they were asked to make a decision. Of course, it may have made no difference—but the only way to find out is to ask them.

I have heard the arguments against having a reconsultation. It will be obvious to this House that I have never accepted them, any more than I would accept an argument against frequent general elections. One of these was of course announced by the now Prime Minister, and the period between that general election and the previous one was shorter than the period we have had since the referendum. I have been strengthened in my view by the Prime Minister, who in her speech today adduced the closely fought and closely decided Welsh referendum as evidence of the principle that you cannot oppose a referendum decision. She said that proved how a referendum had to be accepted by everyone in Parliament—except that it was not.

Following the Welsh referendum, the Conservative Party argued vehemently against the creation of the Assembly. Among the hundreds of MPs voting against the then Labour Government and the Government of Wales Bill in 1997 was the fresh-faced, newly elected MP for Maidenhead, Theresa May. Indeed, as late as 2005, the Conservative Party manifesto promised a second referendum on the Welsh Assembly—a people’s vote, if you will—which now seems to be wrong on principle. That was on whether to scrap the Assembly—which is all a bit awkward for those arguing on principle, as the noble Lord, Lord Lang, did today, that you can never have a reconsultation on a referendum.

I do not know what the final vote in a referendum might be—but whatever the result, it would not be sufficient without addressing the underlying perceptions which helped drive the result of the initial referendum. Austerity has been mentioned today, but I want to mention a word people are reticent about mentioning—immigration—and in particular the perception that, whatever the benefits of free movement, it contributes to a misuse of the benefits system by those arriving, and the deterioration of people’s access to public services. The tragedy is that both of these could be quite easily addressed by the Government.

First, it is perfectly possible, even under existing EU regulations, to ensure that those who come here have to take gainful employment within a reasonable time, or leave. In short: no job, no stay. Secondly, we need a more proportionate distribution of public funds directed towards areas of high immigrant populations, to offset the increased demand for public services that comes in the wake of high immigration.

Whatever the result of a people’s vote, it should be made clear that both these measures will be implemented. If MPs cannot agree, let the people decide. A people’s vote, with policies to address people’s concerns, offers the only potential way out of the terrible mess in which the country finds itself.

Brexit: Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Wednesday 9th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

My Lords, we have come a long way to respect and deliver on the result of the referendum. This House has scrutinised and contributed to a number of Bills which will guarantee that the UK continues to have a functioning statute book after exit day.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

Why should the British people have any confidence in the Government’s capacity to produce what the Minister said they wanted—clarity and stability—when the most glaring recent example of the Government’s capabilities was to hire a firm to supply ferries which had no ferries? If the Secretary of State for Transport really wanted an organisation that had no ships, he could have asked the Royal Navy.

[Lord Callanan]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his amusing contribution. I am sure that many noble Lords would disagree with his assessment of the capabilities of our excellent Navy. We make no apologies whatever for preparing for a no-deal situation. The exit date was legislated for in the notification of withdrawal Act and in the EU withdrawal Act last year. We will be leaving the EU on 29 March next year.

Brexit: Proposed Agreement

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Wednesday 14th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

I agree with my noble friend; a little calmness on all sides would help a lot. But it is amazing to see the number of people rushing to judge something that they have not read yet.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

My Lords, to have a meaningful vote, the House of Commons has insisted that it must have full information on the legal implications, impact assessments and future economic projections, otherwise it will not be meaningful. None of that was available at the time of the last referendum. In the event of a logjam in Parliament, which seems at least possible, why will the Government not allow the people, in the light of all that information, to have the final say on this issue?

[Lord Callanan]

I set out in my reply to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, what information we will make available. Of course, the House of Commons needs to come to its judgment in the light of all the available information and studies, and we will provide that. But I reiterate that we will not hold a second referendum; we have already had one, the people reached their view and we are implementing that view.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Monday 18th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

But we are also talking about Motions and amendments, and the distinction was the very point I was making. Although my noble friend Lord Hailsham has removed the word “direction”, we have to consider what is meant by having amendments and the purpose of insisting that a Motion that the Government bring forward should be unamendable.

The second reason put forward, in addition to making no deal an impossibility, is parliamentary sovereignty. I do not wish to be too aggressive about this but to many of us this seems a very ironic reason when, for year after year in European matters, parliamentary sovereignty has just been ignored. A fundamental point, however, that we cannot forget is that on this issue we have ceded sovereignty to the people of this country. That is what we did when we held the referendum. Noble Lords talk about a meaningful vote but it seems that they want to make the vote on the referendum meaningless; the vote on Article 50, meaningless; and the election itself in which—

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

I will give way in a minute. Noble Lords want to make meaningless the result of the election, in which the overwhelming majority of people voted for parties wanting to support the result of the referendum. These were all meaningful votes as much as anything that is proposed in this amendment.

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[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. Can he elaborate on a statement he has just made? Four months ago, I asked the noble Lord who will be responding tonight to make it absolutely clear that the sovereignty of Parliament is supreme over everything that happens in this country, subject always to alliances, and that the sovereignty of Parliament could not be undermined by a referendum or by two referendums. Incidentally, for four months, the Minister has refused to respond to communications on this subject. The noble Lord has just said that we “ceded” sovereignty to the people though a referendum. Does he stand by that? Is parliamentary sovereignty no longer supreme in this country?

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

Parliament held a debate, Parliament voted, and Parliament decided to hold a referendum on this issue and to be bound by that referendum. Whatever the theoretical constitutional position of a referendum, many statements were made on both sides that we would be bound by the result of that referendum.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Report: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 30th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

The constitutional position has changed radically with the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act. My noble friend is implying that no Government would be prepared to suffer the embarrassment of staying in power. But on the record of this Government, they might be quite prepared to stay in power.

[Lord Grocott]

My noble friend knows perfectly well that the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act provides for a vote of no confidence in the Government. It would be the equivalent of a Motion of no confidence in the Government if they lost the support of the House of Commons for their central legislative plank.

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[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

I must insist—

[The Countess of Mar]

Noble Lords may get up only once, and the noble Lord has already done so.

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[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, it may surprise people who follow anything that I say in this House—there do not need to be many—that I am not opposed in principle to a further referendum. How could I be? I was on the losing side once in a referendum vote, in 1975, and I was very keen to have a second referendum. I certainly got one, but it took 41 years. I therefore have no objection to people who say, “Things can change; circumstances can alter, and maybe we should have another referendum” But to have another referendum in two years stretches it just a little. I shall not say, “Wait till 2057”, which would be a direct comparison with precedent, but it certainly needs to be much longer than two years. Anyone seriously arguing for this needs at least to be able to answer yes to one question, which is this: was that made clear when the referendum Bill was going through this House? I sat through nearly all of it—Second Reading, Committee and Report. I must have missed the speech of someone who said, “If this referendum that we all voted for”—we did; there was no opposition to the Bill at Third Reading—“results in a leave vote, we will need to have a second referendum in a couple of years’ time”. Anyone who said that, please ignore the rest of my remarks—I did not hear it. I shall happily give way to my noble friend, who I know is a very reluctant remainer.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

I was, until I saw the mess the Government are making of these negotiations. My noble friend makes a very good point on the referendum, but it would not be a second referendum on the same proposition. It is not just the facts that have changed; it is the proposition on which people will be asked to vote that will have changed in the light of the deal.

[Lord Grocott]

I am really grateful to my noble friend for pointing out that, if circumstances change, there is a case for a further referendum. During the 41-year gap between the 1975 referendum and the further referendum, the European Union became unrecognisable in comparison with the institution that was voted for in 1975. It went from nine members to 28; it introduced the single market; the powers of the Commission changed beyond all recognition, as did the circumstances in which the European Parliament met. Once again, if there was anyone in this House who during that period said, “Really, things have changed quite dramatically; it is now a different proposition”—to use my noble friend’s expression—“and we ought to have a second referendum now to see whether the people still agree with what they said in 1975”, I did not hear that. It is another speech that I must have missed; I keep missing speeches. There was no acknowledgement, so far as I could see, that, because circumstances changed between 1975 and 2016, there should be a referendum. On the contrary, every time a further referendum was raised, any remainer—if I can describe it in those terms—was vehemently opposed to it. Now we have the irony of people who are opposed to one referendum wanting two.

The argument frequently used—I do not know whether this was what my noble friend was getting at—is that when people voted leave, they did not really know the full details and consequences of what they were voting for. I have had the privilege of representing two parliamentary constituencies, both of them very large. I have spoken to thousands, maybe tens of thousands, of people. I never found anyone in either of those parts of the country who got confused by the meaning of the word “leave”. Yet for some strange reason, in the immediate vicinity of Westminster there are large numbers of able people for whom the meaning of the word tortures them. They go into paroxysms of uncertainty about precisely what is meant by leave.

I know what leave means: at the very least it means you do not have to continue to obey the rules of the organisation you are leaving. I would also argue that if you leave an organisation you do not have to carry on paying the subscription. My noble friend Lord Adonis supports me in the words I am saying: he left the Liberal Democrats and joined the Labour Party—an excellent move; I commend him for that decision—but I very much doubt whether he continues to pay a subscription to the Liberal Democrats. When you leave an organisation, you do not pay the subs and you do not obey the rules; it is pretty simple.

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[Lord Cormack]

My Lords, Amendment 52 is grouped with Amendment 62 and I will address most of my remarks to the latter. Although I hope that my noble friend Lord Hailsham will not be cross with me, Amendment 52 deals rather more succinctly with the subjects that were dealt with in Amendment 49. As your Lordships’ House has already passed that amendment by a substantial majority, and has therefore emphatically accepted the need to have a meaningful vote, and enshrined that in the Bill, it would be tedious of me to repeat the arguments or to ask your Lordships to vote. At the appropriate moment, I will say the appropriate words.

Amendment 62 is very important. It is a logical consequence of Amendment 52 or, now that we have put it in the Bill, Amendment 49. The meaningful vote must be underscored with a meaningful process. There is a great deal of uncertainty around what the meaningful vote will look like and what the consequences would be should Parliament decide—as I hope it will not have to—to vote against any agreement. Amendment 62 seeks to address the current uncertainty in the Bill around this process. It is possible that, if the withdrawal deal fails to get through Parliament, the UK could leave the EU with no deal at all and fall back on WTO terms, which the Government’s own assessment shows would be the worst option, reducing growth, according to some estimates, by 8% over 15 years. Parliament must therefore have the right to request that the Government get back to the negotiating table for a better deal if that is the outcome. Amendment 62 would ensure that, if Parliament declines to approve the Government’s Motion on the withdrawal deal, the UK would retain our current relationship with the EU and the Government would be required to request an extension of Article 50.

Amendment 62 is therefore a common-sense amendment, which would strengthen Parliament’s ability to consider the withdrawal deal effectively, both in good time and in a position to send the Government back to the negotiating table while providing a degree of continuity and stability for our economy. This is very much a common-sense amendment, and if it is not pushed to a vote later this evening, because it will not be reached for some considerable time, I hope that we will have the opportunity to look at these issues again. It is important that we have a good deal, and it is crucial that we do not have no deal. This amendment is therefore a constructive one, and I very much hope that the sentiments behind it will commend themselves to your Lordships’ House at the appropriate moment. I beg to move.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

My Lords, I will speak in favour of Amendments 52 and 62. Given the strictures on repetition, I will not rehearse again anything on Amendment 52, which would allow the British Parliament to have its say before the European Parliament is asked to approve any deal. I already made plain my views on that in Committee so I will stick to Amendment 62. With this amendment we are seeking to safeguard Parliament’s ability to have a “meaningful” vote. It would have been handy if it had been linked with Amendment 49, but I realise the conflicting pressures that are on the Front Bench to decide the groupings. Nevertheless, Amendment 49 has taken a huge stride tonight in underpinning a meaningful vote. However, it is by no means perfect, and it has gaps.

Parliament’s consideration of the withdrawal agreement will be a serious task—we all know that. Our debates this evening alone have shown the level of complexity and sheer number of issues which the withdrawal agreement will have to address in detail. Yet as the clock ticks onwards that exit day comes ever closer—it is now within a year—and if there is no withdrawal agreement, we lose guaranteed access to our biggest market, certainty on the Irish border, and confidence for British citizens living and working in the rest of Europe and for the European citizens who are here. Given the timescale, those are immense risks.

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[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

What evidence does the noble Lord have that you get a better deal when you go back to the table than the deal you have already got?

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

The noble Lord may be able to predict whether it will be better or worse, but any deal that is acceptable to the British Parliament would be better than the disastrous situation of no deal at all. But that may need time. Why have an artificial deadline cutting us off from the conclusion of a deal, which may be there in the bones or, in the famous words of the Brexit Secretary, as a “platform”—and deny ourselves the opportunity of having the alternative of a cohesive deal rather than no deal, which I think would be the worst of all worlds? This is an opportunity that we should take.

A lot of the debate on Amendment 49 was about the ideological motives of those who are handling this. As my noble friend and occasional protagonist Lord Grocott keeps pointing out, I was a reluctant remainer. I was sceptical about the eurozone and the bureaucracy and unaccountability of the European Union, but on balance I wanted to stay in because all the challenges that we face are global: cyber, terrorism, trade and the environment. Being part of a larger bloc is, on balance, worth it. Therefore, my approach to this is pragmatic, not ideological. I admit to being confused by the ideological positions of the leaders of the major parties. We appear to have the leader of one party who is ideologically inclined to remain in the European Union but doing her best to get us out of it, and a leader of the other party who is ideologically inclined to remove us from the European Union who appears to be doing his best to keep us in part of it. I am confused about the ideologies that are supposed to be driving this on all sides of the House.

I believe that we should take what the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, called a common-sense position. It is possible that the vote on the final deal could be little more than a deal or no deal choice, where a rejection of the Government’s Motion would mean the UK exiting the EU with no deal on WTO terms, which would be the worst possible option for the UK. That is not according to me, in my lack of wisdom, experience, depth and analysis, but according to the Government’s own impact studies. I believe that we must insure against that, which is what Amendment 62 seeks to do.

The Secretary of State told the House of Commons that the agreement will deliver the “exact same benefits” as our EU membership. That is basically what the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, said our objectives were. As it happens, that is also the commitment of the Opposition Front Bench, which has adopted it as one of its six tests. Amendment 62 simply safeguards this commitment by guaranteeing that we keep our current benefits until a withdrawal agreement has been reached that can match our objectives. As the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said, it is a common sense, pragmatic amendment. It has no political motivation and no ulterior motive, other than the objective of preserving the best for this country. That is what this whole debate is supposed to be about.

It is my great pleasure to support Amendment 62. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, for indicating that, if time constraints prevent us pushing this to a vote later tonight, we may come back to it at another stage.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, I do not think that this is really about the European Union. This is about parliamentary sovereignty. I have to say that I do not understand why it is that the Government do not want Parliament, in the end, to be in a position to make the decisions which these two amendments make possible. It seems to me, in any case, that that would be valuable to the Government in negotiation, because it would enable them to say that a deal, if both sides want a deal, is one that has to get through Parliament. However, I do not want to go down that route. I want to go down the route of parliamentary sovereignty.

This is the most important decision we have made for a very long time—perhaps the most important peacetime decision that we have made ever. There are people in this House on either side of the debate and I would not be able, even if I wished to, to pretend that I was not absolutely committed to one side. But I am also a parliamentarian, and it is clear to me that there is no reason why Parliament should not make sure that it is able to make a proper decision on this issue and to make a decision that does not leave the nation in an impossible position. All that these two amendments really do is to ensure that there is a sensible programme into which Parliament is “properly”—I use that word in almost a technical sense—conjoined.

Why should one not want this? Well, one might not want it because it is not properly drafted. Of course, the technique of Governments of all kinds is to say that they would be very happy to go along with something but unfortunately there is this or that technical reason why it does not work. Maybe that is so, but I would therefore ask the Government this: if it is technically wrong, would they come before the House with the amendments that would make it technically right? If they do not, they are saying that in this most important issue of all, the Executive are going to make the decision, and that they wish to leave themselves open to making the circumstances in which Parliament cannot make a sensible decision. They would be saying to Parliament, “Vote for us or total disaster and collapse”. This is the technique of dictators down the ages: “Me or chaos; me or something much worse”. This House should insist that the decision is in Parliament’s hands. That means avoiding circumstances in which it is possible for the Executive to say, “However bad this is, anything else would be very much worse”.

My noble friend Lord Hamilton is also arguing from a clear, previous position—so we are in the same situation. He asks whether we have any evidence that going back for a further negotiation would be better. I have been in business since I was 22, except for when I was a Minister, and I have never started by saying that if the negotiation was not successful I was not prepared to go back and see if I could do better. That is how you run businesses and make money. It is how you improve the circumstances. I do not know in advance whether I can achieve something better, but I would never say that I would never go back and put myself into a position in which I could not negotiate again.

So I say to my noble friend that all this amendment says is that if Parliament decides that a negotiated agreement is not satisfactory, then, and only then, the Government will have to go back and seek something better.

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[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, I am a great admirer of my noble friend Lord Reid and therefore, if he presses this to a Division later on in the evening or at whatever hour of the night we get to it, I will of course support him. I have nothing against the contents of the amendment because it is clearly desirable that, if we cannot support the Government’s treaty, the default should be that we stay in the EU unless the House of Commons has a better set of propositions that it wishes to agree to.

However, my concern is that there is a certain element of unreality to the proposals to try to bind the hands of the House of Commons as to what it may or may not do in the autumn. One of two things will in fact happen when the Prime Minister presents her treaty. The House of Commons will either vote for it or vote against it. There are no other alternatives. If the House of Commons votes against the treaty, that is, to all intents and purposes, a Motion of no confidence in the Government. There has not been an incident since Gladstone’s Home Rule Bill in 1886, which was rejected by the House of Commons, where the central plank of a Government’s policy was rejected outright by the House of Commons. The idea that there could be a further negotiation after that is entirely unrealistic. The negotiation would have been concluded with the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, and ratified or not by the European Parliament and so forth. It is not realistic in the real world to expect that there would be further negotiation.

In the eventuality that the treaty is rejected, there are only two things that could conceivably happen. Either there will be an election because the Government have been defeated on what is in effect a Motion of confidence—it might take a formal triggering Motion under the Fixed-term Parliaments Act to produce it—or there will be a referendum, which we discussed earlier. A referendum could happen if the House of Commons itself resolved that there should be one immediately after the defeat or perhaps as an amendment to the Motion that the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, has said would be tabled. Everything else beyond that seems to be superfluous. The policy of the Government will then be the outcome of the referendum or the outcome of that election. A Government will have to be formed after the election, which will have to have a European policy and that will then be the policy of the Government that they would seek to negotiate in Brussels. There would either be some amendments to the treaty, if that is possible or—as I hope there is a Labour Government—there will be a decision not to proceed with Brexit, or there would be a referendum and we would proceed with the outcome of that referendum.

I say all that mainly to my noble friend on the Front Bench and her colleagues in the other place. There is no point in engaging in this displacement activity at the moment and making it sound as if we are being very tough on Brexit by placing ever more elaborate manacles and handcuffs on what might or might not happen in the vote in October. The only thing that really matters is the attitude of the Labour Party when the Government present their treaty. Either we are in favour of it or we are against it. If we are against that treaty, I can assure my noble friend that everything else will take care of itself. If we are against the treaty and vote against it, we do not need all the protections in this Bill. One of two things will happen. Either there will be another referendum or there will be an election. If there is an election, what matters is the policy of my party in that election. Will we or will we not proceed with Brexit if we win the election? Very simple facts of political power come into play.

What happens in Parliament after that will depend on those decisions. Ever more elaborate provisions in this Bill are, I say respectfully, entirely beside the point because they miss the reality of political power. That is that there has to be a Government, they have to have a policy and that can come from only one of two ways. Either a new Government are returned if this Government are turned out on the treaty or there is a referendum that will determine it.

I am entirely in favour of everything in my noble friend’s amendment and I hope that it will be warmly welcomed from the Front Bench, but what really matters, I say to my noble friends, is the policy of the Labour Party when the Prime Minister presents her treaty. If we are against the treaty and we are successful, there has to be either an election or a referendum. I am afraid that there are no alternative options on offer.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

With the leave of the House—and the noble Countess, Lady Mar, if she is in—I want to say something. I used to say to a friend of mine—he was an acquaintance, really—in the Militant Group that I wished I was as sure of one thing as he was of everything. There is an unusual hint of that in what my noble friend just said. It is not true that you can ordain in the future in politics the inevitability of one or two courses. In the wise words of Harold Macmillan, when asked what he was most frightened of, “Events, dear boy, events”. I would therefore be very cautious about taking that view—although my noble friend is perfectly entitled to ask the Labour Front Bench what the party’s position is—on the inevitability of history. Great philosophers have made that mistake before. If I am correct and he is wrong, it would be wise to have some form of plan or safeguard for each contingency. All we are trying to do, in a non-ideological and non-partisan fashion, is say, “Let us have a common-sense plan for the contingency that Parliament votes this down”. There is a huge complexity about what might happen afterwards and none of it is unavoidable or predictable in advance.

[Lord Adonis]

My noble friend makes a very good point, but all of those further eventualities would be so much clearer if my party’s policy were clear in the first place.

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[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, the case has been made that should Parliament fail to approve the Government’s withdrawal deal, the Government should pause the Article 50 process and go back to the negotiating table. That might appear to be a sensible, common-sense—in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack—possibly even essential proposal. Indeed, it was one of the arguments we used when we urged the Government to remove the fixed date for exit in the Bill—we will return to that next week but I am sure they are aware of that—to give the flexibility they may need in exactly those circumstances.

However, I fear that the particular route of Amendment 62 runs counter to the whole thrust of what we have just agreed in Amendment 49. Should the Government’s deal be voted down, the consequences of that failure to negotiate a satisfactory outcome and to win the support of Parliament for it would indeed be extremely serious. Amendment 49 says that in those circumstances it should be the Commons rather than the Government which starts to take charge. The Commons may well decide to take the route suggested in Amendment 62 with a quick letter to the EU asking it to consider an extension. It might consider as an alternative that it wants a referendum. It might decide that it wants to withdraw the Article 50 trigger altogether rather than just extend it, as set out in the later Amendment 57 from the noble Lord, Lord Wigley.

However, today is not the time to speculate which of those would be the right outcome for the House of Commons in those circumstances. We cannot know now and we certainly should not try to second-guess the correct option if there is not a majority in the Commons for the deal that has been negotiated.

It would be a shame if in any way the amendment appears to put the initiative back into the hands of Ministers, rather than the Commons. Amendment 49 said it was for the Commons, not the Executive, to take the next step should we find ourselves in that position. On that basis, we will be abstaining on Amendment 62—assuming that it is dealt with tonight, rather than early in the morning. Our reason is that it is tangential or even superfluous—rather than objectionable—and could be seen to conflict with what we have just agreed at 5 pm today in Amendment 49. It narrows, rather than widens, the options the Commons would have should the final deal be voted down.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

I welcome the constructive nature of my noble friend’s criticism, if you follow me. I am not sure that the two are incompatible. I am not sure that the House of Commons can actually, in international relations, speak for a sovereign state the way that a Government have to speak for a sovereign state. I take it from what my noble friend said that she is not ruling out the idea but objects to the imperative nature of it and the apparent conflicts with what was passed earlier. In that case, I hope that she and the Government will engage in seeing how we could reconcile those apparent differences.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 14th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moynihan]

I know that the whole question of Royal Ascot and the timing of the Queen’s Speech last year was very much determined by Her Majesty. I know for sure—and all noble Lords will know—that the Government, I hope, are absolutely committed to resolving the issues, which are vitally important and serious for the horseracing industry.

On the wider sporting front, we need clarity and certainty over the EU-UK’s future relationship for the sporting industry. I urge the Government to set out clearly what this relationship will look like so that the sports sector can prepare for the future. We also need to look beyond the specifics of top-level elite and professional sport. While the issues of players and transfers in football are important, they should not be the only focus of government in seeking to negotiate the best possible settlement for the sector.

We also need to focus on the continued freedom of movement on a seasonal basis for particular sports. I hope that the Government will consider proposing sports-specific visas to allow players, fans and support staff to enter and leave the European Union easily.

We have been a very important and attractive destination in hosting many events, not least the London 2012 Olympics. However, there will be increased challenges for fans and players to come into and exit the UK which could not just reduce the pool of workers but risks making the UK a less attractive international destination to host events. I hope the Minister will address that point.

As far as the Premier League is concerned, I mentioned that football was at the pinnacle of the debate. That is because there are very important points about player transfers—Bosman issues are high on that list. I will focus the Committee’s attention today on one point, although there are many aspects of professional sport that will be need to be addressed and I hope are currently being addressed. FIFA has a relationship with the European Union under Article 19, which allows international transfers to be permitted only for players over the age of 18, save for limited exceptions. One exception is that the transfer takes place within the European Union or the EEA, when the age criteria is reduced to 16.

When we leave the EU, we could potentially lose the ability to utilise the exception in Article 19 and therefore be prevented from signing players at other EU clubs between the ages of 16 and 18. That is fundamental to how UK clubs acquire young, talented and cost-effective players. This sort of youth development issue is extremely important in light of UEFA’s financial fair play regulations. Naturally, losing the Article 19 exception would have adverse consequences for all UK clubs. It is crucial for clubs to sign talented players whom they have identified at the earliest possible occasion, not just to limit the acquisition cost but to develop the young talent that is vital.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

It is worth making the point that we are not talking about income for massive, rich clubs. We are talking about many clubs, which might be on the verge of insolvency in terms of their operations, having to seek through their scouting systems talented players within the EU who can not only contribute to the club by playing, but through their development can bring in later transfer fees.

[Lord Moynihan]

I completely endorse that point. This is not just about the top clubs in the Premier League; it is about the survival of professional football in the country. I am delighted to hear the noble Lord place his points on the record and I completely endorse them.

Briefly, when we look at the rugby football world, there are Kolpak players. I mentioned this at an early stage on Second Reading, so I will not rehearse the Kolpak agreement. Kolpak players, under the Cotonou agreement, have specific non-discriminatory rights once they are lawfully employed in the European Union. In rugby, this means that, once a player from a Kolpak country has legally entered the UK, they cannot be classed as a foreign player under the Rugby Football Union regulations. Currently, the RFU regulations are that there should be no more than two foreign players in a match day squad in the top four tiers of English rugby. There are some 165 contracted Kolpak players in the top four tiers.

This is a very important point. Negotiations will need to take place within the context of the European Union and the UK Government and also with the Rugby Football Union. There needs to be early engagement with the RFU so clubs have visibility and can make strong commercial decisions moving forward over a number of years. That is vital. Many noble Lords have made the point today that we need consistency, clarity and vision so that decisions in the world of sport can be made early rather than the day before the season starts.

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No one in this country, however they voted on 23 June 2016, voted to make either themselves or the nation poorer. No one voted to reduce the influence of our country in the world. These amendments, and the others, give a chance for Parliament to assert its proper position in the constitution of the nation, and I hope they will have strong support.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

My Lords, I rise to support Amendment 151, courtesy of my noble friend Lord Adonis, who is moving the next amendment. Amendment 151, in a word, is about sovereignty. That word is much used, much abused, perhaps overused, but anyone who lacks the feeling that the sovereignty of Parliament is in doubt need only, I fear, reread the first section of the Minister’s response at the end of the previous group of amendments. We are not speaking about the theory of sovereignty, abstract sovereignty, sovereignty as a slogan on the side of a bus, but what the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, referred to earlier as the practical application of sovereignty. That is what is supposed to be at the root of this whole debate.

When I spoke in the debate at Second Reading, I said that it was the responsibility of this House to make absolutely sure that the other House in particular—the elected House—had the ability not just to accept or reject but to shape, to mould, to compromise, to send back, because it is in that House, above all, that sovereignty lies. This amendment underlines that sentiment, as it seeks to ensure that the meaningful vote that was voted into this Bill by the other House comes to Parliament in a meaningful timeframe.

It is worth reminding ourselves why the amendment proposed by Dominic Grieve and accepted by the other House—Amendment 7—was so important. Whatever the Minister may now believe, Clause 9 of this Bill contains the power needed for Ministers to implement the withdrawal agreement. However, the Government had originally sought sweeping and virtually untrammelled powers to implement whatever they thought “appropriate”, with no substantive reference back to Parliament, with no real further scrutiny in either House and without the consent of legislators. The Minister will forgive us if we are sceptics whenever we are assured that the sovereignty of Parliament is respected by the Government. The track record does not suggest that to be the case, especially when a citizen had to go to the High Court in order to impose or reassert the sovereignty of Parliament.

As noble Lords are aware, the Government failed to convince MPs that carte blanche should be given to them in this way, and the Government were defeated on the amendment referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, which proposed that the powers in Clause 9 could be exercised only,

“subject to the prior enactment of a statute by Parliament approving the final terms of withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union”.

That amendment—known as Amendment 7 in the House of Commons—was passed and is now part of the Bill. That process started outside Parliament through the courts in order to reassert the primacy of parliamentary sovereignty. It means that the Government have to give both Houses of Parliament a legislative opportunity to vote on the final deal. For the purposes of my argument, I will refer to this as the Amendment 7 statute.

Let us remember the Government’s response to the defeat in the Commons. We now know that Ministers were hugely disappointed that this change was ever made. The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU maintain now that they will place a Motion before the Commons to gain in-principle approval for any deal reached. We do not know what options—if any—such a Motion would contain or when it would be brought to Parliament. We know that it would be a Motion only, with no statutory effect.

In a Written Statement on 13 December—the day Mr Grieve’s amendment was being debated—the Government stated that they would also bring forward a withdrawal and implementation Bill to implement “the major policies” of the withdrawal agreement. But again, we do not know when that Bill will be brought to Parliament. I hope that such a Bill will fulfil the requirements of the Amendment 7 statute fully and that the Government do not offer instead a rushed, after-the-fact rubber-stamp exercise.

[Lord Balfe (Con)]

Can I point out to the noble Lord that it is of course possible that the European Parliament’s consent could be given only on the basis that the Houses of Parliament had had a valid vote? It could withhold its consent to the agreement on the grounds that there had been no valid vote in the UK Parliament.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

With the noble Lord’s usual foresight he has accurately pre-empted what I am going on to say. That is precisely the point. The Government’s reassurances were not—for that reason among others—enough for the House of Commons and it proceeded to put the requirement of the statute in the Bill. My point about that is that, from beginning to end, that process was not the voluntarism of the Government reasserting the sovereignty of the House of Commons or Parliament; it was forced on them first by the courts and secondly by the House of Commons itself.

Further safeguards are needed and this amendment seeks to give one by ensuring that the Amendment 7 statute will be brought forward to Parliament in a fair, appropriate and, above all, timely manner. As the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, alluded to, as it stands, Britain could possibly face a scenario whereby the Government strike a sub-optimal deal with the European Union, then rely entirely on an “accept or reject” Motion in the House of Commons and delay the Amendment 7 statute and the regulations necessary to implement the withdrawal agreement right up until the 11th hour. This could take Parliament to the cliff edge and leave the legislature with no real alternative option. This would clearly not be in the spirit of the Amendment 7 statute which the Commons have sought, but, in the light of the Government’s record on the issue of parliamentary sovereignty, there are simply insufficient guarantees written into Clause 9 to ensure that we will see this statutory process in good time.

By ensuring that the Amendment 7 statute is placed before Parliament as soon as a deal is done—and every effort must be made to enact it prior to the parallel ratification stage in the European Parliament—we would enhance the rights of MPs and Peers to have such a “meaningful vote” in a meaningful way and at a meaningful time. We have been told time and again that Brexit is a matter of Britain taking back control. It is so loose in the current clause that it actually allows a huge gap in that control. That is what this amendment addresses. It would be preposterous if Ministers accepted a deal and UK legislatures were watching the televised proceedings from the European Parliament discussing our withdrawal agreement before this Parliament had the opportunity to make a decision itself. That is precisely what this amendment is about.

The Amendment 7 statute, passed in the House of Commons, is the only viable context in which MPs and Members of this House can express their views on the deal, and whether it should be rejected or, crucially, whether the Prime Minister should be requested to seek different or improved terms. In its simplest terms, this amendment is a protection for the will of the House of Commons, which it has already said it wants. If the Government are truly committed to a meaningful say for the British Parliament, if they truly believe in the British Parliament taking back control, surely they can accept this amendment today. I hope that they will.

[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 190 in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Llandudno. I warmly support what has already been said on the important amendments in this group. My amendment is framed to ensure that it is quite clear in the Bill what the implications would be of Parliament not approving the terms of a deal negotiated by the Government. If there is to be a meaningful vote by Parliament as opposed to a take-note Motion, which would be a total travesty of democracy on such a vital issue, then there are three possible outcomes. First, Parliament could endorse the terms of Brexit negotiated by the Government, which would clearly mean the UK leaving the EU on those terms. Secondly, Parliament could reject the terms negotiated. Thirdly, Parliament could resolve to refer the issue back to the people for a confirmatory referendum, something which I believe is raised in later amendments. I am excluding, for the purposes of this debate, the possibility that Parliament could tell the Government to return to the negotiating table and come back with a better agreement—a course of action which appears to be the subject of Amendment 199 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack.

Amendment 190 is essentially a reset amendment, meaning that if there is no deal at the end of the negotiating period then the UK falls back on to the status quo terms. On 7 February 2017 Mr David Jones, the MP for Clwyd West, then a Brexit Minister, said during a debate on the Article 50 Bill:

“There will be a meaningful vote. The vote will be either to accept the deal that the Government will have achieved—I repeat that the process of negotiation will not be without frequent reports to the House—or for there to be no deal. Frankly, that is the choice that the House will have to make. That will be the most meaningful vote that one could imagine”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/2/17; col. 273.]


MPs should not be put in a position where they can vote either for a really bad deal result from the negotiations or in a way that delivers a no deal outcome. There must be a reset alternative for MPs. In circumstances where the deal secured by the Government is transparently inadequate there must be an option provided for the UK to continue being in the EU on existing terms. If that is not an available option it is essentially telling MPs to vote with a gun to their head.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Reid of Cardowan Excerpts

Wednesday 14th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

I am making a perfectly serious point, and I do not think anybody has appointed the noble Lord to decide on the procedures of this House.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

We all often enjoy the speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth. It is not a precedent; it is a convention of this House that if someone unavoidably cannot attend, they may ask someone else to deliver their speech. That was explained at the beginning of my noble friend’s speech, which the noble Lord would have heard had he been listening. It was an unusual discourtesy for the noble Lord to intervene in the way that he has done.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister of State, Department for Exiting the European Union (Lord Callanan) (Con)]

If my noble friend will forgive me, I will concentrate on the amendments before us and leave this existential debate for my two noble friends on the Back Benches to conduct among themselves.

The approval of the UK’s final deal with the EU has already been the focus of a great deal of sustained debate during the passage of both the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act and this Bill. The Government have committed to hold a vote on the final deal in Parliament as soon as possible after the negotiations have concluded. Let me say, in direct response to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Baroness, Lady McDonagh, that this vote will take the form of a resolution in both Houses of Parliament and will cover both the withdrawal agreement and the terms of our future relationship. The Government will not implement any parts of the withdrawal agreement until after this vote has taken place.

As we have repeatedly made clear, we fully expect, intend and will make every effort that this vote will take place before the European Parliament votes. However, I hope noble Lords will understand that we do not control the EU’s timeframe for approving the withdrawal agreement and therefore cannot make any statutory assurances where it is concerned. This would be the case with Amendment 150 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, Amendment 151 tabled by my noble friend Lord Cormack and Amendment 216 tabled by my noble friend Lord Hailsham.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

A much wiser and older head than me, Merlyn Rees, once told me that, when listening to a Minister’s replies, I should forget everything before the “but”; I include in that everything before the “however”. What follows the “however” gives the Government executive powers to take a course of action completely opposite to the amendments that say that a vote should be done before the European Parliament votes. Of course the Government do not control the timetable for the European Parliament, but they control the timetable for this Parliament. We are asking for the vote to be given substance and time—rather than being a theoretical meaningful vote—as well as an assurance that the decision will be taken by this Parliament before we have to sit and watch the European Parliament voting on the deal. Can the Minister address that issue and explain to us why it is impossible to do that simple thing?

[Viscount Waverley]

Before the noble Lord sits down, will he pass comment about not just the European Parliament but the EU national parliaments? Will they have a yes or no, or ask their Governments to go back to the Council to keep at it?

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

Let us take it one step at a time.

[Lord Callanan]

In response to the noble Viscount’s final question, no, there will be no vote in national parliaments on this matter: it is a delegated function to the EU. Only a qualified majority vote in the European Council is required, and then a vote in the European Parliament. I can go no further in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Reid, than to repeat my statement that we expect and intend the vote to take place before the vote in the European Parliament.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Callanan]

My Lords, we will discuss the appropriateness of a second referendum later today—

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

The Minister has just, perhaps inadvertently, said something of profound constitutional consequence. Is he asserting from that Dispatch Box that parliamentary representative democracy is no longer sovereign if there is a plebiscite? This is an extremely important constitutional issue and he has just made that assertion. Would he like to withdraw the assertion or to reassert that parliamentary democracy is no longer sovereign?

[Lord Callanan]

I am asserting that Parliament voted to hold a referendum. The referendum took place, and we all know the result. We believe that that referendum should be respected. I am sorry that noble Lords do not agree with me, but that is the Government’s position.