Mali: UN Peacekeeping Mission

Debate between Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Tunnicliffe

Tuesday 15th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for being here to respond to questions on the Statement.

I commend the 257 British personnel who have been deployed in Mali as part of the mission. It is the deadliest UN peacekeeping mission to date, with 281 peacekeepers of the 12,000 on the mission sadly losing their lives. RAF air and ground crew have also been deployed in Mali. Their bravery and dedication will rightly be commended by both sides of the House.

The withdrawal of French troops from Mali was announced in February, and of Swedish troops in March. Can the Minister explain why this Statement is being made in November, given that the reason given for the withdrawal of our troops is the following of European allies? When were UN partners informed? Does this also signify an end to discussions on an alternative mission in Mali, which the Armed Forces Minister said was under consideration in July? In this time, there has been nothing but silence from Ministers. Is this because the Government have simply taken this long to work out what to do?

What has happened in this time, however, is the mandate of the mission being renewed by the UN Security Council, with British support. That begs a number of questions as to how the mission will proceed given that it would have expected both our personnel and expertise, particularly in long-range specialised reconnaissance? How do Ministers expect our decision to impact the mission’s continued progress and the region’s future, particularly with recent rises in terrorism across the Sahel region and neighbouring countries and the continued presence of the Russian mercenary Wagner Group? The latter has been accused of massacring civilians in a region of Mali where extremist Islamist factions have sought to recruit. What recent assessment has the Minister made of the Wagner Group’s activity in Mali, and its ability to foment further uncertainty in the region? I understand that UK officials were expected to meet counterparts from the EU, west Africa and the UN in Accra today and yesterday for talks on its potential to move on to Burkina Faso, which has suffered two coups in the last eight months. Have these talks taken place, and can the Minister update us?

At the end of the Statement, the Chilcot report is mentioned. One of Chilcot’s key mantras is that action should be taken only if the next step is already determined. When we entered Mali, did we have clear criteria as to when we should leave, and if so, have these criteria been met? The need for this strategic approach applies to the next steps too. France has already outlined its plans for working with African countries for the next six months. Can we expect a similar plan from the UK Government shortly, or will we have to wait another nine months? A lack of clear thinking for the Sahel region was also evident in the integrated review, which hardly mentioned it. Can we expect a more thorough strategic overview in the upcoming update?

Finally, turning to Thursday, it may be a coincidence that this withdrawal comes at the same time as we are expecting government cuts. Is the withdrawal connected to cuts to the defence budget? Clarity on defence spending is vital, especially when looking to maintain our NATO commitments. We know that a real-terms cut was agreed in the 2020 settlement. Its negative impact has been significantly exacerbated by the recent rise in inflation.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, for a decade now, the people of Mali have suffered the consequences of war, the multiplication of violent extremism and the ensuing violence. This has led to a state of crisis, with people facing refugee migrations and food insecurity, and to the suffering of, primarily, women and children. This in turn has led Mali to be ranked 131st of 163 countries for peace, and 137th of 145 countries for gender equality. I therefore support and commend the British personnel who have worked with others to try to create an opportunity for some stability. It is regrettable that there has been a move back from this because of the Mali Government. I hope that the Minister will be able to outline the Government’s policy for continuing the vital work of supporting NGOs, civil society groups, and women and children in Mali after this draw-down.

I declare an interest: I chair the UK board of peace- building charities, Search for Common Ground. It has been operating in Mali with the British Government’s support, trying to combat the sources of the problems there. I hope that this kind of support can continue. Will the Minister outline the Government’s development priorities? How is it seeking to use the Accra talks to progress them? What mechanisms will we use for our development ambitions in Mali?

Will the Minister also outline the role that the UK will play with ECOWAS, the AU, the United States and others to try to return Mali to a constitutional order? Of course the country’s future is in its own hands, but the UK has played a role: it has committed forces. A full draw-down should not bring about a full withdrawal of UK interest. On that, could the Minister explain why UK development assistance is planned to fall dramatically from the £22 million provided in 2019-20 to just £500,000 in 2023-24? Would the draw-down of military personnel not be exactly the right time to review development priorities so that a development vacuum is not created by UK personnel leaving?

Finally, I wish to return to the issue of the Wagner Group. I am on the record on a number of occasions pressing the noble Lords, Lord Ahmad and Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park, for the UK to move on the proscription of the Wagner Group. I will now press the Defence Minster on this. The Wagner Group is acting directly against the interests of the United Kingdom and our allies. Commons Minister James Heappey referred to the human rights atrocities that it is carrying out. The UK has no interest that is not being undermined by the Wagner Group, and there should be consequences for UK relations with countries that seek to use the Wagner Group not only against their own people but against the UK’s national interests. I repeat my call for the Government to prepare and bring forward mechanisms that would see the Wagner Group proscribed. So far, the Government have not made any moves on this. When answering questions, the Minister in the Commons said that he would engage in discussions with the Home Office on this issue, so I hope for a suitably positive response from the Minister today to me on this issue, so that we send a very strong signal that, whether in Mali or elsewhere, the UK will act against groups such as Wagner—and particularly against the Wagner Group by proscribing them.

Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) (No. 3) (High-Risk Countries) Regulations 2021

Debate between Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Tunnicliffe

Thursday 25th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, we support this measure and, as the Minister outlined, while this is an uncontroversial measure with regard to Mali, Turkey, Botswana and Mauritius, it is one element of a much wider agenda on which the UK has an opportunity to lead—and in many areas it is, working very closely with our key allies. The timing is, probably by accident, relevant. It is between the debate on the Statement, when we discussed human trafficking and the linked crime of smuggling, and change to the proscription of a terrorist organisation, so it is linked.

The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, mentioned organised crime offences in the Balkans. When I served on the Select Committee on International Relations and Defence, we carried out an inquiry into the Balkans, and I visited. We identified that one of the biggest interests of the UK in the region is organised crime and the finance connected with it. When I visited the Sahel and looked at some of the smuggling routes, I was told by British officials that this industry equates to £10 billion-worth of organised crime. It is on an awful, industrial scale.

We have debated Afghanistan and will again next week. Some 95% of the heroin on the streets of this country is from Afghanistan. More people die every year than died in Afghanistan as tragic British military casualties of that conflict. All of them are connected with a considerable amount of money. None of those awful activities, which lead to tragic victims and innocent deaths, can be separated from those who are party to this and who launder some of the proceeds and facilitate some of this activity.

Therefore, we support the work of the Financial Action Task Force, our security services, the Treasury, the Bank of England and all the agencies who have to work forensically to tackle this awful use of what are often very technical, legal, financial and bureaucratic mechanisms to hide criminal activity.

I press the Minister specifically on a connected issue, which is what the Government say they intend to do, which is to have a public register of beneficial ownership of property. We know that, because of the openness of the property market, especially in our cities and especially in London, this has been an area of concern. Prior to the pandemic, Transparency International identified 87,000 properties in England and Wales that are owned by anonymous companies registered in tax havens. We have seen in the Pandora papers that UK property remains a popular way to wash dirty money, and there have been cases, of which we are all aware, where that has led to actions. That demonstrates the clear need for a public register, so, in supporting what the Minister is doing, I would welcome his comments on when the Government will make good on their promise in this area.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, on the face of it, the regulations before us are very straightforward. The Financial Action Task Force has updated its list of high-risk countries, and we are mirroring those changes in our legislation. We have supported such instruments in the past and will continue to do so.

Paragraph 3.3 of the Explanatory Memorandum outlines the usual justifications for this instrument being laid under the “made affirmative” procedure. We accept the arguments, but it is a pity that the urgency in laying these SIs is not always matched when it comes to the Government’s wider efforts to crack down on money laundering. Although it is true that the task force has given the UK a good rating in general terms, we know that concerns have long been expressed about the UK’s supervisory regime. As my colleague Pat McFadden said in the Commons, the Treasury itself has conceded that FATF sees our systems as “only moderately effective” and that the international body also believes that there are

“significant weaknesses in the risk-based approach to supervision”

in the UK.

The UK is understandably a target for illicit funds, given the size and global status of our financial services sector. The Magnitsky case is a well-known example of funds being funnelled through UK institutions, but we know it is not the only one: that much has been seen with the recent publication of the Pandora papers. The Financial Conduct Authority is reportedly running several active investigations in this area. We wish it well with those probes and hope that any wrongful behaviour is punished in an appropriate way.

The Minister said yesterday that, despite the lack of criminal convictions secured through FCA action, the body is nevertheless taking robust action. He pointed to the imposition of a number of major fines in recent years, such as those against Standard Chartered. However, it is not clear that these punishments are changing behaviour or preventing the recurrence of bad practice. On Monday, Minister Whately outlined some of the limited examples of government action. We welcome the allocation of funds to this fight, but it is hard to take seriously her claim that everything possible is being done to make the UK

“a hostile place for illicit finance and economic crime”.—[Official Report, Commons, 16/11/21; col. 532.]

Many of the initiatives cited have been announced and re-announced without meaningful action following. For example, Companies House has been given an additional £63 million of funds to assist with its reform, but there is little sense that the changes being made will empower that body and lead to better outcomes.

Minister Whately also failed to provide clear justification of the UK Government not classifying countries such as Russia and Afghanistan as high risk. It is true that this instrument is designed solely to administer the task force list, but does the Treasury not see a case for taking action of its own where UK interests are at stake? We await with interest the outcome of the task force’s ongoing analysis of recent events in Afghanistan. It will be interesting to see whether that country is added to the list when we consider the first of these SIs in 2022 but, on Russia, I will simply repeat one of Pat McFadden’s questions: do the Government really not judge Russia to be as big a risk as some of the countries listed in these regulations?

As I said earlier, we are privileged to have a significant financial services sector in this country. Lots of talented people, both regulators and people in the sector, work night and day to detect and stop economic crime and obviously we support them in their endeavours. However, the fact remains that, despite the efforts of individuals, the UK Government’s regulatory framework of choice is seen by the international community as insufficient. As a global leader in financial services, we have a responsibility not only to replicate international initiatives but to lead them from the front. I hope the Minister can outline today exactly how the Treasury intends to do this.