Mali: UN Peacekeeping Mission

Debate between Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Tunnicliffe

Tuesday 15th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for being here to respond to questions on the Statement.

I commend the 257 British personnel who have been deployed in Mali as part of the mission. It is the deadliest UN peacekeeping mission to date, with 281 peacekeepers of the 12,000 on the mission sadly losing their lives. RAF air and ground crew have also been deployed in Mali. Their bravery and dedication will rightly be commended by both sides of the House.

The withdrawal of French troops from Mali was announced in February, and of Swedish troops in March. Can the Minister explain why this Statement is being made in November, given that the reason given for the withdrawal of our troops is the following of European allies? When were UN partners informed? Does this also signify an end to discussions on an alternative mission in Mali, which the Armed Forces Minister said was under consideration in July? In this time, there has been nothing but silence from Ministers. Is this because the Government have simply taken this long to work out what to do?

What has happened in this time, however, is the mandate of the mission being renewed by the UN Security Council, with British support. That begs a number of questions as to how the mission will proceed given that it would have expected both our personnel and expertise, particularly in long-range specialised reconnaissance? How do Ministers expect our decision to impact the mission’s continued progress and the region’s future, particularly with recent rises in terrorism across the Sahel region and neighbouring countries and the continued presence of the Russian mercenary Wagner Group? The latter has been accused of massacring civilians in a region of Mali where extremist Islamist factions have sought to recruit. What recent assessment has the Minister made of the Wagner Group’s activity in Mali, and its ability to foment further uncertainty in the region? I understand that UK officials were expected to meet counterparts from the EU, west Africa and the UN in Accra today and yesterday for talks on its potential to move on to Burkina Faso, which has suffered two coups in the last eight months. Have these talks taken place, and can the Minister update us?

At the end of the Statement, the Chilcot report is mentioned. One of Chilcot’s key mantras is that action should be taken only if the next step is already determined. When we entered Mali, did we have clear criteria as to when we should leave, and if so, have these criteria been met? The need for this strategic approach applies to the next steps too. France has already outlined its plans for working with African countries for the next six months. Can we expect a similar plan from the UK Government shortly, or will we have to wait another nine months? A lack of clear thinking for the Sahel region was also evident in the integrated review, which hardly mentioned it. Can we expect a more thorough strategic overview in the upcoming update?

Finally, turning to Thursday, it may be a coincidence that this withdrawal comes at the same time as we are expecting government cuts. Is the withdrawal connected to cuts to the defence budget? Clarity on defence spending is vital, especially when looking to maintain our NATO commitments. We know that a real-terms cut was agreed in the 2020 settlement. Its negative impact has been significantly exacerbated by the recent rise in inflation.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, for a decade now, the people of Mali have suffered the consequences of war, the multiplication of violent extremism and the ensuing violence. This has led to a state of crisis, with people facing refugee migrations and food insecurity, and to the suffering of, primarily, women and children. This in turn has led Mali to be ranked 131st of 163 countries for peace, and 137th of 145 countries for gender equality. I therefore support and commend the British personnel who have worked with others to try to create an opportunity for some stability. It is regrettable that there has been a move back from this because of the Mali Government. I hope that the Minister will be able to outline the Government’s policy for continuing the vital work of supporting NGOs, civil society groups, and women and children in Mali after this draw-down.

I declare an interest: I chair the UK board of peace- building charities, Search for Common Ground. It has been operating in Mali with the British Government’s support, trying to combat the sources of the problems there. I hope that this kind of support can continue. Will the Minister outline the Government’s development priorities? How is it seeking to use the Accra talks to progress them? What mechanisms will we use for our development ambitions in Mali?

Will the Minister also outline the role that the UK will play with ECOWAS, the AU, the United States and others to try to return Mali to a constitutional order? Of course the country’s future is in its own hands, but the UK has played a role: it has committed forces. A full draw-down should not bring about a full withdrawal of UK interest. On that, could the Minister explain why UK development assistance is planned to fall dramatically from the £22 million provided in 2019-20 to just £500,000 in 2023-24? Would the draw-down of military personnel not be exactly the right time to review development priorities so that a development vacuum is not created by UK personnel leaving?

Finally, I wish to return to the issue of the Wagner Group. I am on the record on a number of occasions pressing the noble Lords, Lord Ahmad and Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park, for the UK to move on the proscription of the Wagner Group. I will now press the Defence Minster on this. The Wagner Group is acting directly against the interests of the United Kingdom and our allies. Commons Minister James Heappey referred to the human rights atrocities that it is carrying out. The UK has no interest that is not being undermined by the Wagner Group, and there should be consequences for UK relations with countries that seek to use the Wagner Group not only against their own people but against the UK’s national interests. I repeat my call for the Government to prepare and bring forward mechanisms that would see the Wagner Group proscribed. So far, the Government have not made any moves on this. When answering questions, the Minister in the Commons said that he would engage in discussions with the Home Office on this issue, so I hope for a suitably positive response from the Minister today to me on this issue, so that we send a very strong signal that, whether in Mali or elsewhere, the UK will act against groups such as Wagner—and particularly against the Wagner Group by proscribing them.

Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) (No. 3) (High-Risk Countries) Regulations 2021

Debate between Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Tunnicliffe

Thursday 25th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, we support this measure and, as the Minister outlined, while this is an uncontroversial measure with regard to Mali, Turkey, Botswana and Mauritius, it is one element of a much wider agenda on which the UK has an opportunity to lead—and in many areas it is, working very closely with our key allies. The timing is, probably by accident, relevant. It is between the debate on the Statement, when we discussed human trafficking and the linked crime of smuggling, and change to the proscription of a terrorist organisation, so it is linked.

The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, mentioned organised crime offences in the Balkans. When I served on the Select Committee on International Relations and Defence, we carried out an inquiry into the Balkans, and I visited. We identified that one of the biggest interests of the UK in the region is organised crime and the finance connected with it. When I visited the Sahel and looked at some of the smuggling routes, I was told by British officials that this industry equates to £10 billion-worth of organised crime. It is on an awful, industrial scale.

We have debated Afghanistan and will again next week. Some 95% of the heroin on the streets of this country is from Afghanistan. More people die every year than died in Afghanistan as tragic British military casualties of that conflict. All of them are connected with a considerable amount of money. None of those awful activities, which lead to tragic victims and innocent deaths, can be separated from those who are party to this and who launder some of the proceeds and facilitate some of this activity.

Therefore, we support the work of the Financial Action Task Force, our security services, the Treasury, the Bank of England and all the agencies who have to work forensically to tackle this awful use of what are often very technical, legal, financial and bureaucratic mechanisms to hide criminal activity.

I press the Minister specifically on a connected issue, which is what the Government say they intend to do, which is to have a public register of beneficial ownership of property. We know that, because of the openness of the property market, especially in our cities and especially in London, this has been an area of concern. Prior to the pandemic, Transparency International identified 87,000 properties in England and Wales that are owned by anonymous companies registered in tax havens. We have seen in the Pandora papers that UK property remains a popular way to wash dirty money, and there have been cases, of which we are all aware, where that has led to actions. That demonstrates the clear need for a public register, so, in supporting what the Minister is doing, I would welcome his comments on when the Government will make good on their promise in this area.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, on the face of it, the regulations before us are very straightforward. The Financial Action Task Force has updated its list of high-risk countries, and we are mirroring those changes in our legislation. We have supported such instruments in the past and will continue to do so.

Paragraph 3.3 of the Explanatory Memorandum outlines the usual justifications for this instrument being laid under the “made affirmative” procedure. We accept the arguments, but it is a pity that the urgency in laying these SIs is not always matched when it comes to the Government’s wider efforts to crack down on money laundering. Although it is true that the task force has given the UK a good rating in general terms, we know that concerns have long been expressed about the UK’s supervisory regime. As my colleague Pat McFadden said in the Commons, the Treasury itself has conceded that FATF sees our systems as “only moderately effective” and that the international body also believes that there are

“significant weaknesses in the risk-based approach to supervision”

in the UK.

The UK is understandably a target for illicit funds, given the size and global status of our financial services sector. The Magnitsky case is a well-known example of funds being funnelled through UK institutions, but we know it is not the only one: that much has been seen with the recent publication of the Pandora papers. The Financial Conduct Authority is reportedly running several active investigations in this area. We wish it well with those probes and hope that any wrongful behaviour is punished in an appropriate way.

The Minister said yesterday that, despite the lack of criminal convictions secured through FCA action, the body is nevertheless taking robust action. He pointed to the imposition of a number of major fines in recent years, such as those against Standard Chartered. However, it is not clear that these punishments are changing behaviour or preventing the recurrence of bad practice. On Monday, Minister Whately outlined some of the limited examples of government action. We welcome the allocation of funds to this fight, but it is hard to take seriously her claim that everything possible is being done to make the UK

“a hostile place for illicit finance and economic crime”.—[Official Report, Commons, 16/11/21; col. 532.]

Many of the initiatives cited have been announced and re-announced without meaningful action following. For example, Companies House has been given an additional £63 million of funds to assist with its reform, but there is little sense that the changes being made will empower that body and lead to better outcomes.

Minister Whately also failed to provide clear justification of the UK Government not classifying countries such as Russia and Afghanistan as high risk. It is true that this instrument is designed solely to administer the task force list, but does the Treasury not see a case for taking action of its own where UK interests are at stake? We await with interest the outcome of the task force’s ongoing analysis of recent events in Afghanistan. It will be interesting to see whether that country is added to the list when we consider the first of these SIs in 2022 but, on Russia, I will simply repeat one of Pat McFadden’s questions: do the Government really not judge Russia to be as big a risk as some of the countries listed in these regulations?

As I said earlier, we are privileged to have a significant financial services sector in this country. Lots of talented people, both regulators and people in the sector, work night and day to detect and stop economic crime and obviously we support them in their endeavours. However, the fact remains that, despite the efforts of individuals, the UK Government’s regulatory framework of choice is seen by the international community as insufficient. As a global leader in financial services, we have a responsibility not only to replicate international initiatives but to lead them from the front. I hope the Minister can outline today exactly how the Treasury intends to do this.

Customs Safety and Security Procedures (EU Exit) (No. 2) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Tunnicliffe

Monday 7th October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

Perhaps the Minister might like to reflect on this conversation and see whether any of his colleagues could add some colour to that answer. There are quite a lot of deals relating to no-deal situations—I believe the EU calls them bonus deals—and I would be grateful, if there is further information, if he could write to us both.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

This will be the last time I jump to my feet. If the Minister is coming back to the very sensible suggestion by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, might he expand a little on our discussions with the Irish Government? The European Union is land-bordered with the United Kingdom, and if this is applying only to those who are importing goods from the European Union, which would cover the Northern Ireland border, but there is no reciprocal mechanism for those exporting, then this would apply to the Irish Government, who are the European Union. What discussions have there been and where would we, in Parliament, be able to understand the position of the Irish Government where this 12-month period could be completely intolerable? Of course, it can be solved by not leaving without a deal, but if we do leave without a deal—which is prohibited by law, but if the Government are determined to get around it—what is the position of the Irish Government and how do we know?

Customs Safety and Security Procedures (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Tunnicliffe

Tuesday 26th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

My Lords, when the Trade Bill first came to this Chamber in September, out of interest I registered with HMRC as a small business trading with the European Union to find out what information the Government would be providing to businesses. One of the core elements was the EORI component. A business that trades either exclusively or predominantly, or indeed at all, with the European Union was told that it would be required to have an EORI number in the event of no deal. The Government have taken that position consistently over a number of months in indicating that preparations for a no-deal Brexit need to be made.

It has been fascinating to observe both the information that the Government have received and how businesses have responded. As I indicated to the Minister, the last time the Government published information about how many businesses were prepared and in a position to trade with their European counterparts the day after a no-deal Brexit, only one-sixth of British businesses were in a position to do so. That meant that five-sixths would not be able to trade legally with their counterparts in the EU 27 countries. Now, a fortnight before the revised exit day if we leave on a no-deal basis, only one-fifth of businesses can do so. Therefore, if we leave with no deal on 12 April, one-fifth of all British businesses that trade with customers in EU 27 countries are in a position to do so legally. In addition, if, as the Minister said, they are in the category of the 145,000 VAT-registered businesses, they are required to be registered with an EU 27-equivalent of HMRC in those countries.

The Government have not published data on that information. It would be very interesting to know whether they are collecting data themselves. Not only do businesses have to be registered with our regulatory body, the HMRC, but for those 145,000 businesses to pay the correct level of VAT, tariffs and customs duties, they have to be registered with the customs or VAT body of the member state concerned. This is the advice that the Government have been giving, so it would be interesting to know how many companies are in that position.

Even if we crash out on a delayed basis in a fortnight’s time, the vast majority of British businesses will not be in a position to trade legally with their European counterparts. Regardless of what the Government have been saying about the need for preparedness for a no-deal Brexit, British businesses are simply not prepared. That may be because they do not believe the Government would be so cavalier with the interests of the British economy or that, in the words of the business Minister who resigned overnight, the Government are,

“playing roulette with the lives and livelihoods of the vast majority of people in this country who are employed by or otherwise depend on businesses for their livelihood”.

Or perhaps they do not believe that the advice provided by the Government has been of a sufficient standard.

I am open-minded about which category they might be in but sympathetic to the latter because, last week, on the day the Government indicated they were open to extending Brexit day, I received an email, as a business, indicating that exit day would still be 29 March. This afternoon, as I listened to the Leader of the House speaking about the statutory instrument for extending Brexit day, I received an HMRC email indicating that the policy of the British Government was still to leave the European Union with a deal; but there was no indication of an exit day at all.

How on earth can British businesses be expected to prepare now with the Government not even indicating a firm basis on which they need to prepare? Given that having an EORI number is only one of a number of requirements on British businesses, the Government—not Parliament—are asking them to make impossible business decisions. They are asking them to take risks to plan for an eventuality that even the Government are not confident will happen. It would be helpful if the Minister, in responding to this short debate, gave an estimate of when the Government expect all British businesses to be in a position of readiness for exiting the European Union. If at the moment, a fortnight out, only a fifth of British businesses that trade with their counterparts in the European Union are prepared, when do the Government estimate that all British businesses will be in that position?

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

I too thank the Minister for presenting these SIs. Taking them in the same order as on the Order Paper, the first one concerns customs safety and security procedures. The impact assessment says:

“The main purpose of this regulation is to enable the UK to continue to meet its safety and security obligations under the World Customs Organisation … Framework of Standards by introducing a new UK regime”.


This is the new UK regime. It introduces a safety and security declaration—in a sense, at the UK-EU border—after a six-month transition period. It also introduces an authorised economic operator programme. I could not understand whether this was an asymmetrical situation or a symmetrical one. For the six months while the UK firms do not have to make these declarations, is it possible that EU member states may require declarations from what was to have been this Friday and is now a fortnight on Friday, or do we have a reciprocal deal? The impact assessment gives a feel for the real world. It says:

“In the event of a no deal scenario, the UK will no longer be part of the EU security zone and carriers and operators will need to make safety and security declarations for goods moving between the UK and the EU. Whilst many carriers, specifically large economic operators, are experienced in transporting goods to both the EU and non-EU countries, HMRC anticipates that this will present a significant ongoing administrative burden for them, especially when submitting an ENS as it will be a new legal obligation and an additional cost to submitting a customs declaration for import purposes”.


The intention of this programme is no doubt to smooth the effects of a no-deal scenario but at best it will only reduce the chaos, and chaos there will be—at least, that is what it seems to me. However, let us look at the reason why these instruments are in front of us. Paragraph 3.1 of the Explanatory Memorandum says the reason is that the European Statutory Instruments Committee and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee both recommended that the instruments should be moved from the negative procedure,

“to the affirmative resolution procedure, as they believe the House may wish to debate the implications the safety and security requirements may have for trade across the Ireland/Northern Ireland border”.

The reference to this in the Explanatory Memorandum is:

“The amendments to the retained EU law contained in this instrument will not have effect in relation to trade in goods between Ireland and Northern Ireland. Further details on the arrangements for trade between Northern Ireland and Ireland will be published as soon as possible”.


I looked at the instrument to see how that retained law was disapplied. Almost hiding in plain sight in regulation 1(3) is this simple statement:

“They do not have effect in relation to the movement of goods between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland or the reverse”.


That has a charming, heroic simplicity about it. In one line it says that a problem that completely destroyed the Prime Minister’s agreement—that is, the backstop—can be ended by that simple statement. What are the plans for the border under these circumstances? The regulation says they will be published “as soon as possible”. One would have assumed that there was a target to publish them before this Friday because it is the 29th, although we now know that exit day is possibly a fortnight later.

The question posed is the question that the best minds of Her Majesty’s Government and the EU have failed to solve: what will actually happen at that border? My understanding is that if we fall back on WTO rules, there is an obligation to impose tariffs and for these sorts of safety and security rules to be enforced. We will in fact end up with a border down the Irish Sea. Are the two parties in Northern Ireland simply going to ignore all their obligations under these various international treaties? If we have here tonight, at this late hour, a solution to the Irish border question, I would be delighted to hear it from the Minister.