Scotland Act 2016

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Wednesday 20th April 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dunlop]

I very much agree with my noble friend. The people of Scotland voted very clearly and decisively in 2014 to remain part of the United Kingdom, and at the time Nicola Sturgeon, now First Minister of Scotland, said that this was a “once in a generation” issue. It is incumbent on the SNP to respect the decision that the people of Scotland took and to focus on jobs, prosperity and high-quality public services in Scotland.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

The Scotland Act transfers very considerable income tax powers across all bands to the Scottish Parliament. Is the noble Lord aware that the Scottish National Party has now abandoned its long-held policy to restore the 50p additional rate because it anticipates that 7% of additional ratepayers in Scotland would configure their tax affairs to avoid paying taxation in Scotland? What are the Government doing to ensure that there is no prospect of tax avoidance within the UK?

[Lord Dunlop]

HMRC is very focused on tax avoidance. The passage of the Scotland Act 2016 has meant that the debate that is going on for the Holyrood elections is about not what new powers should come to Scotland but how those powers are used. Tax is absolutely central to that, and that is a good and healthy development of the debate in Scotland.

Scotland Bill

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Monday 21st March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

There is no reason to suspect the worst. What we have to do is await the relevant Bill of Rights. Then, when we have considered its terms, we shall see whether it does or does not intrude upon matters covered by DGN10. If it does, then DGN10 will be addressed, as it always has been. There is a clear and consistent record of the United Kingdom Parliament and this Government proceeding in accordance with DGN10 in the context of devolved issues. I do not anticipate, and have no reason to anticipate, that that will change in the future. However, I am not going to comment on a Bill that is not before this House and the terms of which have not yet been finalised.

In these circumstances it appears to us that Clause 2 is sufficient for the purpose of expressing, essentially, a declarator of the Sewel convention in accordance with the Smith commission agreement.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, although that was perhaps his final point from the Dispatch Box on this, he said in response to my noble friend Lord Stephen that this is now stating in a declaratory way that the Sewel convention exists. However, it is worth reminding the House that paragraph 22 of the Smith commission report said:

“The Sewel Convention will be put on a statutory footing”,

not that it will be declaratory that it exists.

Amendment 3 agreed.

Scotland Bill

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Monday 22nd February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Selkirk of Douglas]

My noble friend’s suggestion does not seem to have the disadvantages of the amendment, which I will come to in a moment, and I hope that it will be looked at sympathetically in some form because it could be an important step forward.

There is of course frustration in the Scottish Parliament about this. The convener of the Devolution Committee, Bruce Crawford MSP, recently stated there would be “a substantial impact” on the ability of the Scottish Parliament to go through the process of proper scrutiny. Obviously he was referring to what he regarded as unreasonable delays. He expects the teams from Holyrood and Westminster to appear before his committee tomorrow to give a full explanation of their position on a fiscal framework, whatever the circumstances. There is a strong group of 15 Tory MSPs in the Scottish Parliament. To the best of my knowledge they want the Bill to proceed, and they are the third largest group.

My concern is based on two factors. This could become a major issue in the forthcoming elections to the Scottish Parliament on 5 May. If there is no agreement, the Scottish electorate will most certainly want to know who to blame. If the Bill fails because the Scottish Government shrink from accountability then the SNP will have to take responsibility, but if the Bill fails because the noble Lord’s amendment delays it unreasonably then this House and unionist parties could become a lightning conductor for criticism.

My most important reservation is that the amendment could lead to a serious weakening of the United Kingdom. Noble Lords may wonder what the Scots really want. I think that the answer is given in three ways: in opinion polls, in the referendum and in the recent general election. My interpretation of the referendum was that there is a decisive majority in Scotland for the United Kingdom. That means that the Scots will want to keep the UK intact, which should be remembered and never forgotten. My interpretation of the general election results in Scotland was that it was a clear indication that a large majority of the Scottish people wish to have a Scottish Parliament with increased powers and responsibilities, and within a reasonable timescale. I do not wish this House to do anything that would give the SNP a major propaganda coup during an election because I am a passionate supporter of the United Kingdom.

There are three difficulties with the amendment. First, it could be used to prevent the promises made by the Prime Minister and other party leaders being fulfilled. That could easily enrage the Scottish electorate on the basis that promises should be kept. The second difficulty is that the timing is not totally convenient because the Scottish election campaign will pick up on this and it could become a major issue. The third and most important consideration is that the United Kingdom probably stands a very much better chance of long-term survival if we do not unreasonably delay this Bill. In short, it is the kind of amendment that could trigger the law of unintended consequences.

Finally, I had the privilege of working under my noble friend Lord Forsyth in the Scottish Office. I have no hesitation in saying that he was a very strong, powerful and highly effective Secretary of State, frequently coming up with extremely interesting and exciting new ideas. I will mention one of them as an example. He wished the Stone of Destiny to be returned to Scotland and he got his way: that was a tremendous achievement. The Stone of Destiny was put in a “Stonemobile”, and there was a terrific reception in Edinburgh Castle. Of course, the Scots were not going to be satisfied merely with a stone: they wanted more. I recall a story that when the Stone of Destiny was originally pinched from Westminster Abbey by some youngsters of a nationalist disposition, and the police were searching for it, a Scotsman from the back of beyond telephoned the police and said that he knew who the thief was. The police officer went round to see him and took out his notebook, and the old man said, “It was King Edward I”.

As I have said before, finding a really satisfactory way forward in this area is very much like walking a tightrope. The noble Lord, Lord Smith of Kelvin, put it very well when he said:

“The new powers set out in the Scotland Bill will lead to a transformation of the powers held by Holyrood and it would be a terrible shame if they were to fall away at this late stage”.

My noble friend Lord Forsyth of Drumlean has put forward an amendment that might be entirely logical, but the potential disadvantages, in my view, outweigh other considerations. Above all, we at all times have to keep in mind the essential need to protect, maintain and sustain the United Kingdom.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

If the House will allow me to make a brief observation about the process, I will not detain it much longer. I believe that this Bill should proceed today to the clauses. It is a balanced judgment: the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, made a very valid point in saying that the amendments on the Order Paper would not have been meaningfully impacted upon even if there had been an agreement. However, the question is whether there would have been amendments in light of the agreement if it had been made in a timely manner. That means that the Minister needs to give a bit more information when he winds up this short debate on the amount of scrutiny that is going to be afforded to the fiscal agreement, not only in this House but in another place. Half a day of Report stage might not, I venture, be sufficient.

To paraphrase many whom I have heard over the past 24 hours, we need to progress with a heavy heart, because we are in unfortunate circumstances. They are unfortunate because there has been considerable press coverage, even though the Minister had said that this was a negotiation in private. However, the circumstances of these negotiations go far beyond the previous legislation to which he referred. The adjustment of the block grant will now require a permanent and significant constitutional mechanism given the very large extent of the powers that will be transferred to the Scottish Parliament, and it requires considerable scrutiny. Later on we will debate the adjustment, not only for fiscal powers but for welfare powers, and its financial implications. For the first time, the Scottish Government will have current revenue borrowing powers, which, similarly, are part of the negotiations. Most important, however, is that these discussions are pertinent not just to Scotland—the implications will be much wider for the constitutional arrangements we have across the whole of the United Kingdom.

Scotland Bill

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Monday 22nd February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I add support to my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness’s amendment in this regard. It was Baldwin who said that democracy was government by explanation but, as we discussed in the previous debate, there has not been much explanation of the development of the fiscal agreement. We need to ensure that when it comes to two broadly competing interests—the Scottish Government and the UK Treasury—there are mechanisms for the agreements and their operation to be reviewed in future.

I was a member of the finance committee in Holyrood for five years when it did not have the role of scrutinising the revenue powers of the Scottish Parliament, and I think it will be a positive thing for it to have those powers. In many regards, though, the processes that exist in Holyrood are not fit for the purpose of the powers that are coming its way. The operation of this power, especially and most importantly in the first five years of operation, will therefore be critical. That is why the amendment is of value.

Of course, I agree with the noble Earl about the benefit of building longer-term structures; my party has proposed one potential option for that, which is what the Canadians would recognise as a federal fiscal commission. When there has been a protracted process of discussions between the Scottish Government and the Treasury, not wholly because of a difference in fiscal policy or a different approach to budgetary discipline but because of a political imperative, that is not going to disappear once agreement has been reached. Indeed, it may be compounded once it is in operation, given the difficult situations that may arise.

This afternoon we have all been reading at pace from the Chief Secretary’s letter, and I think we have all registered with the Minister our complaint that we should not be having to do that as well as discussing the relevant legislation. However, the recommendation to take forward the Scottish Fiscal Commission into a more independent body is worth while, and I would be interested to hear what the Scottish Government’s position is. The problem is that it has already been legislated for in Holyrood, and we will be asking the Scottish Parliament to go back on what it has just agreed to establish a structure that this Parliament will perhaps argue is not fit for purpose. It makes for an interesting dynamic that the SNP chair of the Scottish Affairs Select Committee is proposing this to the SNP chair of the Holyrood committee, which has a different view on this, but that is for them to resolve and we will be interested in their conclusion. Ultimately, as has been referred to before, the experience of the referendum is that the people are asked to believe figures and facts that are put forward by one Government and those that are put forward by a competing one. That puts civil society and the public in an invidious position. If we are locking this into a long-term approach, that does not bode well for the future.

My final comment is that I know it has been hard to separate the politics from the constitutional practice in this. It has been very hard for those who argue for independence, because this is the final aspect of their arguments. They have lost their argument through the people of Scotland voting for Scotland to stay part of the UK, and in many respects they have lost the argument for full fiscal autonomy. The only argument that is left on the table is the long-term form of devo-plus that we have with this Bill. It is quite hard for those who are passionately in favour of independence to recognise that there are structures that could be long-term and stable and could work for the union, because if they accept it then they are undermining their own fundamental approach, so we are asking them to do something that is exceptionally hard for them. So I am not surprised that, to some extent, there has been this to-and-fro.

However, do we want that to be a permanent feature of our constitution and of the relationship with the Scottish Parliament, of which taxpayers on both sides of the border will be the victim? In common with all colleagues in this House who are resident in Scotland, I have received my letter from the Inland Revenue saying that we are now designated Scottish taxpayers and that this is now a real process that is under way. If we want to move away from the situation where the two blocs perpetuate this interest, then we need a regular review mechanism, combined with joint working between the Parliaments, not the Governments—the critical part of my noble and learned friend’s amendment. In addition, by taking out the only bodies that are responsible for making the forecasts for revenue and population growth being the two respective Governments, we will be locking in the kind of difficulties that we have been seeing over the past nine months. I hope that the House endorses my noble and learned friend’s amendment.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Scotland Office (Lord Dunlop) (Con)]

My Lords, we have had a detailed debate with many authoritative contributions, and I welcome the contributions from all parts of the House. We have covered a lot of ground. I will try to do justice to all the issues that have been raised. No detriment, block grant indexation, borrowing, review, scrutiny, commencement—there is a plethora of them, and I hope that the House will bear with me as I try to cover each one. I shall pick up on the points that individual Peers have made on each of those issues.

To start off, I shall remind us of what we are trying to achieve here. We are trying to rebalance the devolution settlement and to give the Scottish Parliament greater responsibility for raising more of what it spends. Currently that is around 10% of the Scottish budget and, once the Bill is in operation, it will be over 50%. That will lead to a Scottish Parliament that is more financially accountable to the people who elect it. The Scottish Government should be able to reap the rewards, and bear the risks and costs, of the policy choices that they make. That is something that the UK Government think is important, and something that John Swinney, the Deputy First Minister of the Scottish Government, has publicly accepted. The noble Lord, Lord McFall, talked about grievance politics. This is an opportunity to move Scottish politics on from the familiar blame game.

Why does the fiscal framework matter? A lot of noble Lords have said that this is central. I certainly agree with the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, which said:

“The fiscal framework will be central to future devolution arrangements”.

It is the fiscal framework that provides the financial tools and controls to support the operation of the Scottish Government’s new powers. As with the Smith agreement as a whole, this is about striking the right balance: giving the flexibility to the Scottish Government to take their own decisions, while retaining those fundamental UK strengths. That is what the people in Scotland voted for in September 2014 by a clear and decisive majority. Therefore, it is our duty to deliver a Scottish fiscal framework that is sustainable and consistent, as the Smith agreement says, with the overall UK fiscal framework.

I am sure that noble Lords are on the edge of their seats because we have talked a lot about my next topic: the no-detriment principles. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, said that he had no idea of what the UK Government’s view was of no detriment. Other Peers—the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, and my noble friend Lord Forsyth—raised the no-detriment principles. The House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee highlights the importance of principles, and the Smith agreement sets out a range of principles against which the fiscal framework must deliver. I would be the first to recognise that these principles set out in the Smith agreement are high level, and it is for the two Governments to agree on how to apply them in practice. Central to the negotiations that have been taking place is how the Scottish block grant adjusts to account for new tax and welfare powers and meets these no-detriment principles.

The first no-detriment principle is that the Scottish Government and the UK Government budgets should be no larger or smaller simply as a result of the initial transfer of tax and spending powers. As the noble Lord, Lord Darling, said, in many ways this is a very straightforward calculation. We have the data, use actual figures for the final year prior to devolution and apply whatever indexation method is finally chosen.

The second no-detriment principle is that there should be no detriment as a result of Scottish Government and UK Government policy decisions post-devolution. There are two legs to this no-detriment principle. The first is that decisions by one Government that directly affect the revenues or spending of the other should be compensated. What does that mean in practice? It means direct effects: so if the UK Government were to increase the personal allowance, that would obviously have an impact on the tax revenues of the Scottish Government that was totally outwith their control. Looking at it in another perspective, if the Scottish Government used their welfare powers in a way that automatically and in a direct way affected benefit passporting in the reserved welfare system, that would be a direct effect. However, the principle is explicitly not to compensate the Scottish Government for the economic consequences of the policy choices that they make: so, for example, if higher tax rates lead to an increase in net migration from Scotland, that would be a consequence of the decisions that the Scottish Government had taken.

The Smith report is very clear about economic responsibility, saying that,

“the revised funding framework should result in the devolved Scottish budget benefiting in full from policy decisions by the Scottish Government—”

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Dunlop]

No; it is the responsibility of the two Governments to work out this package of powers and how the fiscal framework will work in practice, which is what we are doing.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

I am anxious to make time before the Minister moves on from this specific aspect of indirect detriment—I know that he will come on to behavioural aspects soon. Will there be one body which will define what these indirect impacts are, with choices north and south of the border, or will we see a perpetual process of two Governments having disputes about how they will define what the indirect consequences are of policy choices north and south of the border?

[Lord Dunlop]

No; we will not see disputes, because that is the process we are involved in at the moment, which is to reach an agreement on how all these aspects operate. That is what we are doing. When I say that I am optimistic that we will reach an agreement, that is on the basis of the discussions we have had so far and the issues that remain outstanding.

I will move on to the second leg of the second no-detriment principle, which is to do with taxpayer fairness. Changes in devolved Scottish taxes—for example, income tax—should affect public spending only in Scotland, and vice versa for equivalent taxes in the rest of the UK. What does that mean in practice? It means that taxpayers in Newcastle and Liverpool will not fund even higher levels of public services in Scotland not available to them. The noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, touched on some of these issues in his recent Herald article, which has already been referred to. The other aspect is that Scotland does not inadvertently gain a double benefit, via Barnett consequentials and a fixed proportion of any growth in tax revenues from the rest of the UK.

In conclusion, therefore, in this part of what I intend to say, some block grant adjustment mechanisms work better against different principles, and the UK Government’s approach is to find a mechanism that performs well against all of them. Each principle is not perfectly met in every respect, which is what we are trying to deal with in the negotiations that are going on at the moment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Kirkwood of Kirkhope (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson of Glen Clova, and support the amendment in his name. I am pleased to take the Minister into the slightly calmer waters of Head F1 of Part II of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998.

I am pleased to see my favourite Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Freud, who has taken the trouble to observe and listen to these amendments, which I appreciate because this is important. I want to make one preliminary point. The most important thing that the Minister can do for me this evening is to give an undertaking that the new-found spirit of co-operation and good working relations that is now evident between Whitehall departments, the Scottish Government and the community of pressure groups who apply these provisions on behalf of their clients will continue. My perception, which is strong because I have been working with these people all my professional life, for the past 35 years, is that at the beginning people in Scotland thought they were getting short shrift, to put it mildly. This is a DWP issue. The impression—this is their perception, not mine; I am simply reporting it—is that they were getting no proper consideration or understanding in what was being proposed by the Government. I think that has changed. From my experience with the current Minister and his team, I am much assured that the consideration that has now been given to these clauses in this important part of the Bill is much better. But we need to continue to work hard at getting a good relationship with the people who are implementing the provisions north of the border. The presence of the noble Lord, Lord Freud, underlines the fact that the Government have got that message. I have now got that off my chest.

I am speaking to the amendments in my name, beginning with Amendment 77A. I will not, however, move Amendments 77D or 77G. I was getting carried away with my enthusiasm for peppering the Marshalled List with probing amendments and inadvertently misdirected myself. I managed to eliminate the UK’s reserve power for discretionary payments in universal credit. I had no intention of doing that, so I will take away from the Minister the pleasure of saying that I got that substantially wrong because I have just realised that myself.

The best way that we can make progress in the Committee is for the Minister, in dealing with all my amendments and those of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson, to take this opportunity to clarify how the provisions should be interpreted.

The one thing of which we should try to persuade people north of the border is that they need not necessarily be suspicious about everything. Some of this legislation is in quite dense language and a lot of it will have to be spread out into secondary legislation to make it work. The view in Scotland is that people in London are trying to have a narrower rather than a wider interpretation of the deployment of these powers. I do not believe that is true. That is why, as I said, it is important that Ministers give this serious attention.

The people who have been briefing the Committee, such as the Scottish CPAG and the Scottish Federation of Housing Associations, have done a very good job. They are anxious to avoid gaps—that is what they are good at—and they have managed to achieve that by identifying some of the amendments on the Marshalled List this evening. They do not care where the powers lie or who is deploying them. They want to make sure that they can look after their client groups as best they can in the circumstances.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson, has already managed to do some of it, I am going to just sketch through some of the amendments in my name. They are all probing amendments. They are designed to capture the Minister’s attention and I think they have successfully done that: he has spent some serious time getting to grips with the concerns. Amendment 77 is a very good example of this. I knew in my heart that winter fuel payments were included because they are part of the regulated Social Fund but it is not explicit in the Bill. At an earlier stage, people in Scotland were not content to take at face value that the words,

“expenses for heating in cold weather”,

would naturally and automatically import the winter fuel payments scheme in Scotland. Therefore, the purpose of the amendment—and it illustrates why I am speaking to these amendments—is to enable the Minister to say on the record from the Dispatch Box that that is the case. If he can do that, I would be grateful.

The amendments to Clause 22 seek confirmation on how top-up powers will be used and clarification on clawback powers. The use of the word “discretionary” in the title of Clause 22 caused some confusion because discretionary by definition means what it means. That could be usefully clarified by the Minister. Could he explain exactly what Clause 22 sets out to do? The amendments to Clause 23 and the two or three subsequent clauses are trying to get an understanding of exactly how the sanction restrictions will effect discretionary payments such as discretionary housing payments, crisis grants, community care grants and top-up payments. If he can help us understand that, the Minister will be doing us a favour.

The amendments to Clause 24 attempt to bottom out what power the Scottish Government currently have under the Welfare Funds (Scotland) Act 2015. It is the view of the people I have talked to that there should be support for families facing “exceptional circumstances”, which the Scottish Government, in spite of the fact that they have the Welfare Funds (Scotland) Act 2015, feel they do not have the competence to cover. I would be very interested—I think the same question was raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson—to learn more about that as well.

In Clauses 27 and 28, I am really nervous about concurrent jurisdiction powers. I do not know how these will be implemented. It is a much smaller-scale problem than financial frameworks and so on, but we need a clearer understanding of how these things will work. I understand that the department thinks that they are well dealt with in Clauses 27 and 28, but I do not think that that is necessarily the case. The power to delay is an opportunity cost in terms of access to universal credit. If the Government did decide that they had to take advantage of the delaying power, that might mean, for months if not years, that people in Scotland were denied access to some of the advantages of universal credit—because there are some—and that would not be a cost-free decision for the Government to take.

I want to spend a moment on Amendment 79ZC on the Social Security Advisory Committee. I am genuinely puzzled by the Government’s approach to this because, as I read the Bill as currently drafted, they are excluding any role for the SSAC in relation to social security issues in Scotland. The Minister will know that the primary legislation for the SSAC was a 1980 Act later consolidated into the Social Security Administration Act 1992. Those provisions gave the SSAC an exactly parallel role in relation to the Social Security Agency in Northern Ireland. These two statutory accountabilities have been running in parallel ever since the SSAC was set up. Hitherto in Northern Ireland there was automatic parity with GB, so there was no real issue about any policy matters, but following last year’s fresh start agreement, it is obvious to anyone paying any attention to what is going on in Northern Ireland that the Northern Ireland Executive and the Northern Ireland Assembly now wish to introduce substantive changes to their devolved social security arrangements, so the SSAC statutory role there will now involve providing advice on devolved arrangements in one part of the United Kingdom.

My question is this: if that is appropriate for devolution in one of the nations of the United Kingdom, what is the Government’s rationale for wanting to take a diametrically opposite view for elements of social security now devolved in Scotland. It does not make any sense and I believe that there is a strong case for ensuring that the SSAC is able to take an overview of the way the UK social security system is evolving in the context of some elements being devolved to Scotland and Northern Ireland. It is certainly essential to have a single statutory independent UK body that can provide oversight of the rollout of universal credit in different ways in three parts of the United Kingdom, because that is what is happening, and of the implications of the way the exercise of the fully devolved powers in Scotland and Northern Ireland are impacting on the effectiveness and coherence of the social security system across the whole of the United Kingdom. I would be pleased to have a Government response to that.

Finally, Amendment 79ZD is the “Lord Freud” amendment, which I am now trying to promote everywhere I can because pilot schemes and test and learn have proved their value beyond any doubt in the policy area of universal credit. We should be encouraging Scottish Ministers and the Scottish Parliament to adopt them as they develop some of these important new social security powers. I understand that the government response might be, “It’s up to Scottish Ministers; it’s not up to us to tell them”, but it would be a good idea to make that explicit in the Bill as often and as clearly as we can. Perhaps the Minister will take some time in his response to clarify some of these amendments. That would do a great service to the understanding of the provisions of Part 3 of the Bill north of the border.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for tabling these amendments, in particular Amendments 77N and 77R. As he has said, these provisions take us in a direction in which we have not travelled so far under devolution. That is quite understandable because this is a very significant transfer of powers.

The use of the phrase “operating concurrently” has the potential to raise not only some constitutional issues, but practical issues in the relationship between the two Parliaments. If my understanding is correct, this will be a novel area where this Parliament is able retrospectively to amend what is in effect devolved legislation. Obviously that would be done in circumstances where agreement has broken down. The Scottish Government will have had a view on the practicability of implementing the powers that have been transferred to them, on who is able to receive universal credit and when. That cannot be done unless with consultation with the Secretary of State.

That is, of course, reasonable: it is an area where there was considerable political disagreement before the Bill came to Parliament, when the Scottish Government claimed that there were veto powers. I think there has been significant movement on both sides, so we have moved away from that political disagreement, but this situation may arise where the Scottish Government have a view, the Secretary of State has another and, in effect, if the Secretary of State believes that the Scottish Government are wrong, it is open to this Parliament to retrospectively amend devolved legislation. That would be a high-profile set of circumstances, so my noble friend is justified in asking the Government for a bit more information as to how the Secretary of State would define “practicable”. An enhanced requirement for the Secretary of State to state why he thinks measures would not be practicable to implement is very reasonable. As my noble friend said, the power to delay implementation is a significant power, in addition to the relationship that it would have with the Scottish Parliament.

--- Later in debate ---

I have noted the suggestion made by both the committee and the noble and learned Lord. However, we continue to believe that non-textual and minor or technical changes should be possible under the negative resolution procedure. It would be inappropriate to set out on the face of the Bill specific kinds of modification of primary legislation that should require the negative procedure. Doing so would create legal uncertainty, especially in those outlying and indirect cases where it is not always clear when a provision non-textually modifies primary legislation. As well as this undesirable level of legal uncertainty, the Government think that many of the cases which fall into this category are unlikely to warrant the use of the affirmative procedure due to their indirect and remote nature. Furthermore, given the range of legislation under the provisions in this Bill, the Government consider that the approach taken is appropriate, particularly as they enable the use of the affirmative procedure should there be a need to do so. The Government acknowledge that this allows discretion on the part of the Minister, but we have also indicated to the committee that on those rare occasions, and unless otherwise provided for, changes to primary legislation by secondary legislation are normally subject to the affirmative procedure. I hope that this offers noble Lords reassurance on the points raised in the debate and I urge the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

It is welcome to hear the Government’s view as regards potential amendments on Report. However, in light of the Minister’s remarks, how does Clause 68 sit with Clause 2 when it comes to areas where the Government may have the power to amend Acts of the Scottish Parliament and devolved legislation? Would a legislative consent Motion mechanism be required for that, and equally for the National Assembly for Wales?

[Lord Dunlop]

I am happy to take the noble Lord’s point away and reflect on it, and I shall either write to him or discuss it.

Scotland: Fiscal Framework

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Wednesday 16th December 2015 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government, in the light of talks on 14 December between the First Minister and the Prime Minister, when the fiscal framework agreement between the Scottish and United Kingdom governments will be finalised and published, and how it will be ratified.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Scotland Office (Lord Dunlop) (Con)]

My Lords, the Prime Minister and the First Minister met on Monday 14 December to discuss a framework which is fair both to the taxpayers of Scotland and the rest of the UK. The Joint Exchequer Committee will meet again shortly to continue discussions, with the aim of reaching final agreement in the new year. Once agreed, a framework would be signed by both Governments.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, the Government said in the summer that agreement would be reached in the autumn, and in the autumn they said it would be reached in the winter. In the communiqué from the Joint Exchequer Committee last week, reference was made to the new year, but the First Minister of Scotland said after the meeting with the Prime Minister that the target for reaching agreement would now be mid-February—long after the proposed scheduling of the Committee stage of the Scotland Bill. When will agreement be reached? Given that this is of such significance for taxpayers across the whole United Kingdom—not just for those of us who are resident taxpayers in Scotland—is it not appropriate that, before Christmas, the underlying data for these discussions be published to enable much wider debate across civic Scotland and the UK, and indeed in Parliament?

[Lord Dunlop]

The Government want an agreement as soon as we can achieve it. I cannot offer any guarantees as to the end date, because there are two parties to these negotiations. However, I was very encouraged by what the First Minister said on Monday after the meeting with the Prime Minister. She and the Scottish Government want to reach an agreement, and she is optimistic that a deal can be done and is very keen that we should get on with it. That is absolutely what the UK Government want as well. Clearly, the fiscal framework will be a very detailed public document when it is agreed, and obviously, it will be made available to this House. We welcome full scrutiny of that agreement.

Scotland Bill

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Tuesday 8th December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lang of Monkton]

As I do not know the context and full detail of what my right honourable friend the former Attorney-General said, I can hardly answer the noble and learned Lord. But I hope that sovereignty can be reconciled with common sense and realism. Certainly that would be my objective.

There is a threat to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom which is potentially raised by the wording of these clauses, and the intrusion of new elements into them which cloud out the specific issues of principle. If a court in Scotland did overrule the power of the United Kingdom and managed to pass a judgment that said that the United Kingdom Parliament was overruled by the view of the Scottish Parliament, it would not be devolution but separation. We must not plant the seeds for such a development in this legislation.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

Does the noble Lord not agree that there is now considerable case law in Scotland which has looked at the competences of the Scottish Parliament and the reach of legislation from this place? So under the existing arrangements, it is perfectly in order for UK legislation to be challenged on the extent of its interaction with devolved legislation. We currently have that practice and it does not seem to have undermined our constitution irrevocably.

[Lord Lang of Monkton]

That does not surprise me, because I have always taken the view that, ever since we embarked—for all kinds of reasons I will not go into in this debate—on an ill-conceived and unbalanced form of devolution, we were on the slippery slope and sliding towards separation and independence unless we were very careful. As I have said many times, this Bill carries us one step nearer to that.

In his wind-up speech at Second Reading, my noble friend Lord Dunlop said:

“The sovereignty of Parliament remains”.—[Official Report, 24/11/15; col. 667.]

That is a commendable, clear, concise statement. We also know, and have reminded ourselves today, that no Parliament can bind its successor. But my noble friend also said of this clause that it puts the permanence of the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government, “beyond all doubt”. In conceding the referendum point on Report in the other place, the Secretary of State for Scotland said that it makes clear,

“beyond question that the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are permanent institutions”.—[Official Report, Commons, 9/11/15; col. 57.]

By putting things beyond doubt, he raises doubts in all of us. The Government’s arguments are in deadlock: they hit each other head-on. That is why, at Second Reading and now, so many noble Lords have tabled amendments and why the House badly needs reassurance. I very much hope that the Minister will be able to give it to us when he winds up the debate.

[Lord Sanderson of Bowden (Con)]

My Lords, I am one of the few non-lawyers who are even putting their foot into this particular hole. I stand to be corrected by the Front Bench, but Clause 2, which has been referred to, makes perfect sense if the United Kingdom Parliament remains sovereign and can legally legislate on anything, including devolved matters. But that would contradict Clause 1 if the purpose of that clause is to entrench all provisions that are unalterable. I want our Front Bench to answer that question.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

I do not agree with the mood of the noble Lord, Lord Lang of Monkton, because I do not share his views on Amendment 1. I am happy that the Government inserted further clauses into the Bill. I am pleased that that was the result of cross-party consideration and that the Government responded to the Smith commission—in a difficult context—and put into proposals what I think most people in Scotland now understand: that they have two Parliaments. This is not an easy thing to do and parliamentary draftsmen have a difficult task because we now operate in a situation where we have more than one sphere of power over primary legislation. That poses considerable difficulties for some because they believe that one should be primary and one subsidiary to it. So far as primary legislation is concerned, most people in Scotland consider themselves as having two legislatures. It is even harder because we do not have a written constitution. In the absence of one, we have to rely on other measures to see how we entrench parts of our governance.

It is not the case that this has simply been dreamt up over the last couple of months, as some noble Lords have indicated. Nor it is the case that it is in response to the referendum. Nor is it the case that it is only to do with political expediency. Some of us have believed for a considerable time that it is right to reflect in statute the permanence of the Scottish Parliament in the context of a new and evolving structure of governance in the United Kingdom. I absolutely believe that that is best in a codified federal relationship, which I hope would be the result of a constitutional convention—others have a different view. However, in the absence of that, I believe that we then have to look at what has been a developing process in the United Kingdom.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, I rather thought that I had answered the point made by the noble Lord, but let me reiterate it. The word “permanence” appears in the Smith commission agreement. After further consideration, it was felt that in order to strengthen the political statement contained in Clause 1 that word should feature in the clause itself.

I return to Amendments 6 and 7 which seek to alter the basis upon which any decision would be made with regard to the provisions of Clause 1. As was observed, it is not anticipated that there will at any point in the future be a referendum upon that issue, but nevertheless as this matter proceeded in another place it was again considered that this would strengthen the political statement that is being made here. Let us be clear: the use of a referendum in this context is consistent with precedent. In 1997, the people of Scotland supported the creation of a Scottish Parliament on the basis of a referendum. In 2014, in the independence referendum they reaffirmed their wish to have two Parliaments and two Governments for the purposes of reserved and devolved administration in Scotland. Therefore, it is appropriate that any question about the abolition of the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government, which is not envisaged, should be based on the expression of the will of the people of Scotland in a referendum. Let me be clear: that is a theoretical point. There has never been any question that the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are anything other than permanent parts of the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements. That remains the case.

It is unusual, but not wholly exceptional, for a clause of a Bill such as this to contain a political statement, an affirmation of the status quo, a declarator that it will not change, and that is the fundamental purpose of Clause 1.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

I am grateful to the Minister because I feel that he may well be making my point for me on the subject of new Section 63A(3). If the Government’s position, which I support, is that there can be change only if the people of Scotland make it in a referendum, does that not adjust the absolute sovereignty of this place, which can make an unfettered decision?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Clearly it is not, because, notwithstanding the outcome of any such referendum, this place might decide not to legislate in accordance with the outcome of the referendum. One cannot use these arguments to undermine the ultimate sovereignty and supremacy of Parliament.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

If I can complete the journey around the houses that the noble and learned Lord has begun on that point: it appears that new subsection (3) simply underlines the political structure—the declaratory statement contained in the clause as a whole. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, observed that of course it goes a step further in so far as it introduces conditionality to the abolition of the Scottish Parliament, which I acknowledge. As to it being,

“a decision of the people of Scotland voting in a referendum”,

that term is capable of clear and objective definition in due course. Respectfully, however, it appears that that wording is sufficiently clear for these purposes.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

Just to carry on a little around the House: the Minister did not make it clear at the Dispatch Box when he said that the people of Scotland would not necessarily be sovereign if this Parliament did not adhere to the result in that referendum. That is absolutely contrary to the Edinburgh agreement that the Prime Minister signed, which stated that the Government would respect that view. The sovereignty of the people should be absolute, not anything else he may say at the Dispatch Box this evening.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I cannot agree with the interpretation of sovereignty the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, puts forward. At the end of the day, if there was a referendum—and we are talking about a theory, not political reality—it would be necessary for there to be legislation to implement the outcome of that referendum if it involved the abolition of the Scottish Parliament. No one in reality is contemplating the abolition of the Scottish Parliament. The whole purpose of Clause 1 is to make clear the permanence and the recognition of the permanence of the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has to recognise that the outcome of any referendum could be implemented only by way of legislation that went through this, the sovereign Parliament of the United Kingdom. That is the only point I seek to make.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I do not accept that expression of the position. As I said at the outset, the whole purpose of Clause 1 is to make a political statement that reflects the terms of the Smith commission agreement, which determined that there should be an expression to the effect that the Scottish Parliament is permanent. We acknowledge that, and that is the political statement being made. It is a declaration of will. However, we also recognise, as I believe this House will recognise, that the United Kingdom Parliament is ultimately sovereign and supreme. I am seeking to make that point. At the end of the day, this Parliament is sovereign, and it cannot disclaim that sovereignty.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

In that case, can the noble and learned Lord expand on the meaning of the Government’s wording in this clause? It states that,

“the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are not to be abolished except on the basis of a decision of the people of Scotland voting in a referendum”.

Therefore, if the people of Scotland vote in a referendum and make a decision, and the Government or Parliament then disregard the view and the decision of the people of Scotland, does that mean that this clause has no purpose at all in legislation? If that is the case, what is the point of this wording being in the Bill?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I was going to continue by saying that, the amendment having been tabled, I would look to its substance, which is that the heading should be, “Competence of the Scottish Parliament”. I am reminded of Voltaire’s observation about the Holy Roman Empire, that it was,

“neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire”.

Clause 2 is not about competence; nor is it about the Scottish Parliament. It restates in statutory terms the procedural convention of the United Kingdom Parliament with respect to its legislation for devolved matters. If we were to have a heading, “Competence of the Scottish Parliament” when in fact we are dealing with a matter that concerns the legislative competence of the United Kingdom Parliament, in my respectful submission, we would not only puzzle historians but confuse everyone else with regard to the content of the relevant clause.

I note what has been said about the present heading. I will reflect upon the observations made about that heading. But given that it is strictly a matter for the draftsmen, I go no further at this time. I hope that my noble friend will see fit to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

I am neither a lawyer nor a historian so I wonder if the noble and learned Lord can help me with his interpretation of this. As this is an amendment Bill to the 1998 Act, once this clause takes effect, if Parliament approves it, will this title actually exist in the amended 1998 Act? If it does not, is this not all rather academic?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

As I understand it, the title will not exist in the amended 1998 Act. The title is a matter for the parliamentary draftsmen but, as my noble friend Lord Forsyth observed, the amendment was put on the Marshalled List and therefore it is addressed. As I say, I will reflect upon his observations, but at this stage I urge him to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

Will the Minister give way?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

In view of the time, no.

Amendment 11 would clearly impact on the ability of the United Kingdom Parliament to make laws for Scotland. To that extent, it would modify Section 28(7) of the 1998 Act. The effect of that amendment could be interpreted as an attempt to limit the sovereignty of this Parliament, a point that I believe the noble Lord, Lord Stephen, acknowledged, and the Government would not be prepared to accept such an amendment.

Amendment 13, conversely, seeks to state in the Bill that Clause 2 places no limits on the sovereignty of Parliament. We would say that if you say that expressly in one part of the Bill, you have to take care as to the impact that it will have on other parts of the Bill, and that it is appropriate to acknowledge that nothing in the Bill impinges on the sovereignty of Parliament.

Scotland Bill

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Tuesday 8th December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord McCluskey (CB)]

My Lords, I may be brief. I made points in my Second Reading speech which the noble Lord, Lord Lyell, has referred to. We are all agreed about one thing: there is a problem. Whether the unelected House of Lords is the right place to start giving a lead in that matter is something entirely different. I would not fashion the problem in precisely the words that the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, has mentioned—the one-party state. I think I have previously used the expression that was made well known by Lord Hailsham, “an elective dictatorship”, because in substance that is what you have in the Scottish Parliament at the moment. The Scottish National Party, for its own reasons, whips its MPs so effectively that there is no dissent, and for reasons that I mentioned at Second Reading, the weakness of the opposition is palpable. There are good people and, by the way, one or two good committees as well, but the committees of which I have experience, which are largely to do with justice, are not satisfactory.

I therefore agree with the noble Lord, Lord Maxton, that there is a problem with having an elected House. The great thing about the House of Lords is that it is not elected, therefore we are not answerable to constituents, and because very few of us are left with ambition, having reached an age and a state in our careers when ambition is no longer available to us, we can say what we think. However, that is not a popular idea in the country generally.

I am not sure that I am totally committed to the idea of an elected second Chamber but there must be some system. One forgets that many of the institutions that are extremely powerful in shaping the political debate and the political results in this country are not elected at all. I mention, for example, the press, which is said to be free and independent. It may be free, and it is independent of government, but in no sense is it elected by anyone. I get no say in who appoints the editors of the Times or the Sun or, for that matter, the Daily Mail, and they have considerably more influence than this House over what happens in this country, but they are not elected either.

This may be just a start but I feel that there is a duty on those of us who share the idea that there is a real problem to publicise that problem in Scotland and to try to persuade the Scottish electorate and the people generally that it has to be tackled, although perhaps not in this way. However, I certainly support the idea that “something must be done”—an expression which I hesitate to use because of its antecedents.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, it was fairly dispiriting to come back into the Chamber and to see our archaic language—which, as a Member of this House compared with being a Member of the Scottish Parliament, it has taken me a while to adjust to—on the annunciator. It announced that the House was “Adjourned during pleasure”, and it was dispiriting when the “pleasure” ended and the Scotland Bill was brought back to us. When I first saw that announcement on joining this House, I asked the Clerk of the Parliaments was it was. He asked me, “Didn’t you have any pleasure in the Scottish Parliament?”. I replied, “No, not very much at all”.

It was a pleasure to hear the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes. His persuasive skills are renowned but I am afraid that I am not persuaded by the case that he made. When I was a constituency Member of the Scottish Parliament, I considered it to be absolutely my duty to be as effective in that role as anyone else, but I was also aware of the pressures on constituency and regional Members of the Scottish Parliament. At one time, I was a member of three parliamentary committees: two were legislative and one—the Finance Committee—was both a scrutiny and a legislative committee. There was most certainly a strain on the number of Members.

It is worth reflecting that it was not designed to be like that. When the Parliament was established and the consultative steering group looked at the fundamental principles of how the Scottish Parliament should operate, it was designed to be a very different type of institution from the one here. There was going to be much stronger pre-legislative scrutiny and that element has been successful. This Parliament has learnt from that approach to pre-legislative scrutiny, with draft Bills now becoming the norm.

The committees in the Scottish Parliament, because of its nature, are both legislative and scrutiny committees. They were designed to be the strength of the Parliament. In a previous element, the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, said that the Scottish Parliament sits for only one and a half days. When I was a Member of that Parliament, that was a frustrating misconception reinforced by some of the press, which I felt had an agenda against the Parliament. There were plenary sessions but, unlike in this place, the committees in the Scottish Parliament had precedence. They met on Tuesday mornings, Tuesday afternoons and Wednesday mornings because of their distinct role.

The feeling was that the convenors of committees were going to be equal to Ministers and that their parliamentary strength was going to be in balancing the Executive’s authority. There was to be a shadow civic Parliament, with a much stronger civic input into the way that the Parliament operated. It is disappointing—there is a mea culpa from my party, which was part of the Administration early on, but it has most certainly been accelerated since 2007—that the Scottish Parliament has become remarkably like the Westminster Parliament. It has an absolutely dominant Executive and the committees have gradually become weaker. Their convenors are not even elected by the whole Parliament—an innovation of the House of Commons. The procedures of the Parliament have become weak in relation to power over the Executive when it comes to money. If there is anything that the Scottish Parliament can learn from our experience now, it is that Parliaments that reduce the ability to hold government to account for the money that it spends on behalf of the people are weakened Parliaments.

Ultimately, that has meant that there have been some examples where there has been less scrutiny than I, as a former Member of the Parliament, would have liked—whether that is on police reform, where mine was the only party to vote against what has happened because there was a large majority and the Executive were able to take it through; criminal justice reform; two areas that are currently being challenged by Brussels, on the Scottish Futures Trust and the delivery of infrastructure; minimum unit pricing, which has been challenged; or the quality. Fundamentally, these are my observations as a former Member who loves that institution, wishes it well and was a very proud Member of it.

However, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth: it is not for this place to tell that institution what to do. If this place is to have a role—I know that members of the major party in Scotland will never accept that, and I understand the reasons for it—it is sometimes for former Members of the institutions with deep respect say to that institution that it is worth it considering its own procedures. I live in the area that I used to represent as a Member of the Scottish Parliament, and so I maintain a vested interest in that Parliament working well.

There is a case for some form of much heightened, strengthened pre-legislative scrutiny. Sir David Edward, whose qualifications I do not need to rehearse, argued in a very good lecture for a council of state, using the existing organisations that we currently have set up in Scotland—for example, the ombudsman—to be a much stronger check on the proposals being put forward. Corroboration is one area where there should have been stronger pre-legislative scrutiny.

Equally, I believe that there will increasingly be an argument for some form of check before the final stages of Scottish Parliament legislation. If there is a reformed House of Lords, it could be that we have a mandate from the Scottish people directly, or indirectly through the Scottish Parliament for senators in this place, and may well have some joint capacity with both the UK and Scottish Parliaments—I will not need to address the next amendment, which deals with the working relationships, because this is my point. Noble Lords may not be entirely surprised to hear me say that, ultimately, that should be one area that we consider in a constitutional convention: to look at the proper functioning and continued strengthening of how the Scottish Parliament operates and the areas where this institution should rightly have a relationship with it. Ultimately, we should seek a better, stronger Scottish Parliament, able to do its job.

Therefore, I am not persuaded by the solution that the noble Lord has brought forward, but I hope, with the deepest of respect to the institution that I love, that it takes it very seriously, especially in the context of the successful passage of this Bill, in which the Scottish Government’s powers over budget and taxation will be greatly enhanced.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I do not want to take up any more time on this issue. However, I remind the noble Lord, Lord Dunlop, that when I followed the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, at Second Reading I asked him a question. The question was whether, having regard to what we see in the Bill, he felt that the Scottish Parliament was able to cope with the additional powers that we are passing to it. Of course it is a matter for that Parliament to work its own procedures; I absolutely understand that. However, we do have an interest, since we are devolving these additional powers. It would be very unfortunate if the Parliament as presently constructed, and designed for a totally different situation, was so overloaded that it could not fulfil its function.

Scotland Bill

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Tuesday 24th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Sanderson of Bowden, not only due to his very strong Borders links, to which I have great affinity, but since he raised some of the aspects that I will try to pick up in my own contribution in the wee small hours of this long debate.

Before I start, I, too, wish to add my congratulations to the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, on her maiden speech, and to my noble friend Lord Campbell of Pittenweem. So successful was his maiden speech that the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, even named me after my noble friend’s adopted area of Pittenweem when he referred to me. My noble friend Lord Campbell’s work as chairman of my own party’s commission, following in the footsteps of the Steel commission, is relevant to this debate. There is obviously something about the Lib Dems that we have the great benefit of our former leaders to chair constitutional committees—noble Lords may draw their own conclusions about that for their own parties—and his work established the fundamentals of our approach to this Bill.

In the last two decades, in the two referendums there have been in Scotland, the people have spoken very clearly. They want a Scottish Parliament and they want it to operate within the United Kingdom. That beguilingly simple opinion is complicated by the fact that, since the Act of Union, we have lived in a unitary state. Furthermore, the Treasury has developed really quite enormous centralised power over the decades. Also, when we developed the welfare state in the 20th century, it was by and large geographically blind for understandable reasons.

Creating a system of governance that changes the core elements of this unitary state has not been easy, and I for one never thought it would be. The consequences of trying to balance choice and affordability in Scotland with a different profile of economy in other areas, as well as changing the British state, has not been straightforward. It proved to be complex both politically and practically. In many respects, it will continue to be so, but that should not necessarily cause any great surprise to us. Securing consensus has sometimes been very difficult and often led to a lowest common denominator for constitutional reform. However, gladly, it has not presented a block to change.

We have debated many aspects of reform but all without the wider narrative as to the future of the union overall. Change has, therefore, proven to be what was expedient for political agreement rather than set within a wider settlement. The establishment of the legislature in 1999 without commensurate fiscal power or a fully formed Government was a clear example of that. We still see remnants of an outdated concept of Westminster parliamentary sovereignty, which we have heard referred to in this debate, rooted in an imperious parliamentarist view rather than the more compelling concept of citizenship sovereignty that we now have across our lands.

In this regard, the noble Lord, Lord Smith of Kelvin, deserves considerable commendation. He is remarkably modest, given his achievement in finally bringing about what can be the fundamentals of a home rule settlement, where we bring fiscal power commensurate with legislative power, and start to establish that we will need much greater transparency in intergovernmental relations and also that Governments must work together across both devolved and reserved interests. That is finally establishing some of the principles on which the future generations of our governance must be based.

I was grateful to the Minister for referencing in his opening remarks the devo-plus reports that I authored after I served in the Scottish Parliament, for five years of which I was a member of the Finance Committee there. I think that we will finally see the functions of a tax and welfare system in Scotland, but this will also bring about difficulties because it will not be easy. It will also add pressure on my former institution in Holyrood. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, and others said, the current way that the Scottish Parliament operates will need to change. Again, that should cause no surprise. I believe it is positive.

There has been much concern about the lack of publication of the fiscal framework. By and large, I share that concern. At the very least, it would have been helpful for the Government to have published the statement of principles, especially on this now famous or notorious concept of no detriment. That would have been helpful and would have framed the debate much better. My noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness outlined very clearly the principles underpinning why such a concept exists, but greater clarity would have been more helpful. Again, it would be helpful to know whether the fiscal framework is simply another iteration of the Statement of Funding Policy. There have been six versions of that since 1999 —that is how the devolved areas are funded—and it would be helpful to know whether the framework is based on that.

Finally, there has also been comment on the need for a wider consideration of a narrative of the union going forward. I passionately believe that that is necessary, and I brought forward a Bill to your Lordships’ House to try to help to bring about space in which we can debate that, in a Constitutional Convention Bill. That would be citizen led and try to establish some of the fundamental principles, as well as establishing a narrative. I have talked about the need for a statement of the new union, and others have called for a new Act of Union, but the common thread is that this Scotland Bill deserves to be passed—we need it on the statute book; it corrects many of the areas where we have been piecemeal in the past. However, without such a binding statement, a core element, on why this union of these nations exist, I think that we will still struggle. Once this Bill passes, as I hope that it will, we should give our absolute focus to bring about either a new Act or new statement for the generations to come.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Dunlop]

I assure the noble Lord that these are ministerial meetings of the Joint Exchequer Committee. In between those meetings, very intensive work is going on to agree the fiscal framework. If, unlike me, you believe—

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

I know that the hour is late and do not want to prolong the debate, but could the Minister address the question that I put in my speech? What standing will the agreement or framework have? Is it a revision of the statement of funding policy, which is a Treasury policy, or will it be a stand-alone agreement between the two Administrations? What standing will that have, as a document, and will it require ratification by the Scottish Parliament, which obviously involves a timetable entirely in its hands?

[Lord Dunlop]

The Deputy First Minister has made it clear that, for the Scottish Parliament to give its legislative consent to the Bill, it would have to be satisfied that there was an agreed fiscal framework in place.

I return to the argument that I was making. If, unlike me, you believe that the Scottish Government are not serious about reaching agreement, that is not a good reason to delay the Bill—far from it. Doing so would hand the Scottish Government a get-out-of-jail-free card, which is not right for the people of Scotland, who expect these powers to be implemented.