Ukraine: UK Policy

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Monday 17th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, as events move apace, it is absolutely right that we in this House ask the Government to restate their policy, and in that regard the Government know of these Benches’ support for it. That does not prevent us asking questions or seeking that they go further and faster, and I will end on that point, but there is full support for the Government’s actions on these Benches.

As we have a couple of extra minutes, I thought that, for the benefit of the noble Lord, I would repeat the 10 points that President Zelensky outlined in September last year as the very reasonable and, I believe, fully justifiable points that he considered to be the basis of a peace plan. The first was radiation and nuclear safety for the people of Ukraine. Then there was food security, then energy security and the release of all prisoners and deportees. Fifthly, there was the implementation of the UN charter and the recognition of territorial integrity in any final peace agreement. The sixth would be the withdrawal of Russian troops and the cessation of hostilities. I hope that the latter part of that may well come to fruition. The seventh was justice for the very many war crimes that have been inflicted on the people of Ukraine, then the immediate protection of the environment and the prevention of escalation. The 10th was the official confirmation of the end of war in a treaty.

Those must all be considered sensible and justifiable, because we all, I hope, would want peace to help the victim of aggression, not to reward the perpetrator—otherwise, history will condemn us all. It seems that there is potentially an incentive in a pause for Putin to regroup, recruit and refinance. There are too many nations, many of them allied to us, that potentially see profiting opportunities and will now, worryingly, have carte blanche to trade with Putin because the US’s new stance will not be a block for them doing so. It is also likely that Putin will seek to insist on protracted discussions on concessions unpalatable to us and Ukraine. In the scenario where those concessions may be palatable to President Trump but not to us, how are we navigating that very delicate situation? I heard the Foreign Secretary speak with clarity earlier, but that must surely be the situation with regard to the position of President Trump.

From the American point of view, sometimes unpredictability can work. It is called strategic ambiguity. The key word is “strategic”, but that is lacking, in many respects, from the Trump Administration, especially since his last comments on seeking discussions on land and power plants and dividing up certain assets. If this was between Ukraine and Russia, perhaps we might have sympathy for it, but my worry is that the negotiations will be between Russia and the United States when it comes to dividing up certain aspects such as land rights and energy rights.

So can the Minister confirm that, in this new time of flux, we can move unilaterally to seize, not just freeze, assets; that we can work with a coalition of the willing, even if that means a more diluted American standpoint; and that we can embolden our strategic relationship with our European allies for defence procurement, defence co-operation and defence purchasing? Surely this is an opportunity for us to make sure that the victim does not pay the price for the perpetration from Putin.