Channel Tunnel Security Regime

Lord Popat Excerpts

Wednesday 30th July 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Popat (Con)]

My Lords, I am pleased to address this Question for Short Debate which the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, has secured on whether the Government have plans to set up an independent review of the Channel Tunnel security regime to consider whether it is proportionate and appropriate to current threats and risks. I am grateful to him and to the noble Lords, Lord Bradshaw and Lord Rosser, for their thoughts on this very important issue.

Security is a delicate issue to debate, as there are matters touching on the precise nature of the security regime that covers the Channel Tunnel that cannot be discussed in too great detail for obvious reasons. It might be helpful, however, if I put into context, as far as I can, the very serious threat we continue to face in the UK and the West generally from international terrorism.

We know from sad experience through events such as the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center in New York, the Madrid train bombings, the London Underground suicide attacks and the liquids plot associated with transatlantic flights, that terrorism exists not just in the UK but internationally. We know also that al-Qaeda and its affiliates have aspirations to cause mass casualties and economic damage that have political and psychological impact. We also know that transport systems are attractive targets for the terrorist because they fulfil those aspirations. As a result, Governments have had to make a variety of adjustments in transport security regimes to reduce the risks of attack and to protect the travelling public, but with each adjustment comes a desire from the terrorist to be ever more innovative. New methods of attack designed to circumvent the systems in place are clearly demonstrated, with the recent changes to aviation security. For example, in America there is now a requirement to see mobile phones as well as laptops.

Twenty years ago, when the Channel Tunnel, one of the most costly and ambitious civil engineering projects of the 20th century, was opened, the main terrorist threat came from the IRA, whereby we had to contend mainly with protecting against vehicle bombs and hidden devices. Islamist terrorism has since emerged, with perpetrators willing to die for their cause; hence we have seen suicide bombings on the London Underground and 9/11, where aircraft were used as missiles, as well as the marauding active shooters in Mumbai and Nairobi. We have also seen terrorists attempting to use more subtle and novel methodologies to achieve their aims, including by liquid explosives and the shoe bomber, to give a few examples.

The Government have to be able to counter in a proportionate way all relevant risks and attack methodologies. Hence we take intelligence-based advice and analysis from an independent body, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, and tailor security regimes to address new and emerging risks, as well as making sure that existing risks are mitigated. The threat from international terrorism continues and currently the threat to the UK is assessed as substantial, meaning that an attack is a strong possibility. We, as a responsible Government, must take note of the intelligence picture, standing ready to protect our citizens and infrastructure.

The security measures in place are tailored to the mode of transport operating through the Channel Tunnel, which explains why there are differences between Eurostar, passenger and freight shuttles and rail freight. That requires balancing convenience to travellers and business against security. It is not an exact science but, as there have been no successful attacks associated with the Channel Tunnel, we can take that as an indication that the security regime is sufficiently robust to deter and prevent acts of violence. In view of that, the measures would seem to be proportionate and appropriate, but we cannot be complacent.

It has been argued by some that there is no difference between the Channel Tunnel and London Underground, where security is less pronounced. Contrary to that view, the Government believe that there are a number of significant differences. Following the 2005 attacks on the Underground, Government considered the introduction of security screening measures to protect the travelling public, but found it nearly impossible and impractical do so for mass transit networks. As we saw in 2005, there were many alternative routes and modes available for travellers. Furthermore, any incident in the Channel Tunnel could potentially be 25 kilometres from the exit, making quick assistance difficult in the event of a bomb attack. That is further complicated in the event of a hostage or firearms attack, when intervention would be necessary. Unfortunately we know from experience the impact and disruption a fire in the Channel Tunnel can cause—that was without any casualties—and the psychological trauma an incident underground and below the Channel would have.

I also remind the Committee that the matter of the Channel Tunnel’s security is not just a UK responsibility. The fixed link straddles British and French territory. For that reason, both countries share responsibility for its defence and security. We must work together to protect the fixed link and the measures should reflect the terrorist threats that are relevant to both our countries. In that pursuit, the two Governments liaise regularly on issues relating to its continued protection. The security regime cannot be effective without joint consideration and comparable security measures on either side of the tunnel.

I am conscious that the noble Lord has an ambition for the tunnel to be utilised to its full potential and to make sure that our security is proportionate. We do not see security as a barrier to having other operatives operate within the Channel Tunnel. If we look at the figures, they do not support an argument for a review of the security. With traffic numbers on the increase, the Government recognise that economically, growth in this area is very important to the UK. We keep security measures under constant review to ensure that they remain proportionate and encourage growth. We have actively engaged with new operators on security to ensure that they understand what is expected of them. In those discussions, we have recognised the need for a flexible approach in the security requirements but they must be able to offer a similar level of protection as exists now.

The noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, spoke about Anglo-French relations. I am pleased to say that we have regular discussions with our French colleagues and operators. Earlier this month, through the Channel Tunnel joint security committee, the UK and French Governments invited stakeholders—including the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, in his capacity as chairman of the Rail Freight Group—to preview a joint document that updates previous guidance on security and is referred to as the declaration of intent. This sets out the security requirements considered necessary by both Governments to protect the Channel Tunnel and those using it. It is an important document which recognises the need to be flexible in future, with the potential expansion of the rail passenger network beyond France. It would not be appropriate, for instance, with single services per day, to insist that permanent infrastructure be provided or that specific security equipment be used. We support proposals to use new technology that can improve the passenger experience and provide similar levels of security. At the meeting, stakeholders were given an opportunity to make some initial comments about the declaration of intent and the plan is to issue the joint document for formal consultation. The two Governments will of course make adjustments to it, where they see that there is merit to do so.

The Government must take security very seriously: this includes any terrorist threat to transport, including the Channel Tunnel. By keeping the threat and security measures under review, and planning jointly to consult stakeholders on revised guidance later in the year, the Government’s view is that the security regime in place is both appropriate and proportionate, providing the correct balance between protection and ease of use. The Government therefore see no need to carry out an independent review of the Channel Tunnel security regime.

A number of questions were raised during the debate. Let me first cover the issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, on whether the security measures are proportionate, practical and necessary and about the options for change, since nothing has really happened in the last 20 years. I say to the noble Lord that the requirement for passengers’ vehicles and goods to be subject to security and screening measures is an appropriate and proportionate response to the nature of the threat. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, also raised the issue of balancing the inconvenience to travellers and business against security and costs. The current measures are necessary to ensure the safety and security of the travelling public and to provide an effective deterrent, together with other safety and security measures, to those who may seek to undertake an attack against passengers or infrastructure. The terrorist threat levelled at all modes of transport infrastructure remains under regular review. We review that on a regular basis and have discussions with our French colleagues.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, raised the risk-based approach as applied to Channel Tunnel services. It is best if I write to him. He raised a number of issues, including trains to Amsterdam and the security measures that there will be, and co-operation between the police and immigration officers.

[Lord Rosser]

It is perfectly acceptable for the Minister to write to me on the questions that I have raised.

[Lord Popat]

I will certainly be happy to write to the noble Lord on a number of his concerns, including, in the light of the police commissioner’s comment, what the Government are doing about fingerprinting. We should take that seriously, although it is an issue for the Home Office rather than for the Department for Transport. I will ask officials to take this matter to the Home Office, which will give an appropriate response.

HS2 is an exciting project for the whole Government and the whole country. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, referred to freight traffic tracks and I will address that. Freight traffic is an expanding business and we want to make sure that we have the right capacity to help to have increased freight traffic.

[Lord Berkeley]

I thank the Minister for his comments. Perhaps he would also write to me in response to some of my questions. He compared an incident in the tunnel with an incident on the London Underground, as well as the fear of passengers in the tunnel compared with the fear of those on the Underground. The Channel Tunnel Safety Authority is looking at evacuation from the Channel Tunnel into a separate service area. When considering people in the deep Tube having to get out one by one and climbing down into a dark tunnel and onto the track with four rails, I suggest the Channel Tunnel is a great deal safer than the Underground. I do not think that that is an argument for saying that there should be a different regime. Perhaps the Minister will write to me on that.

[Lord Popat]

Certainly, I will write to the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley. We cannot compare the Channel Tunnel with the Underground, other than that they both take passengers. Where the security threat level is raised, the security response can be increased. With the number of people using the Underground, it is very difficult to set the security standard that is necessary. Current security measures for the Channel Tunnel are considered to be proper and proportionate, so the Government see no need to have an independent review. Having said that, I certainly will take the noble Lord’s questions into account and will give an appropriate response.