Channel Tunnel Security Regime

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Wednesday 30th July 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, first, I thank my noble friend Lord Berkeley for providing this opportunity to discuss the Channel Tunnel security arrangements. My noble friend raised some serious issues about the balance between security needs and the need not to dampen the growth of traffic through the tunnel. I will refer to the issues that he raised, but I also want to take the opportunity to raise other issues concerning Channel Tunnel security with the Minister.

The Channel Tunnel’s current security arrangements are governed by the Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994. That requires passenger and infrastructure operators to put in place a security regime, including the searching of passenger and freight trains before they enter the tunnel, and it empowers the Secretary of State to order additional searches and checks. The operators are responsible for the day-to-day delivery of security, but the Department for Transport’s compliance officers ensure that the statutory security arrangements in place meet the statutory requirements and standards. They do that through regular monitoring and testing.

The current approach to land transport security in the UK as a whole is regarded as being risk-based, with any security measures deployed being proportionate to the current threats to which each transport sector is exposed. In evidence to the House of Commons Transport Committee, the Association of Train Operating Companies said that three factors needed to be balanced: cost versus benefits of security measures; the practicality of security measures that are both workable for the industry and acceptable to the travelling public; and the balance between technology and human activity. ATOC also said on assessing risks that, ultimately, the rail industry took its guidance from the security services on where the risks are greatest and what form they take. As I understand it, the risk-based approach also applies to the cross-border Eurostar and Eurotunnel operations and thus, presumably, in respect of the Channel Tunnel security regime. No doubt the Minister will clarify that point in his response, in the light of the comments made by my noble friend Lord Berkeley and the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw.

The Channel Tunnel’s general security regulation is overseen by the Joint Security Committee of the Channel Tunnel Intergovernmental Commission, which is advised by the Channel Tunnel Safety Authority. The UK and France jointly nominate the members of all three bodies. Passengers travelling through the Channel Tunnel on Eurostar are currently subject to Home Office passport controls both in this country and at the start of their journey in France or Belgium. In 2011, the BBC, I think it was, reported that some passengers were exploiting a security flaw, which I think went under the name of the Lille loophole, whereby passengers could book a ticket from Brussels to Lille and then travel on to the UK without being subject to passport checks.

Passport checks were adversely commented on by the chief inspector responsible for border and security arrangements. He indicated that some progress was being made in dealing with this loophole. I believe—though I may be wrong—that we have now reached the situation where the Lille loophole has been plugged. Passengers travelling between Brussels and Lille now do so in a sealed carriage, I believe. I understand that this arrangement came in from the middle of this year—that is, about the present time. However, it would be extremely helpful if the Minister could confirm the situation about this loophole and whether it has been sealed. Even if this is the case, will the Minister explain why it apparently took the best part of three years to close it? What measures have been put in place to ensure that any similar loopholes can be dealt with more quickly once they are discovered?

The lessons learnt from this affair should be applied to any future international services. In that regard, Deutsche Bahn has long-standing plans to run trains from St Pancras to Amsterdam and Frankfurt, which would give passengers a choice between two international passenger operators. Two years ago, the Government said that the UK and France were working well with Deutsche Bahn to ensure that comparable security measures would be in place in the Netherlands and Germany. Will the Minister indicate what has been achieved on this issue over the last two years?

The Land Transport Security Division of the Department for Transport is responsible for counterterrorist security in a number of areas, including the Channel Tunnel and international rail services. In its response last year to the House of Commons Transport Select Committee’s report on land transport security, the Department for Transport said that a new body, called the All States International Forum—ASIF—had been created to bring together ministries responsible for transport security from all states that already host Channel Tunnel services or are likely to in future. The purpose was to facilitate intergovernmental liaison on matters relating to the security of the Channel Tunnel and services that might operate through it.

As I understand it, ASIF met for the first time in March 2013 and included representation from the UK, France, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. Will the Minister give an update on what has been discussed and determined at ASIF meetings, indicate how many times it has met since last March and say what the value of our involvement has been to the UK? Does the Minister agree that one of the lessons from the Lille loophole is that close co-operation should be maintained with the police and immigration authorities of other nations, not just the transport operator? If he agrees, is the All States International Forum geared to delivering this?

Earlier, I referred to the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration. He has been critical of the lack of fingerprinting of illegal immigrants in Calais, for example. The chief inspector said that he found it surprising that people caught attempting to enter the UK concealed in freight vehicles—the figure runs into thousands—were not fingerprinted by the Border Force, since gathering biometric information such as fingerprints could assist in the decision-making process if such individuals were ultimately successful in reaching the UK and went on to claim asylum. What is the Government’s position on the issue of fingerprinting in the light of the chief inspector’s comments?

In the coalition agreement, the Government committed themselves to introducing exit checks by the end of this Parliament through the e-Borders system. In April 2012, the then Policing Minister said that the system was very close to covering 100% of flights coming from outside the European Union. However, the head of the UK Border Force has now told the Home Affairs Select Committee that the project has been terminated. Can the Minister confirm whether that is the case and, if it is, say when the ministerial announcement was made to that effect, what the cost was of terminating the e-Borders project, how exit checks will now be implemented by the end of this Parliament and whether they will cover international rail passengers travelling through the Channel Tunnel?

As I understand it, freight is not planned to run on HS2, but the Government’s recent response to the HS2 growth report was to say that they had ensured that the design of HS2 does not exclude its use for freight traffic. If HS2 was adapted for carrying freight, have the Government given any consideration to what additional security measures would need to be put in place at depots if operators wished to run freight services via HS2 and then the Channel Tunnel?

In the Government’s response published on 31 March this year to the House of Commons Transport Committee’s report on land transport security, reference is made in paragraph 13 to a wider review of the national rail security regime. It appears that that wider review commenced in January of this year. It is not clear from the Government’s response to the Select Committee report whether this wider review is confined to the important issue of security training for staff or whether it covers all aspects of security and security regimes. Therefore, will the Minister say something about the review, its terms of reference, who is carrying it out and when it is expected to report? Is it looking at the issues and concerns raised by my noble friend Lord Berkeley? The Secretary of State has reportedly said that a decision on the inclusion of “international facilities” at HS2 stations has been postponed until the conclusion of the study into the options for improving the connections between HS2 and HS1. Will the Minister say whether that is the case, as it is obviously relevant to the points raised by my noble friend Lord Berkeley?

To conclude, the Channel Tunnel is an important national asset, but it remains underutilised. Two years ago, the Department for Transport said that it was essential that any security measures deployed across the transport sector were proportionate, practicable and sustainable. With that objective in mind, the Government need to ensure that existing security measures are effective and properly enforced and that there are no unnecessary or excessive barriers to the growth of passenger and freight traffic.

[Lord Popat (Con)]

My Lords, I am pleased to address this Question for Short Debate which the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, has secured on whether the Government have plans to set up an independent review of the Channel Tunnel security regime to consider whether it is proportionate and appropriate to current threats and risks. I am grateful to him and to the noble Lords, Lord Bradshaw and Lord Rosser, for their thoughts on this very important issue.

Security is a delicate issue to debate, as there are matters touching on the precise nature of the security regime that covers the Channel Tunnel that cannot be discussed in too great detail for obvious reasons. It might be helpful, however, if I put into context, as far as I can, the very serious threat we continue to face in the UK and the West generally from international terrorism.

We know from sad experience through events such as the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center in New York, the Madrid train bombings, the London Underground suicide attacks and the liquids plot associated with transatlantic flights, that terrorism exists not just in the UK but internationally. We know also that al-Qaeda and its affiliates have aspirations to cause mass casualties and economic damage that have political and psychological impact. We also know that transport systems are attractive targets for the terrorist because they fulfil those aspirations. As a result, Governments have had to make a variety of adjustments in transport security regimes to reduce the risks of attack and to protect the travelling public, but with each adjustment comes a desire from the terrorist to be ever more innovative. New methods of attack designed to circumvent the systems in place are clearly demonstrated, with the recent changes to aviation security. For example, in America there is now a requirement to see mobile phones as well as laptops.

Twenty years ago, when the Channel Tunnel, one of the most costly and ambitious civil engineering projects of the 20th century, was opened, the main terrorist threat came from the IRA, whereby we had to contend mainly with protecting against vehicle bombs and hidden devices. Islamist terrorism has since emerged, with perpetrators willing to die for their cause; hence we have seen suicide bombings on the London Underground and 9/11, where aircraft were used as missiles, as well as the marauding active shooters in Mumbai and Nairobi. We have also seen terrorists attempting to use more subtle and novel methodologies to achieve their aims, including by liquid explosives and the shoe bomber, to give a few examples.

The Government have to be able to counter in a proportionate way all relevant risks and attack methodologies. Hence we take intelligence-based advice and analysis from an independent body, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, and tailor security regimes to address new and emerging risks, as well as making sure that existing risks are mitigated. The threat from international terrorism continues and currently the threat to the UK is assessed as substantial, meaning that an attack is a strong possibility. We, as a responsible Government, must take note of the intelligence picture, standing ready to protect our citizens and infrastructure.

The security measures in place are tailored to the mode of transport operating through the Channel Tunnel, which explains why there are differences between Eurostar, passenger and freight shuttles and rail freight. That requires balancing convenience to travellers and business against security. It is not an exact science but, as there have been no successful attacks associated with the Channel Tunnel, we can take that as an indication that the security regime is sufficiently robust to deter and prevent acts of violence. In view of that, the measures would seem to be proportionate and appropriate, but we cannot be complacent.

It has been argued by some that there is no difference between the Channel Tunnel and London Underground, where security is less pronounced. Contrary to that view, the Government believe that there are a number of significant differences. Following the 2005 attacks on the Underground, Government considered the introduction of security screening measures to protect the travelling public, but found it nearly impossible and impractical do so for mass transit networks. As we saw in 2005, there were many alternative routes and modes available for travellers. Furthermore, any incident in the Channel Tunnel could potentially be 25 kilometres from the exit, making quick assistance difficult in the event of a bomb attack. That is further complicated in the event of a hostage or firearms attack, when intervention would be necessary. Unfortunately we know from experience the impact and disruption a fire in the Channel Tunnel can cause—that was without any casualties—and the psychological trauma an incident underground and below the Channel would have.

I also remind the Committee that the matter of the Channel Tunnel’s security is not just a UK responsibility. The fixed link straddles British and French territory. For that reason, both countries share responsibility for its defence and security. We must work together to protect the fixed link and the measures should reflect the terrorist threats that are relevant to both our countries. In that pursuit, the two Governments liaise regularly on issues relating to its continued protection. The security regime cannot be effective without joint consideration and comparable security measures on either side of the tunnel.

I am conscious that the noble Lord has an ambition for the tunnel to be utilised to its full potential and to make sure that our security is proportionate. We do not see security as a barrier to having other operatives operate within the Channel Tunnel. If we look at the figures, they do not support an argument for a review of the security. With traffic numbers on the increase, the Government recognise that economically, growth in this area is very important to the UK. We keep security measures under constant review to ensure that they remain proportionate and encourage growth. We have actively engaged with new operators on security to ensure that they understand what is expected of them. In those discussions, we have recognised the need for a flexible approach in the security requirements but they must be able to offer a similar level of protection as exists now.

The noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, spoke about Anglo-French relations. I am pleased to say that we have regular discussions with our French colleagues and operators. Earlier this month, through the Channel Tunnel joint security committee, the UK and French Governments invited stakeholders—including the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, in his capacity as chairman of the Rail Freight Group—to preview a joint document that updates previous guidance on security and is referred to as the declaration of intent. This sets out the security requirements considered necessary by both Governments to protect the Channel Tunnel and those using it. It is an important document which recognises the need to be flexible in future, with the potential expansion of the rail passenger network beyond France. It would not be appropriate, for instance, with single services per day, to insist that permanent infrastructure be provided or that specific security equipment be used. We support proposals to use new technology that can improve the passenger experience and provide similar levels of security. At the meeting, stakeholders were given an opportunity to make some initial comments about the declaration of intent and the plan is to issue the joint document for formal consultation. The two Governments will of course make adjustments to it, where they see that there is merit to do so.

The Government must take security very seriously: this includes any terrorist threat to transport, including the Channel Tunnel. By keeping the threat and security measures under review, and planning jointly to consult stakeholders on revised guidance later in the year, the Government’s view is that the security regime in place is both appropriate and proportionate, providing the correct balance between protection and ease of use. The Government therefore see no need to carry out an independent review of the Channel Tunnel security regime.

A number of questions were raised during the debate. Let me first cover the issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, on whether the security measures are proportionate, practical and necessary and about the options for change, since nothing has really happened in the last 20 years. I say to the noble Lord that the requirement for passengers’ vehicles and goods to be subject to security and screening measures is an appropriate and proportionate response to the nature of the threat. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, also raised the issue of balancing the inconvenience to travellers and business against security and costs. The current measures are necessary to ensure the safety and security of the travelling public and to provide an effective deterrent, together with other safety and security measures, to those who may seek to undertake an attack against passengers or infrastructure. The terrorist threat levelled at all modes of transport infrastructure remains under regular review. We review that on a regular basis and have discussions with our French colleagues.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, raised the risk-based approach as applied to Channel Tunnel services. It is best if I write to him. He raised a number of issues, including trains to Amsterdam and the security measures that there will be, and co-operation between the police and immigration officers.

[Lord Rosser]

It is perfectly acceptable for the Minister to write to me on the questions that I have raised.

[Lord Popat]

I will certainly be happy to write to the noble Lord on a number of his concerns, including, in the light of the police commissioner’s comment, what the Government are doing about fingerprinting. We should take that seriously, although it is an issue for the Home Office rather than for the Department for Transport. I will ask officials to take this matter to the Home Office, which will give an appropriate response.

HS2 is an exciting project for the whole Government and the whole country. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, referred to freight traffic tracks and I will address that. Freight traffic is an expanding business and we want to make sure that we have the right capacity to help to have increased freight traffic.