Children and Families Bill Debate

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Department: Ministry of Justice

Children and Families Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts
Monday 21st October 2013

(11 years, 2 months ago)

Grand Committee
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Baroness Tyler of Enfield Portrait Baroness Tyler of Enfield
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I understand the intention behind the amendment, particularly in terms of promoting the best interests of the child and the child’s welfare, but I also feel that the signal it would send would not be the right one at this stage. I have heard the president talking about this, and I think that at the moment his mantra is, “It can be done, it will be done, it must be done”. It is all about turning around the culture from one of delay to one of urgency, with all parties involved in this—that is, the judiciary, local authorities, CAFCASS and others—doing all that they can to ensure that these cases are dealt with as quickly as they can be and in a way that is commensurate with the best interests of the child.

I was very much reinforced in this recently. I attended the National Children and Adults Services Conference in Harrogate on Friday. It was a very good three-day event with a number of Ministers and others speaking. I went to a specialist workshop all about completing care proceedings in 26 weeks. Several academics, particularly from the University of East Anglia, presented some initial findings from the research that they have been doing into the impact of the new public law outline to try to move to a 26-week time limit, and particularly the impact of what is called the tri-borough project with Kensington and Chelsea, Westminster and Hammersmith and Fulham. I have been to visit that project myself and the results, frankly, are extremely impressive: already 50% of cases are being resolved in less than 26 weeks.

Even with the knowledge that we were going to have this clause in the Bill or at least debate it, national case duration averages were already coming down from what was something like 49 weeks to about 37 weeks, and they are on a downward trajectory. While I fully understand the case that is being made for those very exceptional cases where the extensions will be needed, there is sufficient flexibility in the Bill as drafted for that. I would be concerned about anything that diluted this very important message about trying to move away from delay in the family court system.

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Portrait Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
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My Lords, I am not briefed by the NSPCC but I have a brief from the Magistrates’ Association, which makes it clear that it also supports the 26-week time limit but also agrees that there should be specific extensions for eight weeks where people can apply to the court. It would probably be most helpful if I raised the questions that the Magistrates’ Association has raised in the brief that it sent me. Before I do so, though, I want to make the point that the examples of exceptions that my noble friend Lady Jones gave are very far from theoretical, because two of those examples I personally dealt with in the past month. They were very real examples of something that I understood very clearly.

The first of the questions that the Magistrates’ Association raised in its brief to me is really a concern that an application for an eight-week extension should resist that extension being a contested hearing, and obviously the decision of the court should be final. If there is to be a contested hearing on an eight-week extension, though, it should be as short and focused as possible. The second point that the Magistrates’ Association made was that it is not clear, from the association’s understanding, that there is any limit to the maximum number of successive extensions. The association’s final point is to ask whether there is any right of appeal if a lower court—although perhaps “lower court” is not the right expression—decides not to grant an extension. Is there any right of appeal to a higher jurisdiction?

Lord McNally Portrait Lord McNally
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My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, for her intervention in support of these proposals—I am also grateful for my momentary promotion. It gives me an opportunity to pay tribute to the work of Lord Justice Ryder when he was with the Family Division. He did a lot of ground-clearing in this area, not least bringing in some very useful comparative statistics which allowed us to see the variety in performance of courts, which was affecting children at a vulnerable time of their lives. When this exercise started, it took more than 60 weeks in some cases to come to a decision. The tri-borough project also demonstrated in advance of this legislation that this could be done more quickly. Certainly, the robust leadership that Sir James Munby has given in implementing the Norgrove proposals has meant that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, said, a culture of delay has been replaced by a culture of urgency. That is much to the credit of what we are proposing.

We all agree that delays in decision-making, whether by local authorities or in courts, can be very damaging. They can add to emotional insecurity and affect children’s prospects for returning to or finding a permanent loving home. Introducing a 26-week time limit for care and supervision cases will send a clear and unambiguous statement to all parts of the family justice system about the need to reduce delay. Removing certain cases from the ambit of the 26-week time limit at the outset, as proposed by Amendment 62, would undermine this effort.

I recognise that these cases deal with important and complex issues and not all will be able to be completed within this timeframe. The court will therefore have the discretion to extend the time limit in a particular case beyond 26 weeks if that is necessary to resolve the proceedings justly. The clause carefully strikes the necessary balance between putting in place a maximum 26-week time limit to tackle delay in all cases and allowing sufficient judicial discretion to extend time where necessary to resolve the case justly, having explicit regard to the child’s welfare.

Requiring extensions to last for a maximum of eight weeks at a time will help ensure that the court is focused on resolving cases as quickly as possible. To allow the court to grant an extension without imposing any limit as to the length of the extension, as proposed by Amendment 63, would potentially allow cases to drift. This could undermine the aim that we all share, of reducing unnecessary delay. There will always be some very complex cases which it may not be possible to complete within 26 weeks. Where that is the case, the court will be able to extend time, where necessary, to resolve proceedings justly. It is important, however, that we keep a clear focus on resolving cases as quickly as possible, and specifying a maximum eight-week limit on the length of extensions will ensure that this happens. There is, however, no limit on the number of extensions that can be sought.

I recognise the concerns of the noble Baronesses and have seen how successful intervention models such as the Family Drug and Alcohol Court approach can be. That is why I am very pleased that the Government are continuing to provide funding of £150,000 in each year of 2013-14 and 2014-15 to continue the development and rollout of the FDAC. As part of our funding of FDAC, we are proposing to continue work that will enable this model to meet the 26-week time limit in most cases. Proceedings in the FDAC model currently take the same time on average as standard care proceedings, and we believe that the 26-week time limit can be applied successfully in most cases.

I think I have just answered the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, asked about the Family Procedure Rule Committee. On the basis of its specific expertise, the committee has been invited to consider whether to further elaborate on the matter to which the court is to have regard in order to support Clause 14, and we await its response. The court rules may set out the matters to which the court must, may or may not have regard when making the decision whether to grant an extension to the time limit. It is, rightly, the remit of the FPRC to consider whether to make court rules under the clause; it is a statutory independent non-departmental public body responsible for making these rules of the court. Before making the rules, the FPRC must consult such persons as it considers appropriate, and we will update the Committee on the FPRC’s work before Report.

I am not sure whether there were any other matters that were specific to this; the questions come thick and fast. Yes, there was one: the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Benjamin, raised the question of whether the 26-week time limit would impact on kinship care and whether it would be shoehorned into a one-size-fits-all solution. We are aware that, in spite of everyone’s best efforts, occasionally relatives are not identified until late in the proceedings. However, the 26-week time limit should not impact on kinship care. It is not for the courts to decide whether it is Granny who the child goes to; rather, it relates to the choice of the permanence plan being a relative if possible, followed by adoption or long-term foster care. After all, the court does not decide which adopters the child goes to when it agrees to a plan for adoption. We are continuing to use programmes such as family group conferences before proceedings start in order to identify family members from the onset of cases. In addition, we are working in partnership with the Children’s Improvement Board and the College of Social Work to support the continuing improvement of social work practice. Of course, the court retains the power to extend the case for longer consideration if necessary.

The public law measures in the Bill will tackle the damaging delays that exist throughout the system. These delays can deny children the chance of a permanent home and have a harmful long-term effect on a child’s development. The measures will also refocus the system so that the child’s best interests are part of the process. Our measures strike the necessary balance between tackling delay and allowing sufficient judicial discretion to resolve proceedings justly, and I hope that noble Lords will agree to withdraw these amendments.