Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, before my noble friend Lady Blake comes to move her Amendment 292H, everybody will have seen what the plans are for today by looking at the groupings. They basically involve five groups dealing with things that have stood over from the pre-protest section of the Bill, and then three or four groups dealing with all the protest sections in the Bill, including one group, I think, dealing with all the proposed new clauses that have been added.

On any basis, the grouping is inappropriate. The proposed new clauses have the additional feature that they have not been debated at all in the Commons, from where this Bill originated. They have had no Second Reading of any sort in this House and now, to have Committee stage with them all crammed in effect into one or two groups means that there will be no proper scrutiny in this House.

Can I make a suggestion and ask a question? In relation to the new clauses, could we treat, without any additional formality, the proceedings today as a Second Reading in effect and then have an additional day in Committee so that there is proper consideration? In addition to that, could one have more time to deal with these very important clauses?

My concern is that this marginalises the House of Lords in relation to considering these provisions in detail—although I am sure that was not deliberate on the part of the Whips. It may well be that these provisions are needed; our role is to look at them line by line. The effect of the way in which this has been done is that now that is not possible. The House as a whole was entitled to look for protection in that respect from the Leader of the House and the Government Chief Whip. Instead, they have just gone along with the Government, like so many institutions, in pushing the institution to one side—and it is not right.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, in what he has just said. I have heard two rumours—one, that the Government Chief Whip is urging people to keep their comments on the Bill today short. I wish to declare to the Government Chief Whip that that is not possible, bearing in mind the number and complexity of issues that we are supposed to debate today. The other rumour that I have heard is that, if the House is still debating at 2 am, only then will the debate be adjourned. If that is right, looking at the timetable, that means that the most contentious parts of the Bill—the new amendments, as the noble and learned Lord said, which have not even been considered by the House of Commons—will be debated either side of midnight. That is no way for this House to be treated.

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[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Brinton for introducing these amendments, which we support. The “Helen’s Law” campaign has achieved a great deal by persisting in campaigning for victims and their families by ensuring that failure to disclose the whereabouts of a victim’s body can increase the killer’s time in custody. These amendments go further, as my noble friend has explained. She has worked with Helen’s mother, Marie McCourt, and others on these amendments, proposing to create specific offences of desecration of a corpse and concealment of a body.

These amendments address serious and real human suffering caused by preventing a victim’s family from recovering the body of their loved one, whose life has already been cruelly snatched from them. The proposed offences would respond to that cruelty in a way that may be inadequate in reducing the hurt, but at least they reflect the justified anger we all feel when killers compound their inhuman actions with further callousness and inhumanity. As my noble friend explained, the existing legislation is not only inadequate but rarely used. We support her amendments.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for the clarity with which she has put this forward. The driving force behind this amendment is Marie McCourt whose daughter Helen McCourt was murdered by Ian Simms, and the body was never found. Ian Simms never indicated where the body was, refused to acknowledge what had happened, and was eventually released on parole. Prior to him being released on parole, Marie had campaigned successfully for a change in the law, which said in effect that if you did not indicate where the body was, parole should normally be refused.

Now, very effectively and with great understanding, Marie McCourt has pressed for a change in the law to make sure that there is, in effect, a crime of desecrating the body of somebody you have murdered. This is a greater problem than previously. In recent times, 54 murder trials have taken place without a body. We on this side of the Committee strongly support this offence. It might be asked whether this matters if you are being charged with murder. It matters to the victims’ families and therefore it should matter to the law. That is why we support this amendment.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Monday 15th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am grateful for the clarification that the noble Lord has given, and I will allow noble Lords to read the official record and draw their own conclusions from what he said.

The noble Lord’s amendment manages only one of these risks—arguably the much lower risk. Each case should be, and is currently, managed on a case-by-case basis, and that should continue. We oppose the amendment.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

We, too, oppose the amendment. I think we all accept that transgender women are entitled to live in their chosen gender. The law protects transgender women and transgender men from discrimination because they are transgender men or transgender women. The position that is outlined in this amendment leads all transgender women to be consigned to the male prison estate—a point made very forcibly by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The moment one says that, one sees the total unthought-out nature of the amendment.

The way forward was, I believe, charted by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Falkner and Lady Brinton. The noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, indicated in a powerful speech that one is dealing, in effect, with rights that may conflict: on the one hand, the right of a transgender woman to be properly protected, including in her choice to be a transgender woman, and on the other, the possibility that certain prisoners, including transgender women, can be a threat to other prisoners in the women’s estate. The way that that is dealt with at the moment was well outlined by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, in her excellent and detailed speech. The prison authorities deal with it on a case-by-case basis using a series of detailed processes. Should we continue with that, or should we condemn every gender recognition-certificated transgender woman who is charged—maybe not convicted —of a violent or sexual offence to being in the male estate?

For my own part, it is pretty obvious that one should continue with the current arrangements. I am sure that they could be improved—I am not in a position to detail any improvements that could be given to them—but that case-by-case basis must be a better approach than that adopted by the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I would go further and say that I do not suggest to the noble Lord and those who have also supported the amendment that they come back with something else. This is much better dealt with on a case-by-case basis, so we on this side of the House oppose the amendment. We do not think it is appropriate; we do not think it even tries to balance rights, and we would not support it coming back on Report.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I am very glad to hear that. It is the first time in my experience—and I am not complaining, because the officials have worked incredibly hard on this—that the Box is entirely without officials.

To go back to the debate about delegated powers, this is what the Delegated Powers Committee said in general about this:

“We are particularly concerned that the Bill would … allow Ministers—and even a non-statutory body—to influence the exercise of new police powers (including in relation to unauthorised traveller encampments and stop and search) through ‘guidance’ that is not subject to Parliamentary scrutiny; … leave to regulations key aspects of new police powers—to restrict protest and to extract confidential information from electronic devices—that should instead be on the face of the Bill; and …allow the imposition of statutory duties via the novel concept of ‘strategy’ documents that need not even be published … We are disappointed that the inclusion of these types of delegations of power—on flimsy grounds—suggests that the Government have failed when preparing this Bill to give serious consideration to recommendations that we have made in recent reports on other Bills.”


In relation to this group of amendments, the committee makes complaint about three sets of delegations. The first is in relation to what could be suitable for community cautions. As I indicated, community cautions are for less serious offences. The Bill provides that they cannot be given for the most serious, indictable-only offences, but it gives the Secretary of State power to determine by affirmative procedure regulations the other offences for which they cannot be given.

The Government put forward a memorandum to justify this approach which said as follows:

“The list of offences which may not be suitable for”—


a community caution—

“is likely to change regularly”

and

“will be subject to continual updating and changing which makes it more suitable for secondary legislation”.

The Delegated Powers Committee report states:

“The Memorandum acknowledges that excluding offences from a community caution disposal ‘will have a significant impact on offenders, victims and the public’. It states that the affirmative procedure ‘is considered appropriate as it enables Parliament to debate the details of the restrictions [on community cautions]’.”


The Delegated Powers Committee report says that the Government are relying on a comparison with Section 130 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and then establishes, clearly rightly, that comparison with that Act is misguided and wrong. It says that the Government should follow the 2003 Act, but accurately and not inaccurately. What the Sexual Offences Act 2003 does is put in the Bill the excluded offences but gives power for them to be amended from time to time. Our amendments would follow the Delegated Powers Committee’s recommendations. I hope that the Government will feel able to accept that. If the noble Lord could indicate that, it would shorten that bit of it—sadly not.

The next group of problems is the conditions that are attached to a caution. A diversionary caution or a community caution must have one or more conditions attached to it. These can include requirements to carry out unpaid work, to attend a specified place for a specified purpose, and to pay a financial penalty. The complaint that the Delegated Powers Committee makes about this is that you need only the affirmative procedure where you are increasing the penalties but not when you are decreasing them.

The Delegated Powers Committee report says:

“We consider that the Government’s justification for its approach”—


applying only when penalties are increasing and not when they are decreasing—

“is flawed because it focusses solely on the impact of increases or decreases on the rights of offenders and on operational resources and fails to take into account the significant effect that decreases are capable of having on the way in which the policy works—and that making the new cautions less onerous forms of disposal may be something about which stakeholders (including victims of crime) and members of both Houses may have legitimate concerns.”

Again, we agree with that. The committee continues at paragraph 75:

“Accordingly, we consider that both increases and decreases in the maximum number of hours of unpaid work or attendance, or the maximum financial penalty, that may be attached to a diversionary caution or a community caution merit the same level of scrutiny”.


That is simply to quote what the Delegated Powers Committee says.

The final group relates to Clause 129 and Schedule 13, which gives the courts power

“to review community and suspended sentence orders, and … to commit an offender to custody for breach of”

such orders. The memorandum that the Government presented to the committee says that

“the aim… is to improve offender compliance with community orders and suspended sentence orders and to reduce reoffending. This is achieved through a multi-agency approach with links to wider support services, one element of which is providing for close oversight by a court of particular sentences being served in the community”.

The intention is to pilot for an initial 18-month period, and that may be applied to different cohorts throughout the country.

The committee report points out:

“The Secretary of State is given power to specify, by negative procedure … categories of community orders and suspended sentence orders that qualify for the review process”—


and it sets out certain things they can take into account in relation to it. The report continues:

“Where regulations specify a category for the first time, there must be an initial pilot period of 18 months … Both regulations that specify a category for the purposes of a pilot … are subject to the negative procedure … The Government’s justification for this is that ‘the principle of the provisions is made clear on the face of the legislation, and the power is limited by the legislation such that it may only be used to apply the provisions to different courts and cohorts of offenders … These matters are administrative in nature’.”


That is what the Government said in their memorandum.

The Delegated Powers Committee disagreed with that, saying that

“the categories of persons and the offences to which the review process will apply go to the heart of the underlying policy. The power gives the Secretary of State maximum discretion … but with minimal scrutiny … We therefore consider that regulations that provide for a category of community orders or suspended sentence orders to be subject to the review process on an indefinite basis should be subject to the affirmative procedure.”

That is what our third set of amendments does in relation to that.

I apologise for taking so long to go through this, but these are important issues.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble and learned Lord about the importance of this part of the Bill. Although the noble and learned Lord has just apologised for the length of his opening remarks on this group, I must warn the Committee that that was nothing compared with my opening remarks on the next group, if the Government wish to go there this evening.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, is right to demand that the list of excluded offences for which the police cannot give a community caution is in the Bill. This is yet another example of why this Bill is a shell, lacking in sufficient detail for noble Lords to give their consent to it. The Delegated Powers Committee agrees, as the noble and learned Lord has said.

He is also right that any changes to the maximum number of hours of unpaid work or attendance, or the maximum financial penalty that may be attached to a diversionary or community caution, should at least be subject to the affirmative resolution. But as the noble and learned Lord has said on previous groups, the House still has no ability to amend such an order. I will have more to say on that issue in a later group. Again, the Delegated Powers Committee agrees, as the noble and learned Lord has said.

Amendment 214B is about community orders and suspended sentence orders, and has, as far as I understand it, nothing to do with police cautions—I look for reassurance. I have no idea why it is in this group of amendments, other than that it is also covered by the Delegated Powers Committee’s report. I have no doubt that the noble and learned Lord is absolutely right about that as well, and the Delegated Power Committee agrees.

We support these amendments, mostly because they are right, and, in the case of Amendment 214B, because the noble and learned Lord is usually right.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Report stage & Lords Hansard
Wednesday 3rd March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, as the noble and learned Lord has explained, most of these amendments are technical in nature. The first group relates to a person who is serving an extended sentence in respect of a terrorist offence.

Amendments 27 to the end of the group amend Schedule 13. As the noble and learned Lord has explained, in Scotland—unlike in the rest of the UK—multiple sentences being served concurrently or consecutively are amalgamated into one sentence with one release date. This is known as “single terming”. Part 7 of Schedule 13 disapplies single terming for individuals where one of the offences is a terrorism offence, to ensure that the provisions of the Bill apply correctly. The noble and learned Lord did not exactly say that, but that is what he meant.

I had two questions for the Minister. The noble and learned Lord has already answered the first—on Amendment 31. The second is about Amendment 43, which makes changes to Section 24 of the International Criminal Court (Scotland Act) 2001. Can the noble and learned Lord give the House some idea of the extent of this change? How many prisoners serving sentences in Scotland have been sentenced by the international court, and what is the effect of these changes on them?

I gratefully acknowledge the support of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, in advising me on these matters.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, for explaining these measures. It would probably be helpful for a similar letter to that provided in Committee to be placed in the Library of the House so that we can have a clear view about it.

We do not object to any of these amendments. They have a quite significant effect on a very small number of cases, because the consequence for people convicted of a serious offence and a serious terrorist offence is that they may stay in prison for years longer. But that is the policy decision and the consequence of the Bill, and I accept that.

I am slightly anxious that this has happened so late in the process and that what the Bill contains depends on when the music stops. The Bill was introduced in the Commons in May 2020. Ten months have gone by. There has been this quite massive change of effect on a few cases. Can the noble and learned Lord explain how that has happened? I was struck by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, saying to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that he was happy to continue discussions on the issues. This is good and nice, but the Bill has a cliff edge. I worry that it is very late in the day to make these sorts of changes but, as I said, we do not object to them.

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[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee has explained Amendments 19 and 20 to the House, and it would serve little purpose to repeat that as we will not be dividing the House on them.

As my noble friend has said, compulsory polygraph tests for those convicted on licence from prison are one thing, but such tests for those not convicted of any offence, who have a right to silence when being questioned, is quite another. It is a long-established principle that a suspect in criminal proceedings should be protected from any adverse consequences of remaining silent. Clause 38 allows the Secretary of State to impose a requirement for an individual subject to a TPIM to participate in polygraph sessions and to comply with instructions given to the individual by the polygraph operator. Although any statement made by the individual while participating in the polygraph session cannot be used against them in any proceedings for an offence, a failure to answer questions could be taken as contravening a measure specified in a TPIM notice—that is, to comply with the instructions of the polygraph operator, so, in this case, the instruction to answer questions. Remaining silent during a polygraph session could therefore be an offence under Section 23 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, for which the individual is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.

If the person is convicted of a terrorism offence and is on licence and subject to a TPIM—unlikely but possible—it would be possible for them to be subjected to polygraph tests under Clause 32 of this Bill, and a failure to answer questions in those circumstances would be a breach of the licence. While we have reservations about that, we do not object to it being part of the Bill. However, if the person is not convicted and is subject to a TPIM, they have the right to silence and to be protected from any adverse consequences of remaining silent. Potentially being imprisoned for five years for failing to answer questions during a polygraph session is an adverse consequence, and we therefore intend to test the opinion of the House on whether Clause 38 should be part of the Bill.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the effect of the Bill at the moment is that a condition of a TPIM can be that the subject takes a polygraph test, and that a failure to do that could be a breach of the TPIM’s provisions. Amendment 21 raises the question of whether that should be part of a potential TPIM. In answering that question, it is important to try to find out what the Government have in mind regarding the use of that provision. First, to what extent do they regard polygraph answers as reliable? There is a general view that they cannot be taken on their own. What is the Government’s view on that?

Secondly, will the Government introduce a code of practice, as envisaged by Amendment 19? If so, could they give some indication of what that would contain? In particular, would it be based on the American Polygraph Association’s code of practice?

Thirdly, in December 2020 Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service announced that it would be seeking a long-term commercial partner to deliver polygraph equipment, training and support services for the sum of £2 million. When this was announced by the Government, it was noted that any partners must provide training to the standard approved by the American Polygraph Association, which is a trade body. Can the Minister give an indication of how that is going?

Will the Minister confirm that the Government will not act solely on the basis of any physiological reaction of the individual while being questioned in the course of a polygraph examination, and that the effect of a “significant reaction” in a polygraph examination will simply lead to further inquiries being made?

There has been, over quite a long time, a legitimate—in the sense of authorised by legislation—use by the Home Office of polygraph tests in relation to sexual offenders. According to Home Office figures, over the last five years 5,228 mandatory polygraph examinations have been carried out on 2,249 sexual offenders. Will the Minister describe to the House what benefit has been obtained from this and the basis of any assertions of that benefit?

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 9th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee has explained, we wish to see the current arrangements for terrorism prevention and investigation measures remain as they are, despite having concerns about them existing at all. As the name implies, these measures were designed to prevent terrorism while an investigation takes place. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has explained, intelligence is often received in relation to suspected terrorists that cannot be used in a criminal trial, either because it is not legally admissible or because it would reveal the source and potentially put the source’s life in danger. That needs to be balanced against Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, enshrined in British law by the Human Rights Act 1998. It requires that, in the determination of a person’s civil rights and obligations or for any criminal charge against an individual, everyone is entitled to a fair public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law—this despite what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has said about control orders withstanding such challenges in the past.

The answer to these potentially conflicting obligations is TPIMs, which are supposed to be a means of protecting the public while an investigation secures the evidence necessary to convict a person of a criminal offence. They were not intended to be indefinite house arrest without trial. As we will see in the groups that follow, the Government seek to overturn this principle of a time-limited safeguarding tool during an investigation into effectively indefinite deprivation of human rights without trial.

The conditions imposed by a TPIM can be draconian, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, said. The subject can be told where to live and have to tell the authorities about anyone else who lives with them. They may need to get permission to stay somewhere else, they may not be allowed to travel outside a specified area without permission, they may have to surrender their passports and they may be prohibited from going to a particular place or area without permission or without being accompanied by a police officer. The authorities can have complete control over the subject’s bank and credit card accounts and they can be told that they cannot possess cash over a certain amount. The authorities can have complete control over the sale or transfer of any property that the subject has and complete control over transferring money to anyone, as well as complete control over use of phones, computers and any other electronic communication device owned or used by the subject or by anyone else who lives with the subject—these measures affect not only the subject but their innocent loved ones as well.

Authorities can have complete control over who the subject meets or communicates with and over where the subject works or studies. The subject may be required to report to a specified police station at specified times and to have their photograph taken at whatever time and location the Secretary of State requires and they can be electronically tagged. On the one hand, noble Lords will understand why the authorities might want to impose such conditions if the person is believed to be a terrorist threat, but they will also understand that TPIMs amount to interference with some of the most fundamental human rights of the subject.

These restrictions on someone’s freedoms and human rights have echoes of the sort of restrictions imposed by ISIS when it declared territory it once held a caliphate. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, said in a Guardian article written when this House was considering the Counter-Terrorism Bill on 13 October 2008,

“we should fight to protect the liberties the terrorists would take from us, not destroy them ourselves.”

The first element the Government want to change through the Bill, which is covered by this group of amendments, is the standard of proof required before someone can be subjected to a TPIM. Originally, as we have heard, in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 the Secretary of State had to “reasonably believe” that the subject is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity. This was changed by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 to the Secretary of State having to be satisfied

“on the balance of probabilities”

—the standard required for a court to be satisfied in a civil case. The Government want to change this standard of proof to

“has reasonable grounds for suspecting”.

A police constable may arrest someone when he has reasonable cause to suspect, and I can tell the Committee from my own personal and professional experience that this is a very low bar indeed. Of course, we are not talking about a police officer detaining someone for a few minutes or a few hours but about restricting someone’s human rights for up to two years, or indefinitely, if the Bill passes unamended. That is a shocking and frightening prospect.

If noble Lords’ common sense and sense of justice are not engaged by my arguments, perhaps they will be convinced by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, whom other noble Lords have mentioned. He has said:

“I am not aware of cases where the authorities would like to have imposed a TPIM if the standard of proof had been lower … If it is right that the current standard of proof is usable and fair, and I think it is, in a word, if it ain’t broke, why fix it?”—[Official Report, Commons, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill Committee, 25/6/20; cols. 6-7.]


That is actually seven words, but I think we understand what he meant. To which, no doubt, the Government will deploy the same argument successive Labour Governments used in trying unsuccessfully to extend the period that a terror suspect could be detained by the police without charge, initially under Tony Blair’s premiership to 90 days, and subsequently under Gordon Brown to 42 days. Operational partners argued that, although limits on the period a subject could be detained without charge had not been a problem up until then, they could envisage a situation where it might be an issue in the future. I suspect that is similar to the arguments the Government will deploy here. Both times, Parliament resoundingly defeated the proposals.

It is important that we consider the reputation of this country throughout the world for the effective protection of human rights. We should not allow such draconian limits on people’s civil liberties to be imposed on the basis of such a low standard of proof—lower than any court employs, even in civil cases.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, in his Amendment 27, offers a compromise, which he is developing a reputation for, trying to steer between what is arguably necessary and reasonable and what he, not without precedent, thinks the Government might accept. He suggests in his amendment that, for the first year, while intelligence-gathering is in its infancy, a TPIM might be imposed on the Government’s standard of “reasonable grounds for suspecting”. After a year, the authorities should have been able to gather sufficient evidence for the Secretary of State to be convinced on the existing balance of probabilities. I see where the noble Lord is coming from but, with the greatest of respect to him, I am with the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation on this one rather than with the former.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, was not only a member of the Labour Governments to which I have just referred but, from memory, was fairly central to the attempts to extend detention without trial. His Amendment 28 would substitute the standard of proof required with

“on the basis of reasonable and probable grounds”.

I look forward to hearing his explanation of how this differs from the existing and government-proposed standards of proof, as, I must confess and with the greatest respect to the noble and learned Lord, when I wrote this speech on Sunday morning I had neither the energy nor the required determination to work it out for myself. Having finished at midnight last night, I have even less energy this evening.

The current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation thinks that we should leave the standard of proof where it is. We agree, which is why we believe that Clause 37 should not stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]]

I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, as ever. I am sorry that he did not have the energy to get to my amendment, but I completely understand why that would be. The difference between my amendment and that of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is that mine seeks to unpack what the standard of proof would be; it requires an objective standard of “probable grounds”: in effect, balance of probabilities, but more spelled out. The difference between the amendments is that, in effect, the noble Lord’s amendment would give a year when the lower standard—namely, reasonable suspicion—could apply and thereafter insist on the balance of probabilities. The real difference is that first year of grace which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, would give to the Government or the Secretary of State to have a lower standard of proof.

Our position on this side of the House is that the TPIM powers have utility to the Government for fighting terrorism. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, indicated clearly the intrusive effect of TPIMs on those subject to them; for example, having to move to a different location, not being entitled to go to particular places, or not being able to associate or communicate with particular people. These are powers of utility for the Government. They are, however, intrusive and infringe against what would otherwise be people’s rights. Before those rights are taken away, it is for this House to decide what the right balance should be between those individuals’ rights and the protection of the public.

All those who have looked at it in any detail, in particular the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and his successor as the terrorism reviewer, take the view that the higher standard of proof from that which the Government currently propose—namely, the balance of probabilities—has not caused them any difficulty in imposing TPIMs where they want to. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, put it, there is no need to lower the standard to keep the public safe.

In addition to the point that no change is required, a significant change is being made to the ability to roll over TPIMs indefinitely, so the consequence of the proposed amendments to the existing law being suggested by the Government in this Bill is to lower the standard of proof for no purpose and to do so on the basis of indefinite restrictions on individuals’ liberty.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester was, in my view, correct to say that the right approach is to ensure that the Government have the right powers but also to ensure that people are confident that they are being properly imposed. If people do not have that confidence, it will cause difficulties down the line.

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[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, requiring a TPIM subject to relocate can have significant consequences, particularly, for example, if he or she has school-age children. It is a well-established fact in the rehabilitation of offenders that social ties are powerful in preventing reoffending. Relocating to another part of the country, presumably, would have the opposite effect.

Clearly, if there is a national security issue that requires the TPIM subject to be relocated somewhere they are not easily in contact with people they should not be in contact with, relocation should be considered. But to allow relocation simply to save police resources seems neither necessary nor proportionate.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]]

This amendment does not address head-on the power under a TPIM to require somebody to relocate. This amendment is only touching on whether the Secretary of State should by notice have power to vary a relocation measure, in part, because

“the variation is necessary for reasons connected with the efficient and effective use of resources.”

While I recognise the intrusive effect that relocation can have, I accept that there may be cases where national security demands it. I am interested to hear from the Minister what test is to be applied where a variation of a relocation order occurs when it

“is necessary for reasons connected with efficient and effective use of resources.”

I do not know, but I suspect that this concerns the perception that someone should relocate for national security reasons. Where they relocate to might be affected by the circumstances in which such an order might be enforced; the amount of resources that would be required if it was to be enforced where they normally live becoming disproportionate; or the amount of resources that would be required where they had been located becoming disproportionate. If that is right, I would have expected the measure in new subsection (1A) in Clause 39(2) to reflect something about proportionality. But there is nothing in it, and I would be interested to hear what the Minister has to say. I hope he will indicate that resource relocations will occur only when it is effectively necessary to provide for national security.

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[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, the only thing that I will add to what my noble friend Lady Hamwee has said about this amendment is an assumption that, even if the subject of the TPIM provides the authorities with all the details of his or her communications equipment—computers, mobile phone and so forth—it would be possible that they could end up borrowing a device from somebody else in his or her household. That is what the authorities are seeking disclosure of, to ensure that they keep track of all the communications the subject of the TPIM is engaged in. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, the provisions contained within Section 43(2)(a) reinforce the fact that TPIMs can impact to a highly intrusive extent on innocent people living with the subject of the TPIM.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]]

This amendment is probing the additional power given by Clause 43 of the Bill to allow the Secretary of State to seek disclosure of

“such details as may be specified of any electronic communication device possessed or used by the individual or any other person in the individual’s residence.”

Its purpose is readily understandable: namely, if the purpose of TPIMs is in part to prevent the subject of the TPIM communicating with anybody or receiving communications from anybody, the authorities should have the ability to look at all the electronic devices to which he or she has access.

However, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, have both pointed out, that means, for example, that the wife, husband or children of a subject become subject themselves to an intrusive order. I would be very interested to know whether the authorities are going to take a different approach to the question of the subject of a TPIM’s own electronic devices, as opposed to those of his family or those belonging to those with whom he lives. What is the standard going to be? Necessary and proportionate? Strong case? I would be very interested to hear what it is. Just before I depart, I will pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Although I have not agreed with every one of their amendments, they have shown indefatigable probing of this Bill and incredible good nature throughout.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I am minded to say, “Like the last lot”—but I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, and to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, for his offer to write with details. I would just say that I think it is rather cruel and inhumane to expect three government Ministers to be forced to remain to the end of the evening; perhaps they can come to some better arrangement on a future occasion.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]]

Like the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I too am grateful to the four Ministers for the care and good humour with which they have dealt with it all. Of the three amendments, Amendment 66 looks entirely technical. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, says, Amendment 67 deals with a situation where you have a non-terrorist sentence and then, consecutively, before or after, a terrorist sentence. I cannot work out how you deal with that situation for the purposes of licences as a result of this amendment. Hopefully, that will be explained to us—for reasons that may be entirely my fault, it is not entirely clear to me from the wording of the amendment. As I understand it, Amendment 70 again deals with the position of consecutive sentences; and again, the effect of that is not entirely clear to me. It might be significant, because what we are dealing with are very long sentences. So I hope that the noble and learned Lord will explain this when he comes to write his letter to us. I am very much obliged.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Debate between Lord Paddick and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 24th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said in her opening remarks, these amendments are about maintaining the status quo—the public interest defence. She described additional safeguards against a rogue prosecutor—potentially of self-defence, necessity and duress—but of course these mechanisms are already in place, and they are put into the amendment to provide clarity.

I am very glad to have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Richie of Downpatrick, with her valuable experience in Northern Ireland. As the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, said in her very powerful remarks, the co-signatories to the amendment are from very different backgrounds. I remind the Committee that I was a police officer for over 30 years and was at one time a controller of informants—covert human intelligence sources, as we now call them.

As I said, these amendments, to which I have added my name, are about keeping the status quo by ensuring that there is a legal power that allows public authorities to authorise CHIS to participate in crime but leaving the question of immunity from prosecution to prosecutors, looking at all the circumstances after the fact.

At Second Reading, the Government made two arguments against maintaining the status quo: first, that it is “undesirable” for the police, for example, to authorise people to commit crime, and, secondly, that it is “unfair and unreasonable” for CHIS to operate under the possibility that they might be prosecuted. In other words, the status quo is not desirable, not fair and not reasonable.

Let me deal, first, with the argument that it is “undesirable”. Can the Minister please explain to the Committee the difference between it being undesirable to create an express power for public authorities to authorise activity that remains criminal and it being undesirable to create an express power for public authorities to make criminal activity legal? Or, to put it another way, what is more or less desirable—a public authority telling someone to commit crime or giving a public authority the power to say something that is a crime is not a crime?

Is it not fundamental to the rule of law that the law applies to everyone equally and that it is clear what is and is not a crime? The Government propose to make legal an act that would otherwise be a crime, and to make the criminal law apply to everyone, except CHIS, who are authorised under CCAs. For example, Section 11 of the Terrorism Act 2000 would in effect change to “a person commits an offence if he belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed organisation, unless he is authorised to belong to it by a criminal conduct authority, in which case he does not commit an offence”. The law, in effect, becomes “it is an offence/it is not an offence, and it applies to some people but not all”.

The effect of accepting these amendments is to say that, of course, belonging to a terrorist group is an offence, but it is clearly not in the public interest to prosecute this person because he was asked to belong to, or to continue to belong to, a proscribed organisation by an agent of the state, and that was necessary and proportionate. Immunity from prosecution should be based on an independent prosecutor deciding whether it is in the public interest to prosecute, not on an agent of the state saying that this crime is not a crime, as many noble Lords have said.

At Second Reading, the Minister—the noble Baroness, Lady Williams—said:

“It is also undesirable to create an express power for public authorities to authorise activity that remains criminal.”—[Official Report, 11/11/20; col. 1115.]


Paying criminals to pass information to the police is undesirable, and paying terrorists to pass information to the security services is undesirable, as is paying those employed by hostile foreign powers to commit treason by passing information to the UK—it is all undesirable, or murky waters, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said on the last group—but, however undesirable those things are, they are necessary. Although it may be undesirable to create an express power for public authorities to authorise activity that remains criminal, it is necessary, and it is not as undesirable as the alternative. To quote the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for whom I know the whole House, including the noble Baroness the Minister, has the highest regard:

“The Bill would give power to police superintendents to confer immunity on members of the public, and of their own organisations, for the commission of crimes. That proposition is startling, and the potential for abuse obvious.”—[Official Report, 11/11/20; col. 1064.]


I shall now deal with the “unfair and unreasonable” argument. At Second Reading, the noble Baroness the Minister said that

“it seems unfair and unreasonable for the state to ask an individual to engage in difficult and potentially dangerous work while leaving open the possibility of the state prosecuting them for the exact same conduct. That tension has existed for many years.”

It has, but we need a reality check here. What might seem unfair and unreasonable to the Government, and indeed to some noble Lords, is not the same as what might seem unfair and unreasonable to undercover operatives, who, whether they be criminals or undercover cops, have willingly volunteered to do this work not for years or for decades but, I am sure, for well over 100 years.

If a handler thought that it was unfair and unreasonable, he would not authorise a CHIS to participate in crime; if a CHIS thought it was unfair and unreasonable, he would not participate in crime. What the noble Baroness the Minister seems to want to address is a sense of unfairness and unreasonableness which the Government have but which is not shared by the overwhelming majority of those who are directly affected—the handlers and the undercover agents.

The second question that has to be asked is: what is the possibility of the state prosecuting them, and is the status quo a real deterrent? The noble Baroness the Minister—again, at Second Reading—talked about what would happen if a CHIS were to undertake criminal activity that fell outside the strict parameters of a CCA:

“The prosecuting authorities are in a position to consider whether to bring a prosecution. This has been done before and will be done again if required.”—[Official Report, 11/11/20; col. 1115.]


So the answer is, “It has been done before and will be done again if necessary”, but it has not been done so often as to put off either undercover police officers or criminals from participating in criminal activity at the request of their handlers, who have willingly engaged on the understanding that, provided you stick to what you have been authorised to do, the CPS is unlikely to prosecute.

There have, no doubt, been rare occasions when a criminal has asked for a written guarantee of immunity and has backed away when it could not be given, but the system has clearly not been seen by the overwhelming majority of those involved—neither the handlers nor the undercover operatives—as unfair or unreasonable, no matter what we might think, otherwise they simply would not do it. In any event, any guarantee of immunity would be conditional only on the CHIS doing precisely what he is authorised to do, which in itself presents problems, as we will see in future groups.

I argue that the potential unintended consequences of what is proposed in the Bill on the question of immunity, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, pointed out, are too high a price to pay just to make us feel better, because we feel it is unfair and unreasonable not to give immunity up front. CHIS engage willingly in criminal activity at the request of their handlers, despite the possibility of prosecution. The proposed solution, to a problem that does not exist, is startling and the potential for abuse obvious, which is why I support the amendments.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who brings experience that none of the rest of us who have spoken in the debate have. It has been a powerful and significant debate. It arises because, under the Bill, a consequence of authorising criminal conduct is that it is rendered “lawful for all purposes”, which creates an immunity both from criminal prosecution and from civil liability for the person carrying out the authorised crime.

As this debate has identified, that gives rise, in effect, to two issues. First, it is a departure from the existing arrangement whereby the effect of the Upper Tribunal’s decision in the third direction case was that the relevant authorities had the power to authorise the criminal conduct, but the power to authorise it did not render it immune from prosecution. In consequence, it was a matter for the relevant prosecutor to determine whether or not the fact that the CHIS was acting in accordance with the authority given to him meant that the CHIS—I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Cormack —should not be prosecuted.

From the point of view of the Government—and very much of this debate—reasons have to be given why that principle is being departed from. The arguments fluctuate between, “It’s a useful power to have, for the prosecutor to determine”, to, “Actually, it makes no difference”. Can the Minister give an authoritative answer to the question why it is immunity now, rather than depending on prosecutorial discretion? In particular, is it because it makes no difference? Has it made a difference in the past and, if so, why is the principle being departed from?

Noble Lords speaking in this debate have asked penetrating questions. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said, in effect, “Tell us why the policy is being changed.” We on this side of the House want to hear answers to those questions before we make up our minds on this issue. The second and separate issue—here, we believe there is definitely a defect in the Bill—is that the consequence of the “lawful for all purposes” approach is that there is plainly no remedy for the victims of the conduct authorised by the criminal conduct authorisation. That is fundamentally wrong.