Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage & Lords Hansard part one
Wednesday 20th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I no longer have to declare an interest but some Members here may know that I was until May this year police and crime commissioner in Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland. As such, I will make a very brief contribution to this first debate in Committee.

I personally support—I hope from my experience—the early amendments that have been proposed. As has been said already, it is quite clear that anyone who works with the police nowadays, knows them or sees them closely at work, will know that for a long time, I suspect, as in the rest of society, mental health, mental illness and all that follows from it was not given anywhere near the importance it should have been. I am glad to say that it is my experience, certainly in the police force I was close to, and I am sure in others too, that chief officer teams are now giving the issue of mental health due regard. That is why any covenant that left this out would be lacking; I do not want to comment on the covenant— good points have been made on it.

I urge the Minister and the Government to consider seriously these obviously non-partisan suggestions, which are meant to be helpful. That is all I want to say, but my experience tells me that this is becoming a larger and larger issue as year follows year for police forces up and down the country.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I start also by paying tribute to my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond for her tireless work in supporting police officers in the many different roles that she has in addition to her work in this House. It was particularly important to hear about the work of police treatment centres, although they clearly do not have the capacity to deal with all officers who are affected. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, in his opening remarks, talked about only being able to imagine what police officers go through. I hope to enlighten the Committee about some of those experiences.

I have Amendment 4 in this group, but I support all these amendments, though perhaps with a qualification on one of them. My experience in the police service was not, in many respects, very different from that of others who have served or those who continue to serve, except perhaps that I was the most junior officer on my relief or response team, as it would now be known. For 18 months, as the junior officer delegated, I was the one who dealt with all the sudden deaths. My first appearance in court was at the Coroner’s Court, when the husband of an elderly couple had taken an overdose of prescription medication. Having worked night duty until 4 am, I was allowed to “slide off”, as I had to be at the mortuary at 9 am to identify the body. I had not seen a dead body before that night—I was 19 years of age—and I was unprepared for the sight and smell of at least half a dozen other bodies that had been opened up for examination by the pathologist when I arrived at the mortuary. It is an important role for a police officer to identify the body that he or she found as being the same one that the pathologist is about to perform the post-mortem on. I will not go into graphic details, but the Committee needs to get a flavour of the trauma that police officers are exposed to.

Noble Lords might think that the first case is the one that sticks in one’s mind, but whether it is the open-top car that overturned at speed, with no protection for the passengers in the back from the road surface, or the pensioner not seen for weeks in the summer, with swarms of flies on her badly decomposed body that was sticking to the bed when the undertakers tried to remove her, or the charred bodies in a number of fires that I attended, the impact on one’s mental health is considerable and cumulative. I can still picture and smell those scenes; I remember the taste that they left in my mouth.

It is not just the horror of such scenes; it is the emotional impact as well. There was a young man in his early 20s who had hung himself from a coat hook on the back of a door. There was a young mother, whose normal session with her psychiatrist had been cancelled because of Christmas; finding a name and address in her handbag next to her body at the base of a tower block, I went to the address, knocked on the door and was invited by her husband into a room where her young children were playing under the Christmas tree with the toys that the mother had bought them. If that was not bad enough, when I suggested that we ought to go into a different room so that I could tell the husband the tragic news that his wife had committed suicide, he asked me, “How did she do it?”. Experiences like that, as noble Lords can hear, I still vividly remember.

It is not just the deaths. I remember a young man who had a broken glass slammed into his face. We had to take him to hospital in the police van, as there were no ambulances available—some things do not change. I remember the terrified look on his face as he shook uncontrollably from the shock. Another man jumped from the fourth floor and landed on spiked railings. We held him up for what seemed to be an eternity, while the fire brigade cut around the railings; they could not use oxyacetylene torches because the heat would have transmitted to his body. Then we had to hold him in the ambulance between two trolleys, with the railings still through his body.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

8: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“Scrutiny of investigation: timeliness
(1) The Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2020 are amended as follows. (2) After regulation 13 insert—“13A Scrutiny of investigation: timeliness (1) A legally qualified person within the meaning of regulation 28(4)(a) and (6) of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 shall be appointed to scrutinise the information provided pursuant to regulation 13. (2) On each occasion where information is provided in writing under regulation 13 paragraph (1) or (2) the legally qualified person appointed under paragraph (1) shall determine whether there is good and sufficient reason for—(a) the time already taken; and(b) realistically anticipated to be needed for completion of the investigation.(3) In determining whether there is good and sufficient reason under paragraph (2) the legally qualified person may have regard to any relevant matter, and shall have particular regard to—(a) whether the investigation has been efficient and effective;(b) whether there has been unnecessary or unreasonable delay having regard to complexity and seriousness of the case;(c) the impact upon the officer and others;(d) any anticipated further delay;(e) the public interest and affect upon confidence in the police disciplinary system; and(f) representations made on behalf of any person entitled to receive a copy of the information provided under regulation 13.(4) Unless the legally qualified person determines that there is good and sufficient reason under paragraph (2)(a) and (b) then—(a) all investigation into possible misconduct or gross misconduct shall be terminated forthwith; and(b) no disciplinary proceedings may be initiated in respect of the matters under investigation.(5) Nothing in this provision shall have any effect in relation to any criminal investigation.”(3) After regulation 19 insert—“19A Scrutiny of investigation: timeliness (1) A legally qualified person within the meaning of regulation 28(4)(a) and (6) shall be appointed to scrutinise the information provided pursuant to regulation 19.(2) On each occasion where information is provided in writing under regulation 19(1) the legally qualified person appointed under paragraph (1) shall determine whether there is good and sufficient reason for—(a) the time already taken; and(b) realistically anticipated to be needed for completion of the investigation.(3) In determining whether there is good and sufficient reason under paragraph (2) the legally qualified person may have regard to any relevant matter, and shall have particular regard to—(a) whether the investigation has been efficient and effective;(b) whether there has been unnecessary or unreasonable delay having regard to complexity and seriousness of the case;(c) the impact upon the officer and others;(d) any anticipated further delay;(e) the public interest and affect upon confidence in the police disciplinary system; and (f) representations made on behalf of any person entitled to receive a copy of the information provided under regulation 19.(4) Unless the legally qualified person determines that there is good and sufficient reason under paragraph (2)(a) and (b) then—(a) all investigation into possible misconduct or gross misconduct shall be terminated forthwith; and (b) no disciplinary proceedings may be initiated in respect of the matters under investigation.(5) Nothing in this provision shall have any effect in relation to any criminal investigation.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amends the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2020 to provide for a mechanism for scrutiny and consequences where there are delays in disciplinary proceedings being brought against police officers.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, there has been much criticism of the police complaints and misconduct process from the perspective of members of the public being unable to achieve justice, but much less has been said about the impact on the officers under investigation, to which I alluded in the last group. When we come to consider Clause 43 and Schedule 4 to the Bill, I will remind the House of the changes the Government brought about in the Policing and Crime Act 2017 to limit the length of time members of the public could be kept under investigation by the police and on police bail. The Government accepted the unfairness of suspects being kept in suspense for months, even years, with the threat of prosecution still hanging over them. This is something many police officers face, with even graver potential consequences than someone who is accused of a criminal offence—potentially losing their livelihoods through being sacked or required to resign from the police service.

When I was a police inspector in charge of a relief, or shift, of officers, a woman who had been arrested and taken to one of my police stations made an allegation of indecent assault by a police officer during a routine search to ensure that she did not have anything that could cause injury while she was being held in a cell. I heard a commotion in the custody suite and went to see what was happening, only to find her spreadeagled on the floor with one officer on each limb. The situation was explained to me: she had resisted being searched, fighting with the female officer designated to search her, and had to be restrained. I asked the prisoner if she was okay and if she was going to behave herself now, and then ordered two female officers to take her into a cell to be searched, much to the concern of male officers, who I ordered to remain just outside the cell door.

Another prisoner, who was present in the custody suite and subsequently interviewed in prison by officers from the complaints unit, corroborated to some extent the female prisoner’s account—a scuffle and then being held down on the floor—although her allegation was actually of indecent assault by a female officer during the search, out of sight of the witness. When the complaints unit took all the female officers who had been on duty that night away for questioning simultaneously and suspended one from duty, I asked that I be interviewed as I was also a witness who had seen nothing untoward.

As a result, I was interviewed as a suspect under caution in a criminal investigation. Although I had already qualified for a promotion, it was delayed for 18 months, and the local area police commander recommended that I face a full disciplinary hearing for lack of supervision, with a recommendation that I be sacked—perhaps related to having recently separated from my wife and having sought permission to cohabit with a man, or perhaps not.

The day that the local area commander retired from the police service, the headquarters complaints and discipline department responsible for scheduling discipline hearings dropped all proceedings against me, and I was promoted. But in the intervening period, my health suffered, my marriage ended and my career was on hold, even though I had done nothing wrong and, arguably, in coming forward as a witness, everything right.

This is but a relatively minor, albeit personal, example of the impact that prolonged police misconduct investigations can have, which, unlike criminal investigations, have no effective time limits placed upon them.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, set out, this amendment seeks to further improve the timeliness of disciplinary and misconduct proceedings against police officers. It seeks to do this by amending existing regulations governing complaint and misconduct investigations by the IOPC, as well as those conducted by force professional standards departments. In substance, they seek to introduce a new system of separate independent adjudicators with powers to close down investigations which have taken longer than 12 months, where they decide that there is no “good and sufficient” reason for delay.

Again, with this amendment, I agree with the thrust of what the noble Lord and others said, namely that disciplinary and misconduct investigations should be conducted and completed in a timely fashion, for the reasons set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Hogan-Howe. Like the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, when I heard “10 years” I was utterly shocked. However, this amendment comes at a time when investigation timescales are already reducing and when the Government have worked hard to reduce bureaucracy in the system and not add to it.

Under the IOPC’s predecessor, the Independent Police Complaints Commission, investigations would on average take 11 months. Since 2018, under the IOPC, that has fallen by almost 30% to just eight months. The IOPC has closed more than 90% of its cases in under 12 months and is making strong progress on the number of cases that it closes in under nine months and even in under six months. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, it is in nobody’s interest for investigations to drag on for long periods unnecessarily. We recognise the impact that this can have on everyone concerned.

It might be helpful in terms of explaining the trajectory that the Government introduced a package of reforms in February last year to the police complaints and disciplinary systems. It included new provisions to improve timeliness, with an expectation that investigations will normally be completed within 12 months. If not, the investigating body must provide a written explanation of any delays and steps to bring the investigation to a conclusion. The Government expect the IOPC to go further, and it now has targets in its business plans to complete many of those investigations in under nine and six months, as I said.

There are a number of reasons why cases might take too long, including the complexity of a case, the time- scale being impacted by parallel criminal investigations, and delays in obtaining expert evidence or post-mortem reports. It might be further complicated by delays in obtaining accounts from key police witnesses and subjects. That said, it is not acceptable for investigations to go on for too long, but the trajectory of timescales is certainly downwards.

The noble Lord’s amendment would introduce an additional layer of cost and bureaucracy. It would also risk creating perverse incentives for investigators to rush to meet deadlines at the expense of the quality of an investigation, particularly in those complex cases or if historic matters are at stake.

If an investigation into police wrongdoing was terminated without being concluded and that officer might have had a case to answer for gross misconduct—I can think of very recent cases which are relevant here—this would significantly undermine public confidence and potentially the course of justice. I am sure that is not the intention of noble Lords.

The amendment also risks undermining the independence of the police disciplinary system, blurring the lines between when legally qualified persons are appointed to this role and when the same person is appointed as a legally qualified chair of a misconduct hearing. These individuals would be selected from the same pool. That fundamentally changes the role of a legally qualified chair and jeopardises the independence of their position and the disciplinary system.

In conclusion, the Government have already taken steps to reduce investigation timescales and we will be monitoring the timeliness of investigations, drawing on new data collection requirements that we introduced as part of recent reforms. I hope that, for the reasons I have outlined, the noble Lord will be happy to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this important debate, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for her support for speedy justice. Obviously, this impacts the complainant as well as the officers.

I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for his contribution. It seems very strange standing here and talking about a former commissioner in that way, but I am in police mode at the moment, I think. He made a very important point about firearms officers who volunteer to take on this enormous responsibility and are then treated so badly by the system.

The Police Federation—I am grateful for its support of these amendments—accepts that there will be delays if a criminal investigation is involved. However, there are still significant delays even after the criminal matters have been dealt with, as I outlined in the examples I gave.

I thank the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, for his promise to come back all guns blazing, as it were, if I bring the amendment back on Report.

It is interesting that there is a parallel with the Armed Forces again. I spoke to a former soldier who was resigning from the police service and asked him why. He said that he was leaving because, in the Armed Forces, when something goes wrong, the most senior officer involved takes responsibility and faces a court martial, while in the police service, the responsibility is pushed down to the lowest-possible level, to alleviate the responsibility of senior officers. That is an aspect of the culture of the police service; I agree with that officer’s conclusions.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, talked about public confidence. If there is no confidence in the Independent Office for Police Conduct and the police complaints system, this will be partly due to the undue delays. Complainants are beginning to think “What are they trying to cover up? Why is it taking so long?”. It is essential that these things are dealt with in a timely manner.

I thank the Minister for her support in principle, but the examples I gave were not complex cases; they were simple, but they still took years. They did not involve expert witnesses, yet there were still delays. These are recent cases from last year.

I am sorry but I do not accept the Minister’s assertion that this amendment would result in a rush to complete investigations. These completely independent people would assess whether there were justified reasons for investigations going on as long as they had. Clearly, if these investigations were not being dealt with in a timely manner, they would have something to worry about. This is about picking up those cases in which there is unnecessary and unreasonable delay. Of course, the same chair would not adjudicate over whether an investigation was going on too long and then chair the discipline investigation.

We are on to something here and I am very grateful to the Police Federation for bringing it to my attention. We may well need to discuss this further on Report, but at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 8 withdrawn.

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[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 10 in this group. According to the Times newspaper, in an article dated 10 March this year, Chris Philp MP, the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office and Ministry of Justice responsible, according to the article, for sentencing, said that

“detailed research had found that the likelihood of being caught and punished was much more important in discouraging people from committing crime than length of jail sentences.”

Answering a Parliamentary Question about the deterrent effect of longer sentences, he said, again according to the Times:

“The evidence is mixed, although harsher sentencing tends to be associated with limited or no general deterrent effect. Increases in the certainty of apprehension and punishment have consistently been found to have a deterrent effect.”


I subsequently discovered that this was the Answer to a Written Question on 19 February from the Conservative Member for Rother Valley about pet theft—of which more on another day. The Bill certainly is the gift that keeps on giving.

Noble Lords around the Committee will be aware that we on these Benches have consistently said that longer prison sentences do not deter criminals and now, according to the Government, harsher sentences have limited or no deterrent effect. So why do we have Clause 2 in the Bill? Noble Lords may be surprised that, as a former police officer, I am not supportive of this measure. Something needs to be done about assaults on emergency workers, but an increase in the maximum sentence is not what is needed. What is needed is a change in attitude among the general public, in society and in the courts towards assaults on emergency workers in general and on police officers in particular. It appears to me to have become accepted by many that being assaulted is part of the job of a police officer or an emergency worker. But no one should be expected to tolerate abuse or assault because of the work they do, whether they are a Member of Parliament or an emergency worker.

The type of assault covered by this clause is common assault. Anything that causes a significant injury, even if it is not permanent, such as a bruise, can and should result in a charge under Section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, for which the maximum term of imprisonment is already five years. We are talking about relatively minor physical harm. Can the Minister tell the Committee how many cases of assault on an emergency worker to date have attracted the current maximum penalty of 12 months in prison—or a sentence of imprisonment at all?

The reason for my amendment, in effect for the Sentencing Council to review its guidance for the existing offence where the existing maximum penalty is 12 months’ imprisonment, is to ensure that the courts and the Crown Prosecution Service reflect the seriousness of this offence in their decision-making, rather than what we see week after week reported on social media, where assaults on emergency workers in general and police officers in particular are treated by the CPS and the courts as part and parcel of the job. That sends a message to criminals and the general public that you can assault emergency workers with impunity, because in court you will be just be given a slap on the wrist—if it even gets that far. What is the point of increasing the maximum penalty for an offence to two years when the Government themselves acknowledge that harsher sentences have little or no deterrent effect and the courts, which can currently send someone to prison for up to 12 months, rarely if ever do so?

The Government may say that in some cases severe penalties can have a deterrent effect—but an increase from one year to two years for an offence often committed in the heat of the moment during the course of a confrontation between a police officer and a member of the public is unlikely to be one of them. Far better that the Government mount a publicity campaign stating that it is completely unacceptable to attack emergency workers who put their lives on the line every day to protect and serve the public, than that they make a minor adjustment to the maximum penalty that is likely to go unnoticed by those it is targeted at, either as a deterrent or in court following conviction, unless there is a significant change in the attitude of judges, prompted by a change in the sentencing guidelines.

On Amendment 11, proposed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, clearly, prison officers are as vital a uniformed force as police, fire and rescue services, the ambulance service and the coastguard, and they are afforded similar protection. I quite understand how others working in prisons feel that they are more vulnerable and, as the right reverend Prelate said, they feel they have a target on their back because they are excluded. He gave the appalling example of an assault on a prison chaplain that resulted in bruising to the chaplain. But, again, I say that that offence could have been prosecuted under Section 47, where there is an even greater penalty available than for an assault on an emergency worker. So we are not supportive of the increase.

On Amendment 9, in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, of course, if such substances are actually thrown at a prison officer or other emergency worker, it would amount to assault and therefore it would be covered by existing legislation around assaults on emergency workers, with a similar penalty to the one the noble Earl is proposing in his amendment. So we feel that there needs to be a change in attitude towards the apparent acceptability of assaults on emergency workers, rather than simply a cosmetic increase in the maximum penalty.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I think the noble Lord and I are in agreement that the problem is that we are not prosecuting these offences, rather than the outcome in the courts. Because, for the prisoners, it may be that even another three-month penalty for my new offence would be enough to deter them—or, using the existing penalties, as the noble Lord said, it is the probability of being prosecuted that matters.