Extension of Franchise (House of Lords) Bill [HL]

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Friday 19th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, quoted one paragraph of the Parliament Act 1911 but he did not then quote the next paragraph, which recognises that, if you change the composition of this House, you also have to revisit the powers of the House.

I congratulate my noble friend Lord Naseby on introducing a Bill that has the merit of brevity. I would normally begin by addressing the merits of the argument, but on this occasion I shall look first at the level of support for the measure. How much support does it enjoy, be it from the public or from Members of the House?

Proposals for change to your Lordships’ House, be they great or small, rarely excite interest outside the House. I have in various writings on reform of this House quoted Janet Morgan, who once wrote:

“On Summer evenings and Winter afternoons, when they have nothing else to do, people discuss how to reform the House of Lords. Schemes are taken out of cupboards and drawers and dusted off. Speeches are composed, pamphlets written, letters sent to the newspapers. From time to time the whole country becomes excited”.


Well, the political classes may become excited but there is little evidence of the whole country ever doing so. Even in 1910, when there were two general elections, with Lords reform ostensibly being to the fore, the electorate remained as uninterested as it had been before the House rejected the 1909 Budget. As George Dangerfield wrote of the December election campaign:

“The country was indifferent, and politicians were hard put to it to stir up its lethargy”.


I am not sure that Lords reform was to the forefront of popular concerns either when the House of Lords Reform Bill was before the Commons in 2012.

Given that, it is not surprising that the issue before us today attracts no obvious public interest. I did a post on my blog about it and invited comments on the Bill. It attracted a grand total of two responses, the first of which was:

“It’s a non-issue. The Lords sitting in the upper house are small in number (and should be much smaller still—I suggest by drawing lots) and relatively balanced politically, so it’s unlikely to affect any election, so who cares? It’s not worth three sentences to discuss”.


Public indifference is matched by apparent indifference on the part of Members of this House. The speakers’ list for today may be notable for quality, but not for quantity. There is no clear, swelling demand for change on the part of Members, and in my view, that is significant. I notice also that the issue has not been the subject of much study. Even the Library briefing note relies on a blog post I did some years ago on the legal position of the prohibition.

I turn to the issue of principle. The argument, which has been made since the 19th century and is repeated today by my noble friend Lord Naseby, is that the House of Commons has powers denied the Lords, not least in terms of taxation, and Peers, the same as other citizens, should be able to vote for those who determine taxation. As my noble friend has mentioned, members of appointed second chambers elsewhere get to vote for members of the elected house.

In this country, we are now almost the only citizens not able to vote for MPs. I say almost, because certain other categories, notably prisoners, are also disfranchised. Once released from jail, they can vote—as indeed can anybody in this House who retires from membership. Mention of prisoners brings me on to the rights argument. We cannot argue that we are denied a basic right without conceding that prisoners are as well. In the Hirst case, the ECHR did not hold that prisoners should have the right to vote but that a blanket ban on prisoners being able to vote was in contravention of the convention.

There is a key difference between us and prisoners, which leads me to address the case against the Bill. Prisoners have no voice in Parliament; we do. It may not be as great as that of MPs, but we have a security of tenure denied those in the other place. The votes of Peers in a general election are not likely to swing the outcome, even in the closest of contests, but the fact of having the right to vote in addition to a place in Parliament—and a secure one—may seem a privilege too far. We may not vote on issues of taxation, but we have privileges that are denied to citizens. We can debate finance Bills at Second Reading. If a Bill is certified as a money Bill, we can offer amendments. Although the Commons is not obliged to consider them, there have been occasions when it has accepted amendments. In short, we can engage government in a way that the ordinary citizen cannot.

As I have said, the Bill will not excite great interest but, if passed, it may contribute to perceptions that we are seeking more for ourselves and do nothing to increase public understanding of the role played by this House. We add value to the political process, and we do so at relatively little cost. Indeed, if one could ascribe monetary value to the raft of changes we achieve to public legislation, I believe it would more than offset the costs of running the institution.

As my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham is well aware, I am keen to ensure that we improve our scrutiny of legislation. We do a good job, but I believe that we could do it even better. As I have stressed before in this House, ensuring that we deliver good law is a public good. That is what we should be focusing on, and ensuring that our scarce resources, including time, are devoted to it. That is what the public should see us doing. We should be thinking of public service, not self-service. We need to focus on raising awareness of the work of this House and what it contributes to the nation. This measure is, I fear, something of a distraction and may prove unhelpful if—it is a very big if—it gets noticed.