Constitution: Gracious Speech

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Thursday 25th June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I, too, congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Wills, on initiating the debate. The Motion addresses the implications of constitutional changes. I propose to focus on the constitutional implications of those changes.

Robert Stevens, in his book The English Judges, published in 2002, makes the point that the nation witnessed massive constitutional change in the period from 1640 to 1720. He notes that there were major constitutional developments in later years, such as the Reform Acts, but these were essentially,

“independent acts rather than part of a dramatic period of constitutional restructuring”.

He then—this is my key point—says:

“For lawyers and courts, however, the period from 1970 to 2000 provided a practical and psychological transformation comparable with the earlier constitutional revolution”.

The Labour Government returned in 1997 introduced a whole raft of constitutional measures. Anyone expecting a period of quiet after 2010 was to be disappointed. The coalition agreement heralded concessions and compromises on a number of measures of constitutional reform. The current Government are committed to several major constitutional measures, not least—as we heard—in relation to devolution and the European Union. The sheer scale means that we are not looking at independent Acts—that is, piecemeal changes that have time to bed in before other changes are made. We are looking at a whole gamut of changes to our constitutional arrangements, changes that are significant quantitatively and qualitatively.

During the 1980s and 1990s, several coherent approaches to constitutional change developed, each stipulating a particular constitutional structure deemed most appropriate to the United Kingdom. The problem with the constitutional reforms implemented by the Blair Government was that they bore no clear relation to any approach. When I asked Ministers what was the intellectually coherent approach to constitutional change being taken by the Government, I received no answer. In 2002, I initiated a debate on the constitution. In replying, the then Lord Chancellor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, admitted that there was no such approach. Rather, he said, the Government proceeded,

“by way of pragmatism based on principle, without the need for an all-embracing theory”.—[Official Report, 18/12/2002; col. 691.]

The principles that he enunciated were not necessarily compatible with one another, as they appeared to embrace power residing at the centre and power not residing at the centre.

The coalition Government fared no better in that they were formed by parties which adopted approaches that were almost diametrically opposed to one another. The Liberal Democrats adhere to the liberal approach to constitutional change and the Conservatives to the traditional, or Westminster, approach—approaches that are at different ends of the spectrum of negative and positive constitutionalism, of what one sees a constitution as being for.

The result is that we are seeing, and pursuing, major changes to our constitution without having a clear appreciation of the implications for the constitution as a constitution. What is the principled approach to constitutional change? What type of constitution are we trying to craft for the United Kingdom? As things stand, we are in danger of ending up with a constitution that is the sum of a raft of disparate constitutional changes, rather than a coherent framework that we have set out to create.

In the debate on the gracious Address, I made the case for a constitutional convocation, not to draft a new constitution, but rather to make sense of where we are. We need an exercise in constitutional cartography. My purpose today is not to repeat what I said then, but rather to put specific questions to my noble friend Lord Bridges about the Government’s approach to constitutional change—not to specific proposals, not to the implications of particular measures to be introduced, but rather to constitutional change as such.

First, what is the Government’s intellectually coherent approach to constitutional change? How do they see the constitution as a constitution? Are they wedded to maintaining the Westminster model and the attributes ascribed to it? Secondly, what are the mechanisms within government to ensure that it engages in joined-up thinking on constitutional measures? Who is in charge of constitutional issues, not least in terms of ensuring a coherent approach to constitutional change? This is a question not about, or not just about, co-ordination, but about leadership. It would be helpful to know from my noble friend how government is now structured in order to consider constitutional issues as constitutional issues.

My key point in this debate is to stress that in looking at the implications of constitutional change, we should not confine ourselves—indeed, must not confine ourselves—to looking solely at the implications of this Bill or that Bill. We must look at the implications for the constitution as a whole. To do that, we need to be clear as to what type of constitution we have, and want, for the United Kingdom.