Lord Norton of Louth
Main Page: Lord Norton of Louth (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Norton of Louth's debates with the Cabinet Office
(9 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this amendment provides for a review of the Act five to six years after enactment. It follows debate in Committee when the noble Lord, Lord Soley, proposed a sunset clause, but raised as an alternative a review of the Act. I favour review. Debate on the Bill has demonstrated uncertainty about its effect. Throughout today’s debate on Report, most of the discussion on amendments made the case for this review. There is a clear degree of lack of knowledge of what the effect will be. It has not been thought through. We are totally unclear about what impact the Bill will have.
To reiterate what I have said on a number of occasions, the purpose of the Bill is to restore, or at least to enhance, trust in politics, so let us see after the experience of a whole Parliament whether it has made any difference. It may be that no recall petitions are started in the period. That does not mean that an MP has not become eligible for a petition to be raised. Even if there have been no MPs who have acted in such a way as to trigger eligibility for a recall petition, it would still be useful to review the situation. If no MPs have acted in such a way as to render themselves liable, it would be useful to examine whether that is a result of the provisions of the Bill. Has it had a deterrent effect, or does it appear to have been irrelevant? If one or more MPs have been eligible for a recall petition, have petitions been raised and, if so, with what effect? If they have been eligible but no petitions have been raised, what does that tell us about the Bill?
There is clearly a case for review. It may be that there is not that much to review, but that in itself is important to know, and it is important to examine why that is the case. The Bill will be subject to post-legislative review anyway but, given the nature of the measure, a formal review is necessary, not least given the degree of uncertainty demonstrated by our deliberations on the Bill. I think it will be helpful for Parliament, but it should be especially for the benefit of electors. It is designed for their benefit. Has it had the desired effect?
The Minister will recognise the wording of the amendment. It is taken in large part from the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. Parliament accepted the case for review of that Act. I think there is an equally compelling case for a review of this measure. I beg to move.
My Lords, the Government are fully persuaded of the merits of post-legislative scrutiny as a general principle. There are frequently valuable lessons to be learnt for the future, and the Government are always happy to listen to and consider recommendations arising from such reviews.
As noble Lords have said, the Government have included review clauses in several of their Acts this Parliament, including ones affecting constitutional or electoral matters. However, the Government have some reservations in this case. My noble friend’s amendment commits to a review after five years. That is a reasonable period in some respects, but it is of course by no means certain that there will have been a recall petition by that point. In fact, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, was getting very close to that. A review of an Act which has not had the opportunity to operate as intended would be severely limited in its usefulness. It would be unable to consider the operation of the recall process, and its conclusions would have to be to some extent hypothetical.
Recall does not have to be regularly used for the power to be a good addition to democracy. Indeed, as I have said before—and I hope noble Lords will understand my good intent—the Government fervently hope that no petition is triggered because Members’ conduct is of the highest standard expected. I am sure that noble Lords would not suggest that Parliament’s disciplinary powers should lapse simply because Members’ behaviour does not cause them to be used.
It is, of course, open to Parliament and to the Government of the day to review legislation on their own initiative, without a statutory requirement to do so. It would be entirely appropriate for a parliamentary committee to conduct its own post-legislative scrutiny at such a point as it felt that it would be useful to do so. I am sure that the Government of the day would be more than happy to reflect on any considerations that might be brought forward in that case.
I hope that we will not have a recall because the standards of Members of Parliament are very high, so will not need a review. The Government are not happy about my noble friend’s amendment and we ask him to withdraw it, because in this case we are not convinced that it would be of the use that we know he intends. If there has not been a trigger, it would not be the sort of valuable review that we would like were we to have reviews. I hope that he feels able to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, is clearly not familiar with my reputation. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, may find himself rather busy in five to six years because this will probably coincide with the review of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. I suspect he will be only too happy to volunteer to serve on that review as well and to reach similar conclusions on both. I may be able to allay the fears of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, on the content of the amendment in terms of how the review would take place. This also relates to what my noble friend the Minister said. It stipulates a review but there will not necessarily be any action in the light of the committee’s investigation. It may find that it has had a deterrent effect and there is not too much to be done, which might be worth celebrating. It would not be in the scope of the amendment to cause more problems or give an opening to those who want to pursue a more radical measure. It would only be if the committee came up with recommendations for repeal or amendment of the Act as it stands. It does not necessarily open it up for everybody to come forward with alternatives.
I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that the underlying principle is the important point. The content of the amendment is not set in stone. I put it in its current form because the Government had already accepted it for the Fixed-term Parliaments Act and I thought this would make it a bit more difficult for them to say no to this. The arguments on both measures are identical. If you accept the arguments for the review of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act—which might be working wonderfully, so why do we need to review it?—those same arguments apply to this Bill. You either have some provision for both or neither. That was the reason I drafted it the way I did: to entice the Government in this direction rather than setting something in stone. I would be quite amenable, if it was felt appropriate, to coming back to this with a differently worded amendment to achieve review.
This will clearly be subject to post-legislative review by the relevant department after five or six years. It needed to be a wider review and be on record as more formal, as is the case with the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. I have made the case for it and I hope the Government might reflect on it, even at this late stage. It does not undermine the principle of the Bill; it just makes a sensible provision that we should look at these things in terms of how they work out. They may not be working as intended but that does not mean they have gone completely belly up—which is when we tend to do something about it—but they might merit modification. However, I do not intend to pursue it further at this late stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.