Cyprus

Lord Northbrook Excerpts

Tuesday 15th July 2014 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Northbrook]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the impact of a successful conclusion to current negotiations on the future of Cyprus on the people of Cyprus and on regional stability.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, this now being last business, it may stretch to 90 minutes rather than 60. The timings for the opening and closing speakers will remain the same, but those in between may luxuriate in up to eight minutes, if they wish.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, I am very pleased to debate the impact of resolving the Cyprus issue on the Floor of the House, which to me shows its increasing importance as a key issue in the eastern Mediterranean. Some speakers may well feel that I am putting the cart before the horse by discussing the impact of a settlement before one has been achieved. When I tabled this QSD, prospects looked rather brighter than they do at present, but I am an eternal optimist. By focusing on the impact from an international as well as a Cypriot viewpoint, I hope to add an extra dimension to the argument, and encourage the two sides to look at these broader issues, rather than narrow tribal rivalries.

The island has been divided for 40 years. In those 40 years talks on reunification have been an enduring feature of political life, without any success. The Annan plan of 2004 was the last and most comprehensive proposal for a settlement. It was overwhelmingly accepted by the Turkish Cypriots and comprehensively rejected by the Greek Cypriots. The reasons for rejection have been carefully analysed in the aftermath. Essentially, the Greek Cypriot political elite and people saw no benefit to them in the proposals, so they voted against.

We are now in the middle of a renewed negotiation. Many see this as the best hope for reunification. Where the negotiations seem to be different this time from the Annan plan, is that they are by Cypriots, for Cypriots—although as I will discuss later, they seem to have the same fault of failing to involve the wider Cypriot public. It is clear that both sides must see the benefit to them of any proposal for reunification—or, as the Turkish Cypriot chief negotiator Dr Kudret Ozersay puts it, they at least see the real harm to their interests that rejection would bring.

So what are these benefits? First, I suggest they are for the people of Cyprus themselves to be able to be one country again and extend their influence in the Mediterranean and on the world stage. Next, they are economic. Meltdown in the Greek Cypriot banking sector would surely have been less severe if Turkish financial know-how had been available to regulate it. UK companies could expand their links with the whole island. Cyprus, as a member of the Commonwealth, could look to the rich Commonwealth countries for investment. Elsewhere, the reunified island would be able to expand its trading links with the EU and Turkey.

Regional stability would be improved. Turkey is a member of NATO but not the EU. Greek Cyprus is not a member of NATO. A reunified island would see Cyprus join NATO, and thus counteract the influence of Russia, which has not only bailed out the Greek Cypriot banks but is now able to use the airbase near Paphos and Limassol for its naval vessels. It is also signing agreements with Israel.

This could partly explain the visit to Cyprus this year by the Vice-President of the USA, Joe Biden—the first such visit for 50 years. The USA is concerned about increasing Russian influence in the eastern Mediterranean. Another reason for his visit was surely the interest in an alternative source of energy supply for the West. The Aphrodite field off the south-east of Cyprus is a useful gas find, but unless it is combined with the neighbouring Leviathan and Tamar Israeli fields it will not produce sufficient gas to justify an LNG plant on the island. If such an arrangement can be agreed, the gas could be piped to Turkey, thus bypassing Russian sources of supply and giving Cyprus much cheaper energy on the way.

The whole exercise would be possible only with a reunified island, and the benefits will not be felt for several years. Can I ask the Minister whether the UK Government support the equal distribution of the natural resources found around the island between the two communities? Do they support the constructive proposal previously made by the Turkish Cypriot side in 2011-12 which includes the establishment of an ad hoc committee to deal with issues regarding natural resources?

Another natural resource that the whole of Cyprus could benefit from after a successful peace process would be water. An ambitious plan is in train to link Turkey with the TRNC, which would help eliminate chronic water shortages. This water supply could then be extended to the south, and thus the whole of Cyprus would benefit. The supply of water to the south could be the quid pro quo for the south agreeing to allow gas to be transported through to the north and thus on to Turkey.

The next area to benefit would be tourism. The stark reality of the current situation was demonstrated to me during my visit to the TRNC last July. Seeing Varosha, which was a prime tourist resort before partition, completely shut off was extraordinary and of benefit to no one. The inconvenience of having to fly to Turkey first if you want to visit the north must put off a lot of visitors.

In the remaining part of my comments, I wish to address the latest attempt to get a solution. In February 2014, the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities issued a joint declaration. On the surface this looked promising, with the Greek Cypriot President Anastasiades being a “yes” voter in the 2004 referendum. Clause 1 of the declaration states that the current situation is unacceptable and its prolongation will have negative consequences for the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Clause 2 states that,

“the leaders will aim to reach a settlement as soon as possible and hold … simultaneous referenda thereafter”.

However, progress since then has been very slow as the leaders have met only five times since February, and I cannot see what real progress has been achieved. What do the UK Government intend to do to encourage the Greek Cypriot side to accept the previously reached convergences so that the negotiations can move forward at a more reasonable pace? What is being done to speed up the process of appointing a new UN special adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus, which may also bring a new sense of urgency to the talks?

One of the key factors over the years in preventing a settlement has been the failure of the traditional top-down approach of the talks. According to a paper from Alexandros Lordos, research director for Cyprus 2015, one of the key arguments for the failure is that the Cypriot public are not involved in the peace process. Lordos states that there had been an opportunity to add public opinion analysis to the Annan negotiating process. Specifically, Professor Colin Irwin from Ireland was asked in 1998 if he could assist with such a programme. In that year he made a presentation of his Northern Ireland work to the Greek-Turkish forum in Istanbul and explained how it was used to build a consensus around the Belfast agreement. The forum subsequently decided that it would like to undertake a similar programme of research in Cyprus. Although the Greek Cypriot negotiators wanted to go ahead with a poll, the Turkish Cypriot Government did not. In the end, no polls were undertaken and without the benefits of an effective programme of public diplomacy both the negotiations and the subsequent referendum failed.

Lordos analyses how a public diplomacy approach would work in practice. First, the UN would step right back and be responsible for providing facilitation rather than drafting services, while groups of Cypriots would be responsible for drafting the peace plan. Secondly, the process would be overseen, supervised and guided by leaders of the two communities—but without being limited, as at present, to the leaders of the two communities. Thirdly, groups of experts would play a role, including civic society. However, an equally important part would be played by groups of society representatives —women, trade unions, commerce boards and refugees, for instance—who would add a human face and human perspective to the process.

Fourthly, the negotiating teams would have at their disposal reliable public opinion information on a regular basis. This would provide feedback on the public acceptability of the various alternative solutions that the negotiators would be considering. Fifthly, external actors such as Greece and Turkey would not have direct access to the drafting process, while other non-invasive and respectful ways should be found for their constructive input to be considered.

Lordos also suggests that the Cyprus problem can be divided into segments or sub-problems, and that, if each of these sub-problems can be solved to the satisfaction of both communities, the final settlement plan, derived by putting together the solutions to the sub-problems, will also be satisfactory to both communities. The areas he believes should be six: security, property, residence rights, settlers, power sharing and legal status.

In conclusion, I commend the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for being very active, especially in inviting the Turkish Cypriot leader and his negotiator to London—the first time that Turkish Cypriots have been invited to London. None of this, sadly, means that negotiations will be easy or successful to achieve the hoped-for impact that I outlined earlier, and the Lordos proposals have great appeal to me if current talks fail.