Sanctions (EU Exit) (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 4) Regulations 2020

Lord Northbrook Excerpts

Monday 8th February 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Northbrook (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I will confine my remarks to the unauthorised drilling activities in the eastern Mediterranean regulations. I declare my interest as co-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus—the TRNC.

By way of background to this statutory instrument, since 2006 Europe has increasingly viewed eastern Mediterranean gas as a resource with huge potential to provide economic growth, mitigate climate change and reduce dependence on Russian gas supplies. European companies have been involved in gas exploration while the European Union has largely supported the idea of a new pipeline that connects Israeli and Egyptian fields with Cyprus and mainland Europe. However, things might be changing. As there is an oversupply of non-Russian liquefied natural gas—LNG—the importance of Mediterranean gas is waning for Europe. Eastern Mediterranean gas is also providing a massive headache, with rival claims by Turkey, Greece and Cyprus on exclusive economic zones—EEZs—and exploration rights. In this short contribution I want to focus on Cyprus. Gas production would be a veritable boon for the cash-poor island.

EEZs are not easy. Greece is one of the signatories to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS. This designates a country’s EEZ as extending 200 miles from its shores. Yet regional powers, Turkey, Israel and Syria, have not signed UNCLOS and do not accept its rulings on EEZs. Lebanon disputes its maritime border with Israel, which it claims was compromised by Israel’s bilateral agreement with the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey argues that Cyprus is entitled to only a 12-mile EEZ until it reaches a resolution on the island’s status, and claims that the TRNC has the right to explore in Greek Cypriot waters. The TRNC believes that the gas resources belong to the whole island and that the north should have its share—a view that I do not feel is unreasonable.

Turkey, as an ally of the TRNC, has deployed exploration and drilling ships to Greek Cypriot waters and sent naval vessels there as well. As a result, the development of gas in these disputed waters has been frozen. Indeed, the tensions between Greece and Turkey over the issue became extremely high last year. Conflict was only narrowly averted and cannot be ruled out in the future. As a guarantor power in Cyprus, I would have hoped that the UK might take a more circumspect view on the gas issue. Now that we have left the EU, this seems a good opportunity to think more outside the box. Instead, we seem to be blindly copying EU regulations, without instead trying to fold the issue into revived Cyprus peace talks.

The failure of these peace talks at Crans-Montana in 2017, despite a major effort by former TRNC President Akıncı, was a great disappointment, especially as the TRNC went out of its way to make concessions, some of which alarmed mainland Turkey to such an extent that it did not want him to have another term. As these bi-zonal, bi-federal talks have failed, the new TRNC President Tatar—rightly, in my view—believes that a two-state solution is the only answer. According to the island-neutral Cyprus Mail, it is reported that, in private, President Anastasiades of the Republic of Cyprus is keen on the idea. The Cyprus Mail’s recent article stated that a section of the population of the Republic of Cyprus believed that he

“had calculatingly spurned the opportunity of a reasonable settlement at Crans-Montana”

because he really believes in a two-state solution.

With regard to the UK’s relationship with the TRNC, I welcome the recent meeting between our Foreign Secretary and President Tatar. Can the Minister say what came out of these talks? After Brexit there are good trade opportunities. As an interim measure, could the UK copy our Taiwan policy, whereby we have a trade office in Taipei, which is very successful, even though we do not have diplomatic relations?

A recent press release from the TRNC President sums up the opportunities well. He said the Turkish Cypriot side desires a win-win situation on Cyprus and believes that solving the decades-long Cyprus problem would help reinstate stability in the eastern Mediterranean. He also said that we should see what ideas and proposals the British diplomats bring to the table. He pointed out that he had also raised the issue of strengthening bilateral relations and commercial ties with the UK now that it had left the EU. Tatar also expressed concerns regarding the opening of certain parts of the British bases for non-military development. Can the Minister write to me on this?

I also ask the Minister, who is so well regarded in this House and has such expertise on FCO issues, when the UN Secretary-General’s 5+1 informal talks convene, will the FCO look at reality and the long-standing deadlock to realise that a two-state solution is the only answer and that the gas situation should be part of these talks, rather than just reinstating this unhelpful statutory instrument?

Foreign Policy: UK-EU Dialogue

Lord Northbrook Excerpts

Thursday 14th January 2021 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness Northover]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what formal arrangements they have put in place to enable regular dialogue between the United Kingdom and the European Union about foreign policy matters.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Lord Northbrook Excerpts

Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 21st May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My Lords, with the public register of beneficial ownership it should be possible to obtain those figures. It would be absurd if money that fled from the London property market went to the overseas territories and sought a haven there. Anyway, the figures that are given—I am very happy be told that the they are incorrect—are that £34 billion of Russian money is currently in the overseas territories, £30 billion of which is in the BVI, and there has been over £100 billion over the past decade. Surely a proportion of that at the very least is dirty money, and the question must therefore be posed: are we prepared to countenance dirty money finding a haven in the overseas territories? That is what is suggested.

We have to respond very sensitively. Of course there will be an economic impact, and that will only be exacerbated by the impact of the hurricane, particularly in the BVI. Because of the UK’s responsibility to these overseas territories, we will have to bear at least part of the cost, but surely we should not countenance the position that I have mentioned. If the Minister has figures other than this £34 billion, I am very happy to hear them, and if he suggests that none of that is dirty money then I will be happy to hear his view, but surely it is in everyone’s interest that dirty money be pursued wherever it is and that there be a publicly accessible register.

At the same time, the economic impact should be recognised, along with the possible damage to the constitutional position. If those countries wish to go independent, so be it. Fairly recently there was a report on the contingent liabilities to the British taxpayer of the overseas territories. I wonder where the balance would lie, if a number of these countries went independent, regarding the amount currently spent by the British taxpayer. I am happy with that, but the question must remain: if these figures are correct, and if it must be that a portion of that sum is dirty, are we prepared to allow that to continue?

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, is the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, aware that none of the overseas territories is on the EU blacklist of non-co-operative tax jurisdictions as of December last year?

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

That may well be the case, but I pose the question again. There is this £34 billion of Russian money. We know that the oligarchs look for areas where they can usefully hide their assets. Are we prepared to continue to allow that?

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[Lord Judd (Lab)]

My Lords, first let me say how much I appreciate the tremendous amount of work undertaken by the Minister in all that he has done on this front. I know that he has shown a great deal of personal commitment—as indeed did his predecessor. That should be put on record by all of us. We have moved a long way forward.

The noble Lord, Lord Naseby, said that he would not take lessons from Oxfam and Save the Children because of their record. I declare an interest: in the 1980s and 1990s I was a director of Oxfam and I have stayed very close to that organisation all my life, and remain as close now as I ever was—perhaps closer. I want to tell the noble Lord that the dismay and disgust in Oxfam at what happened in Haiti at the beginning of the decade cannot be overstated. There is profound dismay at what some people decided to do, and at the damage it has inevitably done both to the organisation and, more importantly, to thousands of people whom the organisation is now unable to help in the way that it would have liked because resources have inevitably dwindled.

That brings me to why this debate is so important. We have been discussing the technicalities of law and the constitution, and talking about the democratic rights of people—but what we are really talking about is justice, social responsibility and the accountability of wealth and power in the world. My noble friend Lord Anderson referred to the Select Committee’s report. It is a very important report, which we should all take very seriously, but it is operating in the context of parliamentary democracy and responsibility. All this Russian and other accumulated wealth that we are talking about—let us not dodge it; we have had allusions to property wealth finding its way to some of these territories as well—is not simply the wealth of those who are handling it; it is wealth that has come from countless ordinary people throughout society. That means that we all have a responsibility to ask: what are we doing, with teeth, to make sure that people who deceive, cheat and accumulate riches wrongly and unfairly are brought to account?

That is why I say how much I appreciate the tremendous work that the Minister has been doing. He has demonstrated the importance of diplomacy and the reality of the world that we live in. It is a matter not just of stating these things, however strongly we state them, but of how you move towards achieving what you want to achieve, and I take his arguments very seriously.

In the time that remains for this debate, I ask your Lordships to remember that we are talking not about money, although that may be a way of measuring the size of the problem, but about people—people from whom this money was accumulated and the countless people across the world for whose benefit it could be used through fair systems of taxation and through policies devised to meet the needs and help the development and emancipation of those who are exploited. This is not just a technical debate. I know that it is not fashionable to say it in this House but it has to be said: it is a debate about morality, justice and fairness. We have to stop sentimentalising about our commitment to those things; we have to make sure that there are teeth and muscle in meeting that commitment.

Perhaps I may come back for a moment to the challenge thrown down by the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, about my old organisation. I invite any of your Lordships to come and meet the staff, the trustees, the volunteers and the people across the world in the organisation who are busting a gut to make sure that something that happened at the beginning of the decade and let down the whole cause can never occur again.

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Naseby. The Minister, to his credit, spent quite a lot of his speech arguing against government Amendment 22. I wondered why the Deputy Speaker did not call the government amendments and had some suspicions, now proved, that they were tabled too late. I add my disappointment at the seemingly lackadaisical attitude of the FCO. That, as my noble friend Lord Naseby said, is deeply disappointing when the issue is so important.

I should like to refer to one or two points that have been raised. First, none of the overseas territories ais on the EU blacklist of non-co-operative tax jurisdictions. Secondly, as I understand it, money laundering is a devolved issue for the overseas territories. Therefore, I question the assertion of the noble Lord, Lord Beith, that it comes under the area of international relations or international treaties. To legislate without even consulting their parliaments, let alone asking for their consent, is deeply wrong. In addition, the EU withdrew its proposal for public registers in December 2016 on the ground of concern about human rights. Could this be another case that the overseas territories could pursue?

Most countries are not adopting public registers. For the Caribbean overseas territories, the rival centres are the USA, Hong Kong and Singapore. They do not have public registers. To use an Order in Council for financial regulation, when the overseas territories have already adopted international standards, could expose the UK to legal challenge and be overturned on judicial review. I do not regard this as an exceptional circumstance where the UK Government should make laws.

The other place may think it good short-term politics, but the serious economic consequences and damage to our relationship with the overseas territories, and with the Commonwealth, will be long lasting. Perhaps one of the noble and learned Lords in the House will give their services pro bono for judicial review.

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[Lord Collins of Highbury]

My Lords, I might as well begin by declaring what is not really a direct interest. My father was born in Bermuda and his father was born in Bermuda, so I think that entitles me to go and live there at some point and not have to deposit the $30 million that I think is currently needed if you want to live there. It is a very nice island, and I do love it and I love its people.

This debate is a reflection of constitutional concerns. There are concerns over the rights of people to determine their own laws and no one can disagree with that. But it is also a very strong moral debate, because we know that developing countries lose three times as much in tax avoidance as they get in all the international aid that is available to them. That is the scandal of this world we now live in. The Paradise papers and the Panama papers highlighted just how much of an issue this really is, and that is why we have such huge public concern. If we want to break the business model of stealing money and hiding it in places where it cannot be seen, transparency is the answer. I agree completely with the words of David Cameron in 2013 when he spoke about ripping aside “the cloak of secrecy” and repeated the well-known mantra that “sunlight is the best disinfectant”. I think that that commitment by David Cameron in 2013 is what this debate is about.

Last week, I had the opportunity of meeting the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition of the British Virgin Islands. They made their case very strongly to me about their concerns over this amendment. However, whatever position you are taking constitutionally, no matter what the concerns are, there is one thing that everyone agrees on, and that is that the scandal of money flowing out of countries and being hidden is something that has to stop. The Prime Minister of the British Virgin Islands acknowledges that transparency is important. We have heard about the actions of Bermuda and other places. David Cameron was actually trying to change the global position, to get to a position where we would have global agreement on addressing this issue.

How do we get global agreement? David Cameron believed it was by giving a lead. There is an issue here about reputation and being able to influence things. While we are in the European Union and saying, “You’ve got to ensure that all territories within the European Union comply with this”, and when we are in other global fora, we should be able to say that we will be acting on this. We know that the excuse of the overseas territories is often used by others to say, “If you’re not doing it there, why should we do it here?”. That is something that we have to address.

I absolutely understand the need to ensure that all the territories have the proper opportunity to consider this, but this is something that they have been acting on for some time. I respect the Minister’s undertaking to ensure that they have the necessary means as well as the necessary policy and advice.

[Lord Northbrook]

When the noble Lord talks about the relevant means, does that mean he expects the UK Government to substitute the revenue that these overseas territories are going to lose? He may say that some dodgy money will go out there, but some reputable people with money out there will take their money elsewhere. Is he saying the UK Government will have to take their place with our duty of supporting these overseas territories?

[Lord Collins of Highbury]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising that point. We have been talking about money flowing out. We have had debates elsewhere. I have also spent time working in Gibraltar and I know that on financial matters—Bermuda is another good example—it has built its reputation on having proper transparency and controls. That is what we need to establish: that there is a good way of doing this that will help expand the industry. Reputational interests are incredibly important.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, is absolutely right that we do have time; the point was also addressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay. We have had some considerable time already on this issue, but we have time to ensure that we can get everybody on board with this principle. The only way we will get global agreement is for the United Kingdom to go into those international fora and say, “No more—we need transparency”, because transparency is what will ensure that we can find all those activities, particularly tax avoidance.

Northern Cyprus

Lord Northbrook Excerpts

Monday 16th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, it is tempting to answer the two questions of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, rather succinctly. To his first, I say that there will be plenty of problems now that the reunification talks have collapsed. As for the second, I am sure the Minister will recite the usual FCO formula that both sides have to work out a new solution and the UK cannot assist until they have produced an almost final blueprint. That view needs revision, as I shall come on to discuss later; but, like the noble Lord, I want to praise the FCO for its efforts toward the end of the talks in trying to achieve a solution.

However, I think the question of the noble Lord needs much more detailed analysis. The main problem will be the continued isolation of Northern Cyprus, which will continue to rely upon Turkey’s support. That isolation comes in several forms. First, it is economic. For instance, I will cite the major problem of the relationship with the EU which, unbelievably, agreed in 2004 that Cyprus could join, regardless of whether agreement had been reached with the Turkish Cypriots. To add insult and injury to the north, it is the whole island that had formally acceded to membership, including the unrecognised and unrepresented Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus—TRNC. As a result, the north is deprived of favourable tariff treatment from the EU and other financial benefits to help the infrastructure and other projects.

The next economic problem applies to the natural resources available from the seas surrounding the island. If the island was reunited, there would be the possibility of exploiting the gas resources in, for instance, the Aphrodite field. At the moment, such exploitation is impossible. That gas could be piped to Turkey, giving Cyprus much cheaper energy on the way.

Another form of isolation is travel. As the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, has already stated, visitors to the north are unable to fly directly to the island, having to stop in Turkey on the way. Such a problem will not be solved as long as the island is divided. That has a direct effect on tourism for the north, as the hassle factor of getting to it deters many. Varosha, which was a prime tourist resort before partition, is still shut off; that is a benefit to no one.

Another problem faced by the north could be the attitude of Turkey. The unpredictable President Erdogan could seek to take in Northern Cyprus as another province of Turkey. That would be a very unsettling event as it could stir up the Greek Cypriot community and Greece itself.

What should be done to solve these problems? Like every other speaker, I fear that negotiations to reunite the island as one entity are now doomed to fail, basically because the Greek side has got exactly what it wants at present, especially with membership of the EU. As Jack Straw, the former Foreign Secretary, wrote in the Independent on 1 October:

“For any negotiation of this kind to succeed, both sides have to be able to gain something. But, from the Greek Cypriot point of view, conceding political equality with the Turkish Cypriots means giving power away. If the quid pro quo had been EU membership, a deal in my view would have been agreed. But absent that … no Greek-Cypriot leader will ever be able to get their electorate behind a deal. The status quo for the south is simply too comfortable”.


Jack Straw goes on to say that he believes the international community should,

“acknowledge this reality and recognise the partition of the island. That would be far more likely to improve relations between the two communities than continuing the useless merry-go-round of further negotiations for a settlement that never can be”.

So what should the role of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office be? Several members of the APPG group for the TRNC, of which I am a member, visited the FCO in July. For myself, having watched the progress of the talks carefully over the last two years, there were major indicators of lack of progress, particularly when it appeared that the Greek side was expanding the convergences. The FCO was putting all its money on the negotiations succeeding and it was apparent that it had no plan B if the talks were to fail. That was too narrow an approach to take. The FCO should be much more proactive at an earlier stage and look to push forward the partition concept. An interesting article by Dr Sen Dervish of the Centre for the Study of International Peace and Security looks at that idea in more detail. First, she says that Cyprus is already a,

“de facto militarily-partitioned state between Turkey and Greece”.

She believes that reunification is,

“a pipe dream … A readiness for political compromise and social cohesion—undisputedly a precursor for any peace deal—is debatably non-existent on the island … The psycho-political stance of the two Cypriot communities indicates that they want to remain divided; Cyprus should not be left at the mercy of an endless peace process where issues are negotiated to a point of tautology”.

She believes that recognition of the two states,

“would consequently eradicate many legal and political problems surrounding partition, such as human rights and property issues … There are further axiomatic legal obstacles to partition, such as Article II of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee signed by the two Cypriot leaders, Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom. International organisations such as the EU perpetuate the existence of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus, granting it enjoyment of protections awarded to states under public international law. In reality, however, there exist two democratic states of Cyprus and obstacles to peace are overtly political rather than strictly legal … accordingly, the solution needs to be a political one. Partition would also result in the destruction of rights of residence and property of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots; justified mutual claims for compensation can, however, be raised following the recognition of the TRNC. Moreover, redistribution of land rights in the interests of permanent peace is not, however, a new concept and has been employed—contentiously but successfully— … in Colombia”.

She concludes:

“If the partition of Cyprus is internationally accepted, a wide variety of challenges of the ongoing peace negotiations can be resolved: derogations from EU law regarding living in the north without limits; freedoms will be restored throughout Cyprus; the contentious guarantorship will cease to be required”.


More controversially, she says that the,

“Greek Cypriot authorities will acquire the sole legal right to use the hydrocarbon findings that have been found on the south of the island”.

I am not sure I can agree with this last point because I feel the natural resources should be shared.

Cyprus

Lord Northbrook Excerpts

Tuesday 15th July 2014 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Northbrook]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the impact of a successful conclusion to current negotiations on the future of Cyprus on the people of Cyprus and on regional stability.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, this now being last business, it may stretch to 90 minutes rather than 60. The timings for the opening and closing speakers will remain the same, but those in between may luxuriate in up to eight minutes, if they wish.

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[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, I am very pleased to debate the impact of resolving the Cyprus issue on the Floor of the House, which to me shows its increasing importance as a key issue in the eastern Mediterranean. Some speakers may well feel that I am putting the cart before the horse by discussing the impact of a settlement before one has been achieved. When I tabled this QSD, prospects looked rather brighter than they do at present, but I am an eternal optimist. By focusing on the impact from an international as well as a Cypriot viewpoint, I hope to add an extra dimension to the argument, and encourage the two sides to look at these broader issues, rather than narrow tribal rivalries.

The island has been divided for 40 years. In those 40 years talks on reunification have been an enduring feature of political life, without any success. The Annan plan of 2004 was the last and most comprehensive proposal for a settlement. It was overwhelmingly accepted by the Turkish Cypriots and comprehensively rejected by the Greek Cypriots. The reasons for rejection have been carefully analysed in the aftermath. Essentially, the Greek Cypriot political elite and people saw no benefit to them in the proposals, so they voted against.

We are now in the middle of a renewed negotiation. Many see this as the best hope for reunification. Where the negotiations seem to be different this time from the Annan plan, is that they are by Cypriots, for Cypriots—although as I will discuss later, they seem to have the same fault of failing to involve the wider Cypriot public. It is clear that both sides must see the benefit to them of any proposal for reunification—or, as the Turkish Cypriot chief negotiator Dr Kudret Ozersay puts it, they at least see the real harm to their interests that rejection would bring.

So what are these benefits? First, I suggest they are for the people of Cyprus themselves to be able to be one country again and extend their influence in the Mediterranean and on the world stage. Next, they are economic. Meltdown in the Greek Cypriot banking sector would surely have been less severe if Turkish financial know-how had been available to regulate it. UK companies could expand their links with the whole island. Cyprus, as a member of the Commonwealth, could look to the rich Commonwealth countries for investment. Elsewhere, the reunified island would be able to expand its trading links with the EU and Turkey.

Regional stability would be improved. Turkey is a member of NATO but not the EU. Greek Cyprus is not a member of NATO. A reunified island would see Cyprus join NATO, and thus counteract the influence of Russia, which has not only bailed out the Greek Cypriot banks but is now able to use the airbase near Paphos and Limassol for its naval vessels. It is also signing agreements with Israel.

This could partly explain the visit to Cyprus this year by the Vice-President of the USA, Joe Biden—the first such visit for 50 years. The USA is concerned about increasing Russian influence in the eastern Mediterranean. Another reason for his visit was surely the interest in an alternative source of energy supply for the West. The Aphrodite field off the south-east of Cyprus is a useful gas find, but unless it is combined with the neighbouring Leviathan and Tamar Israeli fields it will not produce sufficient gas to justify an LNG plant on the island. If such an arrangement can be agreed, the gas could be piped to Turkey, thus bypassing Russian sources of supply and giving Cyprus much cheaper energy on the way.

The whole exercise would be possible only with a reunified island, and the benefits will not be felt for several years. Can I ask the Minister whether the UK Government support the equal distribution of the natural resources found around the island between the two communities? Do they support the constructive proposal previously made by the Turkish Cypriot side in 2011-12 which includes the establishment of an ad hoc committee to deal with issues regarding natural resources?

Another natural resource that the whole of Cyprus could benefit from after a successful peace process would be water. An ambitious plan is in train to link Turkey with the TRNC, which would help eliminate chronic water shortages. This water supply could then be extended to the south, and thus the whole of Cyprus would benefit. The supply of water to the south could be the quid pro quo for the south agreeing to allow gas to be transported through to the north and thus on to Turkey.

The next area to benefit would be tourism. The stark reality of the current situation was demonstrated to me during my visit to the TRNC last July. Seeing Varosha, which was a prime tourist resort before partition, completely shut off was extraordinary and of benefit to no one. The inconvenience of having to fly to Turkey first if you want to visit the north must put off a lot of visitors.

In the remaining part of my comments, I wish to address the latest attempt to get a solution. In February 2014, the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities issued a joint declaration. On the surface this looked promising, with the Greek Cypriot President Anastasiades being a “yes” voter in the 2004 referendum. Clause 1 of the declaration states that the current situation is unacceptable and its prolongation will have negative consequences for the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Clause 2 states that,

“the leaders will aim to reach a settlement as soon as possible and hold … simultaneous referenda thereafter”.

However, progress since then has been very slow as the leaders have met only five times since February, and I cannot see what real progress has been achieved. What do the UK Government intend to do to encourage the Greek Cypriot side to accept the previously reached convergences so that the negotiations can move forward at a more reasonable pace? What is being done to speed up the process of appointing a new UN special adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus, which may also bring a new sense of urgency to the talks?

One of the key factors over the years in preventing a settlement has been the failure of the traditional top-down approach of the talks. According to a paper from Alexandros Lordos, research director for Cyprus 2015, one of the key arguments for the failure is that the Cypriot public are not involved in the peace process. Lordos states that there had been an opportunity to add public opinion analysis to the Annan negotiating process. Specifically, Professor Colin Irwin from Ireland was asked in 1998 if he could assist with such a programme. In that year he made a presentation of his Northern Ireland work to the Greek-Turkish forum in Istanbul and explained how it was used to build a consensus around the Belfast agreement. The forum subsequently decided that it would like to undertake a similar programme of research in Cyprus. Although the Greek Cypriot negotiators wanted to go ahead with a poll, the Turkish Cypriot Government did not. In the end, no polls were undertaken and without the benefits of an effective programme of public diplomacy both the negotiations and the subsequent referendum failed.

Lordos analyses how a public diplomacy approach would work in practice. First, the UN would step right back and be responsible for providing facilitation rather than drafting services, while groups of Cypriots would be responsible for drafting the peace plan. Secondly, the process would be overseen, supervised and guided by leaders of the two communities—but without being limited, as at present, to the leaders of the two communities. Thirdly, groups of experts would play a role, including civic society. However, an equally important part would be played by groups of society representatives —women, trade unions, commerce boards and refugees, for instance—who would add a human face and human perspective to the process.

Fourthly, the negotiating teams would have at their disposal reliable public opinion information on a regular basis. This would provide feedback on the public acceptability of the various alternative solutions that the negotiators would be considering. Fifthly, external actors such as Greece and Turkey would not have direct access to the drafting process, while other non-invasive and respectful ways should be found for their constructive input to be considered.

Lordos also suggests that the Cyprus problem can be divided into segments or sub-problems, and that, if each of these sub-problems can be solved to the satisfaction of both communities, the final settlement plan, derived by putting together the solutions to the sub-problems, will also be satisfactory to both communities. The areas he believes should be six: security, property, residence rights, settlers, power sharing and legal status.

In conclusion, I commend the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for being very active, especially in inviting the Turkish Cypriot leader and his negotiator to London—the first time that Turkish Cypriots have been invited to London. None of this, sadly, means that negotiations will be easy or successful to achieve the hoped-for impact that I outlined earlier, and the Lordos proposals have great appeal to me if current talks fail.

Cyprus

Lord Northbrook Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd October 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Northbrook]

My Lords, as a relative newcomer to the Cyprus question and as a member of the all-party Northern Cyprus group, I have listened to many experts speaking in that group and here today. The recent Congressional Research Service paper entitled, optimistically, Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive, reiterates that roughly 18% of the population are of Turkish origin, so any settlement must take fair account of this representation. The Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 promised the Turkish population security, which was in danger of being breached by a more hard-line president in Greece, who was encouraging union of the island with Greece. Hence, there was the need for Turkey to invade in 1974 to protect their minority on the island.

I can understand more clearly the history of negotiations since the 2002 Annan plan. The best chances of reunification appeared to be the Christofias-Talat negotiations between 2008 and 2010. However, since Mr Eroglu came to power, relations between the two sides seem to have become much more difficult. President Christofias comes out with little credit and it remains to be seen what the attitude of his successor will be after the election in 2013.

With regards to the issues, the paper makes clear why negotiations have been so difficult. First, there is the very basic issue of how a new united Cyprus would be created. The Greek Cypriots assume it would be evolved from the existing Republic of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot view, which I have much more sympathy for, is that the new state would be based on two equal founding states. Mr Eroglu has hinted that he is not prepared to give up the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus or its flag. Disagreement has also continued over the process for appointing the president and vice-president.

The next very difficult area is the thorny issue of property. Since 1974, it is estimated that over 150,000 Greek Cypriots living in the north have been forced south, and close to 50,000 Turkish Cypriots living in the south have fled to the north, with both communities leaving massive amounts of vacated property. The establishment of the Immovable Property Commission—the IPC—to hear cases related to Greek Cypriot property in the north was a positive step. It is interesting to note that a few private Greek property owners have filed claims for compensation. As in past negotiations, the gap in the respective Cypriot positions had been great and appears to remain so.

Then there is the by no means small issue of overall territory that would come under the jurisdiction of the two equal states. The Turkish Cypriot side of the Green Line includes approximately 37% of the island and includes several areas that had been almost 100% Greek Cypriot-inhabited before the 1974 division. Greek Cypriots want that territory returned, which would leave the Turkish Cypriot side controlling about 29% of the territory. Next to the property issue, the issue of security guarantees continues to be one of the most difficult bridges to cross. At the end of all this, I feel that the only way forward will be to involve civil society more, but I fear that formalised partition may be a possibility.

Trade and Investment

Lord Northbrook Excerpts

Wednesday 9th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Green of Hurstpierpoint]

I thank my noble friend Lord Burnett for those suggestions, which are both important. I am happy to undertake that the Government will ensure in their dialogue with the banks that money transfers, particularly for small businesses—but, frankly, for anybody—are done as rapidly as is reasonable. I also agree that we should encourage large companies to ensure that they settle bills with their smaller suppliers as promptly as possible.

[Lord Northbrook]

My Lords, I congratulate the Minister on the White Paper. I applaud the strengthening of the ECGD scheme and the focus on improving important emerging markets such as India, China and Latin America as well as on existing trading partners. I also agree with him on the importance of the Doha round. However, I have a problem with the coalition’s measures for restricting capital allowances for manufacturing companies. If we are to try to refocus the UK economy on manufacturing, surely we need to encourage our manufacturing companies to reinvest and thus not restrict these capital allowances.

[Lord Green of Hurstpierpoint]

I welcome my noble friend Lord Northbrook’s support for what is proposed in respect of the ECGD and the commitment that the Government have given on Doha. The Government are clear that they want the most competitive corporate tax environment of any of our major competitor countries. As the noble Lord is aware, the headline rate of corporation tax is coming down by one percentage point between now and 2014. When it reaches its final level in 2014, it will be the most competitive rate among the G7 economies. From the many comments received from many companies, we have also recently announced the introduction of what I know is important to them; namely, a patent box to enable them to benefit from the fruits of research and intellectual property.

Overall, the sense is that we have got the balance about right. In recent weeks, as I have visited small and larger companies in the regions of this country, I have found that tax does not register as one of the regular issues where they are looking for enhanced government support. I think that they recognise the intent and the substance of what policies have already been announced.