Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Moylan Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Monday 25th October 2021 Lords Chamber

Directly elected mayors and police and crime commissioners already have considerable de facto authority in their local areas from their electoral mandate, without the need for legal powers to force other bodies to provide them with information. Clause 16 is not necessary and should not stand part of the Bill. To suggest that anyone in a position of trust and responsibility who is working with the issues and people affected by serious violence needs to be coerced, to have a legal duty placed on them to collaborate and to pass information that is essential to the prevention and tackling of serious violence to the appropriate authorities, is an insult and is likely to be counterproductive.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I lend my support to Amendments 34, 60 and 65 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, to which I have added my name. I do so particularly in regard to the Bill’s effects on local authorities, having 28 years’ experience of having served on one.

Local authority officers, especially those working in social services, are the most collaborative people possible—they have multiagency working written into their DNA—but within proper professional limits, especially concerning the guardianship of personal information. Their focus is always first and foremost, properly, on the welfare of their client—in the case of serious violence, often young people living in the twilight zone between potential offender and, at the same time, potential victim. Of course, the risk in these provisions is that the disclosure of information provisions in Clause 15 changes the relationship between social worker and client so as to drive the latter away from services that could in fact divert them from serious violence.

What I do not fully understand and has not been made explicit is whether Clause 15 alters or expands the existing legal and professional constraints that social workers operate under in relation to the release of information to the police. If it does not, what is the point of it? If it does, will my noble friend say in what way and to what extent it does so, and what the rationale is? It may be that my noble friend can satisfy my concerns about this, but in the meantime the amendments proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, particularly Amendment 65 requiring depersonalisation of data, go some way to address those concerns, and I support them.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, this group enables me to raise a concern that will not be new to the Committee or to the Minister but has not been resolved as a general issue and is possible as the Bill is drafted. It is the reluctance of immigrant women—it is usually women—suffering domestic abuse to go to the police for help because they fear that information will be shared with immigration authorities.

Last week, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner published a report entitled Safety Before Status, and one of her recommendations is that

“the Home Office should introduce a firewall between police and immigration enforcement, accompanied by safe reporting mechanisms”

I cannot resist saying that it continues

“and funded referral pathways to support.”

Perpetrators can use a victim’s insecure status as a component of coercive control. They can use status that is not insecure, but the victim is led to believe that it is. If victims are to come first, it is essential that they know that they can seek support without putting themselves in danger of deportation. I was going to ask noble Lords to imagine what this means, but I am not sure any of us can: not only the financial and accommodation implications considerations but, in some communities, shame and abandonment by the family in the country of origin. There are a number of very difficult consequences—that is putting it too mildly.

The commissioner’s report says:

“Immigration abuse and insecure immigration status as a risk factor is not always identified in local safeguarding protocols, and often the risk faced by victims … is misidentified.”


She goes on:

“Information sharing with immigration enforcement undermines trust in the police and public services”—


a point that has been made this evening—

“and enables perpetrators to control and abuse survivors with impunity. A key reason why staff in public services share information with immigration enforcement is for the perceived purpose of safeguarding a victim. Data sharing in this capacity, however, can put the victim or survivor at risk … and, even where enforcement action does not take place can compound the experience of immigration abuse, pushing victims and survivors further away from support.”

I could not let this group go by without raising that issue.