Rules-based International Order

Lord Mountevans Excerpts

Thursday 16th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mountevans (CB)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to speak in this debate. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, on identifying such a massively important issue for our time and on her excellent introduction. If I may, I am not going to predict what President Trump may or may not do, although I do share the concerns voiced by some present. To the extent that the UK seeks to be a force for good, what I principally wish to address is remarks concerning preparedness in changed and changing circumstances.

Perhaps challenges to the rules-based international order started most blatantly back in 2008 when the world witnessed the Russo-Georgian War. Six years later, in 2014, Russia illegally annexed Crimea and started a war in eastern Ukraine, which eventually transformed into a full-blown attack on the country, and which continues to this day. In the meantime, putting to one side its annexation of Tibet in 1951, China has been attempting to redraw rights of sea passage in the South China Sea by constructing an array of extensive military facilities and has systematically eroded Hong Kong’s freedoms. Alarmingly, it has also on multiple occasions categorically asserted its aim to unify democratic Taiwan with mainland China, threatening to do so by force if necessary.

But it is not just Russia and China, though they are the most important disrupters. There are numerous countries and regimes that are not full participants in the rules-based order or which, like Iran and North Korea, pretty much play by their own rules. The result is a world where an increasing number of nations and societies put a low value on human life—President Putin does not value the lives of conscripts and convicts at all—where there is the highest ever number of conflicts in process, and where the UN is highly challenged due to players who do not accept the current rules. In particular, Russia and China have a veto on the Security Council. A significant number of countries feel that the system is not working for them and in the meantime, need, greed and corruption see democracy being eroded on an alarming scale.

In the 2000s and 2010s, the democracies became complacent. On the one hand, Russia retreated from international aggression and entered a short and confused era. On our side, we became risk averse as we clung to that old system, and we became averse to conflict and reluctant in the use of force. We made steep reductions in defence spending and were comfortable in what seemed to be a period of peace. But the integrated review of 2021 and its refresh already pronounced the decay of the rules-based international system, so for the democracies this new era of intensifying geopolitical competition requires new thinking. The extent of the challenge posed by large authoritarian states is clear.

My good friends at the Council on Geostrategy—I declare an interest as a member of its advisory board—have summarised the mounting challenges we face succinctly under three headings, each highly destructive. First, we face an anti-systemic drive, primarily from Russia. Russia lacks the means to replace the prevailing order with a new one, even in the Euro-Atlantic area. Instead, it focuses on an anti-systemic approach designed to spoil and degrade the free and open international order, with a specific focus on eastern Europe, where, due to proximity and history, it is strongest. Secondly, we face a counter-systemic challenge, primarily from China. Beijing seeks to break down the free and open international order before replacing it with a new one centred on an authoritarian China. Thirdly, on a different point, many leading democracies seem unprepared to generate the power needed to underpin the system. For example, defence spending remains very low by historical standards, even when taking into account recent rises in NATO countries—particularly Poland and Germany—and elsewhere, such as Japan.

We need to move faster to invest in our infrastructure, domestic industrial base and state autonomy to move away from economic links with authoritarian rivals. This is particularly acute when it comes to China, on which we have become dependent for many critical minerals and manufactures. It is time for a rethink and a more vigorous stance in defence of our freedoms, prosperity and that which we hold dear. We need to think more about shaping the international order of the future—a free and open international order. This means that we need to learn to value power and be willing to utilise it once again. Our competitors appear to understand power very well and they are prepared to take risks: from building fake islands in the South China Sea to invading foreign countries such as Ukraine. Perhaps, sadly, they have come to understand power and escalation better than we do. Undoubtedly, they recognise the extent to which the democracies would really far rather not engage in hostilities. But unfortunately, in this new world, power is going to be increasingly important to international relations. It always was critical.

In the 1990s, however, our power became invisible and less important, at least to us. Power is not only about military strength, though we undoubtedly need more resources to uphold a strong defence which can deter. Power is also about economic strength and command over discourse and narratives. Much of this new era of competition already is—and will be—about economic, political and discursive instruments of power.

In my remaining time, I will look at some things that I believe could be done. We need a whole-of-society approach with full societal engagement, not just for Britain but in other democracies. We also as a matter of urgency need to adopt longer-term thinking. Business typically has a short-term horizon while government of course has to live within electoral cycles. We need to see the international world as one world. If we do not, our adversaries will continue to undermine the free world.

The best way to uphold peace is to deter, not just militarily but politically, economically and discursively. We need not overconcentrate on Russia; China is a much bigger threat. We need a strong domestic foundation, political and commercial, and a focus on emerging technical sectors. As for the new minilateral arrangements, we must be alive to any and all possibilities better to meet the challenges of our competitors, and I note the success of the AUKUS and JEF arrangements.

We need to develop a more competitive mindset and we must be ready to identify the attempts of others to undermine us and prepare to push back with a vision of our own, underpinned by strong domestic foundations. This is a battle for ideas, and this is a battle we must win if we want to ensure sovereignty, security and prosperity, both for ourselves and our key allies and partners.