Rules-based International Order

Lord Mountevans Excerpts

Thursday 16th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mountevans (CB)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to speak in this debate. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, on identifying such a massively important issue for our time and on her excellent introduction. If I may, I am not going to predict what President Trump may or may not do, although I do share the concerns voiced by some present. To the extent that the UK seeks to be a force for good, what I principally wish to address is remarks concerning preparedness in changed and changing circumstances.

Perhaps challenges to the rules-based international order started most blatantly back in 2008 when the world witnessed the Russo-Georgian War. Six years later, in 2014, Russia illegally annexed Crimea and started a war in eastern Ukraine, which eventually transformed into a full-blown attack on the country, and which continues to this day. In the meantime, putting to one side its annexation of Tibet in 1951, China has been attempting to redraw rights of sea passage in the South China Sea by constructing an array of extensive military facilities and has systematically eroded Hong Kong’s freedoms. Alarmingly, it has also on multiple occasions categorically asserted its aim to unify democratic Taiwan with mainland China, threatening to do so by force if necessary.

But it is not just Russia and China, though they are the most important disrupters. There are numerous countries and regimes that are not full participants in the rules-based order or which, like Iran and North Korea, pretty much play by their own rules. The result is a world where an increasing number of nations and societies put a low value on human life—President Putin does not value the lives of conscripts and convicts at all—where there is the highest ever number of conflicts in process, and where the UN is highly challenged due to players who do not accept the current rules. In particular, Russia and China have a veto on the Security Council. A significant number of countries feel that the system is not working for them and in the meantime, need, greed and corruption see democracy being eroded on an alarming scale.

In the 2000s and 2010s, the democracies became complacent. On the one hand, Russia retreated from international aggression and entered a short and confused era. On our side, we became risk averse as we clung to that old system, and we became averse to conflict and reluctant in the use of force. We made steep reductions in defence spending and were comfortable in what seemed to be a period of peace. But the integrated review of 2021 and its refresh already pronounced the decay of the rules-based international system, so for the democracies this new era of intensifying geopolitical competition requires new thinking. The extent of the challenge posed by large authoritarian states is clear.

My good friends at the Council on Geostrategy—I declare an interest as a member of its advisory board—have summarised the mounting challenges we face succinctly under three headings, each highly destructive. First, we face an anti-systemic drive, primarily from Russia. Russia lacks the means to replace the prevailing order with a new one, even in the Euro-Atlantic area. Instead, it focuses on an anti-systemic approach designed to spoil and degrade the free and open international order, with a specific focus on eastern Europe, where, due to proximity and history, it is strongest. Secondly, we face a counter-systemic challenge, primarily from China. Beijing seeks to break down the free and open international order before replacing it with a new one centred on an authoritarian China. Thirdly, on a different point, many leading democracies seem unprepared to generate the power needed to underpin the system. For example, defence spending remains very low by historical standards, even when taking into account recent rises in NATO countries—particularly Poland and Germany—and elsewhere, such as Japan.

We need to move faster to invest in our infrastructure, domestic industrial base and state autonomy to move away from economic links with authoritarian rivals. This is particularly acute when it comes to China, on which we have become dependent for many critical minerals and manufactures. It is time for a rethink and a more vigorous stance in defence of our freedoms, prosperity and that which we hold dear. We need to think more about shaping the international order of the future—a free and open international order. This means that we need to learn to value power and be willing to utilise it once again. Our competitors appear to understand power very well and they are prepared to take risks: from building fake islands in the South China Sea to invading foreign countries such as Ukraine. Perhaps, sadly, they have come to understand power and escalation better than we do. Undoubtedly, they recognise the extent to which the democracies would really far rather not engage in hostilities. But unfortunately, in this new world, power is going to be increasingly important to international relations. It always was critical.

In the 1990s, however, our power became invisible and less important, at least to us. Power is not only about military strength, though we undoubtedly need more resources to uphold a strong defence which can deter. Power is also about economic strength and command over discourse and narratives. Much of this new era of competition already is—and will be—about economic, political and discursive instruments of power.

In my remaining time, I will look at some things that I believe could be done. We need a whole-of-society approach with full societal engagement, not just for Britain but in other democracies. We also as a matter of urgency need to adopt longer-term thinking. Business typically has a short-term horizon while government of course has to live within electoral cycles. We need to see the international world as one world. If we do not, our adversaries will continue to undermine the free world.

The best way to uphold peace is to deter, not just militarily but politically, economically and discursively. We need not overconcentrate on Russia; China is a much bigger threat. We need a strong domestic foundation, political and commercial, and a focus on emerging technical sectors. As for the new minilateral arrangements, we must be alive to any and all possibilities better to meet the challenges of our competitors, and I note the success of the AUKUS and JEF arrangements.

We need to develop a more competitive mindset and we must be ready to identify the attempts of others to undermine us and prepare to push back with a vision of our own, underpinned by strong domestic foundations. This is a battle for ideas, and this is a battle we must win if we want to ensure sovereignty, security and prosperity, both for ourselves and our key allies and partners.

Latin America

Lord Mountevans Excerpts

Thursday 7th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mountevans (CB)]

My Lords, I join other Members in congratulating the noble Baroness, Lady Hooper, on securing this important debate. She is a champion for closer relations with Latin America. As a distinguished former president of Canning House, she is, quite frankly, an inspiration. I declare my own unremunerated interest as the current honorary president of Canning House, which is now in its 80th year. It is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, another of its former presidents.

According to my latest figures, Latin America has a population of around 650 million, almost double that of the United States and 10 times that of the UK. Three of the largest cities in the world by population are located there, and the region is the second-most urbanised in the world, with 78% of people living in cities.

However, as we have heard, it is a very sad fact that Latin America, in general, does not receive the attention in Britain that it deserves. At a time of great international concern, it is deeply regrettable but perhaps understandable that Latin America is not higher on the Government’s list of priorities.

As CEO of Canning House and former Latin America Minister in the coalition Government, Jeremy Browne, writes in the introduction to our latest review of the region, the LatAm Outlook 2024, which the noble Baroness, Lady Hooper, mentioned and was published just two days ago—I commend it highly to those with an interest in Latin America—there is a

“danger … that Britain overlooks Latin America, not consciously, but because there are always bigger distractions elsewhere”.

This is most unfortunate, as Latin America is an important partner for Britain across a whole range of interests. There is real friendship from many of these countries dating back to their independence, where, in most instances, the UK played a significant part.

In the 19th century, Britain had a huge hand in developing the coffee trade, building railways and much more. The longest traded share on the London Stock Exchange is that of the Chilean copper miner Antofagasta. I have personally enjoyed great friendship in Chile, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Argentina, Panama and Costa Rica in business, as sheriff and then Lord Mayor of London, and with a son now living and marrying in Costa Rica.

The great majority of the Latin American countries are democracies. A number of them, including Chile, Peru and Argentina, have in the recent past come through intense elections, opting for major change, but accomplished correctly, in each case according to their constitutions. The remarkable political maturity that much of Latin America has demonstrated recently is something we should commend and support. We are told that autocracies now outnumber democracies. I ask the Minister, who is held in such high regard in this Chamber, to confirm that the very status of established democracy is an important consideration for our Government when looking at Latin America.

There would appear to be no early likelihood of armed conflict—I leave aside questions of Guyana and, sadly, now Venezuela—between any Latin American nations. Leaving aside internal conflicts, to which I shall return, these are peace-loving countries. None of them has nuclear capabilities.

Latin America is an obvious ally for the UK on climate change. The region is often cited as a custodian of the Amazon. A number of countries in central America—Costa Rica, Panama and Ecuador—enjoy the remarkable distinction of being at or close to carbon neutrality. More broadly, it is a world-leading region in the utilisation of non-carbon energy.

With more than half of the world’s known reserves of lithium and more than 40% of known copper reserves, the region is of great interest to China, the United States and Europe. It is also the world’s biggest net exporter of food, as we have heard, with an estimated 18% of all global food exports by 2031. The region is a source of significant additional oil and gas production, notably from Brazil and Guyana—I strongly support the remarks made about the need to guarantee that country’s security. We should not overlook the vast potential for shale gas in Argentina. At a time when much of the world is looking to avoid Russian oil and gas, and it makes sense not to be overdependent on the Middle East, this is a clear opportunity for Latin America.

Along with its significant hydroelectric power, major potential for solar and wind generation, and the promise of green hydrogen, Latin America has a great deal going for it—so what is holding it back? It is certainly not China, which has been investing heavily. It recognises the important resources and potential of the region. In particular, it has invested heavily in rare minerals. Apparently, this has not been achieved by any underhand methods; it has been buying companies on the open market. The reality is that China takes a very long-term view, often in contrast to what might be termed the West. Further, with its absolutist structure, with government, business and finance aligned, it has the ability to move rapidly and progress at pace. There is a clear contrast with the West. Latin American trade with China has grown, while there has been limited growth with the US and Europe. In 2000, Latin American trade with China stood at $12.5 billion. By 2021, it stood at $450 billion. The view has been expressed that Latin America wants to avoid replacing one hegemony, the United States, with another, China. This is a clear opportunity for Britain and Europe.

In my view, the biggest obstacles to western investment are transport infrastructure, security and corruption. Although living standards have been rising, and with a growing middle class, there remains considerable poverty throughout the region. Poverty and, in some cases, remoteness from positive government influence and intervention have shaped a growing trade in narcotics, particularly cocaine, which represents an horrific epidemic, particularly in North America and Europe. I personally have difficulty blaming all that on Latin American countries, where local poverty and remoteness stimulate the growing of illegal crops, feeding the demand for well-to-do individuals in rich countries. With this demand come whole structures of often sophisticated illegal transport, sometimes affecting countries just because they have very good infrastructure. It is easy to say, but we must find a way to eliminate the enrichment of callous lawbreakers wherever they are, but not least in Latin America, where they are holding countries back, spawning lawlessness and discouraging investment.

Given its enormous land mass, Latin America is important in terms of geopolitics, international trade and freedom of navigation. Britain has close defence ties with Chile, defence co-operation with Brazil and a history of seeking to assist the Government of Colombia in its challenges with the narcotics industry. On the other hand, the disputed sovereignty of the Falkland Islands has been a thorny matter in relations with Argentina and, to an extent, the wider region.

This is a vital time for UK business and trade. Our competitors, not only China but elsewhere in Asia, North America and Europe, are not sitting around. The government support and encouragement is vital. I was impressed by the contents of a paper presented by the business specialist for Latin America and the Caribbean at the Department for Business and Trade. Good work is going on to make trade easier. For example, there are now eight double taxation agreements, including with Brazil, and the shiny new agreement with the CPTPP, among other positive developments. She drew attention to areas of opportunity, including fintech, where there are many highly tech-savvy individuals in Latin America. In general, IT is growing much faster in these countries than national income.

This is perhaps a good moment to mention how fortunate we are to have an exceptionally engaged Minister for Latin America in David Rutley, and we are also fortunate to have some dedicated diplomats in post in the region. We are also blessed with an excellent cadre of Latin American diplomats here in London.

In the post-Brexit era, with an outward-looking Britain, it is particularly important that the UK builds relationships with increased exports. The good will and friendship of many Latin Americans towards the UK is well known. We have much on our side to encourage, but we must first grow British awareness of the value and attraction of the region.