Abortion

Lord Morris of Aberavon Excerpts

Thursday 10th October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I know of the long-standing interest that my noble friend has had in this issue, going back, as she indicated, to the passage of the initial legislation. Given the reporting, people might well think that this case was about medical practitioners offering abortion on the basis of the gender of the child. In those circumstances, it would seem incomprehensible that the full force of the criminal law was not being brought to bear on a practice which most of us would consider abhorrent. However, if one reads the full note provided by the Director of Public Prosecutions earlier this week, which I will make available in the Library, one will see that on the facts of the case it would not have been possible to prove that either doctor authorised an abortion on gender-specific grounds alone. It is a far more complex case than that. Indeed, the criteria used were those set out in Section 1 of the Abortion Act 1967.

[Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab)]

My Lords, first, there have been differing reports as to whether there was a realistic prospect of prosecution, and I wonder whether the Minister could clarify that again. Secondly, on the public interest point, did the director consult the Attorney-General on this very issue, and what exactly were the public interest points against prosecution in the case which has been very much in the newspapers?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, with regard to the first point that the noble and learned Lord raises, the note that the Director of Public Prosecutions has set out indicates that the evidence was not strong and that the prospects of conviction would not have been high but that, on balance, there was just sufficient prosecution to provide a realistic prospect of a conviction. As the noble and learned Lord well knows, there is a second test—the public interest test. The view taken by the Crown Prosecution Service was that the jury would have had no independent yardstick of professional practice by which to assess the facts of the case—hence the need for the greater clarity which is now being sought. On the other question that he asked, the Director of Public Prosecutions did not consult the Attorney-General before the decision was made not to prosecute. My right honourable friend the Attorney-General has obviously had subsequent discussions with the Director of Public Prosecutions in the context of the review and, without in any way wishing to infringe on the independence of the prosecutor, he believes that the decision was taken in a proper and conscientious way.