Local Audit and Accountability Bill [HL]

Lord McKenzie of Luton Excerpts

Wednesday 26th June 2013 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

18ZZZA*: Schedule 9, page 74, line 1, at end insert—
“(d) to assist in the prevention and detection of maladministration and error.”

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, this amendment refers to Schedule 9, and in particular paragraph 8(2).

The power to conduct data-matching exercises is currently exercisable for the purpose of assisting in the prevention and detection of fraud. However, a relevant Minister, which is the Secretary of State or Minister for the Cabinet Office, can add a purpose for which such exercises can be used provided they fall within the specified purposes. These are currently the prevention and detection of crimes other than fraud, apprehension and prosecution of offenders and recovery of debt owing to public bodies. The amendment would add another purpose,

“the prevention and detection of maladministration and error”.

It should be stressed that neither the further purposes described nor the additional one arising from this amendment can be a proper purpose of data matching until introduced by regulation following wide consultation.

The data-matching powers currently exercised by the Audit Commission through the national fraud initiative have been a considerable success, having identified nearly £1 billion of fraud, errors and overpayments since 1996. It is important that the NFI is found an appropriate home in the new regime and we understand and accept that discussions are under way to make this happen. Probing this is not the purpose of the amendment although if the Minister has an update for us it would be good to hear.

The amendment has been prompted by the Audit Commission, which has expressed concern that some of the data-matching exercises that it undertakes at present under its audit powers would not be available to any new body as they would not fall within the additional purposes provided for in Clause 8(2). However, it has instanced a data-matching exercise to assist with identifying maladministration which it undertook concerning GP lists. This was done as part of the national duplicate registration initiative and sought to identify such matters as deceased persons registrations or duplicate registrations. The two most recent exercises led to more than a quarter of a million patient registrations being removed—saving some £16 million—and some 30,000 patient records ending up with current rather than previous GPs.

This work targets error rather than fraud so would not be covered by the Bill as it stands. There is quite properly a sensitivity about data matching and we support the safeguards which are included in Schedule 9 restricting the use of such exercises and protecting certain data. There is also the code of data-matching practice which has been drawn up by the Audit Commission, the maintenance of which will become the responsibility of a relevant Minister under the Bill. Clearly, data matching has, as a matter of fact, been undertaken under powers which will seemingly not be available in the future under the Bill. Where does this leave exercises such as the national duplicate registration initiative in the future? Will the initiative be conducted, at least in part, by data matching, by whom and under what powers? The NDRI is just one example. Perhaps I may ask the Minister whether there have been discussions with the Audit Commission about the demise of its audit powers in this regard and how matters will be handled in the future.

There is a further matter concerning the extent to which those fall within the mandatory provisions of data requirements. The Bill retains this requirement for those currently required to do so and now includes foundation trusts. The Bill also enables the adding-in of other public bodies subject to consultation and regulation. Has any consideration been given to adding in any further public bodies? What assessment has been undertaken of this possibility? One possibility raised with us has been adding in housing associations which currently participate only on a voluntary basis. Data matching has proved to be a powerful tool in helping bodies to detect potential tenancy fraud and we are advised that just one RSL which participated in 2010-11 recovered 12 properties from illegal occupation which were able to be reallocated to general tenants. There is a continuing imperative for local authorities and RSLs to manage their stock in the most effective way given the housing crisis which faces the country and punitive measures such as the bedroom tax.

We have a shared interest in targeting fraud but also—I hope—in the prevention and detection of maladministration and error. This is all the more important given the huge cuts in local authority budgets and of course the further dreadful announcements from the Chancellor just a few hours ago. Data matching has a role to play provided there are robust safeguards. At the very least the Government should justify any diminution in the opportunity to use these as a result of the demise of the Audit Commission. I beg to move.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

My Lords, what worries me with this is the possibility of spreading the data protection rules and investigations even further than they are now. They are pretty strong already in the Bill and detection of maladministration and error is done by many local authorities—I am not sure about health authorities—in their internal and external audits. One of the main raisons d’être for that is to look for maladministration and error. As my noble friend will know, such audits are independent of the other departments of the local authority or health service.

I therefore ask the Minister to say how this is or is not already covered at present. What worries me is the creep of adding more and more things all the time in order to look behind what is happening. I understand the motives for that but this is perhaps going a step too far.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

Will the noble Lord accept that the purpose of the amendment is not to spread anything further but to preserve what is there? The point that the Audit Commission has made is that it can use its audit powers to do this data matching to achieve the objective at the moment. Obviously, once the commission disappears, it will not have those powers. If those powers are to go somewhere else, that is fine. I accept entirely that internal audit would be one means of helping to address the issue but data matching across bodies has proved to be effective. This is not about seeking to extend what currently happens but preserving what the Audit Commission is able to do under its audit powers.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

Let me give an example. If one is looking into housing fraud, one does not, as a local authority, look only at the housing department and benefits claims. I know that local authorities such as mine look towards the UK Border Agency, with which they have a great relationship. When they look into possible fraud, administration error and all the other things that the noble Lord spoke about, the powers already exist. I am asking whether they need to be enshrined in the Bill.

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I understand that the Audit Commission has already run exercises looking at error rather than fraud, using its other powers and that furthermore, following the abolition of the commission, such exercises might not be possible. I am, therefore, interested in better understanding the outcome of such exercises, particularly how they have contributed in terms of improved efficiencies and savings for the participants, and thus the risks and benefits of including a power such as that proposed by the noble Lord, before considering the merits or otherwise of its inclusion. Perhaps the noble Lord would like to meet me after officials have considered this matter further with representatives of the Audit Commission and others. We can then bring this back at a later stage if necessary. With that full assurance, I hope that it is possible for him to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

I am grateful to the Minister, and that we got two for the price of one with the Minister for the Cabinet Office as well, which is particularly apt. I am grateful, too, for the offer of a meeting, which I would be very happy to have. The noble Lord acknowledged the point that once the Audit Commission goes, some of the powers that it has used to do data matching will fall with it. Those will not automatically be picked up in the Bill or elsewhere, but that is the subject of ongoing discussion. I should just say in defence of the Audit Commission, if it needs it, that these data-matching exercises were not done in any sort of clandestine way. It published the results, particularly on this one initiative to show its benefits. I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss this point further.

I take the point entirely that there is already provision in the Bill for those who have to participate on a mandatory basis. I guess that part of my question was: is it intended in relation to housing associations to perhaps kick-start a consultation? Some do participate but I understand that it is quite a small percentage, and it looks as if some of the benefits could be quite significant for them to participate. That has nothing to do with extending the powers of data matching, but just extending the basis of those who are required to participate. Having said all that, I am grateful for what I take to be a positive response and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 18ZZZA withdrawn.

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[Lord Beecham]

Yes, whole place. It is playing with words, and of course Labour words such as “total” are not acceptable. Within these areas there will of course be collaboration, and the proportion of funding will vary considerably. For example, in public health, less than 50% of government money will be coming in, so the Audit Commission would presumably be prohibited from taking a look at the effectiveness of that. It is not an audit job in that sense, but it is particularly desirable that it should address the issues of effectiveness and outcome, not purely in financial terms but across the piece as well, and that in itself should facilitate the work that the LGA and individual local authorities are doing, particularly in their scrutiny functions, to see how they are faring relative to others, and for that information to be communicated to the people who elect them. So I certainly could not support these amendments. I understand what the noble Lords are saying, but I think that a mission creep has overtaken their amendments as well. They were going too far in the interests of local democracy and the effectiveness of local government.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, like my noble friend who was unable to support these amendments from the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, and the noble Lord, Lord Tope, I understand that—apart from the issue around this 50% funding—the Bill does what they are seeking to achieve. If you look particularly at paragraph 117 of the Explanatory Notes to the Bill, it says:

“These powers do not enable examinations of individual relevant authorities and are not designed to produce assessment of the performance of individual relevant authorities or comparative analyses in the form of published league tables”.

Unless that wording is defective—doubtless the Minister can help us on that—it achieves what the noble Lords want. As my noble friend says, whether it achieves what we want is another matter.

In relation to the other test in Amendment 18ZA—that is, an authority,

“who receives more than half their income from government funds”—

I can see that, for certain bodies, it is a test that is currently relatively straightforward to determine. However, if you seek to apply it to a local authority you can imagine the sort of criteria that you would have to unpick and examine. Presumably it is not part of government funds to take account of its income which comes from council tax. What happens when you come to the business rate? Is it part of its income? Do you look at the gross amount or the 50% under business retention that goes to central government and then comes back? Is that still government funding? Does it originate with the local authorities? All the issues around how tariffs, top-ups and safety nets work just from that regime itself could make that particular test in the context of local authorities extremely difficult to apply. It would be easy in some cases where either they would be clearly in or clearly out but I would be surprised if there were not a whole range where it would be extremely problematic.

The test at the moment, as I understand it, is that the Auditor-General can carry out examinations of bodies when more than half of their income comes from public funds and where they are appointed by or on behalf of the Crown. I am not quite sure how you translate that into the local authority context but it seems to me that the basic proposition which the noble Lords are seeking to achieve in terms of avoiding mission creep and certainly league tables is already in the Bill.

If that is right—and for that reason some of the comparative stuff to which my noble friend was referring is not available—it raises again the question we discussed earlier about the value-for-money profiles, the guardian of which is currently the Audit Commission. We discussed who was going to maintain those profiles, which I think would be part of the data that my noble friend and I would be looking for. We do not yet know where that is going to end up and how those profiles are going to be maintained, but I think that that is a slightly different issue from the one pursued by the noble Lord, Lord Tope.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Communities and Local Government (Baroness Hanham)]

My Lords, it is not very often that the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, makes my case for me, and I am delighted to be in this unusual situation. Perhaps I should sit down without going any further. As always, however, the noble Lord provides a sting in the tail somewhere. On this occasion it was in his final question—to which I may not, even now, be able to give him an answer, but we will try.

Under the National Audit Act 1983 the Comptroller and Auditor-General can undertake examinations into the economy, efficiency and effectiveness or value for money with which a government department it audits has used its resources. He or she can also undertake these examinations in relation to bodies that receive more than half their income from public funds and which are appointed by or on behalf of the Crown.

Clause 34 broadens the Comptroller and Auditor-General’s powers to enable the National Audit Office to undertake examinations on groups of relevant authorities, enabling a more end-to-end view on the use of public money. The powers in Clause 34 have been designed deliberately to support the National Audit Office in undertaking its core roles. It enables examinations that support the National Audit Office either in holding the Government to account to Parliament or in providing analysis and advice that is useful to the sector. By definition, this does not mean that the NAO will be examining or reporting on individual authorities. It means that the comptroller can look at what is going on in a local authority but only in relevance to a wider group or area in relation to the money coming from Parliament.

The amendment would limit these powers to enable the Comptroller and Auditor-General to undertake examinations only on groups of relevant authorities that received more than half their funds from government. I think that that is where the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, has stepped in and given a pretty clear explanation of why this is not going to work. The amendment is overly restrictive and would not support the National Audit Office in fulfilling its core roles. The Audit Commission currently has powers to undertake examinations in relation to all relevant authorities. Removing relevant authorities that receive less than half their resources from the Government would mean that the National Audit Office could not look across the whole spectrum and thus do its job. The amendment would also reduce the level of scrutiny of public spending that the NAO could carry out, including all the other elements mentioned by the noble Lord regarding the way that grants are paid and the money that goes into local authorities.

Amendment 18ZB would prevent the Comptroller and Auditor-General from undertaking examinations for the purpose of assessing the performance of individual authorities or the production of league tables. Clause 34(2) already provides for the first part of this. It states that a value-for-money examination must relate either to all authorities or to a particular description of relevant authority, and it is extremely unlikely that an individual authority would meet those criteria. An individual authority could be looked at but only in relation to a group and could not be identified as one authority. The Explanatory Notes set out that these powers are not designed for the National Audit Office to produce an assessment of the performance of individual authorities or comparative analyses in the form of published league tables. The Government do not wish to see a return to the comprehensive area assessment of local authorities. The NAO’s evidence to the pre-legislative scrutiny committee on the draft Bill confirmed that it is seeking neither to audit individual local authorities nor to interfere with the primary accountability of local authorities to the local electorate.

However, the clause does not prohibit comparisons of individual authorities during the course of the examination. This is because such group or overall analysis is necessary in order for the National Audit Office to make conclusions about the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which authorities in a particular group are using resources, or to provide evaluation, commentary and advice to relevant authorities. We believe that the Clause 34 will give the National Audit Office a strengthened role in the assessment of value for money, which the Government said we wanted to achieve when we announced the intention to close the Audit Commission. I know that that intention has received a great deal of parliamentary support, including from the Communities and Local Government Select Committee, the committee which undertook scrutiny of the draft local audit Bill last autumn, and from many noble Lords during our discussions.

However, I understand—and I know that the National Audit Office does too—the concerns that have been expressed about the risks of scope drift or expansion of the programme beyond what is intended. I believe that there are safeguards in the Bill that mitigate against these risks. I emphasise that it is not the Government’s intention to replicate the Audit Commission’s programme of studies. The powers are narrower than the Audit Commission’s and there will be fewer studies. Although the examinations programme is ultimately a matter for the Comptroller and Auditor-General, Parliament undertakes a full and thorough scrutiny of the National Audit Office’s strategy and budget. The House of Commons Public Accounts Committee scrutinises the strategy and budget annually, including the balance of work between different roles, before approving the National Audit Office’s budget for the year ahead.

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[The Earl of Lytton]

My Lords, first, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Tope, for his support and the noble Lords, Lord McKenzie and Lord Beecham, for their comments. All three have a much greater knowledge of local government matters than I can claim to possess but I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, in particular that it is important not to take amendments of this sort at this stage of the Bill too literally. The intention was to try to probe the parameters and get that on the record so that we know where we are.

Turning to the Minister’s comments, I hope I did not say that there would necessarily be mission creep, damage to democracy or any of the other things; only if it is uncontrolled and unconstrained could there be circumstances in which such things arise. But I am very comforted by what she said, particularly about the safeguards already in the Bill in connection with Amendment 18ZB.

It is my view that audit is a right and proper process. I am not suggesting for one minute that it should be removed, far from it; I do not think that anybody would advance that. However, it needs to be consistent with cost efficiency and done in a way that is not intrusive or that displaces other proper avenues of choice. I will leave it there for the time being but may return to it at a later stage.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

Before the noble Earl withdraws his amendment, can the Minister tell us any more about the value-for-money profiles, and in particular what the plans are to maintain those? Obviously that requires the compilation of data and comparative data.

[Baroness Hanham]

We are currently considering the future management of the Audit Commission’s value for money—the question asked. I cannot say anything more today but we will come back to this before Report, I hope, and I will certainly make sure that noble Lords are kept in touch with progress, which I think is what I said last time.

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Moved by

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

19D*: After Clause 39, insert the following new Clause—
“Report to Parliament on the new audit regime
Within three years of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State shall report to Parliament on the effectiveness of the new audit regime, covering in particular—(a) how the regime is being coordinated across government departments,(b) how the proposed arrangements are enabling accounting officers and Parliament to obtain assurance that the audit regime is performing effectively, (c) assurance that the independence of audit and quality of audit is being maintained,(d) the extent of diversity of provision in the audit market, and(e) the application of the regime for all relevant authorities including health bodies and smaller authorities.”

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, the amendment calls for a report to Parliament on the impact of the new audit regime and for this to be made within three years of the passing of the Act.

Let me acknowledge at the start the undertaking given by the Government on a post-implementation review but its objectives appear to be somewhat narrowly based and do not address some of the fundamental issues. The Bill provides for arrangements that are significantly different from the current regime whereby the Audit Commission effectively acts as regulator, commissioner and provider of audit. As the pre-legislative scrutiny committee report sets out, the new regime is more complex and certainly more fragmented. The regulation of local audit will transfer to the Financial Reporting Council, professional accounting bodies and the National Audit Office. Commissioning of local audit will transfer to local public bodies, and the provision of local audit will go to private sector firms. Research and value for money will be picked up by the NAO to a limited extent and by the sector’s own self-improvement. The National Fraud Initiative’s ultimate destination has yet to be determined, as we have discussed, and the co-ordination of grant certification remains a little vague.

Although some of the bases have been covered, potential gaps remain. Some of the bodies that are subject to the new regime are accountable to government departments other than CLG. How is this to be co-ordinated across government? Audited bodies themselves will have to liaise with government departments, the NAO and auditors because the commission will not be on hand to act as an intermediary. The role of accounting officers within departments is fundamental to the management and control of resources. They are currently able to draw on information on the outcome of audits, implementation of major initiatives and value for money outcomes analysed by the Audit Commission. How is this all to happen in the future? Unless the Minister can tell us otherwise, there appears to be no organisation that will be publishing the outputs of more than £200 billion of public expenditure.

Clearly, quality of audits is paramount. The role of the FRC as overall regulator and its specific role in providing quality assurance to just a few “major audits” has been the cause of some concern. We hear the government assurances on this but consider that Parliament is entitled to a more formal report on how this is working in practice. Can the Minister confirm that the reports of the recognised supervisory bodies monitoring auditor performance outside major audits will be in the public domain?

There is also the need for oversight on how this is working for all “relevant authorities”, including health bodies and smaller authorities. Many of the provisions in the Bill are not applicable to health service bodies because equivalent provision is made in other legislation. We have not thus far sought to compare or contrast these provisions with those applicable to other relevant authorities. Contemplating consolidation may give the Ministers a nightmare at the moment but the Bill does not give us a sense of how joined up this is all going to be in practice. A report to Parliament would cover this. I beg to move.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, the Government support the intention behind this amendment. Post-implementation review is acknowledged good practice. It will provide the assurances that Parliament and the general public will want that the new audit arrangements are achieving the outcomes that we expect, and it will identify how policies might be improved if they prove to be less effective than we anticipate. For these reasons, the Government have already committed to undertake such a review. This is set out in the impact assessment, at Section K.

However, I am not persuaded that the timeframe envisaged in the amendment is the right one. The commitment in the impact assessment is to a review within three to five years of Royal Assent. This is in line with the Government’s general commitment to post-legislative review. The reason for preferring a slightly longer period in the case of this legislation relates to the implementation of local auditor appointment.

Assuming that this Act is passed in early 2014, the amendment would require a report in early 2017. As noble Lords are aware, the earliest date at which local auditor appointment would begin is 2017. It would seem to make sense to include some assessment of the move to local appointment in the proposed review. This would enable a robust assessment of audit quality and auditor independence in the new regime, and of the impact of local appointment on the audit supply market.

Nevertheless, government departments, through the accounting officer, are accountable to Parliament annually for the money voted to them. Where this money is distributed to others, accounting officers need to be able to demonstrate that appropriate accountability arrangements are in place, usually through an accountability systems statement. The external audit of local bodies is one of the evidence sources that will help to demonstrate whether the system is working effectively. We will ensure that the necessary assurance can be provided to accounting officers and to Parliament.

The provisions for the audit regime of health bodies have been designed to provide at least the same level of assurance to the Department of Health accounting officer and Parliament on the use of resources by the health sector as current arrangements. All the health bodies covered by this Bill are included in the annual accounts of the Department of Health. The department reviews the outcome of the audits and annual governance statements of all health bodies and the NAO also uses these to inform its audit of the departmental accounts.

Finally, I would like to say a few words of reassurance about the scope of the proposed post-implementation review. The impact assessment explains that the review will look at how well the core objectives of the local audit reforms are being met. I remind noble Lords that these objectives are: to deliver greater localism, decentralisation and transparency; to maintain competitive audit fees; and to uphold high standards of auditing.

There does not appear to be anything in the list of specific requirements in the amendment which is obviously out of scope. The impact assessment makes a commitment that we will work up the detail of the review with representatives from local government and other interested parties. I hope that these reassurances will satisfy the noble Lord and he will be willing to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his response. Of course, I will withdraw the amendment.

As I said in moving the amendment, I was aware of the proposal to have a post-implementation review. I accept the point about the timeframe. If it was done within three years, we would not have had any—or certainly many—local appointments of auditors so would not be able to judge the ramifications.

I do not know whether the noble Lord can help me on a further point, or write to me on it. In considering the Bill, I do not think that we have done enough work on how the regime for health bodies and other relevant bodies fits together. They are all defined as being relevant authorities. However, a whole raft of provisions appear to apply to relevant authorities other than health bodies. We may not have an overall view of how that fits together but one would hope that any review of how the measure will work in practice would pick up what the inconsistencies and consistencies of the regimes are and what lessons can be learnt from one stream which could benefit the other. That aspect appears to have received less attention than many other aspects of the Bill. However, I accept the undertaking that there will be a post-implementation review based on consultation with relevant bodies. I accept the point about a three to five-year timescale rather than within three years. That seems to me entirely reasonable. I do not know whether the noble Lord can say anything further on the health bodies point.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I take the point about health bodies. This clearly is an important part of the arrangement. We, of course, intend to include health service bodies in the post-implementation review. If there are other matters about the health bodies that the noble Lord would like to discuss between Committee and Report, I am very happy to do so. We recognise that this is an important part of the whole shift.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

I welcome that and would like to take up that opportunity. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 19D withdrawn.

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[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

Amendment 23A would add new provisions within Schedule 12. The purpose of this amendment is to include local authority social housing providers within the Homes and Communities Agency’s existing powers to require a separate audit report into social housing accounts, once the Audit Commission has been abolished.

Currently, Section 210 of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 gives the Homes and Communities Agency a power to order an extraordinary audit as part of an inquiry under Section 206 of that Act in respect of a private registered provider of social housing where it has serious concerns that a housing provider has mismanaged its affairs. The agency can require the registered provider to allow its accounts and balance sheet to be audited by a qualified auditor appointed by the regulator.

Section 210A applies this regime to local authority housing providers by placing a duty on the Audit Commission, if asked by the regulator, to provide a report on the local authority’s accounts, so far as they relate to the authority’s provision of social housing. Amendment 23A ensures that local authority social housing accounts continue—upon closure of the Audit Commission—to be subject to examination as part of a Section 206 inquiry by enabling the Homes and Communities Agency to appoint an auditor which is on the register held by the recognised supervisory body to undertake an extraordinary audit. I therefore beg to move this amendment.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

That is very clear. I am happy with the amendment.

Amendment 23A agreed.

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[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, as Cabinet Office spokesman in the Lords with some responsibility for charities, this is another amendment on which I shall speak. This is, indeed, about health service charities.

Amendment 24 makes changes to the Charities Act 2011 in respect of English NHS charities as a result of the abolition of the Audit Commission. Currently, the auditors of English NHS charities are appointed by the Audit Commission, so this amendment ensures that arrangements are in place for the audit of English NHS charities’ accounts after its abolition.

The trustees of English NHS charities will be able to appoint a person who is eligible to act as an auditor under the Companies Act 2006, this Bill or regulations under the Charities Act 2011. The amendment allows smaller English NHS charities, with income of between £25,000 and £500,000 in the year in question, to opt for an examination of their accounts as an alternative to audit, which is intended to minimise costs of producing accounts to the charities. This is consistent with the way smaller non-NHS charities are treated in the Charities Act 2011.

The criteria for who may undertake such examinations are set out in the amendment. An examiner of an English NHS charity’s accounts must be independent and the charity’s trustees must reasonably believe that the person has the requisite ability and experience to carry out a competent examination of the accounts. The examiner of an English NHS charity’s accounts must also be a member of a professional body as set out in Section 145(3) of the Charities Act 2011 if the gross income of the English NHS charity is between £250,000 and £500,000 a year, or be eligible under the Local Audit and Accountability Bill, once enacted.

The amendment enables the Charity Commission to give guidance to NHS charity trustees on the selection of an independent examiner and directions as to how an examination is to be carried out. The amendment also applies the same provisions to the group accounts of a parent NHS charity as have been set out for individual NHS charities. I beg to move.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

I have only one question for the noble Lord which concerns his reference to an independent examiner and a person who is independent. Can he remind us which definition of “independent” we are dealing with here?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I think we are referring back to the definition as in the Charities Act 2011. Since we have batted forward and back on the question of what exactly “independent” means in this respect, I may need to write to the noble Lord just to confirm the exact definition being used here.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

I am grateful for that.

Amendment 24 agreed.