King’s Speech

Lord McDonald of Salford Excerpts

Thursday 25th July 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord McDonald of Salford (CB)]

My Lords, like the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, and other noble Lords, I welcome the new ministerial team and thank the old one, especially the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, who is sadly not in his place but is, magnificently, the longest-serving Foreign Office Minister since I joined the FCO in 1982. He had already clocked up three years by the time I left, four years ago.

In the war raging in the east of our continent, the UK’s interest is that Ukraine does not lose and Russia does not win. We are committed to keeping Ukraine in the fight for as long as Ukrainians are willing to fight, but it is emphatically not in the UK’s interest to join the fight. That being the case, I wondered why Ukrainian membership of NATO featured prominently in the gracious Speech. A country can ally itself with a country at war only if it is willing directly to participate in that war. The NATO summit in Washington two weeks ago made a more realistic short-term promise to increase NATO and Ukrainian interoperability. NATO membership is for later, when the fighting has stopped, and can be offered only if the UK and other allies are prepared to fight if the Russians break the armistice which will conclude this phase of the conflict.

Russia and Ukraine will dominate the defence review. Several noble Lords have spoken in favour of increasing defence spending beyond 2.5%, yet many other vital policy areas are also strapped for cash. Reviewers need to assure themselves that the Ministry of Defence is making best use of its existing budget. I note that the US Marine Corps is 30% bigger with 50% more aircraft than the UK’s Armed Forces, yet costs 20% less.

I have a number of questions for the reviewers, who must first and foremost tackle our unwillingness to prioritise. Along with the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, I ask: will they recognise that our region—Europe and the North Atlantic—is our absolute priority? If they do, what future do they foresee for the Indo-Pacific tilt? The two new aircraft carriers are no doubt marvels of engineering, but what essential function will they fulfil in the mid-21st century?

Will the nuclear deterrent be on the table? The deterrent is vastly expensive—so expensive that we never admit in public exactly how much it costs. Looking not too far into the future, we are likely to face a savage choice between contracting or expanding the deterrent. Because of the expense, and the possibility that nuclear might crowd out conventional capabilities that we might actually use, we need at least to consider contraction. In that context, will we revisit what we mean by minimum deterrent, the so-called Moscow criterion? All we require is for Moscow not to strike us. What we have is a maximalist version of minimum by assuming that only the prospect of obliteration of its well-defended capital would deter it.

We claim that our deterrent is independent, and yet its continued existence relies on the continuous good will of the United States. Can we be sure that the next US Administration will support us, as their predecessors have done for the last 60-plus years? If not, we must consider expanding the programme. Will we be prepared to do more by ourselves or with other Europeans? The French rely on American nuclear input more than they like to admit. Will we build on the Lancaster House agreements of 2010, signed by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, and building on work initiated by Gordon Brown? Lastly, will we continue to strain to achieve the full spectrum of defence capabilities, or will we embrace greater mutual reliance with key European allies? This is a review crying out for close consultation with other Europeans, particularly France and Germany. I wish the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, and his colleagues the best of luck as they grapple with these fundamental questions.