Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Massey of Hampstead Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 22nd June 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly to Amendment 30 in my name, which would introduce a fiduciary-style duty on firms in their dealings with consumers and small businesses.

This group is about affordable credit and consumer protection. The problem that we see time and again is not that firms set out to behave badly but that good intentions drift under pressure to increase revenue, under pressure from internal incentives and, sometimes, under pressure from government to deliver growth. When that drift occurs, the cost is pushed on to consumers and, as I said earlier, passing costs on to the people is not growth in any meaningful, national sense.

Motor finance, the example that keeps on giving, shows this clearly. The FCA did not intend to create misalignment, firms did not intend to breach the law, but because the rules were not anchored in a well-understood legal framework, the system drifted. The FCA’s rules permitted the non-disclosure of commission unless asked. The statute required disclosure. The gap widened over time and nobody noticed until the consequences were enormous.

We see similar patterns in insurance add-ons and premium finance arrangements. These products did not begin as bad faith practices, they began as convenience, but over time, margins accumulated, incentives shifted and the products drifted into a place where the consumer’s interests were no longer the anchor. That is not malice but drift, the same drift that we saw in motor finance, and it happens when rules are not anchored in well-understood legal principles. This is what happens in a rules-based system—that is what we have, however we may pretend—rather than a principles-based system.

Parliament has been here before. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has already explained, when this House supported my noble friend Lord Sharkey’s proposal of a duty of care, the intention was to create a principle, a relationship-based obligation, that firms must not exploit unequal bargaining power or information asymmetry. What emerged instead was the FCA’s consumer duty. Is it valuable? I suppose so, but fundamentally it is a rules-based construct, shaped in part by industry pressure for something that their compliance departments could tick. Rules can be changed, narrowed or reinterpreted. Principles such as duty of care and fiduciary duty are legally understood, durable and resistant to drift.

My amendment does not attempt to rewrite the consumer duty. It would simply provide a well-understood statutory anchor—a benchmark against which to assess products and detect the kinds that end up exploiting imbalance. The test becomes, “Is it fair?”, and not merely, “Is it the next step on a path that might already have drifted?” In other words, it is about fairness versus incrementalism.

[Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as a shareholder and a director of financial services companies in asset management and wealth management.

I have considerable sympathy with the objectives that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, is seeking to advance. Access to affordable credit is a genuine problem in this country, as in many others, and the Committee is right to view financial exclusion as a problem. However, I am unable to support Amendments 28 and 29 on the grounds that the proposed solution will not solve the problem and may in fact exacerbate the issue that the Bill is partly designed to alleviate: excessive and complex regulatory demands on our financial institutions, which are making us less competitive.

My first concern is one of basic commercial economics. Banks and building societies are not lending to certain sections of the community, however deserving they might be, not because of a lack of understanding of the opportunity or a lack of data; they are not serving those clients at scale because the risk-adjusted returns of lending to higher-risk borrowers at affordable interest rates, and indeed the compliance risk of so doing, do not work commercially. A rating framework published by the FCA will not change that calculus, but it creates yet another compliance exercise, another box to be ticked and another issue to be managed without addressing the underlying economic reality that makes such lending unworkable.

My second concern is the risk of unintended consequences. A rule that would rate banks on their willingness to provide credit to financially-excluded populations—in some cases, very high-risk borrowers—could create an implicit incentive to lend more to people and companies who cannot really afford the loan. The amendment contains no credit quality safeguard and no minimum standard of affordability assessment, yet banks could be incentivised to lend just to improve their ratings. The pressure to improve ratings would not be cost free, of course. In practice, banks will not be carrying out this lending for solid financial reasons, so if they feel forced to extend credits into markets with reduced or zero margins, they will seek to restore those margins elsewhere, through higher charges on other products, reduced rates on savings or increased lending spreads in other parts of the business. The cost will not disappear; it will be redistributed invisibly to existing clients, who also deserve protection.

Moreover, I draw noble Lords’ attention to the stated purpose of the Bill, which is to reduce regulatory burden, not add to it. Yet here we are, being invited to add a new mandatory framework, new data collection requirements, new publication obligations and new performance ratings, all enshrined in primary legislation. This is precisely the regulatory ratchet: the cumulative, seemingly endless new measures that damage our competitiveness. The Financial Services Regulation Committee of this House, chaired by my noble friend Lady Noakes, concluded in its report last June that:

“The cumulative burden of regulatory compliance in the UK is perceived to be disproportionately high, diverting resources that could otherwise support … growth”.


As a serving practitioner in the sector, I strongly agree with this finding. Diverting lending from growing businesses to those effectively in financial need is not going to improve our economy. If anything, it will lead to loan losses for the banks and encourage excessive borrowing from those who cannot afford it, while piling even more costs and regulatory obligations on financial firms. We should resist the urge to reach for intervention every time a market imperfection is identified. Not every problem has a regulatory solution. Indeed, those solutions can often have unintended consequences that increase bureaucracy and undermine growth, so I cannot support the amendments.

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, I support Amendment 28, to which I have added my name. As we have heard, the amendment would require the FCA to establish a framework assessing banks’ and building societies’ provision of affordable credit. I spoke at some length at Second Reading on the importance of equal access to credit. I welcome what is already in the Bill, as I did then, but we can and should do more.

We are witnessing a crisis of deepening economic inequality in this country. For the most vulnerable communities, it is worsened by a lack of choice. Struggling to meet their most basic day-to-day needs, long-term financial planning is not an option for many families today. Daily life is a battle to put food on the table and to keep the house warm in winter, though perhaps not today. It is often the most impoverished who are forced to accept riskier loans, to turn to loan sharks—many of those operate in my diocese of Manchester—or to enter credit agreements that they are unable to pay back. In doing so, they find that they are paying a poverty premium, which then exacerbates and ratchets the problem round and round, deepening the financial injustice.

As I said earlier, I am trying to be more overtly religious in my speeches on the Bill today, so I assure the Committee that this is not merely a modern phenomenon. I could point to specific places in the Hebrew and Christian scriptures where specific rules are set out to ban the most egregious practices around unfair credit arrangements—things like extortionate interest charges, or the taking of essential items like protective clothing or workers’ tools as a pledge for credit.

Yet the alternative to unfair credit cannot be no credit but instead must be fair and affordable credit. Across the country, in churches, food banks and charitable organisations, the impact of financial exclusion on human dignity—another important Biblical concept—and well-being is being made apparent. We also see how certain communities are at a particular disadvantage: this includes if you are a migrant without a long-standing credit history, or an adult with little financial literacy, unable to navigate complex financial systems on your own, or a family experiencing living pay cheque to pay cheque—and about 10 years ago we passed the point at which most families in poverty began to be working families, rather than families in which no person is in work. The services that community institutions provide to such communities are essential but are not enough. In order to truly flourish, individuals and households facing financial insecurity need access to credit which gives them choice and independence and creates opportunities for them to become full participants in economic life.

One thing I learned when I worked on responsible investment for the Church of England’s national investment bodies was the phrase “social licence to operate”. That is an important part of this conversation today, though I have not heard it mentioned yet. The banks—not only those which were bailed out so expensively to the taxpayer less than 20 years ago—are required to operate not simply as best turns a profit, but as fits the needs for the society in which they are working. That requires a willingness to provide social goods, not merely the most profitable products to the most eligible customers.

What is set out in Amendment 28 will not only enable us to measure where affordable credit is and is not reaching people but will lay the foundation to make targeted improvements. I am told that the banks already have much of that data and that it is simply a question of making it more available by providing and publishing it. With a clearer understanding of the barriers that minoritised communities face, we can work beyond this Bill toward financial policy which tackles financial exclusion at its very root, creates new opportunities for families in debt, and promotes economic growth on a wider scale.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Massey of Hampstead Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th June 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I have added my name to three of the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in this group. To be honest, I am not quite sure why I did not add my name to her other two; I should have done, so I apologise. The noble Baroness has already explained those with her usual clarity, so I will try hard not to repeat what she said.

Briefly, on Amendment 70, I was going to say that I assumed that the omission from the FCA’s strategic priorities of its secondary objective was an oversight. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has kindly shared with me an email she has received from the Minister that effectively confirms that, and that it will be sorted out at a later stage. Can I very gently say to the Minister that when he writes to noble Lords, it should be copied to all who have signed an amendment? On Amendments 73 and 76, I will listen with interest as to why the Treasury should be able to make recommendations to the FCA and the PRA only in relation to the long-term strategies—that is, every five years. I suspect that the Treasury will come to regret that restriction.

I have also added my support to Amendments 72 and 75 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, both of which would require the FCA and PRA to carry out a review of their regulations as part of the five-year strategy process, with a view to eliminating any unnecessary regulations. Rulebooks have a habit of growing—being added to—and scope has a tendency to creep, so a five-year spring clean must be a good thing and would be a good discipline that I would wholeheartedly support. I finish by saying that I share the reservations that have already been raised about the whole of Clause 16.

[Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)]

My Lords, the Bill reflects the very substantial transfer of power, as mentioned by my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, from Parliament and from existing regulators, such as the PSR and the 22 professional bodies with specialised knowledge of the sectors, as we discussed earlier. This reflects a high degree of centralisation of regulatory supervision, which may lead to a lack of clarity and, in some cases, as my noble friend Lord Mackinlay mentioned, double regulation for small firms. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said earlier, the system is also already overloaded. In that context, given the extensive proposed changes and the real possibility of unintended consequences, it seems that the Government should consider the setting of strategy for the future as an important component of the Bill.

Although I support all the amendments in this group, I emphasise the need for consultation with regulated firms and the regular review of the rulebooks as provided for in Amendments 71, 72, 74 and 75. The Bill indeed provides for the publication of a document and consultation with one party—the Court of Directors of the Bank of England is specifically mentioned as a party that will be consulted—but seemingly not with any regulated firm, despite the fact that regulated firms could clearly be very helpful in the setting of long-term strategy. Amendments 71 and 74, proposed by my noble friend Lady Noakes, therefore seem essential additions to the Bill, as would Amendments 72 and 75, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I say a word of support in favour of these amendments. This industry, financial services, is one of the most innovatory and dynamic industries in this country and has led the world in its imaginative, entrepreneurial approach for centuries. What we are seeing—I am glad to follow my noble friend—is the centralisation of regulation in one ever greater regulatory body. This will mean that the slowest ships of the regulatory convoy will determine the pace.

For these reasons, it is imperative that the strategic review takes account, much more regularly than every five years, of the updating of business actions, business transactions and the tools used by the sector; and that, as my noble friend Lady Noakes pointed out, it talks to the people who are the wealth creators whom it will regulate. For all the reasons that have been enunciated in the course of this short debate, including those from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, I support these amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

Understood.

[Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)]

May I ask the Minister for a clarification? In his answer to the question about not having consultation in the Bill itself, I think he said that the FCA would engage with firms but that he did not want this in statute. Do I understand that correctly?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

That is correct.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Massey of Hampstead Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 6th July 2026 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Massey of Hampstead]

144A: After Clause 28, insert the following new Clause—
“Appointed representatives: impact assessment(1) Before any provision of this Act relating to the appointed representatives regime comes into force, the FCA must conduct and publish an impact assessment of the effect of those provisions on—(a) the number of principal firms choosing to maintain appointed representative relationships,(b) the total number of appointed representatives operating in the United Kingdom,(c) consumer access to regulated financial advice, with particular reference to consumers with modest investable assets who may be dependent on appointed representatives as their primary source of regulated financial advice, and(d) the viability of smaller principal firms for whom the costs of compliance with the new senior manager function requirement for appointed representative oversight may be disproportionate relative to the revenue derived from appointed representative relationships.(2) The impact assessment required under subsection (1) must—(a) have regard to the existing contraction of the appointed representatives population,(b) include a quantitative assessment of the likely further reduction in appointed representative numbers attributable to the provisions of this Act, and(c) assess the consequent effect on the availability and accessibility of regulated financial advice to retail consumers.(3) If the impact assessment concludes that the provisions of this Act are likely to result in a material reduction in consumer access to regulated financial advice, the FCA must publish proposals for mitigating measures before those provisions come into force.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment calls for an impact assessment to ensure that the measures in this Act do not lead to a large drop in the number of appointed representatives who often provide services to smaller clients thereby promoting financial inclusion.

[Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)]

My Lords, I should again declare my interest as chairman of Canaccord Genuity Wealth Management, as set out in the register of interests, although I should also state that Canaccord has no appointed representatives, which is the subject of this amendment.

I do not oppose these reforms in principle, although we should recognise that in Clauses 24 to 28 and in other measures we are adding significantly to the regulatory burden of member firms. It can certainly be argued that there is a case for greater oversight of appointed reps, as too many principal firms have historically taken a light-touch approach to supervising the firms acting in their name. Where that has gone wrong, consumers have borne the cost. However, regulation of this kind is always a question of balance, and my purpose in moving this amendment is to ask whether the Bill has struck that balance correctly.

By way of background, this part of the financial sector, affecting mostly retail clients, is surprisingly large, and its fortunes bear directly on financial inclusion, a subject on which the Committee shares a common concern, mindful, as we all are, of the advice gap. The numbers are meaningful. There are approximately 34,000 appointed representatives, according to the FCA, and they generate £11.1 billion in regulated revenue and a further £27 billion in non-regulated financial services revenue, so some £38 billion in total is running through this part of the market. The number of appointed reps fell by 12% in the 3.5 years from 2022 to 2025, but there was a more pronounced fall in the numbers of principal firms—that is, those that appoint representatives. That population has fallen by 26% over the same period, so we are seeing quite a decline in participation in this space.

Why does that matter? Appointed reps are overwhelmingly small firms, often sole traders, regionally based, who work closely with smaller clients. They cannot afford the administrative and compliance burdens of larger firms, hence the need to operate under their regulatory umbrella. They are a significant channel through which smaller clients can access the markets and receive highly personalised service and advice. I am not sure we want this part of the business to be under threat of more serious decline as an unintended consequence of some provisions in the Bill.

Clause 24 introduces a new discretionary FCA gateway before a firm may act as a principal at all. Principal firms will now have to seek specific approval to have appointed reps, and if they enter the business—this is an important point—the FCA can remove their permission at its discretion for vague reasons. Alongside that, the FCA will gain the power to create a bespoke senior management function specifically for AR oversight, layering on a new form of personal regulatory liability to firms taking on ARs. ARs will now be brought into scope of SMCR and will therefore be subject to misconduct rules, so principal firms will have to carry out fit-and-proper tests on ARs, as they do now for their own employees. Furthermore, the compulsory jurisdiction of the FOS is now extended to ARs, which means that principal firms will be held responsible for complaints against ARs in most circumstances. These are significant new duties that represent potential liability risk and a lot of additional cost to principal firms.

We should bear in mind that some of these principal firms are not large organisations, and they may find these new exposures quite onerous, which in turn might render the economic risk-reward of having ARs less attractive. Overall, the clear direction of travel here is to have fewer but larger principal firms. Indeed, this might be the FCA’s agenda for this part of the business.

Amendment 144A calls for the FCA to look before it leaps. It calls for an assessment of the impact of the new rules on the number of principal firms, the number of appointed reps and, most importantly, consumer access to advice, particularly for those on modest means, and the viability of smaller principal firms.

I am not necessarily asking the Government to reverse course, but these measures represent a significant increase in regulatory burden and there is no getting away from that. I am asking for the regulator to measure the impact of what it is doing before the provisions take effect, and to bring forward mitigating proposals if the impact on consumer access turns out to be material. Given that the FCA’s own data already show a firm population in genuine retreat and the implications for the advice gap, this seems to be a modest, proportionate and uncontroversial request. I beg to move.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I will say a few words in support of my noble friend Lord Massey’s amendment. We should not forget that many of these small firms coming into the market are to be valued in Britain’s highly competitive industry—until there was too much regulation, perhaps—and we rely on them. They are what distinguishes the UK’s financial services historically. From the 16th century on, the growth of financial services and the City of London depended on small people coming together to provide for a niche in the market that people wanted.

If we continue to put too much burden on these small firms, they will not emerge. We have heard from my noble friend Lord Massey how important they are, sometimes locally. They are small firms which meet a need, so it is a very good idea to have an impact assessment of what the costs will be for ARs before the law comes into operation, for the competitiveness of the UK’s sector.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising the importance of ensuring that measures to make the appointed representatives regime safer do not undermine the benefits provided by that regime. This amendment would require the FCA to publish an impact assessment before the measures can take effect.

I am happy to assure noble Lords that the measures have already been assessed as part of the impact assessment completed for the Bill. That concluded that the measures for appointed representatives should result in a net benefit of £108 million over the next 10 years. Before implementation, the FCA will also need to publish proposals for new rules, including on the approach to bringing appointed representatives within the senior managers and certification regime. FSMA already requires the FCA to publish a cost-benefit analysis when it proposes new rules; this analysis may be scrutinised by the independent cost-benefit analysis panel to ensure that it accurately captures the costs and benefits that are likely to result.

I also want to provide some reassurance on the introduction of the senior management function within principal firms responsible for overseeing appointed representatives. The FCA will have the flexibility to apply the senior management function in a proportionate way; it will not be obliged to require this of every principal firm, and may judge that it is not proportionate for smaller principal firms.

The Government share the objective of ensuring that we have a safer regime that does not undermine the benefits provided by appointed representatives. That is why the approach to implementation is designed to minimise disruption and cost to firms, and will be subject to further consultation and cost-benefit analysis by the FCA. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)]

I thank the Minister for his response and take reassurance that some of the measures that I raised have been dealt with already by the FCA, as it has—hopefully—assessed the impact of these quite significant changes, which, as I mentioned at the beginning, do add to regulation, rather than taking away from regulation. I also thank my noble friends for supporting this amendment. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 144A withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I am always in favour of trying to provide streamlining, and this amendment offers a common-sense approach to that. However, an issue that I want to take up with the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, is that the focus of the FCA should always be on new hires, not previous ones. The ongoing fit and proper process is crucial, particularly if we are going to have lighter-touch regulation as people move from one position to another, but that ongoing process is critical. Perhaps the Minister could expand on that because I am not quite clear about how all the various changes in FCA rules change what has been an annual review process but now gives more flexibility in what that means.

I shall give some examples. I am not sure that when Sir Fred Goodwin—he was not “Sir” then, obviously—was appointed as chief executive of RBS anyone recognised that he was going to get caught up in what I think most people would describe as an addiction to completely irrational acquisitions, which eventually led to the collapse of a major bank. I am not sure that when Jes Staley was hired to be CEO of Barclays people were aware of the significance of his extensive involvement with Epstein. I am not sure that when the Reverend Paul Flowers was approved as chairman of the Co-operative Bank people were conscious that he was potentially someone who would become seriously addicted to and affected by a number of drugs, notably crystal meth. In other words, there is an ongoing process that is critical; it should not be only a one-time process. I hope that will be absorbed into the thinking if this amendment moves forward. The ongoing process is vital. Fit and proper is not a one-time-only process.

[Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)]

My Lords, I rise quickly to support this amendment, which is exactly the sort of streamlining amendment we are looking to achieve in this Bill. I politely take issue with the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on people such as Fred Goodwin, Jes Staley or the Reverend Flowers. The FCA would not have picked up those problems; they all emerged much later. We should give credit to member firms for being able to judge who they should be hiring. If they are already licensed, why would notification not be sufficient?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for tabling this amendment. The Government agree that the regime should operate more proportionately where that can be done without undermining accountability—in fact, that is what the Bill aims to do. The core objective of these reforms is to reduce unnecessary regulatory and administrative burdens for firms, while preserving the accountability standards that underpin the regime. The changes will help to deliver the Government’s and the regulators’ ambition to reduce burdens from this regime by 50%, while retaining its core benefits.

As set out in the impact assessment for the Bill, the reforms to this regime alone are expected to reduce administrative burdens on the sector almost £600 million over 10 years. The Bill is already speeding up the target for the regulators to make these decisions. As I said in the debate last Wednesday, in Q4 of 2025-26, 50% of senior manager cases were determined within 19 days and over 99% were determined within the new target of two months.

The Bill moves to a more flexible system, led by regulators. Rather than requiring pre-approval for all senior managers, it allows the FCA and PRA to decide which senior management functions require approval and which can simply be notified to the regulators. The regulators will not take this decision without direction. Schedule 3 sets out the factors the regulators may use when designing the notification approach. These include whether an individual has previously been approved for a different role. The detailed operation of the new framework will be taken forward by the regulators through their rules, which are already subject to the statutory consultation and parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms. The regulators already operate a proportionate application process for individuals applying for a similar senior manager function to the one they are already approved for, including when within the same group. This usually allows for a faster and more targeted assessment.

I note the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. I will pick that up with the FCA. The continued accreditation assessment of senior managers needs to be something that is reported back on; she makes an important point about that.

Finally, I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, that the Government will continue to engage closely with the regulators as they implement these changes, to ensure that the regime operates as intended and delivers a more proportionate approach in practice. I therefore ask her to withdraw the amendment.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Massey of Hampstead Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 8th July 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

I rise to speak to the Motion that Clause 40 does not stand part. As I explained at Second Reading, I have no professional knowledge of the banking industry but, because of circumstances, for more than 14 years I have been in this Room talking about the finance industry and doing my best to pretend to understand at least bits of it.

The one thing that I think I bring to this Bill is my long experience of concern about problems of little likelihood, even small likelihood, but with catastrophic results if the risks mature. It is on that theme that I am concerned that we are creating risks. In 2008 we had the crisis. It is now 18 years ago, just long enough for most people to have forgotten it. We had the Vickers review, which we all felt was pretty good, and after that came ring-fencing, and we convinced ourselves that this would solve most of the problems. There were some other things as well. There was the splendid clause that vested criminal responsibility on the boss of a subordinate who committed some criminal offence. Clearly this was too uncomfortable for the City, so it was changed. I led the opposition to the change and failed with a 200-vote tie. Because we were the Opposition not the Government, we failed.

The preparation for my consideration of this ring-fencing issue caused me to read through a lot of stuff. I came to the conclusion that the ring-fencing was not nearly as effective as we had felt it would be at the time, but, in a sense, I was reluctant to be overly concerned about it because I felt that the resolution regime developed by the Bank of England, in which I had personally taken a great interest, would be good enough to pick up the holes in the Bill.

I was comfortable in this position—almost willing to ignore it—until, at Second Reading, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for whom I have immense regard, rather woke me up. I quote her speech:

“Picking up on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe—I disagree with him completely—that in the case of resolution, we do not need ring-fencing because we have a resolution regime in place or we can weaken the one because the other exists. Will the Minister be able to look me in the eye and say that he would activate a bail-in bond scheme if a big bank failed? The consequence would be huge financial instability among those who held those bail-in bonds—I am talking about the insurance companies and pension funds. Many would be on the verge of collapse if we ever exercised bailing in those bonds. That is one of the reasons why, in the financial crises that have happened, no Government have ever taken that step”.—[Official Report, 8/6/26; col. 1206.]


I do not have the weight of knowledge to be able to disregard such a statement.

The Minister was kind enough to facilitate a visit to the Treasury and the Bank of England to take me through the bail-in regime. It took four people from the Treasury and four from the Bank of England to try to persuade me that it was in good hands. I came out of that uncomfortable. If one is uncomfortable about a potential catastrophe, one feels that one has to pursue it, I am afraid.

Then one comes up against the mechanisms of legislation; here, I have to give notice of my concerns. If we are going to remove or take away activity from the ring-fencing solution and replace it with the resolution regime, it is important that that is tested much more intrusively than is proposed. I hope to persuade the Minister that, between now and Report, some mechanisms that are convincing to like-minded, fair-minded people have to be put together so that that balance will be achieved.

I was responsible for all sorts of safety, but particularly in the railway industry. You would not be able to do this in the railway industry. If you make a change that is of critical importance, there is a set procedure that must be gone through, and it must be signed off at the highest level. We should recognise that Clause 40 is of that magnitude. It just so happens that, in yesterday’s Times, there was an article that said:

“The Bank of England is planning to loosen rules it brought in to make the financial system safer after the 2008 crisis despite worries about the proposed changes voiced by some of its own officials … The central bank’s financial policy committee announced on Tuesday that it intended to revamp some regulations on the loss-absorbing capital that lenders must hold because it wanted to tackle the ‘unintended consequences’ of its rules and make it easier for banks to lend to households and businesses … Andrew Bailey, the Bank’s governor, insisted the overhaul would ‘make our capital regime more effective, proportionate and better calibrated to the risks in today’s financial system without unduly compromising the safety and soundness of firms’”.


“Without unduly compromising” is not nearly a powerful enough test. The limited test is that the risk should be lowered—as low as reasonably practicable.

We have all sorts of problems in this world, and all sorts of unprecedented things are happening. We have cryptocurrency. Now, I do not understand cryptocurrency; it seems a series of charades to me, but I suppose the purist would also point out that the dollar is a series of charades, because that is the essence of paper money. Nevertheless, things that can go and down up like that are fundamentally dangerous, given how large they are becoming in the banking world.

We also have the unregulated banking area. Without knowing the detail, but from listening to people who know about it talk about it, that seems to be an increasing threat. We also have wars all over the place. If we are moving to a regime where we give up ring-fencing, depending on resolution, we will need to subject it to a stronger set of tests through the processes of this legislation.

[Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)]

I support Amendment 160A. I want to start by briefly addressing a couple of issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pitt-Watson. Most importantly, I want briefly to quote the conclusions of the Skeoch report. The panel judges that the ring-fence

“is worth retaining at present”

but adds a number of considerations:

“The Panel recognises that the regime’s benefit will likely diminish with time, especially as the resolution regime—designed to ensure the continuation of all critical functions … —is embedded. This is because … UK authorities become comfortable with the viability of the large banking groups’ restructuring capabilities”.


I mention this only because the impression was given—

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

I did indeed talk to senior members of the Skeoch commission before writing my speech, and what I said is completely consistent with the conclusions of the Skeoch commission, which was set up by the previous Conservative Government, as I said.

[Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)]

I am just reading the conclusions from the report, my Lords. They make it very clear that the continuation of ring-fencing made sense at the time the report was written, but the commission clearly envisaged that it might not be needed over the passage of time. I also remind noble Lords that Glass-Steagall was abolished some 25 years ago with no detriment to the American banking system. I say this just to make the point that it is not so obvious.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

I find it difficult to believe that someone has told me that the withdrawal of Glass-Steagall, which took place 13 years before the global financial crisis, had no detriment to the American banking system. As I say, I have read the Skeoch report and discussed it with senior members of Skeoch, and I believe that what I said is entirely consistent with the recommendations that they made to the Government and this House, which is recognised in the Bill.

[Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)]

I also draw attention to the abolition of FOS, which the noble Lord mentioned. I draw the Committee’s attention to Amendment 172A, which discusses the changes proposed to FOS. It is to be abolished and replaced with something called the financial adjudication service, which is a broadly similar methodology to give redress to consumers and private clients, in the event of problems with the firms that serve them. While it is a change, it is a reform to FOS with an organisation with a different name, but it is not a straightforward abolition of that very important process. This will be dealt with in that later amendment—not in my name, I might add.

Governments, like some businesses, are very good at locking the stable door after the horse has bolted. Our reaction to 2008 was an example of just that. But we are now 18 years on and the banking sector has been solid during that time. However, as we know, growth has flatlined, despite many years of ultra-low interest rates. I am not suggesting that we are an exception here; there has been a similar experience across most of Europe. But we now have a substantial cost of capital for business to bear, with interest rates stuck at 3.75% and sadly not much prospect of a reduction in the near term.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I have one question for the noble Baroness, as my noble friend Lord Sharkey will speak for us on this. What will the cost be to the individual of going to the tribunal system? I am conscious that an individual needs to raise between £40,000 and £50,000 to get to preliminary hearing at the employment tribunal. Is that the kind of number that she has in mind?

[Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)]

I support this amendment and just raise the point of the First-tier Tribunal. I have experience of dealing with the FOS as a firm. At the moment, if you want to appeal the decision of the FOS, you have to go to judicial review. Therefore, whatever the cost of this First-tier Tribunal, it would be very substantially less than going through a process of judicial review, which firms are reluctant to go through, as noble Lords can imagine, because of its cumbersome nature.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

Can I ask the noble Lord to clarify? Judicial review can determine a matter only if there is a matter of law involved, not a matter of adjudication; is that right?

[Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)]

That is right.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, remarked earlier in our Committee discussions, we often agree about things, but not, I am afraid, about this amendment. There are three reasons for that: first, the amendment is not necessary; secondly, it probably would not work, although its lack of any real detail makes it quite hard to tell; and, thirdly, it would significantly bypass parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms. For example, proposed new subsection (1)(c) says that the determination of complaints will

“be determined by reference to such statutory requirements as may be specified”,

without actually specifying them. This does not make for proper scrutiny.

How complaints are determined is absolutely critical in how redress is obtained. The amendment tells us nothing about how that would be done, or on what criteria judgments would be made. Proposed new subsection (1)(g) contains what looks suspiciously like a Henry VIII power. None of these provisions is really necessary, and nor is the amendment as a whole. That is because there does not appear to be a convincing evidence base for the radical root-and-branch reform that abolishing the FOS would bring about. The nearest we have to evidence is in the assertion by the Minister that:

“The Government’s review found that, in a small but significant minority of cases, the FOS has acted as a quasi-regulator”.—[Official Report, 22/6/26; col. GC 260.]


That is all the government explanation there is for the proposed radical reform and, by extension, for the amendment before us.

I have repeatedly asked the Minister for more detail; I asked at Second Reading, and I asked again on the first day in Committee. I have had no response to what are essentially simple questions. How many cases are small? How was their significance assessed? How is the FOS, in this small number of cases, acting as a quasi-regulator? What we have currently is an assertion, but it certainly is not evidence. When he speaks, can the Minister tell the Committee what “small” means in this context? How many and what kind of cases were involved and how did they come to be characterised as significant? As for HMT’s rather bland consultation report, the frequent use of the phrase “broadly speaking” does not inspire a lot of confidence about the strength of its case.

The amendment before us is essentially skeletal and removes the complaints procedure to a wholly different legal arena. Given the grossly overstressed nature of our justice system, it is very hard to see any improvements being located there. The FOS is meant to be, and is, a quick, simple alternative to costly court processes for consumers. There is no hard evidence to support the proposals made in this amendment and, indeed, no clear sense of what kind of redress system and what criteria for determination are envisaged.

Last July, the FCA and the FOS signed a memorandum of understanding. Article 21(b) of the memorandum says that the two parties will

“seek to achieve a complementary and consistent approach, so far as that is consistent with their independent roles by consulting each other at an early stage (including on the interpretation of regulatory requirements where they are relevant to the resolution of disputes)”.

Article 24(c) says:

“For the Financial Ombudsman Service: seek a view from the FCA on the interpretation of its rules and how redress could potentially be assessed, as early as possible in advance of issuing a final determination, and provide the FCA with any relevant information and draft determinations it can share, to assist the FCA in formulating a view.”


The following article says that the FCA should try to respond to the FOS’ submission within 30 days.