(9 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, these instruments form a very important part of the defence of our borders and of the realm. I think I am right in saying that they provide for the reintroduction of the monitoring of the departure of persons from the United Kingdom. I want to ask my noble friend—in as far as the instruments cover the departure of persons from the United Kingdom—about the method of administering the scrutiny of travel documents of persons proposing to or attempting to depart. Is that scrutiny made by the organisation, company or airline by which the persons intends to travel, or by an immigration officer in the same way as is now being done to people arriving? In other words, who will scrutinise passports? Under these instruments, will it be done by the airline or whatever? If it is not being done by an immigration official scrutinising the travel documents using the latest technology, will any warning that an immigration officer would have who scrutinises and examines a passport or other travel document of somebody seeking to arrive in this country—a system that has advanced a great deal in recent years—be available to anyone who is asked to scrutinise the document or passport of someone seeking to depart from the United Kingdom in the same way? In other words, will a non-government official to whom the task is delegated, such as the airline, the railway people or the boat people, have that same information or be able to have it under these instruments?
My Lords, I merely seek clarification on one aspect of the 2015 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act’s code of practice for officers exercising functions under Schedule 1 of the Act, which accompanies these instruments. This code of practice is referred to in the 28th report of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. The final sentence of the information paragraph reads:
“In its consideration of the Code the Committee was concerned that directions about when officers may search a member of the opposite sex, particularly a child, were not as clear and consistent as they need to be”.
I am most grateful to my noble friend the Minister for his reply to my written query regarding this matter, but I remain concerned that the clarification I sought has not quite been met.
The committee and I still have concerns relating to the powers that the code of practice confers on officers who need to search a child—defined as anybody under 18—in order to seize or retain their travel documents. The code is exemplary in its guidance to police constables and designated border control officers, highlighting the care which must be taken when exercising their powers and the need to be aware of the necessity of safeguarding a child’s safety and welfare, as well as urging officers to be sensitive to the intimidation that children travelling alone can feel and the possibility that they may be vulnerable to exploitation by an adult with whom they are travelling.
I draw the attention of the House to paragraph 31, which outlines the scope of the power as it relates to the searching of children who have been removed from an adult. In particular, it gives guidance that two officers of the same sex as the child should, where reasonably practicable, be present during the search. It was the insertion of the three words, “where reasonably practicable”, which most concerned the committee and which led to its call for clarity. It seemed to the committee that the words,
“two officers of the same sex … where reasonably practicable”,
could give rise to any number of permissible permutations. I would be grateful if the Minister would clarify which of these would be justifiable and acceptable.
If two officers of the same sex as the child are not available, would two officers, one of the same sex and one of the opposite sex, be acceptable? If they are not available, would two officers of the opposite sex to the child be acceptable? If two officers are not available, would just one officer of the same sex as the child be acceptable? If they are not available, would just one officer of the opposite sex to the child be acceptable? At this stage, I am at a loss to understand why the last alternative is included. Are we to take from this that our ports are so understaffed that there are likely to be times when only one officer of the opposite sex will be available to search a child?
The code has already referred to the intimidation that a child travelling alone can experience. Does the Minister believe that a child, removed from an adult, would experience a similar feeling if searched by one or two officers of the opposite sex because they were the only reasonably practicable alternatives?
I would also be grateful if the Minister would add some detail on the advice given to officers governing the circumstances in which a child may be searched in the absence of the responsible adult with whom they are travelling, and explain how the child is to be removed from the adult and where the search will take place. If the child is travelling with an adult who is deemed to be exerting influence or pressure, how is an officer to defend him or herself against accusations of inappropriate behaviour if the child is influenced to make accusations against the officer and there are no witnesses to the search?
However, these children are unlikely to make a complaint about the manner in which they are searched, by whom they are searched and where they are searched. They are intent on leaving this country and, to all intents and purposes, this renders them powerless to control their situation. I would want firm guidelines to govern the way in which my grandchildren could be removed from my presence and searched at a UK port. Those firm, unambiguous guidelines should be applicable to all children.
The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee called for clarity in this aspect of the code of practice. I hope that the Minister will be able to provide the House with that clarity and describe, definitively, the circumstances under which children will be searched.
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I sense that the House probably wants to come to a conclusion, so I will not delay noble Lords long. Very powerful speeches have been made both in favour of the powers in these amendments and against them. But I note that the speeches that have been made against have been made against these particular amendments—the ones that were taken out of the draft communications data Bill. Something else has happened in the mean time. An admirable process was followed on this Bill. It was submitted to a Joint Committee and that committee reported on it and its defects. The Intelligence and Security Committee also considered the Bill with classified evidence and we similarly identified some defects. Since then, a revised Bill has been prepared. The noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Armstrong, have seen that Bill and they consider that it meets 95% of the criticisms that were in the original Bill. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, went so far as to say that if those clauses had been presented he would not have objected to them.
There is therefore a Bill waiting. The urgency has increased. The threat is now much higher. If the Government consider that this is a serious threat—they say that they do—it is their duty to produce that Bill and take action on it quickly if that can be done before the election. The arguments that have gone against these amendments do not go against taking that course.
The noble Baroness, Lady Lane-Fox, made another powerful argument, which was that if legislation were hastened it would create resentment and possibly opposition among the people whom we need to carry with us. But I disagree with her in this respect. She said that that may accelerate the bad people going to the dark web, but I think they will go there anyway. We are dealing with very sophisticated people. The argument that she makes simply underlines the fact that we are running behind the development of technology. The fact that we cannot go all the way to dealing with it should not prevent us doing what we can. That is an urgent matter.
The House will not be surprised to hear that I could not find myself in agreement with a lot of the things said by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, but in one respect I do agree with her. What worries me most is the cost of this legislation, which, if I recall rightly, is put at £1.6 billion. That is money that could be well used on other aspects of the Prevent process. I am torn about whether this is the best use of the money. But I take the view—the noble Lord, Lord West, argued about being hard-nosed with the providers—that it ought to be a duty of the providers to retain these records. It is not something that the taxpayer ought to pay for. The providers make a great deal of money out of these services. If they are required to keep these records at a cost, they may bid a little less for the licences, but I am prepared to take that risk. It should be a condition of the licences that records of this sort should be retained which can be consulted.
My final point underlines something said by the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong. We are not talking about the Government or the authorities holding these records. If people are writing to Alcoholics Anonymous, the Government will not have access to that information. They will access these records only when they are looking for people they have reason to believe are preparing terrorist acts or serious crimes. People who are going to Alcoholics Anonymous have no serious cause to be concerned.
My Lords, I am curious about two of the sources of opposition to what my noble friend Lord King and others have proposed. One is that we somehow have plenty of time and that we do not need to rush. Terrorism is time-related, but it is not time-limited. The terrorist threat was there yesterday and the day before. It is certainly there today and it will be there tomorrow, I am afraid, and I fear the day after tomorrow as well. We do not have the luxury of time that many have suggested.
The other point that surprised me so much is the one about public concern. Of course, it is very easy to say to the public that there is a danger of a snoopers’ charter, which will interfere with everything that you are communicating and is very much against your interests. We know that technically that is simply not true. It is a fear and concern that has been fanned by politicians, quite often for their own purposes.
The noble Lord, Lord Butler, was so right to draw attention to the fact that a draft Bill has been prepared. As far as I can make out, that has been deliberately suppressed by one party for presumably some sort of political reason. It has not been brought forward for discussion. If you ask the public to choose between reducing the risk of death from terrorism to themselves or others whom they do not know, or a possible invasion of their privacy or the privacy of others whom they know or do not know, I have little doubt as to what they would choose.
There are ways in which the security of this country is not being maintained when the Government would like to maintain it. I take one example. It is clearly in our interests in the world of terrorism that we should know who crosses our borders—out as well as in. We have been given an example of the people who go to do jihad and all the rest of it. The fact is that a big attempt was made with the e-Borders programme. A contract worth £750 million was given to Raytheon in 2007. It ran into tremendous difficulties and in 2010 the contract was cancelled. Since then there has been a great deal of judicial toing and froing and arbitration. The net result appears to be a debt to the taxpayer to be paid by the Home Office to Raytheon of £200 million. Something like that failed when it was tried. Let us at least do things that we think can be done. Do not let us say that we have until the day after tomorrow as things may happen tomorrow.
My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Butler, I appreciate that this debate has gone on for some time, so I will try to keep my intervention short. These extensive amendments have been proposed in many ways by people whom I consider to be institutions, so I am therefore hesitant to stand up and speak on them. They have been proposed by people for whom I have much admiration. But it concerns me that they are being bolted on to what is already a difficult and in many parts controversial Bill, at the end of a Parliament in what will be a toxic political year and in an expedited way. It is probably not the best way in which to bring these matters forward. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that if there is a better version of this Bill out there in the ether of government it may have been better to have considered that version rather than the one before us today.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Lane-Fox, for her expert understanding of the IT community and developments in that community. It always surprises me that just when we think that we will be able to deal with an issue the industry finds a way that leads us to think—after that legislation has been passed—that we probably will not. In those circumstances it is important that we ask whether what we are going to do is needed.
The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, made some very important points about evidence gathered and the basis on which we secure prosecutions and convictions for people who are now serving sentences. Is it absolutely true that this kind of communication is the missing link, right now, in preventing terrorist actions being successful? The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, raised the issue of the two ladies who are married to the two men in France and were communicating with each other, how we did not have those data, and how, had we had that information, it might have provided the missing link that alerted the French security services. I, for one, am not convinced. Sisters-in-law spend hours gossiping to each other all the time. I am not sure that that would have been the moment when the bright light came on to say that a terrorist act was going to be committed—because two women married to two men are speaking to each other.
The gathering and retention of these data is for the purposes of national security. Again, noble Lords, or the Minister, may be able to clarify what this means. I was talking to the noble Lord, Lord King, earlier, about the definition of national security as it relates to this amendment, or part of the Bill, and we could not find such a definition. Perhaps somebody could bring one to my attention. However, for the purposes of national security something that could be interpreted as very wide and broad, and which could change depending on the political persuasions of Ministers at any time, is a very wide provision and so requires consideration.
I hear the point which has been made: “We do not have the time”, but I also think that our security services have, through the number of plots they have foiled up to now, shown that they are able to operate within current constraints and keep us safe. While we need to give them more power, over time, to make sure that they continue to keep us safe, it is important that those powers work and are needed by the people who are an essential element of our fight against extremism and terrorism.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Evans of Weardale, who, in many meetings, used to be the biggest voice of reason on these issues. He spoke of the amount of support and co-operation that was received from the British Muslim communities in the fight against terrorism, and how that was an essential element of ensuring that we were kept safe. I speak as somebody who has been on the receiving end of what could be described as profiling or as a general concern about keeping us safe. I probably get more random checks than many Members of this House and my husband is never going to catch an internal flight in the US. He never arranges a meeting on the day he arrives in the US, because he knows he is going to miss his first internal flight. It is, therefore, important that whatever powers come into play are effective, and that they do not send out a general sense of alienation among those communities which we need to keep on board. I made that point in my piece at the weekend, saying that we must seriously look at how the Government start to engage in a much broader and deeper way with the British Muslim communities, who are going to be part of the solution.
A recent radio phone-in asked whether, if your husband, wife, partner or “relevant other half” asked you to hand over your mobile phone to him or her right now so that they could look at absolutely everything on it, you would be prepared to hand it over immediately. Or would you think: “I probably need to delete a few things from this phone before I hand it to them”. Perhaps that is a question that we should all go away and think about. If we cannot just hand things over to those whom we consider to be our “relevant other halves”, knowing that our data are completely safe with them, although there may be consequences, then we should be much more careful about handing over that power to government—the different colours of government—who could, over time, go into realms that we would not want them to go into.
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support this order, as I would any measure that will protect us against the serious and growing terrorist threat that we face. The Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments has noted but not commented on the report, but I would like to make one or two points.
I shall refer in particular to the Muslim Brotherhood. It has been well described as the trunk of the tree that represents political Islam. The root is probably the Wahhabi sect. The branches of the tree include buddies such as those named by my noble friend, as well as other terrorist organisations, spreading from al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and, above all, ISIS. Together, these branches form an international fascist movement specialising in spreading terror and even seeking to dominate Europe—as well, of course, as Muslim lands.
In April last year, my right honourable friend the Prime Minister ordered an inquiry into the Muslim Brotherhood by Sir John Jenkins, Her Majesty’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia. As my noble friend will know, the Muslim Brotherhood is at present in open armed conflict against the Egyptian Government of President Sisi, particularly in Sinai. The Muslim Brotherhood is also politically active in the UK. Indeed, I understand that a summit has been planned in London on 12 February under the umbrella of an organisation called Cordoba, of which the chair, a Mr Tikrit, is well known to security circles in both Washington and London. I also understand that Cordoba has recently had its bank accounts closed by HSBC.
I hope that my noble friend will be able to give some indication of when we shall be made aware at least of the conclusions of the Jenkins inquiry into the Muslim Brotherhood.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his explanation and for writing to me earlier in the week with further information. I am genuinely grateful; like his predecessor, who is also here tonight, he has always been willing to engage with us and assist us by providing information. He will appreciate that we do not have access to the same security information as the Government and we take the information given by Ministers on trust. We support this order and recognise the need to have such protections in place. The judgment that we make has to be based on our trust in Ministers and the information that they provide to the House. The information given here is quite clear.
I will raise just two issues with the noble Lord, which I have mentioned to him. One is about the Prevent programme. It is quite clear when we hear of cases like this, of extremism and the dangers and fear it brings and the horrific terrorist acts that are inflicted, we must do everything we can to deter young people from becoming radicalised to the extent that they wish to commit such violence in this or any other country. The Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, which we are currently discussing—it has two days in the Chamber next week—addresses just that issue and how important it is to deter young people from being caught up in extremist views. It is a question of extent: holding views is one thing, but if that leads to terrorism and engagement in terrorist activities, clearly that is extraordinarily serious and has to be tackled.
One way of doing that is through the Prevent programme, which the Bill places on a statutory footing, and we welcome that. But we need to think long-term on these issues. Over the past few years the funding for Prevent has been cut from £17 million when we were in government to less than £3 million. If we are serious about tackling such issues, we cannot think, “What’s the next issue? What’s the one after? What’s happening next week or next month?”; we have to think long-term. I was appalled that at one point the number of local authorities receiving funding from Prevent fell from 90 to just 23, although I think that is improving now. We support Prevent being on a statutory footing but I urge some longer-term thinking to ensure that we tackle this at source and prevent any more of our young people being caught up in such abuse of their religion.
I told the Minister as we came into the Chamber that I would briefly raise this second matter. I mentioned the issue of trust and us not having access to the same information as the Government. In this case, I think we do have information. I was reading the Hansard of the debate last night in the other place and was absolutely horrified to see that there is a Twitter account for JAA, glorifying violence and terrorism and directing readers to other places they can get such information. It is an English Twitter account, in English; there are links to the Arabic site as well. This account has more than 14,000 followers. My honourable friend Diana Johnson, the shadow Minister, raised this last night, and I am appalled that when I looked on Twitter today, just minutes before I came into the Chamber, I saw that that account is still active.
If we are serious about dealing with young people and tackling such terrorism, we have to look at how social media is being used and use all the powers available to us to do something about it. Surely the Government are aware of this. The Minister will probably say the same as the Minister said last night—that it has been reported to the appropriate body, which is dealing with it. However, there are powers in place and we have to look to those who engage with social media and those responsible for it. I do not expect to be able at the click of a button to access a Twitter account glorifying such horrendous terrorist acts.
I make a plea to the Government. The powers are there. Referring this problem to a body that is going to look at it and think about it is not good enough, and I hope that by tomorrow if I look at that account it will be closed down.
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am very happy to do that. That is absolutely right. We saw images of Jews and Muslims coming together in Paris—there was reference made to them last night. I think they were actually from Albania and came together to show solidarity that this is not happening in their name and that all faith communities are going to stand together against this attack on their freedoms. The more we see of that, the better.
Does my noble friend agree that there is nothing remotely disrespectful in the cartoon in this week’s Charlie Hebdo which depicts the Prophet Muhammad identifying with the victims of the murderous attack by fascist terrorists and weeping at the thought that it could be claimed to have been done in his name?
I think that all those who believe in a divine force in this world will recognise that any divine element who is love will be weeping at what is happening now, not just in France but across the whole world, in many corners where people’s lives are blighted and violence is used.
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I suppose it is axiomatic that defence of the realm is the first priority for any British Government, but what is it defence against? Today in the UK we face the gravest threat to our safety, freedom and way of life since the end of the Cold War with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. We are not alone. It is a threat faced by much of the developed world and often more immediately by developing countries in every continent. The threat is that from political Islam. I first heard this phrase through President Sisi of Egypt, himself a devout Muslim, who is one of the doughtiest opponents of political Islam. It is, he said recently, “antagonising the entire world”. Some Muslim clerics have bravely denounced political Islam as a distortion of the religion of Islam, although many have remained silent. Let us hope that some of them now speak out.
I believe that political Islam ticks all the boxes to be identified as an international fascist movement. It is conceptually undemocratic. It is wholly intolerant. It is racist. It is in fact secular, with its leaders being drawn, and many of its supporters attracted, from among the fanatical, alienated, criminal and psychopathic elements that lurk at the bottom of every society. It inflicts on men, women and children unbridled brutality and cruelty that is truly psychotic. By combining modern management methods with the latest cyber and communications technologies, as well as the lesson of history on the effectiveness of terror as a weapon, which the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, referred to, it has been horrifyingly successful so far. Its stated aim is to establish a worldwide caliphate apparently recalling the days of the Ottoman Empire, which in 1923 Ataturk replaced with a secular republic in Turkey.
We are told that political Islam has succeeded in recruiting some 15,000 foreign fighters from 80 countries, the majority of them to ISIS in Syria and Iraq. The seduction of many of these appears to involve offering sexual delights. I have myself seen a film on ISIS in which one of its leaders promises recruits, “The virgins are waiting for you”. In north-east Nigeria, where Boko Haram continues to wreak havoc, killing more than 4,000 people last year, schoolgirls are being kidnapped to become sex slaves of the fighters of that terror group.
In the longer term, the destruction of political Islam must come through the collective rejection of it by the Governments and religious leaders of the Muslim world. Meanwhile, we have to defend ourselves from it, and this Bill is concerned with that defence. Its aim, therefore, must have our support. However, the methods that it proposes manage, in some areas, to be both inadequate and sometimes injudicious. I shall focus on some of the inadequacies.
First, in Part 1, with its powers to disrupt the travel of people suspected of involvement in terrorism, I suggest that one of the most urgent and easiest measures—not in the Bill—would be to require all British passport holders to notify Her Majesty’s Passport Office of any other passport they hold. I have, over several years, repeatedly sought to introduce this requirement. I have never sought any limit on other passports of British passport holders. All I ask is that details of them are available in the records of the Passport Office and that they are revealed to immigration staff when scanning British passports. The Home Office has always opposed my proposal. Now surely its time has come.
Other, very simple but necessary, changes to passport administration should include the automatic electronic cancelling of passports—I think that the idea of physically seizing passports is rather old hat—particularly, for example, those of all deceased persons. There is currently a silly little gap in this regard. Quite often, these passports are flogged off on the black market. I think that the General Register Office should be made responsible for the immediate notification of deaths to the Passport Office. The cancellation of passports of all persons while in custody or serving custodial sentences is also appropriate. We have heard of people suspected of terrorism, even on bail, getting out with their passports intact. The courts can already require the surrender of passports but I think that electronic cancellation would be simpler.
Secondly, there needs to be much more rigorous vetting and control of the integrity of Border Force staff and all those concerned with the processing and issuing of visas. In January 2012, my noble friend Lord Henley, in a Written Answer, gave me details of 29 convictions of Home Office staff for misconduct in public office in the previous five years—that is, one every two months. The seriousness of the offences is indicated by the sentences passed: 18 were sent to prison for two years or more, and in one case nine years. Twenty-one of the 29 were employed in what was then the UK Border Agency. Considering the improbability of detection, the scale of what in many cases was abuse of the administration of the immigration system for private profit suggests that this behaviour may be responsible for a significant failure to secure our borders.
The Answer to the Written Question gave an indication of the sort of profiling needed in the recruitment procedures. Interestingly, my noble friend Lord Bates, updating the list in an Answer on 6 January, omitted to give the names of those convicted. When I inquired about the reason for this omission, I was told that the Home Office,
“do not consider it appropriate to include sensitive personal data in our response, ie the names of individual offenders”.
Convictions and sentencing in this country are done in public. What is this Home Office playing at, trying to conceal from Parliament names of its employees who have been sent to prison for misconduct in public office? Given the ease with which people could get jobs in the border agency in order to make money from such practices, is not the possibility of terrorists infiltrating the Home Office to threaten our country a much more serious risk? For example, given what the Government said yesterday about Boko Haram, would it be wise to employ people who might have such sympathies or indeed connections? During the Cold War there was an elaborate system of positive vetting to prevent those with communist sympathies being employed in sensitive areas. I hope that the Minister will be able to assure us that all government departments and agencies are now equally vigilant on the threat from political Islam.
Finally, I draw attention to the extremely unsatisfactory situation regarding the electronic monitoring of our national borders. I refer of course to the e-Borders system, which is one of the biggest failures of government computer procurement. The main contract with the American-based company Raytheon, signed in 2007 and worth around £750 million, was terminated by the present Government in July 2010. After binding arbitration, the Home Office has been left to pay Raytheon £224 million. Now we are talking about the need for more resources for the police and security services. That, by any standards, is big money.
What we should have is electronic scanning and recording of the passports of every person arriving at and leaving our borders, by land, sea or air. This information should be stored, probably for at least five years. That is simply not happening. Although there is now fairly extensive scanning of arrivals, even that is not complete, nor is it recorded. However, scanning and recording on departure is every bit as important. That is virtually non-existent. How do we know that those who have been admitted for a limited period have departed? How do we know that those who should not have been allowed to depart have not got out of the country?
A full e-Borders system is of the highest priority in protecting us from terrorism. When I have raised this question I have been fobbed off with the suggestion that the monitoring of exits is “intelligence-led”. That is simply not good enough.
I hope very much that the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee will urgently consider the consequences of Raytheon and the action that is now needed. I hope that the report of the National Audit Office, which is reviewing this fiasco, will be published soon and reported on by the Public Accounts Committee.
There are three problems in making this legislation fit for purpose. First, the Home Office is traditionally extremely resistant to any suggestions as to how it could better perform its duties. The “not invented here” factor meant that it took me 10 years from the time the legislation requiring it was passed to get the invaluable electronic firearms register established—10 years. Secondly, the Home Office is not taking the measures it could do under existing legislation. There is a lot of new legislation but it is a matter of doing what could already be done. This is largely because—as demonstrated by Raytheon—it is lacking in the computer skills and capabilities to defend our borders. Thirdly, I am afraid that the performance of the Home Office certainly does not indicate that—in this area at least—the “gentleman in Whitehall always knows best”, as has been demonstrated by a number of contributions this evening. This House must scrutinise and, where necessary, amend this legislation fully and fearlessly.
(10 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberWhen I was waving my hand, I was not making an offensive or hostile gesture to the noble Lord, Lord Harris; I just wanted to explain that they are not inquiries but reviews. They are reviews that are taking place with the Home Office. He wanted to know how the reviews would work together. They are all short term and are designed to report within the next six months, with some even shorter, in order to bring together, as the noble Lord quite rightly pointed out, the parallel policy formation that will be necessary to make sure that we have coherence.
On the accountability of restraint, I will suggest that that is something that the College of Policing could consider. It is the sort of issue on which it quite rightly makes recommendations and issues guidelines. I am sure that it will be interested in the noble Lord’s comments, but I cannot comment today.
My Lords, the “Plebgate” incident at the gates of Downing Street took place on 17 September 2012. At that time, the commissioner of the Met decided to investigate himself. Does my noble friend recollect that, when he answered a Question from me on 1 April this year, 18 months after the incident had happened, he said, first, that HMG had no role in deciding who should investigate it? Therefore, I ask him whether in future it would be possible for the Commissioner of the Met to decide to investigate such an incident rather than having it independently investigated.
Secondly, my noble friend told me in his Answer that although the IPCC had requested that the Metropolitan Police should publish its report once the misconduct proceedings had been concluded, it would be for the Metropolitan Police to decide whether to publish the report. Does that example not reveal a very unsatisfactory state of affairs? And, incidentally, when will we get the final report on that incident?
I cannot answer my noble friend on the latter point. All I can say is that the events surrounding my right honourable friend Andrew Mitchell and the process that followed are among a number of issues informing the present debate about policing and the way in which the police deal with complaints. It is good that my noble friend has had the opportunity of raising the matter again today; it belongs to a whole collection of matters, including Hillsborough and the Stephen Lawrence murder, that have led us to believe that it is right for us to undertake these reviews.
(10 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberI do not want to go into detail today on the noble Lord’s points. However, I will examine what he said, because he is talking about procedures rather than the matter that the Bill deals with—how we handle this in legal process. If the noble Lord will allow me, I will write to him in response to his question. I am grateful to him for raising it.
Given the point that the noble Lord, Lord Butler, has just made, and of course given the total paramountcy of the defence of the realm, will the Minister assure us that if the scrutiny of the Bill were to reveal defects in the legislation—which, after all, is what scrutiny is about—the Bill would be amendable, notwithstanding the parliamentary timetable for the Recess?
My Lords, the passage of the Bill contains all the normal phases of discussion so it would be for Parliament to decide whether it needed to change the Bill. I hope that it will not be a political football, with people trying to make further points about what might have been and what could be, and all the rest. I do not think that the House is in the mood for that. All the comments that have been made have made it clear to me that, in general, the Bill correctly addresses the issue and we will look at the wording and make sure that we have got it right. That is what scrutiny is for and that is what we are here for. I hope that we will take advantage of that opportunity. I also hope to brief noble Lords on Monday by party group—arrangements are in place for those briefings—because I thought it would be helpful if we had an opportunity to talk about these things before we consider the Bill and before it goes to the House of Commons, which will consider it early next week.
(10 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I make no apology for raising again the issue of foreign passports. I say straightaway that I am not proposing, and have never proposed, any restrictions of any sort on people holding foreign passports.
I last raised this matter on 7 April as an amendment to the Immigration Bill. It was of course opposed by the Home Office for the usual NIH reasons. Of all departments, the Home Office more than others rejects ideas that do not originate from its own creative and fertile mind. However, the problem is that the Home Office, especially in recent years, has not always been good at joined-up thinking, so it can be an obstacle to joined-up government. That is why I fear that my noble friend the Minister is probably under riding instructions to say that my proposal for there to a requirement that details of foreign passports held by British passport-holders should be with the Passport Office is unnecessary and irrelevant in the war against terrorism, serious crime or organised crime. There is a second reason. The Passport Office is at present in considerable difficulties and may regard itself as incapable of handling the changes that are needed, however urgent they are. I shall give a little detail of this later.
I bring forward the amendment in the context of the menace of the deep cloud of Islamist terrorism. Tragically, the fundamentally good and admirable purposes of Islam—one of the three great monotheistic religions, which has given the world so much in science, culture and ethics and has historically been a haven for religious tolerance—and the true religious dimension of it as laid out in the Koran, which at its finest level is expressed by the mystical doctrine of Sufi, have been undermined by the medieval intolerance of the Wahabi sect and hijacked by political Islam, with its armed terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda and now ISIS, which are engaged in the savage and cruel civil war between the Sunnis and the Shias.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Attlee for his comments. He was absolutely right: we had to adapt the amendment to the Bill. The Minister’s answer was exactly as I expected and also quite revealing. The emphasis on the Passport Office’s burden reflects my point that I suspect that its internal problems mean that it feels that it could not cope with it, and that if anything makes the proposal go away, so much the better. What he says is the Passport Office’s view is not the one that has been expressed to me by a number of people in the security world, which is that this is necessary.
I was not, of course, suggesting that the caliphate passport would ever be shown to a British Border Force inspector. The whole point about the caliphate passport is that it will be used in the sort of countries where we would want to know a British passport holder had been doing things. The one thing he has not mentioned is that there is a greatly increasing and very serious threat of Islamist terrorism from the al-Qaeda and ISIS terrorist wings of political Islam. Pray God there is not, but if there were some terrible atrocity and it was found later that we had no idea what was likely but that we might have done if we had realised a person was moving around with other passports, there would be some regret at the Government’s line.
Frankly, the Government are wrong about this. The passport is a powerful weapon for defending our borders but full use is not made of it. I very much hope that the Permanent Secretary who has been tasked with looking at the Passport Office will consider these issues. As I said earlier, I pay tribute to the Border Force, which has greatly improved since Admiral Montgomery took it over from the Civil Service. As I said last time, I suspect we will gradually tiptoe towards a sounder way of making the best use of the passport system to protect us and our citizens. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(10 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this amendment is a simple one. Its purpose is to ensure that Her Majesty’s Passport Office is fully aware of other passports that are held by an individual to whom a British passport has been or is to be issued.
There is nothing new about this amendment: I have raised this matter in this House several times. I had convinced the previous Government to support it but, on that occasion, policy officials in the Home Office intervened to oppose it. I have had long, helpful discussions with my noble friend Lord Taylor, for whom I have the greatest affection and respect, and I believed that I had convinced him of the merit of this amendment. I had expected that it would be in the Bill, though there was obviously no commitment to it. However, once again, Home Office officials intervened to prevent it. The gentleman in Whitehall does not necessarily know best, especially when he lives in the Home Office. It is where, rather as in the European Commission, the monopoly of initiating legislation is seen as a prerogative to be carefully guarded, regardless of the merits of outside views. In the Home Office, new thinking is successfully repelled by the three initials—NIH. I remind the House of Margaret Thatcher’s adage: “Officials advise, Ministers decide”. However, sometimes Ministers need parliamentary help in so doing, especially from your Lordships’ House.
I have had a couple of earlier battles. Eventually, I won them both. The first one took 10 years. It was to set up a national electronic register of firearms. Parliament passed my amendment on that in 1997. The Home Office decided to stonewall it for 10 years. Minister after Minister in successive Governments backed me. Eventually, the Home Office capitulated and the electronic firearms register is today in full and effective use. The second battle, during which I introduced a Private Member’s Bill in 2011, was to secure the removal of those protestors in Parliament Square who hogged the space by camping, preventing access for others. The Government eventually agreed the amendment and put it in their own legislation. That area is now again attractive and protestors can still protest.
My amendment on passports is extremely simple. It intrudes on no one’s rights and the cost would be negligible. I emphasise that I am well aware, as are your Lordships, that, as passports come under the royal prerogative, Her Majesty’s Government already have extensive rights in setting rules and practices in relation to them. However, there is a serious gap in their practice, of which the security forces warned me more than five years ago. Successive Governments have for years and years tried to introduce an electronic border system so as to be able to scrutinise and record every passenger who enters or leaves the UK. It is obvious that without such a system it is impossible to keep track of those who have been given leave to enter for a limited period, let alone get a handle on those who wish our country ill or whose presence is not conducive to our national security. Although entry scrutiny has greatly improved, it is still not complete, and exit scrutiny is hardly under starter’s orders. It still depends largely on the airlines, shipping lines and railway ticket offices. Only a few countries, such as the USA, have put in place full checks on those departing the UK, if they intend to enter the USA.
Those who wish our country ill, by which at present I obviously mean primarily those Islamist jihadists who have demonstrated their ruthless determination to use all the methods open to terrorists, may hold other passports in addition to their British passports. They can travel in and out of the country with their British passports and it is very hard for the security services to track them when they use their other passports once they are abroad. That has been shown to be the case and has been referred to, and people are amazed that what I am trying to achieve by this amendment does not already exist. I have discussed it with senior serving police officers, who told me that they believed that it was already in force and were amazed that it was not. However, it is not.
To make the administration simpler, my amendment would apply initially only to new passports and the renewal of passports, which has to happen every 10 years. In due course, it would apply to all British passport holders. I emphasise that my amendment does not in any way prevent, threaten or reduce the right of British passport holders to hold as many other passports as they can acquire. Therefore, in a sense, it is very different from the amendments that we have just discussed. It is absolutely the opposite. It is a fully libertarian amendment. I believe that it would be a major contribution to ensuring that our borders are fully protected. It would mean that when a person presents a British passport at immigration control, the details of other passports held would show up on the scan. Indeed, once the British passport holder had recorded the fact that they had other passports, if those other passports were used, again, the scan would show the corresponding information about a British passport, so the measure is logical and straightforward.
The fact that this measure does not exist was emphasised in January 2009 in a reply given by the noble Lord, Lord West, the then Home Office Minister. The noble Lord told me last week that he was very sorry that he could not be here tonight to support my amendment. When asked how many British passport holders also held passports of other countries, the noble Lord had to reply that the “information is not available”. That was an astonishing situation. However, it is still the situation. It is high time that we encouraged the Home Office to close this gap in our defences. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness and, of course, I thank my noble friend Lord Marlesford. He is patient, but I think he is also a realist. I think he understands that he may have been too optimistic in expecting this measure to be included in the Bill. However, some of the points that he mentioned in his speech, and which are referred to in the amendment, are very much sentiments that we share. I share his aim of bringing offenders to justice and fully support closing down any avenue that could impact on our ability to prevent and detect crime. However, I hope that I can explain to the noble Baroness and to my noble friend why legislation in this area is not necessary and would not be beneficial to the Home Office.
Her Majesty’s Passport Office directly contributes to the Home Secretary’s key aims of securing borders, tackling terrorism and reducing crime. It does this through its public protection strategy and by sharing data and intelligence with other parts of the Home Office and other agencies. Access to personal data for the purposes set out in subsection (3) of the proposed new clause is already permissible.
My noble friend has suggested that this passport information could be made available for deprivation decisions under the proposed power in Clause 64, on which we have just had a Division. This would not significantly improve the evidence base for these sorts of deprivation decisions. The Home Office retains information regarding an individual’s previous recorded nationality or passport from their immigration records and will undertake research to determine these facts. Within the new power, the Home Office will also consider the ability to acquire a former, or another nationality, although this will not be a bar to action, as I said in moving a previous amendment. We would not necessarily rely on information provided by the individual, who may seek to benefit from renouncing or not declaring other passports or nationalities.
My noble friend has also suggested that information collected could be made available to immigration officers for consideration when undertaking their duties. Immigration officers already have powers to require a person to furnish any information that is relevant to an examination, which may include details of dual nationality where necessary and appropriate.
Her Majesty’s Passport Office does not collect data on the number of passport holders who have a second nationality. My noble friend Lord Marlesford is aware of that. The passport application, however, requires all customers to submit any sort of passport, British or otherwise, at the point of application. That information is collected to help to confirm identity and is recorded on the person’s UK passport record. HM Passport Office receives about 6 million passport applications a year from domestic applicants. It receives a further 380,000 applications from overseas. Because of the smaller quantity involved, HMPO has been able to estimate that about 50% of overseas applications may involve applicants who hold dual nationality.
HM Passport Office is required to gather information that is relevant solely to the passport application. The issue of dual nationality is not directly relevant to the UK passport application process, because a person is not prevented from having another nationality under UK law. Collecting data for purposes other than the issue of the passport would require HM Passport Office to change its published data-sharing principles and to consider the possible impact on the exercise of the royal prerogative. Furthermore, HM Passport Office is not permitted to use the passport fee to subsidise the collecting of data for a purpose that is not relevant to the issue of the passport. The agency is required to charge applicants a fee that covers only the cost of the issuing of passports.
In any event, I am not convinced that establishing and maintaining such a database would provide any significant benefit. We already require existing and previous passports to be submitted at the point of application. Information is also held on the nationality of persons who have registered or naturalised as British citizens. Gathering information on dual nationals simply because they are dual nationals would therefore be of very limited value. It would be disproportionate, as there would be no specific benefit either to support an application process or to assist in preventing and detecting crime.
However, possession of another passport is of interest to HM Passport Office for the identity reasons that I have given above. In considering the amendment, I have asked that we look at the benefits and consequences of placing a requirement on British passport holders to submit to HM Passport Office, during the lifetime of their British passport, any new, renewed or replacement passport issued to them by the country from which they hold dual nationality. I will write separately to my noble friend when we have considered this further.
I have taken the opportunity of providing your Lordships with a detailed response to this amendment because the noble Baroness said that she would like to hear the reasoning behind the Government’s position. I hope that my noble friend will appreciate that I have been fuller than I might have been. This very much reflects the seriousness of the issues that he has raised today and previously in the House—he does the House great service by doing so. However, I am satisfied with the existing processes to record dual nationality and passports when required and that, importantly, mechanisms are in place to share those data with law enforcement agencies, including border staff. So, to some degree, we have met the objectives of his amendment. I hope that, with that clarification, my noble friend will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am most grateful to the Minister for what he has said. It does not answer my amendment, although I suppose that there is an indication that the Home Office is tiptoeing towards doing the sensible thing. I shall certainly continue to press this. The next time that there is relevant legislation, I shall attach this amendment to it. I hope that we will have a strong and full debate in Committee on this because I am certain that my proposal is simple, feasible, fully in accordance with freedom and would make a very useful additional weapon to ensure that our borders are properly policed. The information that led me to bring this forward originally was good information, from those who are responsible for the practical methods of protecting our national security. I believe that this can be done.
My noble friend mentioned the possibility of non-compliance and concealment. There is a simple remedy for this. If someone, in applying for a British passport or a renewal, with the requirement that they disclose other passports that they hold, fails to do so, it is obvious that they have not complied with their obligation in getting the British passport and it could immediately be cancelled. That would be an easy and satisfactory penalty for non-compliance.
I believe that my proposal is both needed and practical and I shall return to it. However, in the mean while, I withdraw the amendment.
(10 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I would like to speak, as briefly as I do passionately, in support of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay. My noble friend the Minister is well aware that I have always been enthusiastic about the proper, effective and efficient control of our borders in the national interest. Indeed, there are a number of areas in respect of national security where there is much more that can be done. I hope to introduce some amendments on Report to fill some of those gaps.
However, it is very sad that, when a government department is seeking to produce policies to deal with sensitive issues and there is a choice between being subtle and acting in a crass manner, all too often the crass seems to win. I am convinced that the overwhelming empirical evidence is that students who come to this country, whether they be at schools, universities, business colleges or military establishments such as Sandhurst, Cranwell or the Royal College of Defence Studies, contribute hugely to their own future as well as ours. One of the features of this relatively small country is the way that we act as a catalyst in world chemistry. We are a catalyst for tolerance, for the rule of law, for decency and for the cultural and political aspects of what we call civilisation. I would never be able to vote for something that reduces our country in respect of being that catalyst.
My Lords, the Minister will not be surprised that I wanted to have a last word about colleges. We have many illustrious representatives of the universities but every time that we have this debate I think, “Why has no one mentioned the colleges?”. The proportion of foreign students in our colleges and other institutions is quite a bit higher. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, refers in the amendment to “all institutions”, so they are covered, but the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, made an important point about the sustaining of courses: if you do not have enough students, you do not have enough courses. This is happening right now. I know personally of a college in London—I am not a representative of it—that is losing staff and courses as fast as it is losing its students. I think that last year they had an 80% loss, which they are now trying to make back up again. I remind the Minister of my interest there.