Healthcare (International Arrangements) Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 5th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I join the noble Lords, Lord O’Shaughnessy and Lord Foulkes, in welcoming the noble Baroness, Lady Blackwood of North Oxford, to the House and to her post. I congratulate her on making an excellent maiden speech. I hope she will forgive me when I admit to spending a great deal of time in her erstwhile constituency and to having campaigned there in the last two general elections—so I may have played a very small part in her elevation to your Lordships’ House.

Although I thoroughly enjoyed the Minister’s speech, particularly the passages about Oxford, she did not—perforce, I accept, as did she—comply with the tradition that maiden speeches ought to be uncontroversial. I oppose the Bill in its present form. I am conscious of the fact that it has passed through the House of Commons unamended and that the report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee was, unusually, produced on 15 November, before Committee in the other place. Nevertheless, regrettably, the Committee’s report was taken insufficiently seriously by the House of Commons. Sometimes the lack of scrutiny of departures from our constitutional arrangements is frankly unforgivable.

Of course, noble Lords across this House much want to see arrangements for reciprocal healthcare with member states of the EU, the EEA and EFTA continuing as closely as possible to their present form. Indeed, one of the great risks of the calamitous decision to leave the European Union is 27 million UK EHIC card holders, and 180,000-odd UK state pensioners living in the EU who benefit from the S1 scheme, risking the loss of their current rights to reciprocal healthcare.

The Explanatory Memorandum and the Minister say that the Bill has been introduced as a result of the decision to leave the EU and is intended to respond to all possible outcomes of EU exit with new reciprocal healthcare agreements. However, the Bill confers on the Secretary of State exceptional and untrammelled powers that are utterly objectionable. Furthermore, as I will argue, the breadth of these is entirely unnecessary to achieve what is needed to enable satisfactory reciprocal healthcare arrangements to be made on Brexit.

I shall start by turning to the proposed powers. Clause 1 states:

“The Secretary of State may make payments, and arrange for payments to be made, in respect of the cost of healthcare provided outside the United Kingdom”.


There is no limit on the amount of such payments. There is no limit on the type of healthcare to be provided. Indeed, Clause 3 says that,

“‘healthcare’ means all forms of healthcare provided for individuals, whether relating to mental or physical health, and includes related ancillary care”.

There is no geographical limit on where it is to be provided: the power is worldwide. The additional definition of “healthcare agreement” covers providing to other countries healthcare without limit within the UK, and possibly at UK taxpayers’ expense. Clause 2(1) cures none of these deficiencies.

Worse still, Clause 2(2) is entirely unlimited. The regulations may do any of the things provided in subsections (a) to (i), “for example”. So logically they may also do anything else. The Secretary of State may specify, in regulations, levels of payments and their calculation; classes of beneficiaries; types of healthcare to be provided; set-off arrangements; and reimbursement levels, which may include caps. I interpose that this is particularly important because the Secretary of State may decide who pays back what—whether citizens, international organisations, states or the UK Government. The list goes on with processes, appeals, discretion and an unlimited power to boot to delegate any functions under the clause.

Further, the Secretary of State may, in an exercise of absolute power under Clause 2(3),

“give directions to a person”,

and under Clause 2(4),

“may vary or revoke directions”,

in relation to any function. The Bill does further violence to our constitutional arrangements by providing, at Clause 5(3) and (4), that:

“Regulations under section 2 may amend, repeal or revoke primary legislation—(a) for the purpose of conferring functions on the Secretary of State or on any other person (including conferring a discretion);—


or—

“(b) to give effect to a healthcare agreement … Regulations under this Act may amend, repeal or revoke retained EU law”.

These are Henry VIII powers in terms that would have made even that Tudor monarch blush. But we should remember that Henry VIII powers take their name from the Statute of Proclamations 1539, which enabled the King to govern by decree without regard to Parliament. In the context of a process whereby Parliament is supposed to be taking back control, these powers fly in the face of parliamentary sovereignty.

The House will by now be familiar, from speeches by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, and others, with the conclusion of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee:

“Clause 2 has a breath-taking scope. Indeed the scope of the regulations could hardly be wider”.


I had the honour of serving on that committee under the distinguished chairmanship of my noble friend Lady Thomas of Winchester. Our discussions were entirely non-partisan and our reports generally—indeed, I think always—unanimous. They were carefully considered. We were extremely well staffed and our recommendations were almost always accepted and implemented by the Government.

The principles we applied were well known and well understood. First, we considered whether a delegation to a Minister was proper and appropriate. Only if it was would we move to the second stage of considering the proposed level of parliamentary scrutiny. Henry VIII powers were to be severely limited to those cases where the need for them was fully explained and justified.

The passage of legislation around Brexit has seen many arguments about the use of Henry VIII powers, but I regret that the Bill persuades me that the Government have learned nothing. As we are forced into an unholy rush to get Bills through, our constitution takes second place to political expedience and face saving. An important passage in the committee report is at paragraph 11:

“All regulations made under clause 2 are subject only to the negative procedure, save where they amend primary legislation. If, without such amendment, as quoted by the noble Lord Lord Foulkes, the Secretary of State wished to fund wholly or entirely the cost of all mental health provision in the state of Arizona, or the cost of all hip replacements in Australia, the regulations would only be subject to the negative procedure. Of course, these examples will not be priorities for any Secretary of State in this country. But we judge powers by how they are capable of being used not by how governments say they propose to use them. The fact that the powers could be used in this way suggests that they are too widely drawn”.


That last reference to the potential use of powers is an important quote from paragraph 20 of the committee’s guidance to departments, published in 2014:

“If the government has in mind a particular proposed exercise, it is helpful for the Committee to be told of this. But the Committee will judge the power by reference to what could be done under it by the current or any future government and not only what the current government say they intend to use the power for”.


That principle is what makes the Government’s Explanatory Memorandum unhelpful and the caution of the committee essential. I am afraid that the Minister’s speech and that of the noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy, failed to grapple with this issue. The Minister seeks to reassure the House while she urges the House to accept the possibility of what is unacceptable. I accept the committee’s view that its examples of Arizona and Australia are extreme. However, we have a Government who are, in their own words,

“determined to make a success of Brexit”,—[Official Report, Commons, 10/7/18; col. 929.]

and resolutely opposed to our staying in a customs union with the EU, so as to be free to make trade deals across the world. May it not be that, in their zeal to reach such trade deals, given the difficulties of so doing, the Government could offer in exchange for trade deals health agreements to third countries on terms that Parliament might consider unsatisfactory were it allowed to consider them properly?

The EU’s new economic partnership agreement with Japan, mentioned earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Henley, demonstrates how difficult new trade deals may be. Nor should we forget either that the ill-fated TTIP attracted so much opposition in the United Kingdom precisely because it opened up our healthcare market to American competition, to the extent that the Conservative Government in 2016—

[Lord Framlingham (Con)]

The noble Lord is putting a most peculiar slant on some aspects of this legislation. I am following this very carefully. Is there not a good case for being perhaps overgenerous and having a wide scope in this area to ensure that nobody misses out, rather than being too precise and risking the chance that people will suffer as a result?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

No, and I regard that view as profoundly dangerous. The reason is that when we need arrangements that justify legislation, we can specify what legislation we need. As I will seek to go on to show, I believe that the arrangements that could be put in place by the Bill, were it tightly drawn and properly amended, could enable all outcomes from our exit from the European Union to be catered for by reciprocal healthcare arrangements in a way that is constitutionally acceptable—as I do not believe this is. As for giving too much ground and being too generous, that is a slippery slope indeed to allowing the Executive to take undue and unacceptable power from Parliament.

I suggest that it is not unrealistic to foresee a Government seeking to enter into healthcare agreements that would be unfair to the UK and unwelcome to many. The Bill would make that possible by unamendable regulation, possibly passable by the negative procedure.

So what should happen? If we secured a withdrawal agreement, an implementation period to the end of December 2020 and any extension of such a period would ensure that we continued reciprocal healthcare arrangements substantially as at present. That is what the Minister wants; I accept that she wants it, and that many in the Government want it as well. But we cannot guarantee that we are going to get it, and the Government have resolutely set their face against ruling out a no-deal agreement.

There is presently no reason whatever to make fresh statutory provision for any extra healthcare agreements outside the EU, the EEA and Switzerland. Such arrangements can be made if relevant, when necessary and authorised by a proper and detailed statute—nothing to do with Brexit—just as they could have been made at any stage over the past few years.

The need now is for provision in the event of no deal. I suggest that in that ruinous event, the only arrangements that we could practically make for continuing reciprocal healthcare would be the same as, or broadly comparable to, the existing arrangements. The noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy, explained that, from his discussion with other European Health Ministers, he regards it as likely that they would want similar arrangements. Similar arrangements might be possible. Something completely different would, I suggest, be entirely impractical.

It might be necessary to agree such arrangements on a bilateral basis with individual states. It might be possible to make such arrangements on a multilateral basis. For such purposes, I accept that legislation is necessary. An appropriate Bill could be drafted without undue difficulty. Indeed, as the Bill is here and has passed through the House of Commons, I accept that amendment of it, while demanding, might be possible. The powers of the Secretary of State to introduce a new scheme and make equivalent agreement arrangements with other member states, whether on a bilateral or multilateral basis, could be carefully drafted in a fashion that was appropriately limited and would command the confidence and respect of this House.

However, I have no hesitation in saying to the House that the Government must come back in Committee with amendments that limit this Bill to that achievable and justifiable purpose. To press ahead with it in its present form for fear of a no-deal Brexit would be unconstitutional and improper. The Government must think again.

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[Lord Lansley]

We spent four days in Committee on the Trade Bill. I do not know how much time is planned for this Bill but it is perfectly possible for us to consider this legislation and to put in place the necessary powers for future agreements, as long as it is done with the necessary scrutiny and approval provisions. I will come on to make one or two points about that, and I am sure we will go on to debate that robustly—as my noble friend on the Front Bench said—in the days ahead.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I accept the noble Lord’s point that I should not have said “or”. My point is that outside the context of the withdrawal agreement, which would have been fully debated, any new agreement is a new healthcare agreement, so the limitation of the lack of an “or” does not make a great deal of difference.

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[Baroness Blackwood of North Oxford]

The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, raises a very important point, and he is absolutely right that the Government do not seek to have no deal. The best way to avoid no deal is to have a deal. Under the withdrawal agreement there is protection of reciprocal healthcare arrangements for EU citizens in the UK and for UK citizens abroad, and that is what the Government seek to deliver. We have set out a number of steps to ensure that individuals who currently receive reciprocal healthcare can be protected as much as possible under a no-deal scenario. One of them is to put in place the powers in this Bill so that we can go very quickly to seeking bilateral arrangements. That is why I hope we will receive the support of the noble Lord as we go forward with this legislation.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I think the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, was that it is very dangerous to give the reassurance that the Minister was giving and to tell the public that all will be well in the event of no deal. The public need to know that all will not be well in the event of no deal. Even if this Bill and the regulations go through as quickly as they can, there will be a very serious hiatus. It is important that, rather than reassuring the public, the Government—which want a deal, as I know the Minister does—should say how dangerous it will be to leave without a deal on 29 March.

[Baroness Blackwood of North Oxford]

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, has made an important point. The Government have not in any way avoided the consequences of no deal. They have been very clear in outlining some of the risks associated with no deal and exactly why they are seeking a deal, with strength and authority. Those currently using reciprocal healthcare arrangements abroad can find advice on the GOV.UK and nhs.uk websites. Any of your Lordships who would like more specific advice are very welcome to write to me or to seek a meeting with me on that.

I would like to make a little more progress, as there are only two more minutes before I must close and I have not dealt with a number of issues your Lordships raised with me. On Ireland, which was raised by a number of important Members—the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker, Lady Brinton and Lady Jolly—I reassure noble Lords that the UK is firmly committed to maintaining the common travel area and to protecting the rights enjoyed by UK and Irish nationals in each other’s states, whatever the terms of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. The common travel area facilitates the principle of free movement for British and Irish citizens between the UK and Ireland and the reciprocal enjoyment of rights and entitlements to public services of citizens in each other’s states.

In addition, on negotiations with the devolved Administrations, we are very pleased to have received a legislative consent Motion from Scotland and are continuing to negotiate.

To conclude, I hope that I have been able to summarise the main issues and topics. There are clearly still some important questions that need to be answered, and I will write on the further points. It is clear from this debate that there is much work still to be done on the Bill, and I am sure that we will have adequate time in what my noble friend Lord Bridgeman predicts—I suspect rightly—will be a lively Committee to make sure that the Bill is in the best possible shape. However varied our views may be on the future relationship with Europe, I think that we can all agree that access to healthcare is essential both for British nationals living in European countries and for EU citizens living in the UK. We have heard that reciprocal healthcare arrangements enjoy broad public support. This Bill is designed to ensure that we can give British nationals living in European countries and EU citizens living in the UK certainty and continuity of care. With that in mind, I beg to move that this Bill be committed to a Committee of the whole House.

Healthcare (International Arrangements) Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 19th February 2019 Lords Chamber

I wanted to speak on this because there is a misconception that the purpose of this Bill ought to be to limit itself to provide continuity of the arrangements we have. That is a purpose of the Bill and the Government have been very clear about it. They were clear when I was a Minister and they are clear now my noble friend is the Minister. However it also gives us the opportunity—and why should it not?—to strike similar arrangements reciprocally with countries with which we want to deepen partnerships. It falls to this Committee to debate appropriate ways in which scrutiny and accountability are provided to look at those arrangements. It may be that the Committee believes it is necessary to put in different kinds of arrangements for different kinds of deals, a point my noble friend Lord Lansley made at Second Reading. However, it does not seem to me that because of a need for a more sophisticated approach to scrutiny based on what kind of agreements are being put forward it follows that this Bill should limit itself to repeating and continuing the deals we currently have as a result of our EU membership.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, this is a compendious group of amendments to a Bill that may appear simple but is made complex by the fact that it is, for all the reasons developed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, and others, frankly a constitutional affront. I of course join other noble Lords in welcoming the Minister to her first Committee stage. We tangled on some of these issues at Second Reading, but I am afraid I look forward to tangling with her a great deal during the rest of the passage of the Bill.

Most of what I will say about the powers in the Bill and its geographical scope I will address in the context of the amendments I and others have tabled to Clause 2, which are in the next group. I will also address much of what the noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy, said, but I agree with what the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton and Lady Andrews, said when they intervened during the speech of the noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy. It seems that he was trying to justify international arrangements outside of our existing arrangements with the EU, the EEA and Switzerland, within the same Bill and subject to the same time constraints and breadth of powers that the existing arrangements might justify for their extension, in a way that would enable international arrangements to be made within a legislative framework that is frankly unacceptable. The whole point of our amendment in the next group is that the Bill should be drawn in tight terms to replace our existing arrangements, and that other arrangements can then be made for future international agreements.

It is always a great pleasure to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, but I have to say that whereas I have agreed with almost everything everybody else has said, on this occasion I thought his ambition was limited when he said, “I suppose we must pass this Bill and it is to be hoped that in future Bills like this will become much rarer”.

On the amendments already tabled for today and Thursday, it would be possible, certainly when they are refined on Report, to produce a Bill on this restricted aim of replicating our arrangements with the EU, the EEA and Switzerland that was not a constitutional affront. It will be our aim to enable the Government to tailor this Bill to an acceptable, laudable and desirable aim without it being the constitutional outrage that it presently is. To that end, Amendment 3 is in my name.

I completely agree with the view expressed so far in this debate that Clause 1 is wildly inappropriate as it stands. On the face of it, it gives the Secretary of State an unrestricted blanket power to organise and make payments from the pocket of the British taxpayer for healthcare outside the UK—that is, anywhere in the world. In one sense, I suppose that it could be described as a general political statement but it really is not; it confers a power on the Secretary of State that is simply far too wide.

I agree with the straightforward position taken by the noble Lords, Lord Patel and Lord Kakkar, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that Clause 1 should simply not stand part of the Bill, and I agree with every word that the noble and learned Lord uttered. If his grandchildren say that he is banging on, I join with the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, in saying, “Long may it continue. May he bang on unrestrained by his grandchildren, certainly on this issue, for as long as he wishes to contribute in this House”. These are important points that deserve constant repetition until they are finally listened to and we get back to a semblance of parliamentary democracy that allows proper scrutiny by this House, and the other House—where scrutiny is, frankly, often lacking.

If striking down Clause 1 is not accepted by the Committee, my amendment would at least address the fundamental point that the power proposed in the clause is not limited by any provision setting out how that power should be exercised. It would simply limit Clause 1 by insisting that the exercise of the power to make and arrange payments for healthcare abroad may be exercised only in accordance with regulations.

Clause 2(1) confers on the Secretary of State the power to make regulations, on which we have heard much already and much more will be heard later from me and others. My amendment would, however, add a limitation to the effect that the Secretary of State may not exercise the power under Clause 1 other than in accordance with the legitimate regulations. The need for such an amendment, if Clause 1 survives and stands part of the Bill, is, I suggest, self-evident. The power of the Secretary of State must be governed, defined and limited by clauses in the statute and by regulations made under the statute. That is how law-making in a parliamentary democracy must work if parliamentary democracy is to mean anything at all. If the Bill remains as drawn, I expect the Minister will say that it is the Government’s intention that regulations under Clause 2 will be constrained. However, that is not the point; the point is the potential of such regulations. My amendment would ensure that regulations constrained Clause 1 as well.

[Lord Wilson of Dinton (CB)]

My Lords, I assure the Minister that my comments, which are very much in support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, the noble Lords, Lord Lisvane and Lord Cormack, and in fact all noble Lords except the noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy, are in no way a criticism of her. I heard her maiden speech, which was memorable. I think we will all remember it, and we all know that she is not responsible for the problem that she has today.

To the noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy, whom I do not follow, I simply say that I think that accidentally he made a really powerful case for splitting the Bill so that we can deal immediately with the immediate problem and the Government can think more carefully about the legal framework within which new arrangements are brought forward. I thought that he made a very persuasive case; it just happened to be in the opposite direction from the one he intended.

I support the arguments made, which we have heard before. We heard them on Clause 7 of the EU withdrawal Bill, as the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, reminded us. I still regard the word “appropriate” as objectionable, but we did our best there. We must not let only the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, bang on; we must not leave it to him alone. We all have to bang on about this issue because it is of fundamental constitutional importance.

I say to the Minister that this Bill is worse than the EU withdrawal Bill because, as the noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy, admirably demonstrated, it is not confined to Brexit. Let us look at the use of words. The language in Clause 5 is like a red rag to a bull:

“Regulations … may amend, repeal, or revoke primary legislation”.


We cannot accept this practice creeping in general into our legislation. I believe that there is such a thing as good and bad government. I have thought about my career and the years when we were governed well, and when we were governed badly—the years when the machinery worked well, and when it worked badly. Sometimes—in the 1970s, for example—it was really dreadful, and we are in a period of really bad government now.

I remember my first Bill 50 years ago, the Trade Descriptions Bill, which I connect with this Chamber. I was a junior official. We went to see parliamentary counsel who, in those days, were venerable people. You were allowed to see them only with a solicitor present. My assistant secretary was asked why we needed a particular power, and he rather flippantly replied, “Because I thought it might be useful”. Parliamentary counsel gave him a withering look and said, “I am not going to draft a clause for you simply because it might be useful. You have to know what you want it for”. He did not know, and we did not get that power. I read this Bill today and thought, “It has all been thrown in just in case it is useful”. The Government do not know what they want; they are putting it in simply in case it might be useful later on. My goodness, the job of this House is to stand up and say no to that. In Mrs Thatcher’s words: “No, no, no”.

I hope the Minister will accept the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, or that she will at least pause, consider it and come back on Report. I hope that she will also consider the option of a sunset clause, which I believe will be overwhelmingly important. The Bill as drafted breaks all the rules of our constitutional understanding. We have no written constitution. The machinery of government works only because we know where the constraints are and what the rules and behaviours are. We have understandings between ourselves—Governments and Oppositions—about how we run and manage legislation. This Bill tramples on that understanding. It does so in the name of Brexit, but it goes far too wide.

I hope that parliamentary counsel will say no to the Government, in private, and that the machine will say no. I hope the Government will have the wisdom—this is about wisdom—to think again, because the precedent being set here is wholly unacceptable. We have to make a stand.

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There is a benefit to participating in the debates on the Trade Bill at the same time. We will have to think in a broader context about whether the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 provides sufficient basis for the scrutiny and ratification of treaties. We will inevitably agree some form of ratification process for such international agreements in future, and they will apply to any international healthcare agreements as well. To that extent, we should rest on that. The regulations that flow from it will be implementing legislation in relation to those agreements which, strictly speaking, under CRaG, the House of Commons can choose not to ratify—we cannot, but it can.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

Does the noble Lord accept that all Parliament can do to treaties is withhold agreement in the House of Commons? Is he seriously arguing that that is sufficient scrutiny of potential healthcare treaties and that this House should not persist in its objection?

[Lord Lansley]

The noble Lord invites me to go on about a subject that I anticipate Report stage of the Trade Bill will discuss in considerable detail. I do not propose to discuss it now, if he will forgive me, because this is a wide debate that raises broader issues that will have to be addressed. Quite properly, they might be better addressed in the Trade Bill, which is actually about large-scale international treaties that we are likely to enter into in short order. I am not aware of any proposals for an international healthcare agreement that will be presented in the form of a treaty that we will have to ratify in any immediate timescale. I would rather think about it under those circumstances.

I will say one more thing about sunset clauses. Because of their nature, I am rather sympathetic to the idea that, if we know legislation has a limited shelf life, we should put one into the legislation, otherwise the temptation to go on and on will be irresistible to Ministers. But I do not understand that this Bill has such a limited shelf life. We want to enter into healthcare agreements that might or might not be agreed by December 2020; they might be agreed in 2021 or 2022. In so far as they relate to non-European Economic Area countries, they might arise at any time. There is no immediate prospect of them doing so. To have a sunset clause of this kind would be potentially unduly restrictive, especially expressed as a two-year limit, as it is.

For all those reasons, the debate has been useful. I absolutely understand its importance, because I have future amendments, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said, about the ability to amend retained EU law and the question of whether there should be different arrangements relating to agreements that replicate an EU agreement or do something different. As my noble friend Lord O’Shaughnessy rightly said, I raised that at Second Reading and I have amendments that will allow us to debate it later. Those are practical steps where we can question the structure of scrutiny and control that Parliament will exercise in relation to these regulations. A future group that I hope we will get to this evening questions the extent of the Secretary of State’s power to pay money—to whom and how much. That is important. All of us want to set down in legislation how we think Ministers’ use of this power should be structured in the agreements they might consider with other countries. Those debates will be useful, not least in terms of the Minister’s response—which I very much look forward to.

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Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

4: Clause 2, page 1, line 11, leave out subsections (2) to (4) and insert—
“(2) Regulations under subsection (1) may be used only to the extent necessary to replicate so far as possible the model of reciprocal healthcare for the European Union, the European Economic Area and Switzerland in place before the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union.”

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, this group contains two amendments. Amendment 4 is in my name and the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay of Llandaff and Lady Watkins of Tavistock. Amendment 10 is in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and the noble Earl, Lord Dundee.

Amendment 4 addresses two fundamental faults, as we see them, with the Bill. The first is that the Bill is a global Bill, when it does not need to be. The second is that the powers proposed for the Secretary of State in the Bill are, in effect, unlimited and so thoroughly dangerous. The first point, the international scope of the Bill, has been considered in part and defended by noble Lords opposite—the Minister and the noble Lords, Lord Lansley and Lord O’Shaughnessy—in the previous group. Notwithstanding the position taken by the Government and those noble Lords, my position is firmly that the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Dinton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, were right to say that the Bill ought to be directed solely at ensuring the continuation of the reciprocal healthcare arrangements we currently enjoy with the EU, the EEA and Switzerland, and that international healthcare arrangements outside that context should be left for another day when they can be more carefully considered, with a consideration that I raised with the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, about the effect of CRaG in the picture at that time.

That immediate EU/EEA/Switzerland Bill is what British travellers in Europe need; what EU visitors to the UK need; and, perhaps most important from a UK point of view, what 190,000 desperately worried British pensioners living in other states of the EU need to ensure that their existing healthcare will continue. The Explanatory Memorandum makes it clear that the Bill is being introduced because we are leaving the EU. Whatever our views of that decision, we all share the aim of ensuring that our current reciprocal healthcare arrangements continue.

The Bill is necessary if—but only if—we leave without a deal that secures a transitional period as envisaged by the current version of the withdrawal agreement. If we do secure the withdrawal agreement, or something like it, our reciprocal healthcare arrangements will continue, and one would hope that they would be replicated on a permanent basis before the transitional period ended. However, the Bill goes far further than is needed to achieve that limited and legitimate aim. The Government are seeking—unashamedly—to use the Bill to go global in healthcare by making arrangements with other countries across the world. That is simply not necessary because arrangements with third countries can be made at any time, and they should be negotiated and brought before Parliament properly, subject to the CRaG procedure and extra procedures. There is no urgency about that. We already have agreements with Australia, New Zealand and some others. So far as I know—and the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, knows—there are no others in the pipeline, but any which are in prospect can be dealt with individually in their own time.

The Constitution Committee, as has been said, reported on the Bill yesterday. While it acknowledged that Brexit legislation might justify,

“broader powers than would otherwise be constitutionally acceptable”,

it was absolutely clear that such powers should be used only for the limited purpose of passing that Brexit legislation. It reported in clear terms that:

“The Bill should be limited to the making of arrangements for future reciprocal healthcare arrangements with countries that participate in the existing European Health Insurance Card scheme”.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

The noble Lord has quite rightly referred to the existing countries—Australia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, New Zealand and Serbia, as well as our independent territories—with which we have reciprocal agreements. They are being dealt with at the moment without the need for this Bill, so is my noble friend Lady Thornton not right to be suspicious, irrespective of the Minister’s assurances? We know that 24 Tory MPs and Peers have links to 15 private healthcare companies which have £1.5 billion worth of NHS contracts. We are right to be suspicious about what they are up to; indeed, there is one of them sitting opposite.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I am grateful for that intervention: I did not know the facts about the involvement of certain members of our political establishment in healthcare arrangements. I agree that we are right to be suspicious and I shall come to that later in my contribution, but for now I will go on to the second fundamental fault with the Bill, which is that the proposed powers would enable the Secretary of State not only to make healthcare arrangements with countries across the world but to make such arrangements on whatever terms he or she chooses. That is a dangerous concept.

Many noble Lords, including me, quoted the Delegated Powers Committee’s powerful first report on the Bill at Second Reading. We have now had its second report, published on 14 February. It is in similarly strong terms, speaking, for example, of,

“unprecedented powers for Ministers to make law by statutory instrument”.

The powers are described as far too wide and,

“drafted in far wider terms than are necessary to give effect to the Department’s limited aims”.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, that the Government ought to be listening more carefully to that committee and to the Constitution Committee. I agree that it is frankly outrageous that, on receipt of the first report of a committee that, when I was a member of it, generally expected its reports to be accepted by the Government, instead of that report being accepted, the Government came back with a response that stuck by every word in the Bill, made no real amendments to it, and provoked the second, outraged report of the committee. That, in my experience, is unprecedented. The committee chose, on this occasion, to deal with the Bill before the Commons had finished dealing it, rather than between Second Reading and Committee in the House of Lords, and the Government, frankly, took no notice.

The Constitution Committee said:

“We agree with the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee that the powers in clause 2 are ‘inappropriately wide and have not been adequately justified’”.


I went through the powers in outline at Second Reading. The committees have been through the powers in detail, but the Bill puts absolutely no limit on the Government’s power to enter such deals. The Secretary of State would be empowered to authorise payments and claim reimbursement at any level he or she chooses and for any kinds of healthcare arrangements. Parliament would have no effective scrutiny or control. I urge the Committee to remember the Delegated Powers Committee’s central point, which it repeated in its second report, that,

“we assess powers by how they are capable of being used, not by how governments say that they propose to use them”.

The Government now profess entirely innocuous motivations for taking the powers contained in the Bill to make international healthcare arrangements outside the European context. Indeed, the noble Lords, Lord O’Shaughnessy and Lord Lansley, almost suggested that this was an exciting prospect. In closing the Second Reading debate, the Minister spoke of,

“a natural opportunity to consider how we can best support Britons in an increasingly global world … Global reciprocal healthcare agreements have the potential to protect public health by supporting international visitors to access emergency and needs-arising treatment when they need it”.—[Official Report, 5/2/19; col. 1488.]

She may be right. She repeats all those points in her long and detailed letter—a well-drafted, well-written and impressive letter that she sent to all of us yesterday or the day before. However, I am afraid that what she envisages as the use of the powers misses the point, as her answer to the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, on the possibility of a healthcare arrangement with the United States, illustrated. It is the powers that count, not what Ministers of the day might envisage for their use. The powers are not limited to such benign purposes.

I am not generally a cynic, but if we leave without a deal, then the day after Brexit one can foresee this Government, battered by the failure to reach an agreement, being desperately keen to make all kinds of trade deals with third countries across the world, in an effort to protect a vision of our future as “global Britain”, and no doubt to give the Department for International Trade a purpose to fulfil at the same time. There is a serious risk, in such a climate, of the Government offering third countries health deals in return for trade deals. The terms of such health deals could be seriously detrimental to the United Kingdom. Access to the NHS could be sold cheaply, and across wide and populous markets. UK taxpayers could be committed to unreasonable payments to foreign countries for offering treatment to UK citizens, and all as sweeteners to secure free trade deals. This is why I share the suspicions of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, and all this in an attempt to rescue an economy in difficulties—

[Lord Lansley]

I am sorry, but I am getting a bit confused here. By what mechanism does the Bill, which provides a power to make payments in respect of healthcare outside the United Kingdom, give power to access the NHS? It simply does not, does it?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

It simply does: you can make a healthcare arrangement with countries outside the United Kingdom in return for access to healthcare within the United Kingdom, on the same basis as the EU reciprocal arrangements do at the moment.

[Lord Lansley]

I do not mean to badger the noble Lord, but this is simply not true. The power in the Bill relates to payments for healthcare outside the United Kingdom. Governments make agreements with other Governments all the time, including trade agreements, but this Bill does not provide for what is in a trade agreement. It provides for the power to make payments outside the United Kingdom. That has no bearing on access to the NHS inside the United Kingdom.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

That does not, as I understand it, prevent the Government offering other countries access to the NHS on terms that are sweet for them.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

Clause 3(b) concerns,

“healthcare provided in the United Kingdom, payments in respect of which may be made by a country or territory outside the United Kingdom”.

So it is reciprocal and the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, who is one of the people involved with private healthcare, is trying to mislead the House by intervening.

[Lord Lansley]

I object to what the noble Lord has said: I am not involved in private healthcare in any sense. Not now nor at any time in the past have I acted in any way as a representative of the private healthcare sector. I think the noble Lord should simply withdraw that.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I make no aspersions on either the motivation or the interests of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, but I think the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, was right to draw attention to the definition of “healthcare agreement” in Clause 3, which provides that,

“‘healthcare agreement’ means an agreement made between the government of the United Kingdom and either the government of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or an international organisation, concerning either or both of the following— (a) healthcare provided outside the United Kingdom, payments in respect of which may be made by the government of the United Kingdom; (b) healthcare provided in the United Kingdom, payments in respect of which may be made by a country or territory outside the United Kingdom”.

That makes the point I am trying to make about the danger. If the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, disagrees with me about that, perhaps we could discuss it outside the Chamber, but for the moment I regard it as a serious danger.

[Lord Lansley]

With respect to the noble Lord, we are having the debate now. I have read the Bill, and reading it out does not make his point. The Bill simply defines what a healthcare agreement is. The Government have the power to make healthcare agreements now. He is objecting to the Bill. The only power it gives the Government that they do not presently have is to make payments in respect of healthcare outside the United Kingdom.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

It is right that Clause 1 allows the Secretary of State to make payments out, but the point is that the regulations in Clause 2 provide for giving effect to a healthcare agreement. A healthcare agreement, as defined, allows reciprocity. My concern is that if we enter into healthcare agreements giving reciprocity on terms that are disadvantageous to the United Kingdom, that could involve our giving cheap access to the NHS.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

This is a reciprocal healthcare Bill, after all. Let us separate out the point that the noble Lord is making about non-EEA countries for a moment. First, why would a Government—any Government—want to make such an agreement? It is meant to be reciprocal; it is not reciprocal if it is heavily one-sided. Secondly, why on earth would the House of Commons, which has the power to reject such a Bill, accept it? It is like saying that we would trade one thing for something entirely different because it is logically possible. Well, possibly, but that does not mean that anyone in their right mind would do it.

My noble friend could not have been clearer in everything she said: this Government, whose motives the noble Lord is impugning, would not act in such a way. The insinuation he is making simply does not follow from the Bill.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

The noble Lord makes the point that whatever innocuous motivations may be expressed by Ministers at this stage, the powers in the Bill go far further. If there comes a stage where a Government are not so benign and have motivations that are political and unhelpful to the NHS—those could be, as I suggest, trade motivations—that presents a real risk. If easy access is given to the NHS in return, for example, for trade deals—

[Baroness Blackwood of North Oxford]

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, is very kind in giving way. It may be helpful if I clarify. The Bill is an implementing Bill, and that power can implement only an international agreement which has been entered into; it would be laid before Parliament for scrutiny under the CRaG process. That reciprocity would have to be scrutinised by Parliament.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

That is a helpful intervention. It brings me back to the point that all that Parliament can do under CRaG is for the House of Commons to reject the entire treaty. If there is a stage at which a Government are interested in securing a trade Bill that even a majority in Parliament may regard as deleterious to the NHS, they may decide not to throw out the treaty because that is a very strong thing to do. Although I take the view that I suspect the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, takes—that the CRaG procedures are insufficient—that merely makes the point in favour of my amendment.

We ought to be looking to the question of international healthcare agreements outside the context of the very important aim we now have of replicating EU arrangements. Taken at their worst—obviously, not if the noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy, and the noble Baroness are right that these agreements will be used for wholly benign purposes for the benefit of the NHS—they could do serious damage to the NHS, which is already cash strapped. They could encourage visitors coming here to seek treatment from the NHS in competition with UK residents. They could put added pressure on a service that is already suffering from staff shortages, which will be compounded after Brexit by the additional loss of large numbers of EU doctors, nurses and vital support staff.

What the Bill needs to do, and all it needs to do, is to ensure that in the appalling event of no deal, we can attempt to salvage our reciprocal healthcare arrangements by coming to replacement healthcare agreements with our present partners. That can be simply assured by our amendment, which would leave out all the offensive unrestricted powers in Clauses 2(2) to 2(4) and substitute a requirement that regulations may be used only to the extent necessary to replicate, as far as possible, our existing arrangements.

Agreements with the rest of the world can be left for another day under clearer, more carefully constructed and constitutionally appropriate legislation, for which we will need a great deal of time to consider. I beg to move.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)]

My Lords, I point out that if Amendment 4 is agreed, I cannot call Amendment 5 by reason of pre-emption.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope that, on consideration of these points, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I propose to withdraw the amendment at this stage. We have had a lively debate, and I am grateful to everybody who has taken part in it and extremely grateful to the Minister for her comprehensive reply. In begging leave to withdraw the amendment, however, I urge the Government to consider very seriously the points made in this group and the last on the two issues that our amendment raises. The first is the global scope of the Bill and the second is the extent of the powers, particularly in Clause 2.

On the global scope, of course we wish the Government the very best of fortune in negotiating reciprocal arrangements against the horrible possibility of leaving the EU without a deal. If that can be done and reciprocal healthcare with as many countries as possible can be safeguarded in that way, that is all to the good. The Minister made technical points about the need to change our amendments to cover difficulties that might arise if they were passed in their present form. If she is attracted by the idea of restricting this Bill to EU, EEA and Switzerland arrangements, we would be very keen to discuss with her ways in which the amendment can be altered and for her to come back on Report with a different type of Bill.

On the powers, everything that needed to be said was said in the first group. Our amendment would replace the unacceptable powers with the aim of replicating the arrangements we have with the EU. If I may say so, it is a very important aim. I do not believe this House will let powers of the nature of those included in Clause 2 at present pass Report without dividing—and I have a fairly clear idea what the outcome of any such Division will be. So we will come back to this on Report—probably, in any event. It is an important issue that we raise.

On the dangers I saw in future healthcare agreements with third countries outside the EU, EEA and Switzerland, I was pressed—in a number of interventions that I can only describe as vigorous—by a former Health Secretary, a former Health Minister and an existing Health Minister, and I stood up to those interventions as best I could. But after I sat down, as one always does, I remembered something I probably ought to have said. To be fair, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, passed me her iPad with a mention of something I ought to have said. It was a quote from a document, and I will read it:

“The Bill will provide a legislative framework to implement any future longer-term reciprocal healthcare arrangements with the EU, individual Member States or countries outside the EU. The Bill is also a key piece of legislation to ensure that the UK can respond to all possible scenarios”.


As the Minister probably recognises, that document originated with the lady who signed it “Yours, Nicola”—the Minister. That is the danger. We are concerned; it is a concern that needs addressing. With those words, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 4 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Wheeler (Lab)]

My Lords, I am moving Amendment 6 in the name of my noble friend Lady Thornton. The amendment would prevent regulations being made unless they specify the process for settling disputes concerning healthcare agreements, including the name of the responsible body or bodies, their jurisdiction, the procedure that must be followed and any further appeals mechanisms.

Amendment 9 in the names of the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, and my noble friend Lord Foulkes has similar intent but includes a specific reference to the need for information on the involvement, if any, of the European Court of Justice in the resolution of disputes relating to healthcare agreements made in the EU. My honourable friend Justin Madders doggedly pursued this matter in the Commons, particularly the lack of clarity and information about how disputes would be resolved and whether the Government would oppose the European Court of Justice having any jurisdiction where there are disputes over agreements with European countries.

Agreements between countries must be applied, interpreted and enforced if they are to be worth making. Any and every healthcare agreement made under this Act will need to stipulate a dispute resolution process that must be followed in the event of a dispute between the UK and another country. The Government have repeatedly stated that they intend to end the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in the UK. However, it is hard to see how leaving the EU will not still involve some sort of continuing role for the ECJ in cross-border disputes. I understand that in the event of a deal under the terms of the draft Brexit withdrawal agreement, mechanisms for resolving disputes would be through consultation at the Joint Committee and, if that is unsuccessful, an independent arbitration panel. However, if any dispute rests on the interpretation of EU law, the arbitration panel refers the case to the ECJ for a binding decision. We have yet to receive any clarity on how disputes will be adjudicated in a no-deal scenario which, following the Government’s historic defeat in the meaningful vote and failure to renegotiate the backstop, looks increasingly likely.

In dispute resolution, would the ECJ also be the final tier and ultimate arbitrator? The European Commission’s negotiating guidelines say that the ECJ should be able to decide any disputes that involve the interpretation of EU law that still applies to the UK, rights of citizens or the financial settlement between the UK and the EU. While the draft EU withdrawal agreement does contain the bare bones of a disputes process through consultation at the Joint Committee level and, if that is unsuccessful, independent arbitration if requested, the response from the Government to a no-deal scenario is so far just to refer to having case-by-case bilateral dispute resolutions included in negotiations, with no single dispute resolution process. What further work has been undertaken by the Government on how this process will operate? What kind of dispute resolution procedure does the Minister envisage in the case of bilateral agreements with individual states?

The Minister’s response in the Commons did not appear to contain any confirmation that there were red lines on ECJ involvement in the case of the uncharted territory and chaos we would have in respect of disputes over reciprocal health agreements if there is no deal. Is the Minister able to clarify today the position of the Government? It is difficult to see what incentive there will be for other countries to agree a brand new architecture for dispute resolution, let alone pay for one. Is it not only desirable but inevitable that the ECJ will need to play a continued role in dispute resolution on these matters?

The Minister has previously advised that the Government are in “advanced negotiations” for bilateral healthcare agreements with at least five EEA countries as part of the Department of Health’s no-deal planning. Can the Minister advise what dispute-resolution mechanisms have been discussed in each case and whether the Government’s position is still that the ECJ will have no jurisdiction over such issues? Can she also tell the House what alternative institutional mechanisms have been discussed?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I will speak to the amendment in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Wheeler, pointed out in moving the amendment, our existing arrangements are the result of European law. The EHIC scheme is provided by EU regulation 883 of 2004. As was mentioned at Second Reading, there are 27 million active EHICs in circulation. Most importantly from our point of view, the S1 scheme entitles 190,000 UK pensioners living elsewhere in the EU to healthcare provision on the basis that they are in receipt of a UK pension. The scheme also entitles anyone enjoying an income from a particular member state but living elsewhere within the EU and EEA countries to reciprocal healthcare. The S2 scheme authorises pre-authorised elected health and maternity care abroad for those away from their country of residence or those who choose to go away to receive that care. The S1 and S2 schemes are established under the same EU regulation. The patients’ rights directive enables patients from one EU or EEA country to access specialist or high-quality healthcare available in different member states of their choice and to claim reimbursement from the member state of which they are resident. The common feature of all these beneficial arrangements is that they are established under European law.

I repeat all the questions that the noble Baroness, Lady Wheeler, has asked. My concern is that there seems to be an aversion, which I would accurately describe as pathological, among members of the Government, and many advocates of Brexit in the Conservative Party’s ranks, to dispute resolution that depends on the European Court of Justice having a role that ultimately monitors the development of the law. It is important to ensure that, whatever arrangements we have for reciprocal healthcare, we have a sensible and practical dispute-resolution system, and one that develops in accordance with EU law under the regulations and the directive that are being replicated.

No one has come up with any suggestion at all that there is anything wrong with or unworkable about the arrangement whereby our legal rights to reciprocal healthcare are embodied in domestic law but are subject to an appellate arrangement that ensures consistency across the EU and the EEA under the aegis of the Court of Justice of the European Union. But if political dogma is to drive us to adopt an alternative, the Government need to start thinking now about what that alternative will be and how it will ensure the important objective of securing a body of healthcare law, consonant with the law of the European Union, that will apply to future arrangements with our partners as developments continue. I support this amendment.

Healthcare (International Arrangements) Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 21st February 2019 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

26: Clause 5, page 3, line 36, leave out paragraph (e)

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group concern the Henry VIII powers in the Bill. Without going into the details of the drafting of my amendments, because they hang together, I make one central point. It is my contention that, given the breadth of the powers as they currently appear in the Bill, the only Henry VIII powers enabling the Secretary of State to make regulations amending, repealing or revoking primary legislation or EU retained law should be those that are limited to consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional, transitory or saving provisions. That is quite a wide category for these powers in any case. If when the Bill comes back on Report the Government have changed their position, and the Henry VIII powers in the Bill are limited to those which they can justify in accordance with what I might call a conventional approach to permitting secondary legislation to amend, revoke or modify limited categories of primary legislation, we may change our position.

For the moment, however, we stand by the position taken by the Delegated Powers Committee, which described the Henry VIII powers in the Bill in trenchant terms:

“The Bill contains a Henry VIII power to amend or repeal any Act of Parliament ever passed”.


The power may be used for the purposes in Clause 5(3), but those powers are no narrower than the purposes of the Bill as a whole:

“Regulations under section 2 may amend, repeal or revoke primary legislation (a) for the purpose of conferring functions on the Secretary of State or on any other person (including conferring a discretion); (b) to give effect to a healthcare agreement”.


These purposes are scarcely narrower, and to describe them as limiting is to misuse the English language. The committee pointed out that the Minister does not give any indication of what primary legislation might in future need to be amended. She said that there may be a need to confer functions on healthcare bodies at some stage in future, to which the committee’s robust and, I suggest, accurate response was that the time to confer functions on such bodies is when those bodies are created.

We should all remember why such powers are called Henry VIII powers. Their name is a reference to the Statute of Proclamations of 1539, which effectively enabled the Crown to govern by decree, ordering that proclamations should be obeyed as though they were made by Act of Parliament. Writing in the 18th century in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, Sir William Blackstone—after whom the great human rights set of chambers of which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is a member is named—described the Act as a statute,

“calculated to introduce the most despotic tyranny; and which must have proved fatal to the liberties of this kingdom, had it not been luckily repealed”.

Those words are as true now as they ever were.

I suggest that when it comes to primary EU retained law, the principles are the same. The Constitution Committee report draws attention to the distinction specifically drawn in Section 7 of the EU withdrawal Act between retained direct principal EU legislation and retained direct minor legislation, on which less stringent conditions are imposed for its modification. In this Bill, the Government have simply ignored the distinction.

The Constitution Committee said:

“One of the purposes of drawing this distinction was to make it possible for subsequent Acts of Parliament to afford greater protection to retained direct principal legislation, such as by requiring delegated powers that amend it to be subject to the affirmative procedure”.


It continued, in bold:

“We recommend that clause 5 be amended to reflect the distinction drawn in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 between principal and minor retained direct EU legislation”.


The report drew attention to the fact that the committee had made the same recommendation in its report on the Trade Bill and that the Government, in their response to that report, had accepted it. It went on:

“We recommend that the Government ensures that all future bills that provide for the amendment or repeal of retained EU law include the distinction between principal and minor retained direct EU legislation”.


First, why have the Government not accepted the committee’s recommendation on this occasion, and, secondly, will the Government commit to complying with the committee’s general recommendation in the future?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Blackwood of North Oxford]

The noble Lord is right to expect that I will take these questions away and consider them.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for assuring us that she is listening to the criticisms, that the Government have seen the point of them, and that she will consider them before Report. In those circumstances, I invite the House to accept my withdrawing the amendment. It is not enough to give assurances on how the Government intend to use the powers, for all the reasons we canvassed on Tuesday. It is important that the Government consider how far the powers need to go and how far they can be limited, in order to achieve the object that the Minister seeks to achieve—and only the object that she seeks to achieve. If the Bill comes back limited in that way, the Minister may well get a much more favourable wind when she seeks to put such a power through on Report.

I also suggest that the Minister asks the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Dinton, whether there is now a parliamentary barrister acting as parliamentary counsel who will take the same rather tough view on the extent of powers that are taken as that consulted by him when he was a junior official. It is that kind of rigour that is necessary and must be brought to bear upon the powers.

Regarding the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and the response by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, it seems that a greater use of appropriate conjunctions, making clear when “and” is meant and when “or” is meant, would help in Clause 5 and Clause 1. A little bit of English grammar might go a long way to improving this and other legislation. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 26 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Then, apart from affirmative and negative procedures, other expedients might serve to reduce the perceived anomaly or imbalance that from the Bill the Secretary of State has too many powers and Parliament too few. The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, has already referred to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and all other noble Lords who have collectively expressed concern about this. Therefore, might the Minister be able to say in what way and to what extent she could achieve some accommodation between now and Report?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendments 35 and 36 in this group, which are in my name. What I say is entirely without prejudice to what I said on the last group: changing the procedure does not make it acceptable for statutes to include fundamentally inappropriate delegations such as are included in the Bill. Nevertheless, we are now considering the Bill and the breadth of the powers as currently drafted, particularly those in Clause 2.

In that context, I draw attention to the use of the ghastly phrase “for example”, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, drew attention on Tuesday. To allow for the widest possible powers, and then to introduce them in a clause that starts:

“Regulations under subsection (1) may, for example”,


showing therefore that the powers are entirely unlimited, is completely unacceptable. However, that is the background against which we are considering the question of the appropriate procedure.

I do not believe that any regulations should be made under the Bill unless they are made by affirmative resolution. Should the Government come back on Report with a Bill in which the powers of the Minister are appropriately circumscribed, there may be a case for some regulations of a minor nature to be amenable to the negative resolution procedure.

In particular, I listened with care to what the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, said when he drew a distinction between rolling over agreements that already exist in the regulations in relation to the EU-EEA-Switzerland agreements and others that we already have, and making new agreements and regulations in relation to them. That may be a point on which a distinction can be drawn, and no doubt the Minister and her colleagues will consider it as a possible distinction. Generally speaking, however, regulations of this type ought to be by affirmative resolution.

If, later on, we are looking at a very different Bill, I ask the Minister and her colleagues to consider the Delegated Powers Committee’s Guidance for Departments when determining how the procedures should be adopted, which procedure should be adopted, and the criteria that should be applied in choosing them.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly on my noble friend Lord Lansley’s Amendments 27 and 41. Noble Lords will know that because of my role as a Minister up until the end of last year, I find some of the provisions in the Bill rather more defensible than do other noble Lords, and I know that that is a minority opinion. Nevertheless, the Minister has said that she will reflect on the House’s strength of feeling, and of course she has much greater wisdom than me on these matters.

I was struck by some comments made by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern on the last group, when he talked about the scope of the Bill; that is relevant to the context of the amendments laid by my noble friend Lord Lansley. That is the point I was trying to make on Tuesday: there is no reason a priori why the Bill should not have a broader scope. As my noble friend pointed out, in other contexts, the House is arguing that similar Bills ought to, but it follows from that that the functions carried out as a consequence of the Bill are of two distinct types. One concerns what my noble friend called rollover Bills, to provide continuity with the EEA and Switzerland; the other concerns new arrangements—not necessarily with new countries but of a new and deeper kind. Clearly, that will be taking on a relationship that does not have precedent when it comes to dealing with individual countries, even if it has precedent as modelled on those available with the EEA and Switzerland.

My noble friend’s logic in thinking about how the regulation-making power ought to reflect that distinction is therefore sound. Clearly, there needs to be sensitivity. That is reflected in the timeliness and urgency of what we need to do for one set of circumstances and what we might want to do with the longer-term global role.

I am sure that the Minister will reflect carefully on the amendments. If the goal of the Bill should be to give us the broad scope, as I still believe, not only to deal with the consequences of leaving the European Union but to build a different, broader, more global set of relationships, which I think is the kind of network the House supports, there is a compelling case for my noble friend’s argument for a differentiated approach. Whether the specifics are right, I do not know; others will be in a position to judge. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s comments on the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

32: Clause 5, page 3, line 43, at end insert—
“( ) Not less than 28 days before laying any regulations pursuant to subsection (1) the Secretary of State must publish a draft of the proposed regulations, and not less than 14 days before such regulations are laid, Her Majesty’s Government must give both Houses of Parliament the opportunity to consider and debate the draft.”

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, for years many of us have believed that the procedures for considering statutory instruments have been unsatisfactory. Whether any statutory instrument is to be passed by the affirmative resolution procedure or the negative resolution procedure—a question we have discussed today—is not the fundamental point. That distinction merely determines the way in which the instrument comes before Parliament to be debated—if it does so.

The more fundamental problem, which we all recognise, is that SIs are unamendable. They are “take it or leave it”—every paragraph or none. We were reminded on Tuesday by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that it is exactly 40 years since the House of Commons rejected a statutory instrument. In this House, we too have the power to reject statutory instruments by fatal Motions. The last time we did so—at least, it was said by some that we did—was over tax credits in 2015. Indeed, it was on the Motion of the noble Baroness, Lady Manzoor, when she was on this side of the House.

On that occasion, the right-wing press railed against us for exceeding what it thought our powers ought to be and advocated our abolition. Anyway, the Government set the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, on us, after which the fuss rather died down. However that may be, fatal Motions are very rarely passed by this House. I think that is partly because they are seen as disrespectful of the primacy of the House of Commons and partly, perhaps, as was pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, because the Whips discourage fatal Motions in case they, too, will face such Motions when it comes to their party’s turn in government.

I suggest that the power to reject delegated legislation is an important power and ought to continue. However, it is a residual power to be used very sparingly and when the objection to an SI is very substantial indeed. The noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, said in debate on the first group that we should use the power to reject SIs more often to achieve amendment by sending them back for review and reintroduction. That is a way of doing it, but it runs into the difficulty that it may be too cumbersome and, for the reasons I have mentioned, I doubt that it would be a politically workable approach. Regret Motions, which we often use, are useful, but they come too late in the process and the Government do not have to take any notice of them.

However, under my amendment, the Government would have to publish a draft 28 days before laying the regulations and give both Houses a chance to debate the draft, and to do so before it is actually laid. That would give us an opportunity in a relatively informal way to identify defects in instruments or particular provisions that ought to be removed. Amendment 32 would avoid the need to go through the super-affirmative procedure, which many would advocate for some of the provisions in this Bill, but it would improve scrutiny.

Under our existing arrangements, the power to scrutinise secondary legislation is weakened by the lack of any provision for Parliament to point to particular provisions in an SI and ask the Government to think again. Mine is of course a probing amendment. I suggest that it is particularly relevant to the provisions of the Bill because the regulation power, as we have all considered—many have made this point—is so general, so unrestricted and so unpredictable in its likely or possible exercise.

This amendment may be of more general relevance—I do not suggest otherwise. It is intended to offer a way for Parliament to have an early opportunity of considering proposed delegated legislation in draft before it is laid; to give MPs and Peers an opportunity to consider and express concerns about a proposed statutory instrument, or particular provisions within it; and to give the Government an opportunity to respond to issues raised in such exploratory debates. The amendment is expressed in the terms of a requirement on the Government to make those debates possible, because it is intended to emphasise that statutory instruments, though made by Ministers, are made under powers vested in Ministers by Parliament and are subject to parliamentary scrutiny.

I do not suggest that this amendment, or this type of procedure, ought to apply to every piece of delegated legislation, but I do suggest that it is worth considering. Many of us believe that scrutiny has become too weak and the power of Ministers too strong. This amendment is intended to explore a way of tilting the balance back in favour of parliamentary scrutiny and would, I suggest, offer us one path to better and more carefully considered secondary legislation. I beg to move.

[Baroness Wheeler]

My Lords, I listened carefully to the strong arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, on this issue, and I await the Minister’s response. We have every sympathy with the intention behind the amendment, and the noble Lord’s frustration that the House can either accept or reject a statutory instrument but cannot amend it, while parliamentarians can and often do take note of or reject Motions. However, Parliament is ultimately at the mercy of the Government to withdraw regulations and bring forward a revised draft, which may or may not adequately address the concerns that have been expressed. Fatal Motions are quite rightly used rarely, in exceptional circumstances.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, says this is a probing amendment. However, I fear that, in this circumstance, it would be counterintuitive to the Bill’s primary objective of implementing reciprocal health agreements after Brexit. As my noble friend Lady Thornton said on Amendment 33 in an earlier group, time is not on our side, and I fear that the approach contained in this amendment would lead to delays in implementing reciprocal health agreements. In the event of no deal, when millions of British citizens will lose their current access to healthcare treatment overnight, any delay while Parliament debates and considers draft regulations would be catastrophic. Obviously the delay that would occur from the proposals that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, suggests would have to be taken into consideration in any future changes, and would certainly need to be discussed.

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However, I recognise the experience and intentions of the noble Lord, and the concern of the House, and so I would like to make an offer to discuss, in advance of Report, the issue of scrutiny of the regulation-making powers in the Bill—on the general point, not relating to this particular amendment. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for raising this vital issue, but I hope that, after reflection, he will feel that he is able to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I do not need to reflect very hard to withdraw what was plainly a probing amendment. I raised an idea and I accept the point that, in the context of many of the regulations, particularly those to replicate the European agreements that we have, my amendment might not be appropriate. In the context of the wider issue of any other new healthcare agreements, if they are persisted with, it may be appropriate, and it is something that we would consider.

I would like to say how grateful I am for the offer from the noble Baroness to consider the question of scrutiny. I would like to accept that offer now, and, in so saying, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 32 withdrawn.

Healthcare (International Arrangements) Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 12th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her efforts to improve the Bill and her courtesy in accommodating my concerns, meeting me and discussing various amendments. I am particularly grateful to her—I emphasise this—for her amendment, which we will consider later, that delivers us from the tyrannous shackles of King Henry VIII. Perhaps this might be the start of a new understanding that the ghost of that monstrous ogre should no longer walk about the corridors of power in this country. Chance would be a fine thing but I commend a little touch of Blackwood to the House.

However, although the Bill has been significantly improved, it is still not good enough. We are faced with nine major regulatory powers, which are put before us as examples of regulations that the Bill might have in mind, or extend to. It works on the basis that we must—as we must—recognise the need of our citizens living in the EU to have their healthcare properly attended to. That puts great pressure on all of us. If it were not for that pressure, I would not accept that the scope of the Bill should be allowed to extend as far as the EU and Switzerland but I understand why it must be so. We are brought, in effect, to face up to the creation of unacceptable powers, and we have no choice, so far as the EU and Switzerland are concerned.

However, we have a choice in relation to international places other than those in the EU. There are many countries to which these powers could be extended, payments made and so on. Last time I said I was being modest. My real worry is about the creation of legislation for such places as Guadeloupe and the Galapagos; and these powers would extend to Venezuela, where the present Government may not be in power indefinitely. We therefore need to think carefully. Introducing out of the blue nine regulations, which are only examples of the powers that would be given to Ministers, goes too far. It is not the way in which we should legislate.

My objection to the Bill, and the reason why I support the amendment, is simple. We must not legislate in this way. We need time to think, reflect and ponder on what limitations and constraints should be put on the power of Ministers. We are therefore being asked to go too far under the pressure of events surrounding Brexit.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I have in my name Amendment 4, which has a great deal in common with the other amendments in the group. It is intended to achieve two objects, the second of which is to restrict the operation of the Bill to the EU, the EEA and Switzerland—as do other amendments of the group—by ensuring that the object of any regulations under the Bill would be limited to replicating existing arrangements. The first sentence of my amendment would delete subsections (2) to (4) and thereby drastically narrow the regulation-making power to replicating the reciprocal healthcare arrangements we have now. That part of my amendment fits more sensibly with the amendments in the second group, and I shall address it then. I will be brief in speaking about this group because I agree with every word that the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said.

This House has shown conclusively that it supports ensuring that we can continue to provide EHIC cards to the 27 million British citizens who enjoy them and guarantee continuing healthcare to British pensioners living elsewhere in the EU along with the other arrangements for reciprocal healthcare that we enjoy as members of the European Union. Those arrangements are in place. They work extremely well in providing guaranteed healthcare across the countries that they cover. They enjoy very wide public support and are clear. Millions of our countrymen and countrywomen would be very unhappy to lose them as a result of Brexit, but there is absolutely no urgency for introducing legislation now for healthcare deals around the world.

Throughout the debates on this Bill, the Government have not come up with a single reason why we should not now pass this legislation limited to agreeing the continuation of our existing reciprocal healthcare arrangements while deferring legislation for new healthcare agreements with third countries to another time, and then considering the Secretary of State’s powers in the context of those arrangements in another Bill. Before we legislate for new international healthcare agreements, we should be able to consider in detail the criteria for making them, what should be their objects and limitations, what they should contain, who should be in charge of monitoring them and how we might seek to improve them. We should also have clear arrangements in place for their parliamentary scrutiny better than exists under the existing CRaG rules for consideration of treaties by the House of Commons.

It may be, as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, said, that international healthcare agreements could be beneficial to Britain and British citizens, but they could also be detrimental, with unacceptable increases in pressure on the NHS and with the potential for healthcare agreements being offered without proper scrutiny in exchange for trade deals on terms that many would find offensive. All we are asking on this side of the House and, as we have heard, from some of the Cross-Benchers, is to give this Bill a fair wind and pass it quickly only to enable the reciprocal arrangements that we have to be continued but giving Parliament a chance to consider carefully the far wider and more difficult issues involved in agreeing new healthcare agreements across the world. This Bill does not do that.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lady Thornton who has done a splendid job in dealing with this Bill, in analysing it and bringing forward amendments for consideration by the House. According to the Delegated Powers Committee, this Bill has “a breath-taking scope”. I have not heard that said about any other Bill coming before the House. All the other Bills and statutory instruments that we have considered deal with providing exactly the same arrangements that we have at present in the event of no deal. They have been precautionary for that. This is the only one, as I understand it, and this is the only department that is trying to include something completely new, very wide and extensive, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and my noble friend Lady Thornton said.

If the Government want to do that, as my noble friend said, they can wait until the Queen’s Speech. We know that the Government Chief Whip does not know when that will be, but there has to be one eventually and that is the right time for us to consider it. We can then look at the proposals in detail and, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, examine them then. These additional powers are opposed by the trade unions, the BMA and a whole range of people. Indeed, I have not found anyone except Conservative Members and Ministers in favour of this wide extension, this “breath-taking scope”, of the Bill. I hope that the House today will support my noble friend’s amendment and reject the proposal put forward by Her Majesty’s Government.

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Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

3: Clause 2, page 1, line 10, at end insert—
“and may not exercise the power conferred by section 1 otherwise than in accordance with such regulations.”

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, as I should have done at the beginning of the first group, I thank the Minister for her help and courtesy in discussing this Bill and in engaging with Peers across the House to see how we should proceed with it. I echo the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, including his tribute to the Blackwood amendment in respect of Henry VIII powers. As the Minister will have appreciated and has recognised by her actions, there is a real concern about the use of delegated legislation to amend or revoke primary legislation and EU legislation.

Amendment 3 is intended to bring a constitutionally acceptable structure to the Bill. It will ensure that the powers of the Secretary of State can be exercised only within the context of regulations. I will start with a word or two about the other amendments in this group: Amendment 5, on the words “for example”, and government Amendments 6, 7 and 8, which limit the delegation of powers to public authorities.

As we have heard, Clause 2 contains the principal regulation-making powers. We had considerable debate, both at Second Reading and in Committee, about how unacceptably wide those powers are. The use of “for example” at the beginning of Clause 2(2) speaks volumes as to the disrespect shown in the Bill for the proper restriction of ministerial powers. The Delegated Powers Committee and the Constitution Committee have exposed how outrageously broad these powers are.

My amendment is directed at the absence of anything in the Bill that would limit the Secretary of State to exercising his Clause 1 powers only in accordance with regulations. One does not have to read far into the Bill to appreciate that, under Clause 1:

“The Secretary of State may make payments, and arrange for payments to be made, in respect of the cost of healthcare provided outside the United Kingdom”.


This is wholly without restriction. It is this glaring deficiency—the failure to tie the Secretary of State to the exercise of powers in accordance with limitations either in the statute or contained in regulations—that my amendment is intended to cure.

The Minister frankly and commendably, if I may say so, recognised on our first day in Committee that the effect of Clause 1, if not amended in the way I suggest, would be to enable the Secretary of State to make or arrange payments without any regulatory limitation. She justified this untrammelled power—which, frankly, I find frightening—on the basis of urgency. She said that the Bill was unlikely to secure Royal Assent before March, so regulations would not be laid before the summer. If there were no deal, she explained, Ministers might need to use the powers before then. She mentioned—again, frighteningly—sharing data as well as making healthcare payments before the Government had a chance to get regulations passed to deal with these matters “more transparently”, as she put it.

This clause alone, unamended, would justify this country ruling out a no-deal exit and ensuring that our leaving date is delayed. It is an extraordinary travesty of the notion of the United Kingdom Parliament taking back control that we are asked to pass a Bill which involves ceding to Ministers an entirely unconstrained power to pay money out across the world on the sole professed ground that the Government failed to introduce legislation in a timely way, and to permit Ministers to spend public money and make arrangements of great public importance without any parliamentary scrutiny or authorisation.

I turn briefly to the other amendments in the group. Many of us still take the view that their scope is breathtakingly and unacceptably wide. The Government’s proposal to limit possible delegation of the Secretary of State’s powers so that such powers may be conferred only on a public authority is of course welcome; so is the limited five-year sunsetting provision, to which we shall return later, but, taken together, they barely scratch the surface of the massive transfer of unrestrained power from the legislature to the Executive set out in Clause 2. Of course, the sunsetting clause should be more restrictive—at least as restrictive as proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. Again, we will come to that later.

It goes without saying that the ridiculous and offensive restriction-busting words “for example” should be removed, as proposed in Amendment 5. However, the only satisfactory way to restrict the Government’s power to what is necessary and acceptable is for the House of Commons to now accept the amendment we just passed restricting the use of the Bill to replicating the arrangements we have with the EU, the EEA and Switzerland. We hope that it does that.

This Government and future Governments must show more restraint and respect for the proper limits to the scope of delegated legislation. In the Bill, as in others to do with Brexit, they have not done that. It is to be hoped that they return to a wiser path in future.

[Baroness Thornton]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for his exposition, which saves me from exploring yet again the powers in the Bill. I shall speak to Amendment 5, which is a simple amendment but one that we think might be quite clever in its intent. It states that regulations under the Bill can be made only for specific purposes.

When the clause was debated in Committee, noble Lords discussed the nine regulation-making powers mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, which brought comment from the DPPRC, about the widest possible scope. However, as drafted, Clause 2(2) appears to bestow infinite powers on the Secretary of State to make regulations by virtue of the seemingly innocuous phrase “for example”, which effectively grants the Secretary of State carte blanche to bring regulation forward outside the listed examples in relation to pretty much anything and everything. Just deleting those words will assist with the accountability that needs to be built into the Bill.

Amendment 5, which has the support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, would ensure that regulations can be brought forward under the Act only for the purposes specified. We will, of course, support the Minister in the amendments she has tabled in this group—Amendments 6, 7 and 8 —and I think the combination of our amendment and hers significantly improves the Bill, so I hope she will accept it. I probably need to say that, unless there is a very good reason why she does not want it and why it should not be there, we will seek support from the House for this amendment.

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[Baroness Blackwood of North Oxford]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for tabling Amendment 3 and the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, for Amendment 5, both of which seek to place limits on the powers in the Bill.

I will first address the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, on Amendment 5, and clarify the purpose of Clause 2(2). We have had some debate about this already but this will be helpful. Clause 2(2) is intended to be an illustrative list of examples of the type of provision that may be included in regulations made under Clause 2(1). It is not itself intended to be a delegated power. The intention has always been to be prudent and transparent in the use of the delegated legislation, and the list was included to be helpful, by demonstrating the types of provision that the regulation-making powers at Clause 2(1) could enable, in order to effectively implement international healthcare regulations in the same way as under reciprocal healthcare regulations. This is not uncommon in primary legislation.

The list is reflective of the kind of provision already included in our current, more comprehensive, reciprocal healthcare arrangements with the EU, and it is intended as a guide to how the powers in Clause 2(1) can be exercised. Regulations under this clause need to be able to do everything that they might need to do to provide healthcare outside the UK, or to give effective agreement. I described in some detail during our debate on this clause in Committee why each of the descriptive lists were included and what they would be used for.

This amendment could mean that future Administrations would be unable to effectively implement reciprocal healthcare agreements with the EU, individual member states or other countries. The reason for this, which has already been alluded to in the debate, is that we have not yet concluded those negotiations and so it is not possible to rule out what we may need to provide for in regulations to give effect to an agreement. In addition, it would not be appropriate to circumscribe in the Bill the Government’s negotiating mandate with the EU, EU member states or countries outside the EEA and Switzerland.

The examples in Clause 2(2) are not exhaustive, but they are useful pointers to aid understanding of how Clause 2(1) is capable of being exercised. I think they have served their purpose, given that we have had such robust debate about them. They offer additional transparency and assistance in understanding how the regulation-making powers in Clause 2(1) would work for the purpose of implementing reciprocal healthcare agreements. This is not an unusual statutory construction; there are examples of where regulation-making powers are accompanied by illustrative lists of what may be included in regulations in order to provide assistance in the understanding of what the powers are capable of doing. As to whether those illustrative lists include the words “for example”, I have an example from Clause 11(2) of the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018, which states:

“Regulations under subsection (1) may, for example—”,


include paragraphs (a), (b) and (c). That is perhaps a helpful example for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope.

As this important policy area continues to develop and progress both in the EU and outside the EU, it is appropriate for the Government to be able to respond to protect the continuity of care of those already in receipt of reciprocal healthcare, as well as to explore whether we would like to extend it to others. Were we to accept this amendment, it would, as I said on the previous group, restrict the implementation of reciprocal healthcare arrangements to current processes. That is clearly inappropriate when implementing dynamic agreements in which there are two parties.

Regulations under Clause 2(1) need to be able to do everything they might need to do to provide for healthcare outside the UK or give effect to a healthcare agreement. One small example of why it is right that the Government retain the ability to do this is developments in IT or new technology. As technological change continues to gather pace, it is right that the Government should be able to make the best use of those changes and ensure the most effective and efficient systems for the people accessing these arrangements. That is why we might need to bring in another regulation-making power. I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, as a former Health Minister, would agree that technology has the power to change the way people access healthcare and can make a real difference in people’s lives, especially perhaps those who are restricted from accessing healthcare because of long-term conditions or distance from services.

While the illustrative list at Clause 2(2) does not expressly make reference to this matter, it may well be necessary to make arrangements to ensure that the most effective and efficient technological processes and systems are incorporated into the implementation of future reciprocal healthcare agreements. The Government are working, through this Bill, to ensure that we have the necessary ability to implement future international healthcare agreements with both EU and non-EU countries.

Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, speaks to concerns about the breadth of the powers in the Bill. Clause 1 follows a long line of general payment powers found in primary legislation, further to the Public Accounts Committee’s concordant that government expenditure should flow from a specific Act of Parliament. It is a free-standing payment power and needs to be so. Notwithstanding that, we have deliberately chosen to include a power in Clause 2(1) that can be used to support the exercise of the payment power. Therefore, it is not possible for the Government to accept this amendment. Indeed, the DPRRC recognises that general payment powers are not delegated powers.

As I said in my response to this amendment in Committee, the Bill is making good progress through Parliament but clearly will not have Royal Assent until later this month. So, with the best will in the world, we will not be able to lay regulations until the summer. However, in the undesirable, unprecedented situation of no deal, we may need to use these powers before then. That would be specifically for a scenario concerning citizens’ rights agreements with the EFTA states and with Switzerland, which will protect reciprocal healthcare for people living in those countries on exit day, or in other specified cross-border situations.

It is good news that we have operative agreements in the context of no deal, as they will guarantee healthcare for those covered by them. It is likely, though, that we will need to use the power in Clause 1, together with Clause 4, to temporarily implement those agreements. We cannot therefore accept the amendment because we would not be able to protect the healthcare arrangements of people in those countries. We will bring forward further detail in coming weeks when we can be clearer about bilateral agreements, and on the need for any further arrangements. I hope that noble Lords will agree that the Government must have the ability to provide for people at this unprecedented time. I emphasise that stand-alone funding powers such as those in Clause 1 that operate without the need for delegated legislation are not unusual—so this is not being brought in simply because of a no-deal situation.

I have listened carefully and considered the comments of noble Lords about concerns about the scope and breadth of the power. That is why we have sought to address concerns about it, with a large package of amendments to which I have already referred. We have specifically limited the delegated powers and the scope of what can be done under the Bill, and provided additional parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms and greater transparency.

Finally, I will speak to government Amendments 6, 7 and 8. They are in direct response to the concerns raised that regulations under the Bill could be used to confer functions on anyone, anywhere. It is understandable that noble Lords raised the possibility that the regulation-making powers in Clause 2 could be extended to confer functions on private bodies. There is not and has never been an intention to confer functions on private bodies in order to implement reciprocal healthcare arrangements. This was always the case but, given the concerns raised, we are taking action to make this clear.

The proposed government amendments limit Clause 2 to the operation of Clause 2(1) to ensure that any conferral or delegation of functions may only be to a “public authority”. The definition of “public authority” is a person who exercises a function of a public nature. This ensures that public bodies maintain autonomy over how services are procured, contracted and delivered. When making regulations to implement such healthcare agreements, we wish to confer relevant functions on appropriate public bodies according to their part, giving them clear legal responsibility and an operating mandate. Our amendment does not prohibit us from doing this.

I therefore hope that noble Lords will withdraw or not move their amendments.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I shall seek leave to withdraw my amendment, because I feel very much under pressure from what the Minister has just said. It is the case that the free-standing power is needed, as she said, because of the delay that there has been in order to ensure that the payment power can be used before regulations can be laid. My amendment would therefore imperil the continuation of our current European arrangements. I feel under pressure because it the wrong way to do this. It is a great shame that this legislation was not introduced timeously, but I do not wish to divide the House on my amendment and I beg leave to withdraw it.

Amendment 3 withdrawn.

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Tabled by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

4: Clause 2, page 1, line 11, leave out subsections (2) to (4) and insert—
“(2) Regulations under subsection (1) may be used only to the extent necessary to replicate so far as possible the model of reciprocal healthcare for the European Union, the European Economic Area and Switzerland in place before the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union.”

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

Amendment 4 is, I think, consequential on Amendment 1.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I am not sure that Amendment 4 is entirely consequential, so it is probably better if I do not move it, now that Amendment 1 has been agreed.

Amendment 4 not moved.