European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sherlock]

It is standard legal terminology, and I thank my noble friend for his question. It would mean having regard to the human rights model. I said at the start that these were probing amendments. One of the reasons why I tabled it in that form is that I knew that if I tried to do anything more specific I would end up getting a classic government answer about the European court. To be honest, I am not really interested in having a fight about that. All I want to do is to understand what the Government’s approach to this is and how they will deal with whatever kind of judicial oversight is needed to enable reciprocity. So I will be open to whatever they come back and say; I will look at it in Hansard and judge it afterwards, rather than getting into it now. This is Committee and that is what I was trying to do.

My final questions are: will the Minister assure us that the 1996 Hague child protection convention will have continued application? Secondly, the UK will have to ratify the 2007 Hague convention on maintenance independently once we have left the EU. Because we have to give three months’ notice on that, if we do not take action before Brexit there will be a minimum three-month gap in its applicability after we leave. So what steps are the Government taking to ensure that it continues to apply seamlessly?

I know that I have asked an awful lot of questions, but at heart there is a core question: do Ministers want to try to stay with the current reciprocal provisions, which are tried and tested? If the answer is yes, are they taking the necessary steps? If it is no, where are we heading and what are we going to do in the interim until we get there? These are important provisions for the effective conduct of cross-border family cases. There are a lot of international divorces each year. These issues cannot be ignored. Children will suffer if they are not returned promptly after being abducted, or if their main carers do not get the maintenance they are entitled to. Families can lose time and money fighting court cases in two countries, with no certainty as to what happens at the end. We need to know where we are heading. To that end, I look forward to the Minister’s reply.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 29 and the supporting amendments. My noble friend Lady Hamwee has put her name to them to express our strong support from these Benches.

The Foreign Secretary said in his one of his more perceptive interventions—delivered, appropriately, on Valentine’s Day—that if we get the right deal on aviation and visa-free travel, British citizens will continue to travel within the EU, meet interesting people and fall in love. It follows that they may also marry and have children with EU citizens.

There are approximately 16 million international families in the European Union and about 140,000 international divorces in the EU annually. While the statistics are not collected by individual countries, a great many of them involved British citizens married to citizens of other member states. Over many years, we have painstakingly constructed an effective, fair and widely admired set of arrangements for permitting very different family law systems to operate alongside each other within the EU, while enabling member states to respect the laws, orders and arrangements made elsewhere in the Union.

Importantly, as the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, explained, EU family law concerns procedural and not substantive law. All EU states have their own substantive family law; in the UK alone, we have three systems: one for England and Wales, one for Scotland and another for Northern Ireland. However, EU law has established a common set of rules for jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments and orders and cross-border co-operation. The Brussels IIa regulation, enforced since 2005, governs jurisdiction; that is, where proceedings ought to be brought and decided. It applies to divorce and cases concerning children; in private law disputes, such as those concerning residence or contact between parents and children; and to public law disputes where local authorities are concerned for child protection. The regulation also provides rules for child abduction cases, of which there are roughly 1,800 a year within the European Union, simplifying and expediting the enforcement within the EU of the protections accorded by the Hague convention.

The maintenance regulation which the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, also mentioned, enforced since 2011, enables parties to enforce maintenance obligations for adults and children across the Union. Further EU measures, directly applicable in all member states, reinforce protection for victims of domestic violence and assist in enforcing out-of-court settlements.

The effect of the Bill is that the UK would continue to be bound to apply EU family law in its entirety as it stood at exit day. However, there would be no reciprocity. We would be bound to recognise and enforce the decisions of EU member states, but the 27 remaining member states would be under no such obligation to recognise or enforce decisions of UK courts. So British citizens would be at a significant and lasting disadvantage. There would be the risk of proceedings in the UK being pursued in parallel with proceedings in EU member states and so the risk of conflicting judgments, with EU judgments enforceable in the UK and UK judgements unenforceable in the EU. This would be,

“the worst of all outcomes”,

as the Family Law Bar Association, Resolution and the International Academy of Family Lawyers pointed out in their excellent joint paper published in October. It would, as the paper asserted, leave our citizens in a position of significant vulnerability and confusion, and lead to unfair outcomes.

A further issue is that Brussels IIa is currently being revised. British family lawyers have been playing their important part in shaping the new arrangements. However, the new regulation will not apply to the UK unless we legislate for it to do so. Even legislating for it to do so will not bring about reciprocity unless we agree in negotiations to that reciprocity, and there’s the rub, because EU law is subject to interpretation and ultimate determination by the Court of Justice of the European Union, yet the Government insist on rejecting the direct application of CJEU decisions. Decisions of the CJEU in this field concern the rights of individual citizens. Cases are referred to the court because national courts seek the determination of individual cases before them by the European court. Members of this House have asked over and over again: why should the 27 give that up?

Amendment 53 is designed to explore a continuing role for the CJEU. The court has provided a successful system for the determination of disputes and for the supervision, monitoring and development of EU law. In our debate on the European arrest warrant on 8 February, I suggested that if we went ahead with this project to leave the EU, we could seek some adjustment of the constitution of the court, so that in areas of cross-border co-operation involving the United Kingdom the court might include a UK judge and a UK Advocate-General, which it otherwise would not, after we left, whether by the creation of a separate division of the court or by some other means.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, whom I see in his place, raised the constitution of the court in Committee with my noble friend Lady Ludford, last Monday. However, I cannot see any basis on which we can preserve the benefit of EU family law, just as in many other areas where we seek continued co-operation with the EU, without agreeing to its fundamental underpinning by the guarantee of recourse to the CJEU. There has been no answer from our Government on these issues.

European family law brings this country an unqualified benefit. There is no down side. The Government, in answers from the Dispatch Box, have recognised this. They say they want to continue to benefit from the rules for cross-border co-operation in family law. However, we can no longer be asked to listen to pious protestations from the Dispatch Box in this House to that effect when, almost in the next breath, they contradict themselves by rejecting the decisive role of the Court of Justice in determining the application of the rules. Amendment 29 would insist on some frankness on the part of the Government about the consequences of Brexit for family law—frankness with the British public, who have a right to be informed of the threat to international co-operation in this area, and frankness with this Parliament, which will in due course be asked to enact a statute approving any withdrawal terms.

This Bill and the Government’s obsessive stubbornness on the question of the CJEU threaten to make international co-operation in family law a needless casualty of Brexit, with absolutely no countervailing benefit, either for British citizens or for citizens of the rest of the European Union.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

As a family judge, I regularly tried international family cases, so I entirely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and very much support Amendment 29. I am dismayed, I have to say, by the inadequacy of the current wording of the Bill, which does not refer specifically to family law and does not deal with the main issue of reciprocity and the importance of the European court in Luxembourg. I will reiterate two figures because they are important for noble Lords to know. One is that there are 140,000 EU divorces between the UK and other member states. That is not a small number. There are 1,800 EU child abduction cases—an area of the law that I spent a disproportionate amount of my time trying under the Hague convention before the EU law came in and enormously improved the Hague convention.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, neither I nor the Prime Minister misunderstood any of that. With great respect, I want to correct the noble Baroness on one point: that ecosystem is simply not required for mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments by two separate jurisdictions. That happens between the countries of the Lugano convention and countries in the EU in any event. I am talking about starting from the same point, with common rules regarding judicial recognition and enforcement, and moving from there to the negotiation of a new partnership. We do not foresee the sort of difficulty that the noble Baroness alludes to in that context.

At this stage, I want to come back to the point I was seeking to make. First, it is not necessary for the UK to subject itself unilaterally to the CJEU’s jurisdiction to secure a reciprocal agreement. Many other countries do that. Secondly, in any event, the Government have been clear throughout debate on the Bill that it is in no way designed to legislate for any future agreement between the UK and the EU. That is not the purpose of the Bill. We cannot unilaterally legislate for our future relationship with the EU simply by including in our domestic legislation certain provisions about recognition of family law, maintenance and other agreements—a point that the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, readily acknowledged at the outset of her opening remarks some considerable time ago.

I understand that the intention behind Amendment 120 is to make sure that there can be continued application of international agreements, such as the Hague 2007 maintenance convention, which the UK currently operates by virtue of its membership of the EU. Of course, we are intent on doing that; as I noted earlier, we understand that there is a potential three-month gap there, which we need to address. I hope I can reassure the noble Baroness that we are clearly intent on securing an agreement, albeit not as an EU member and not subject to the direct jurisdiction of the CJEU, which ensures that we can maintain the highest standards of family law and mutual recognition, whether it be jurisdiction, choice of law or enforcement. I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I entirely understand the response the noble and learned Lord gave to the effect that you can, of course, have a treaty to ensure reciprocity, but he does not appear to recognise the role of the CJEU in the difficult cases where there is an argument about what reciprocity means and the obligations on states that are parties to that treaty. I do not know that there has been any explanation from the Government of how we deal with the difficult cases without accepting the jurisdiction of the CJEU. Would he like to elaborate?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am happy to repeat the observation I made earlier: these difficult cases are resolved, for example, between Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and the other members of the Lugano convention embraced within the EU. In that context, each of the courts—the Lugano court and the CJEU—respects each other’s judgments, but they are not bound by them. That happens all the time. Ultimately, it would be for the domestic courts of each jurisdiction to determine what they were and were not prepared to enforce in the context of these agreements. That does not present any insurmountable difficulty, any more than it does in the context of the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of orders made pursuant to the current Hague conventions.

Again, I am obliged to the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, for the report. I repeat my offer of further meetings to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 12th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cormack]

My Lords, I support what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has just said and ever so slightly disagree with my noble friend Lord Hailsham. Whatever the nature of the offence, it is wrong that it should be created in this way. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that custodial sentences are highly unlikely, but that is not the point. To create any sort of offence in this way is fundamentally wrong and we should not have anything to do with it.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, has just said. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and my noble friend Lord McNally explained, the Bill as drafted would permit Ministers, when they consider it “appropriate”—a point made by the noble Viscount and a word discussed at length last Wednesday—to create by regulations new criminal offences carrying up to two years’ imprisonment for wide and diffuse purposes. As discussed last week, regulations could also be used to make any provision that could be made by Act of Parliament. The Henry VIII powers are as all-embracing as could be imagined. This is all the more shocking in the context of the creation of new criminal offences. These may concern individual liberty, certainly; reputation, always; and the conduct of business, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has pointed out.

The report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee—on which I sat for a number of years—described the powers as “wider than we have ever seen”. It described Clause 7 as notable for its width, novelty and uncertainty, and the same can be said of all three of the clauses in question. The principle is simple: it is in general not acceptable for the Government to have the power to create new criminal offences by regulation without an Act of Parliament. That principle was treated as cardinal when I was on the Delegated Powers Committee.

In 2014 the committee produced a document headed Guidance for Departments, directed principally at memorandums for the departments. However, on the question of criminal offences it was considered so out of order that new criminal offences would be created by regulation that the guidance did not even address that possibility. The committee said:

“Where a Bill creates a criminal offence with provision for the penalty to be set by delegated legislation”—


that is, the Bill creates the offence—

“the committee would expect, save in exceptional circumstances, a maximum penalty on conviction to be included on the face of the bill. Therefore, where this is not the case, the memorandum should explain why not, and at the very least the Committee would expect the instrument to be subject to affirmative procedure. Similarly, where the ingredients of a criminal offence are to be set by delegated legislation, the Committee would expect a compelling justification”.

However, this Bill potentially permits the creation of a new range of criminal offences. Both the Bill and the Explanatory Notes are silent about everything to do with such offences as might be created except for the broad statement of their purpose in the three clauses, in the most general terms, and with no indication of what offences are envisaged, except that the maximum penalty must not exceed two years imprisonment—which, as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, pointed out, is a not insubstantial period.

The basic principle was enshrined in Article 39 of Magna Carta: that no one should be imprisoned or stripped of his rights or possessions or deprived of his standing in any way except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land. These are constitutional principles as old as this Parliament, and we should be very careful in dealing with the issue of allowing the right of Parliament to insist on a say over criminal offences being created by the diktat of Ministers.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, in this context, I draw attention to the paragraphs in the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee report which deal with tertiary legislation because it is important that this aspect should be understood. The Bill confers powers on Ministers to make law by regulations, and the secondary legislation can do anything that Parliament can do. This would allow people, bodies or Ministers to make further subordinate legislation—tertiary legislation—without any parliamentary procedure or any requirement for it to be made by statutory instrument. Where tertiary legislation is not made by statutory instrument it evades the publication and laying requirements of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946 but it is still the law.

Nothing in the Bill limits the power of creating tertiary legislation. It can be used for any purpose—for example, to create new bodies with wide powers, which could introduce criminal offences in many of the areas currently governed by EU law, including aviation, banking, investment services, chemicals, agriculture, fisheries and medicines. They may only provide the skeleton provisions in relation to a particular activity, leaving the detailed regime to be set out in tertiary legislation made not by Parliament or Ministers but by one of the new bodies so created.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Wednesday 18th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, many Members of this House will remember that I have raised the issue of matters concerning family law arrangements that cut across the whole of Europe. I chair the EU Justice Sub-Committee of the European Union Select Committee and we published a report for this House, which dealt with issues of maintaining the mutuality that exists across Europe for matters concerning family law, business and commercial disputes, and individual rights.

The concern that we have is that we want it to be clear that, in the negotiation, the Government should be mindful of the ways in which current arrangements have been carefully crafted over many years. A number of directives exist, which I know the Minister is only too aware of: directives on which court will take control of a particular issue if there is a dispute between parties based in different nations; the ways in which family law matters can be dealt with where there is divorce and a breakdown of families, or where there are issues concerning access or maintenance arrangements for children. Those are dealt with by Brussels regulations I, II, IIa and the maintenance regulation, and they are found to be of incredible value in these areas of law. I wanted to raise this again because I would like some assurances from the Minister that these are going to be included in any negotiated settlement with Europe in the future, because the loss of these legal arrangements would be detrimental to the rights of individuals, businesses, people running businesses and others.

Those are the matters raised by me; we want to have monitoring of the ways in which the Government might proceed. It is similar to the position that was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, just now. I am raising this because I want assurances and I hope to receive them from the Minister before deciding what to do. I beg to move.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I start by apologising for arriving a moment after the noble Baroness had started speaking. I did not know what had happened to Amendment 13. I want to speak briefly in full support of the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. I do not propose to rehearse all the arguments that we made at Committee at some length, but want to make four very brief points.

First, no one suggested in Committee, on behalf of the Government or anyone else, that the family law provisions contained in the European regulations Brussels I, IIa, the maintenance regulation and the arrangements for the enforcement of obligations and co-operation were not a considerable benefit to the citizens of the UK as well of other member states. Secondly, no one suggested that any benefit would flow from our not continuing to have those regulations applied in the United Kingdom. Thirdly, no one suggested that we could achieve reciprocal protections for UK citizens and citizens from other member states of the EU without negotiating for their continued protection. Fourthly and finally, all that could be said and was said by the Minister for the Government was that it was all a matter for the negotiations, but it would be possible to negotiate arrangements whereby we could continue to benefit from the regulations without accepting the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in overseeing their implementation.

It is on that point that I take issue with the Government, because I ask why the EU 27 should agree to a set of arrangements affecting private law rights—these are disputes between citizens of different member states, by and large—whereby citizens of those other member states have obligations that are enforceable in their courts at the instance of citizens of the United Kingdom, while the United Kingdom could refuse to honour such obligations unless the courts of the United Kingdom approve their enforcement. In other words, a different set of rules could be said to apply to the UK from the rest of the Union.

The Government’s obsession—and I use the word without embarrassment—with the direct effect of CJEU decisions in cases involving treaty rights threatens to scupper the whole system of family law protections that is so important to our citizens, as well as to the citizens of other member states. The noble Lord said that it would be easy to negotiate other agreements for non-binding decisions. That, I suggest, is simply impossible to achieve. I do not see any difficulty with our accepting, in the case of private law rights between citizens, the binding nature of decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union. That way, we could commit, and commit early, to continuing to have all the rights and benefits for all citizens bound by the regulations for the foreseeable future.

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[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

I think the noble Baroness has demonstrated the truth of what I am saying: namely, that she is concerned with the rights afforded by EU law in this country. The fact that those rights will continue to be enforced in this country is what the Bill is about. Therefore, I do not see any possibility of this amendment having any effect. The noble Baroness has just mentioned its operation in Italy, if the husband is there. That depends not on the domestic law of this country but on the law of Italy, and that is not part of what we can do in this Bill.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I am terribly sorry to interrupt the noble and learned Lord when he has already been interrupted, but the point is that these provisions are all about reciprocity. They are about the mutuality of enforcement in other member states and in the United Kingdom. Subsection (2) of the proposed new clause seeks to address the problem with reciprocity. It says:

“The report provided for under subsection (1) must include … the steps, if any, taken by Ministers of the Crown to negotiate the continuation of reciprocal arrangements between the United Kingdom and member States in the field of family law”.


The point of that reciprocity is to ensure that United Kingdom citizens can enforce rights in other members states under the regulation in the same way as member state citizens—or former member state citizens as they would be—can in the United Kingdom.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

I take what the noble Lord is saying, but such a report would not be dealing with subsection (1). That is my point. Subsection (1) is the operative subsection and it deals with domestic law, and reciprocity is not a matter that can be dealt with by domestic law. The only thing we can do, as I said on the last occasion on which we discussed this, is make sure that our arrangements are suitable for reciprocity and, if the reciprocity comes, that we have the right arrangements to deal with it. That is our domestic side of reciprocity. The rest of the reciprocity belongs to the rest of Europe, and I hope it will see the benefit of this as much as us. However, as far as we are concerned, we are bringing the whole of EU law that refers to family matters into our law by virtue of this Bill, and a report about that would be otiose.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 23rd April 2018 Lords Chamber

I remember dealing with this in the body dealing with convention. It is there precisely because of this country’s idea at that stage that we would move to have some exceptions to this, having regard to the case to which the noble and learned Lord referred. This is much less vague than some noble Lords think. I commend their attention to it.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

On the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, not assisted by the fact that the charter applies only to EU law and that the law on murder is not Union law?

[Lord Goldsmith]

It is always good to have a second argument when you are in front of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge.