European Union (Withdrawal) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Cormack
Main Page: Lord Cormack (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Cormack's debates with the Department for Exiting the European Union
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I make two short suggestions. One is that all the words that we have heard today should be treated exactly the same. The second is that Parliament should deal with all of them.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Deben, in his scintillating speech, referred to the power of arbitrary monarchs. I do not need to remind him—or anyone else in your Lordships’ House—that 369 years ago something happened to a monarch who had sought to exert those powers absolutely. The ultimate end of ship money was outside Banqueting House in Whitehall on 30 January 1649. I do not want to make too many historical diversions, but I was grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, whom we missed last week when we really began these debates on Wednesday, for referring to what I had sought to say then. This is the specific consequence of the generality that we abhorred last week—giving to Ministers, effectively, arbitrary power.
My noble friend mentioned VAT. Is that not an example of where Parliament no longer has the power to reduce the rate of VAT below 5% because we have given that to the European Union? Is not our leaving the European Union an example of restoring the authority of Parliament to impose taxes?
Our leaving the European Union is an exceptionally unfortunate measure that will do great damage to this country, in my opinion. But the answer to my noble friend’s specific question is that it was enacted by Parliament—a Parliament of which he was not a Member but of which my noble friend Lord Deben and I were—and that, knowing the consequences, we voted for it because we believed that it was in the general interest of our country. We were behaving as Members of the House of Commons should behave. It was properly debated, thoroughly approved and it came on to the statute books as other things have done.
I go back to what I was saying when my noble friend interrupted me. We have a duty to protect and to urge the other place not to abdicate the central power of an elected House—to deal with taxation. I hope that when my noble friend replies we will have a slightly more satisfactory and understanding reply than we had last Wednesday. I hope, too, that he will ensure, if not today, that we have a glossary of all these terms, including charges, fees, taxes, contributions and levies. At the end of the day they all mean something very similar: imposing an obligation to pay. People should never fall under that obligation unless it is imposed by their representatives in Parliament. We have a duty, as the second Chamber—the unelected Chamber—to say to our colleagues at the other end of the Corridor, “Please do not abdicate; please flex your muscles; please do not give to Ministers—the 109 whom we talked about the other night—or to other bodies or authority a power that is only rightly yours”.
My Lords, my name is to Amendment 126. I do not want to say very much. I can think of another word to add to that great list and I could give my view of the history of how taxation became the weapon for democracy, ultimately. Taxation is the ultimate control that the Commons has over the Executive. Just reflect on the set-to in the United States of America a few weeks ago: Senate and President at odds over money. These issues must be resolved at parliamentary level and House of Commons level—not by regulation.
My Lords, I want to add one short point to what has been said about sentences of imprisonment. It is likely that if the Government think it necessary to introduce new criminal offences, they are not going to be offences of assault or anything of that kind, but offences that relate to the conduct of business between the United Kingdom and the European Union. What we are talking about here are possibly mainly regulatory offences, for which sentences of imprisonment may not be necessary at all. However, such offences may affect severely the conduct of companies and the relationships between them, the conduct of local authorities and so on. Therefore, I ask that included in the scrutiny that the Minister has very helpfully promised is a slightly more sophisticated test that bears in mind the effect of potential new offences on the business community and the economy.
My Lords, I support what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has just said and ever so slightly disagree with my noble friend Lord Hailsham. Whatever the nature of the offence, it is wrong that it should be created in this way. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that custodial sentences are highly unlikely, but that is not the point. To create any sort of offence in this way is fundamentally wrong and we should not have anything to do with it.
My Lords, I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, has just said. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and my noble friend Lord McNally explained, the Bill as drafted would permit Ministers, when they consider it “appropriate”—a point made by the noble Viscount and a word discussed at length last Wednesday—to create by regulations new criminal offences carrying up to two years’ imprisonment for wide and diffuse purposes. As discussed last week, regulations could also be used to make any provision that could be made by Act of Parliament. The Henry VIII powers are as all-embracing as could be imagined. This is all the more shocking in the context of the creation of new criminal offences. These may concern individual liberty, certainly; reputation, always; and the conduct of business, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has pointed out.
The report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee—on which I sat for a number of years—described the powers as “wider than we have ever seen”. It described Clause 7 as notable for its width, novelty and uncertainty, and the same can be said of all three of the clauses in question. The principle is simple: it is in general not acceptable for the Government to have the power to create new criminal offences by regulation without an Act of Parliament. That principle was treated as cardinal when I was on the Delegated Powers Committee.
In 2014 the committee produced a document headed Guidance for Departments, directed principally at memorandums for the departments. However, on the question of criminal offences it was considered so out of order that new criminal offences would be created by regulation that the guidance did not even address that possibility. The committee said:
“Where a Bill creates a criminal offence with provision for the penalty to be set by delegated legislation”—
that is, the Bill creates the offence—
“the committee would expect, save in exceptional circumstances, a maximum penalty on conviction to be included on the face of the bill. Therefore, where this is not the case, the memorandum should explain why not, and at the very least the Committee would expect the instrument to be subject to affirmative procedure. Similarly, where the ingredients of a criminal offence are to be set by delegated legislation, the Committee would expect a compelling justification”.
However, this Bill potentially permits the creation of a new range of criminal offences. Both the Bill and the Explanatory Notes are silent about everything to do with such offences as might be created except for the broad statement of their purpose in the three clauses, in the most general terms, and with no indication of what offences are envisaged, except that the maximum penalty must not exceed two years imprisonment—which, as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, pointed out, is a not insubstantial period.
The basic principle was enshrined in Article 39 of Magna Carta: that no one should be imprisoned or stripped of his rights or possessions or deprived of his standing in any way except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land. These are constitutional principles as old as this Parliament, and we should be very careful in dealing with the issue of allowing the right of Parliament to insist on a say over criminal offences being created by the diktat of Ministers.