European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 15th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Woolf (CB)]

My Lords, if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, would like to speak first, I would welcome that.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

I do not particularly wish to speak first, but in view of the noble and learned Lord’s invitation, I will make my brief contribution. Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, I have a fair amount of experience in this area of European law and the modification of existing judgments—I sat in the House of Lords when it set aside a previous judgment. It is extremely important that we consider the principle that has to lie behind this. The present situation is that EU retained law has been made part of the law of the United Kingdom unless and until it is modified by Parliament in due course. When passing the previous withdrawal Act, we placed a number of restrictions on that power for Ministers in various areas relating to human rights and so on.

From what I read in the newspapers as these things developed, my impression was that the Government were anxious that the power to modify or depart from EU judgments would be better given to a wider set of courts than the Supreme Court, and the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland on criminal matters, as had been done in the withdrawal Act. I can see that it may be part of overall policy that it should be rather wider than the present law would permit. However, it is important that whatever method is used, it is one that will prevail across the whole of the United Kingdom. Therefore, to give the power to do this to, for example, the Inner House of the Court of Session, would have the effect that it would apply in Scotland but not in England and Wales directly, nor in Northern Ireland. There would be a degree of difficulty in that. That is why, in my view, this power should be in the Supreme Court. As we all know, when the Supreme Court gives a judgment, it is a judgment for the whole of the United Kingdom. It is important to emphasise that the name of the court is the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.

If it is desired to give the power to a wider section of the courts, the way to do so is to specify which courts they are. The example given by my noble and learned friend is one possibility, but it is for the Government to decide how wide they wish to be. However, it is important that the courts should not have the power to ultimately decide; it should be required to refer the matter to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court can modify the burden that that would involve by a lead process, leaving it free to dismiss a case where it was thought there was nothing in it. One possible line is for the lower court to give a judgment which might ultimately help the Supreme Court, but I do not know whether that would always be necessary. The important thing is that any court that has this power would have it only as a way of referring the matter to the Supreme Court.

I was thinking of putting forward an amendment to this effect, but I thought it probably better to leave it until we have had a chance to discuss it. I have reached the conclusion that, as a practical matter, if we in this House can persuade the Government to change, it is likely to be effective; whereas if we do not persuade the Government to change, it may not be effective, with results that we may not altogether approve of. My main effort in this is to try to persuade the Government that a system along the lines I have proposed would be perfectly acceptable and workable, and would embrace all the courts that it needs to embrace.

[Lord Woolf]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for preceding me because he is in a unique position to give advice to the House on this issue. I only intervene to add to what has already been said because I want to stress the importance of the issue. There is an old saying that hard cases can make bad law. This may be a hard situation for the Government but they are in danger of making very bad law indeed. Why they are in danger and why they would be wise to think very carefully again before they ask for this to be implemented is apparent from the careful steps that were taken back in 2005 when I was still one of the chief justices—to whom the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, referred—who are present before your Lordships.

At that time, changes were being made which went to the root of the constitution, and the courts were concerned that they could be severely damaging to our unwritten constitution. As a consequence, the then Lord Chancellor and I—then Lord Chief Justice—came together to make a concordat to try to deal with those difficulties. It was recognised that one of the underlying principles of our common law and constitution was the separation of powers, and what was being done in 2005—which affected the position of the Lord Chancellor in relation to the courts—was trespassing on the principles that had existed hitherto. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, was well aware of these principles when he was Lord Chancellor and a member of the Government. The role that the Lord Chancellor played at that time was to ensure that the important balance—which explained how we managed to continue without a written constitution—succeeded, which it did remarkably well.

As I see the situation, what my noble and learned friends and my noble friend Lord Anderson have been saying to your Lordships is that this proposes a change in our law that would undermine the proper observation of the rule of law in a most critical way. I suggest that for this House to allow that to happen without protesting in the clearest way would be very undesirable indeed. I feel confident that if the Government look at this matter again and bear in mind the speeches made to this House today, they will see how it can be dealt with. However important Brexit is, it must not be allowed to create a precedent that could be followed hereafter, as has been suggested, which would damage our situation.

I hope we will always be able to continue in this country without a written constitution. However, if we let what is proposed go through with saying it should be amended, we will create a situation where that will not be possible. We should pause before doing so.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is not a question of having policy areas in mind. We want to take forward a consultation process that will enable us to arrive at an appropriate conclusion as to how we should look at EU case law as a part of retained EU law after the implementation period has expired.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, I understand that the first part of the amendment may be reasonably accommodated within the answer given to the previous question about separation of powers. I cannot see how the second part can be accommodated—formulating the question the court has to decide in deciding whether the previous decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union should be followed.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect to the noble and learned Lord, we seek to consult on the appropriate test to be applied in taking this matter forward. We intend to do that in consultation with the senior judiciary.

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard continued) & Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 15th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)]

My Lords, I am going to make a rather cynical contribution to the debate. The debate has brought out very clearly the difference between accountability and a mandate. I am not in favour of the Government’s hands being tied by Parliament in these negotiations. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, that it is for the Government to conduct these negotiations, not for Parliament. We will have the opportunity to comment and to give our views, and we should. We certainly should not be cowed from doing that.

However, I will quote a recent example that I really think establishes this point. The Government unexpectedly, before the election, got an agreement with the European Union that the European Union always said that it would not make. How did they get it? They did it by making a concession on the Irish Sea that they would never have got through Parliament. They made a concession which they had said they would not make—but they found it necessary to do it, and when they had done it, Parliament and the electorate came to the conclusion that it was the right thing to have done. If Parliament had been able to control what the Government were able to do, the Government would not have been able to make that concession.

We might be cynical about that concession—we might think it was the wrong thing to do—but it was the thing that got the agreement and that was necessary to get the agreement. Certainly, the Government will need friends in these negotiations, but they will also need flexibility, and Parliament should not seek to take away that flexibility.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

I would like to point out two matters. First, in new Clause 13D(2)(b) and (c) in Amendment 28, there is the requirement that a Minister must provide

“a declaration of whether, in the Minister’s opinion, agreements can be concluded and ratified before IP completion day”,

which seems to be in the nature of a prophecy required from the Minister as a matter of compulsion, and

“the policy of Her Majesty’s Government if agreements are not concluded and ratified before IP completion day.”

Once again, that is nothing to do with saying what is happening; it is giving an opinion as to what is to happen next, which as far as I am concerned is the difference between the two.

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[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords, I have sat and listened to the debate on the Bill in this House, which has been wise—and sometimes entertaining, sometimes depressing, depending on one’s view of leaving the European Union. For the past two days I have stayed quiet and reflected on what has been said. For me it has been a surreal debate at times. Last night we had a debate in which all sides of the House pleaded with the Minister to keep one single market in the United Kingdom, and the Minister could not agree that that could be guaranteed. Earlier today there was an amendment about the rule of Parliament, and taking back control of the sovereignty of Parliament and not the sovereignty of the Executive. In the previous debate the Minister said that our hands should not be tied in negotiations—but the Government are tying their own hands by putting a false deadline on the negotiations.

However, I have to stand up now, because we have moved from a surreal debate to a cruel and heartless debate. Now we are talking about children who have family in this country. They are segregated; they will have seen war and persecution; some of them may have seen their mothers raped; some will have seen things that we cannot understand. And we already have a law in this land that says that, as a guarantee and as a matter of principle, they will come here now. Clause 37 takes that away. The Minister shakes her head, but it does. Basically, it says that rules will be laid before Parliament in two months’ time. It stops the existing provision and tries to put in a new provision—and we know not what that new provision will be.

Sometimes in politics, you just do the right thing. You do a thing as a matter of principle. I see nothing at all wrong in bringing here, as fast and as safely as possible, unaccompanied children who have family in this country. It is the right thing to do practically, and it is the right thing to do in principle. I must say to the Minister that this is a political decision. It is not a legal decision; there is nothing impeding negotiations. What is more, it is the right thing to do. I do not care what the other 27 countries do. As a British citizen, I want my values to be that we accept these children as a matter of principle. If the other 27 do not wish to do that, that is about their values—but this country, and this Parliament, should stand steadfast in saying that this is the right thing to do, and we want it to happen now.

I tried to think why the Government would not just allow this to happen. Why would they want to put a two-month staging post in place? Do they not want to do it? The Minister and the Government keep telling us that they do want to do it, and that it will happen. Fine. Are they not quite sure how it will happen, so they want to change the rules and the policy? The Minister shakes her head. So why have they not shown us what the new policy will be? Why the two-month gap? What are we waiting for? If nothing is going to change, the existing provision should stand.

Are we saying that we are putting in a provision for a two-month wait and nothing will change? Yet there are children across the country who need our support and help. Or are we going to use these young, vulnerable children as a negotiating chip? What a disgraceful position for us, as a country, to get ourselves into—that we could use the most vulnerable of the vulnerable as a negotiating position to try to get the other countries to agree to do something, we know not what? There is no reason for this clause—other than the possibility that there is something, however slight it may be, that the Government wish to change. I do not believe that that is the British way, I do not believe that those are British values, and I do not believe that that is what the British public will support.

I will end with what Robin Walker said when he was a Brexit Minister in the other place. He said that this was a matter of principle. I agree: it is a matter of principle—and it is time to put principle into action and stop the fake negotiation.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, I think my credentials in legislation for children are fairly long and fairly clear—or at least I hope so. Before we start to think about children in principle, it is vital to think about the provision that we seek to replace. The Clause in the 2018 Bill gives children no rights whatever. It does nothing more than require the Government to enter into negotiations with regard to those children. That is all, which is very important.

However, the question is: is Parliament entitled to tell the Executive what they must negotiate for? That is the language of the part of the letter to which the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, referred. In other words, it is said that, as a matter of principle—I will elaborate on that principle in a minute—it is not right that the Government’s hands should be restricted by Parliament before the negotiations. It is the Executive’s responsibility to do the negotiation; it is for Parliament to call the Executive to account on how they have done it.

I shall refer to this only briefly, but your Lordships will remember that in the decision of the Supreme Court in relation to Prorogation, it pointed out that the important thing was the accountability of the Executive to Parliament. That makes an important distinction between the Executive and Parliament, because the Executive have the executive function, and then Parliament has the right to call them to account for the way in which they have carried it out.

The provision in question—Clause 17 in the 2018 Bill—is precisely that. It is an instruction to the Executive to open negotiations in a certain way. I understand from what we have heard already that the Executive have entered into such negotiations. However, the point made in the letter is a general one, of the kind I have just mentioned.

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[Baroness Sheehan (LD)]

My Lords, I cannot believe we are here again. It is like déjà vu, or a bad dream. I thought we had put this issue to bed. It took a long time previously and I have not forgotten how hard NGOs and people on this side of the House—and, of course, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs—had to work to make Dublin III work for unaccompanied asylum-seeking children who had family here. It was not an easy legal trip but, through JRs and so on, we got it to work eventually, and the thought that the system might be dismantled is too depressing for words.

It seems that Conservative Governments pass up no opportunity to try to prevent us abiding by our legal duty to uphold the rights of the child. I fear that views sometimes articulated by the right-wing press make some Members on the government Benches think they are being taken for a ride. One such view is that these children are sent here as a way to cleave open the system, so that the rest of the family may follow. Can they produce the evidence to back that up? No, because there is none. Children are more likely to stay quiet about where their family is because they fear that retribution might be visited upon them.

Another such view, referred to by my noble friend Lady Hamwee, is that allowing family reunification creates a pull factor that will encourage others to make the trip. I suggest that anyone who truly holds that view visits some of the refugee camps and speaks to people there. I am sure that listening to their human stories—such as that of Adam, whom I know well—will encourage them to think differently. Adam is not his real name. He fled north Darfur at the age of three with his family. He was orphaned but made it to a refugee camp where he lived a hand-to-mouth existence until the age of 14, in constant fear that the Janjaweed militias would one day succeed in taking him away. There was no school and no hope, just fear. At the age of 14 he took the decision to leave to try to make his way to Europe because the risk was worth it. He was driven to take the risk by desperation. His is just one story. There are many more children like Adam who desperately need our compassion and our kindness but, most of all, our commitment to international rules of law that protect the best interests of the child and, in particular, to the continuation of the Dublin III regulation once we have left the EU for good.

Removing our commitment to Dublin III from the Bill with a promise to make good later is not good enough. These children, and in particular their advocates, need to know that a system that has finally been made to work will not be dismantled. Starting from scratch to set up another system that works legally will mean that time will be lost, and lost time means that lives will be damaged. I think the Government will agree that there will be a gap in legislation and they cannot know how long it will be. Please let us leave things be.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

The Dublin III arrangements will continue until the end of this year. The Government’s purpose is to make arrangements that will take effect immediately after that. That is what this is about. It is not about taking anything away. It is about construction after the end of this year, assuming that—I am assuming what was said in the last debate—still stands.

[Baroness Sheehan]

I thank the noble and learned Lord. The Government say that they will, but the question is when. There is no guarantee that there will not be a gap through which—

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

There is no guarantee that anything is going to happen particularly, but Dublin III is in and the Government have expressed their intention to replace it with an arrangement that applies to children here who have family in Europe and to children in Europe who have family here.

[Baroness Sheehan]

If, as the noble and learned Lord said, nothing is going to change, let us leave things be.

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting
Monday 20th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith]

My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 12. This amendment will not delay Brexit. It will not even delay this Bill, which is going to the Commons in any case. However, it will avoid a great deal of legal confusion and safeguard the independence of the judiciary. It reflects concerns held by the Constitution Committee, several members of which have taken part in the debates, including of course our chair, the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor. The background is that European Court of Justice case law will be relevant in interpreting retained European law. We recognised that in the 2018 withdrawal Act and made provision for it to be dealt with, so that the Supreme Court and the High Court of the Justiciary would be able to depart from EU case law when they thought it right to do so.

Clause 26 of this Bill gives Ministers very wide regulation-making powers to decide which courts can depart from CJEU case law. It could be any court, right down to the magistrates’ court, the county court or the sheriff court. Through unamendable statutory instruments, Ministers could decide what test the courts should apply when considering whether to depart from EU case law. Ministers could effectively direct the courts to disapply case law in specified circumstances. Bear in mind that lower courts cannot bind other courts, so we will have conflicting interpretations and a lot more litigation as a result.

These are not appropriate powers to be exercised by regulation. They open the way to ministerial interference with the courts. If any of this needs to be done, it should be done in primary legislation. I would have been happy to see provision in the Bill to extend the powers in the 2018 Act to the Appeal Court and the Inner House of the Court of Session, for example. However, I have tabled these amendments on Report because last week’s proceedings in Committee were inconclusive. I said then that when such serious concerns are raised by so many noble and learned Lords, including those with a lifetime of experience in interpreting the law, Ministers need to think again and respond.

I encouraged the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, to use his skills when he spoke in the debate to think of ways in which we could get through this and to encourage Ministers to do so, which he certainly has. Amendment 14, his valuable amendment in this group, would be very helpful. It does not do all the things I sought to do by deleting some of these powers, but it would very much clarify the situation I am worried about, of lower courts making rulings which conflict with those of other courts. If the noble and learned Lord decides that he wants to press his amendment to a vote, in circumstances which I will refer to in a moment, I would be happy to make way by withdrawing mine in due course to enable him to do so. I hope he can make it clear to us when he explains his amendment whether that is the course of action he wishes to take.

I said that reconsideration was necessary. I believe that such reconsideration had taken place and that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, was ready to move an amendment at Third Reading which would have met all our concerns. I have a copy of that draft amendment. The noble and learned Lord was expected to wind up this debate, but is no longer doing so. That seems very significant to me. I think he knows full well that the Bill as it stands would be a source of legal confusion and would lead to this danger of Ministers having the power to impose an unspecified new legal test on the courts, a test which could not be amended by Parliament. Parliament is about to make bad law which Ministers know to be bad. I am afraid that my conclusion is that No. 10 Downing Street is in a sulk because this House carried an earlier amendment to the Bill. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, is an entirely honourable man who serves the House very well and is always a man of his word. I think his absence from the debate at this stage indicates that some exchanges in the Government have led to this House being asked to make law that it knows to be bad. I beg to move.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, when we debated this clause in Committee, we looked at two key provisions: which courts should be able to look at this matter, and what the test should be. I was particularly concerned about saying what the test should be, because I regarded that as an interference with judicial independence—and I still regard it as such. If Parliament sets out the test, as it did in the 2018 Act, for the Supreme Court and the High Court of the Justiciary, that is the law and the courts can therefore take it and act on it. However, it seemed to me and a number of your Lordships that it was not proper for a Minister to deal with the judiciary in these circumstances. Having the Minister set what the test should be by regulation really should not happen. That was the conclusion of the debate in Committee, generally speaking.

When I thought over that, I concluded that we were blocking altogether what the Government were seeking to achieve. I therefore felt strongly that it was my responsibility, along with others, to see whether there was some other way of dealing with this problem. I have thought about it a good deal and, as I understand it, the Prime Minister said that he was in favour of every court being able to deal with this matter. I was anxious that my proposal should achieve that, if at all possible, because he had said that in good faith as part of his election campaign. Therefore, I felt that I should try to think up an amendment which gave that power. Amendment 14 does that because it allows any court in the United Kingdom to consider this matter and make a judgment on it. However, because of the nature of the judgment, there is a requirement that it be referred to the Supreme Court, which should have a power to grant the result, on condition that it has a power not to hear it if it feels that the application was not very substantial or very good, as it has for many appeals in the ordinary course of events.

I can see that having that sort of burden on the Supreme Court might be rather disagreeable. Therefore, it was quite reasonable to think of giving that power, the result of the reporting power, to the Court of Appeal in England—I think Wales and Northern Ireland would also be covered by that—and to the Inner House of the Court of Session in Scotland, which is its equivalent. The High Court of Justiciary would of course also have that responsibility in criminal cases. I am very open to negotiating how this should happen, but I venture to think it important that we consider this issue carefully. I hope that your Lordships may feel that we should pass this amendment.

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[Lord Beith]

My Lords we are no further forward at all on which courts it is intended shall acquire the power; on what the test they will be required to carry out is; or on any reliable process by which we can ensure that Ministers do not get involved in specifying the circumstances in which courts, at any level, can depart from existing case law. The beauty of the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, is, as he explained, that it seeks to satisfy the Government’s objective—as restated now by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan—that any court in the land should be able to engage in this process. This is not a very wise thing to do but, if it is going to be done, it should be done with the protection suggested by the noble and learned Lord: that it should involve a reference process which the Supreme Court can take up if it sees reason to do so. On that basis, and knowing in what high regard the noble and learned Lord is held, I am content to seek the leave of the House to withdraw my amendment, so as to facilitate him pressing his.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

It would be right for the noble Lord, Lord Beith, to continue with his two amendments, because I am proposing the option in my amendment in the event of his disappearing. I think I am right in saying that. I may be wrong; I stand to be corrected. I understood from the Public Bill Office that I did not need to put my name to Amendments 12 and 13—in fact I could not, because there were four there already. It may be that those amendments should just stand.

[Lord Beith]

The consequence of my amendment, if it was carried, would be that the amendment in the name of the noble and learned, Lord, Lord Mackay, could not then be taken, because the words upon which it bites would have been removed. I would be content to divide on my amendment, to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

14: Clause 26, page 30, line 20, leave out paragraph (d) and insert—
“(d) after subsection (5) insert—“(5A) Where a court or tribunal other than the Supreme Court or the High Court of Justiciary is of the opinion that any retained EU case law that is relevant to an issue before it should be departed from, that court or tribunal must—(i) in its judgment set out the reasons for that opinion, and(ii) refer the case to the Supreme Court or, as appropriate, the High Court of Justiciary,and if the Supreme Court or High Court of Justiciary grants leave for the case to proceed, it must decide whether to depart from the EU case law on the issue before it.”, and”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would introduce a procedure which could be initiated in any court of the United Kingdom and result in a decision which is authoritative in the United Kingdom without any interference with the independence of the judiciary.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, I have spoken to and certainly want to move the amendment. It is with great regret that I am voting against the Government, but that is what I want to do.

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments & Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords & Ping Pong (Hansard)
Wednesday 22nd January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Oates (LD)]

My Lords, I regret the Government’s decision to reject all the amendments, in particular the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, has just spoken to and the amendments that my noble friends moved.

I am sorry that in another place the Minister, when addressing the EU citizens amendment, failed to make any arguments at all. Indeed, so devoid of them was he that he resorted to a whole load of canards and non sequiturs. I could go through them at length, if I thought the Government were in any way moved by arguments on this, but it is clear to me that they are not. Sadly, and without any coherent reason at all, they have rejected an amendment which would have improved the Bill, alleviated the severe anxieties of EU citizens who are currently being refused documentary proof of their right to settled status, and ensured that the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary kept the promises they made to EU citizens during the 2016 referendum campaign.

Our amendment did not seek to interfere with any rights under the settled status scheme, nor did it do anything to thwart or delay Brexit. The proposals were not radical: the provision of documentary evidence of status is exactly the system that exists for non-EU holders of indefinite leave to remain. Our proposal for a declaratory system was simply aimed at preventing the Government and EU citizens becoming embroiled in a bureaucratic quagmire after June 2021.

As a result of the Commons’ failure to heed these modest requests, the conditions have been created for a great injustice to be visited on tens, perhaps even hundreds, of thousands of EU citizens. Millions of EU citizens will continue to face deep anxiety about their status as a result of the inexplicable decision to refuse to provide them with documentary proof. This is not an arcane debating point. This decision will have a real impact on people’s lives. Every member of the Government and every one of its supporters should, frankly, be ashamed that they are party to a casual abandonment of a solemn undertaking made by the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary to EU citizens during the course of the referendum. I am sorry that it has been abandoned so casually.

EU citizens in this country—and UK citizens in the EU, who are concerned about how the UK’s approach at home will impact their position in the EU—can be assured that, despite the set-back today, we will not give up the fight for good sense on this matter to prevail. Although our amendment has not gone through today, we will seek further legislative opportunities to ensure that it does so in future.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I would like to say a word or two about the two amendments in which I had an interest. I am sorry that my voice is not quite up to it, but it is better than it was yesterday.

I am very glad that the situation now is that Parliament can act and get on with what is required. Clause 26 is the one I am interested in. Your Lordships will remember that the noble Lord, Lord Beith, moved an amendment to take out the provision which required a selection of courts to be made in a statutory instrument. I had understood that the Prime Minister had said that he wanted all courts to be able to deal with this matter in some way. By a majority of around 100, those in the House of Commons preferred that situation to what he said—that must be a matter of some interest. So far as I am concerned, I was extremely anxious to uphold what the Prime Minister said in his answer during the election.

Those in the Commons do not say that my amendment is unsuitable, but that it

“does not deal appropriately with the issue of domestic courts departing from the case law”.

But they do not say that their own provision is necessarily suitable either. I am sure that I, and all my noble and learned friends who spoke on these amendments, would be very willing to offer any help that may be required when it comes to promoting this statutory instrument.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

I wonder if I might be allowed to follow the noble and learned Lord, since we are discussing the amendments to Clause 26. He made such a bold and ingenious attempt to provide the Government with a reasonable platform on which they could deal with this problem.

I am faced with words from the House of Commons that my amendment would not leave an appropriate means of dealing with

“the issue of domestic courts departing from the case law of the European Court after IP completion day”—

but nor does the Bill as it stands. It relies on the use of a regulation-making power, under which any or all courts could be included, including lower courts which do not have the capacity to bind other courts and therefore can make many inconsistent decisions. It still leaves the Government with the power to, effectively, impose a different, unspecified test.

This is a very unsatisfactory situation, but the best thing that the Government can now do, since they have failed to accept either my amendment or that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, is think very carefully before proceeding, because there is already sufficient statutory provision in place in the 2018 withdrawal Act, under which the Supreme Court and the High Court of Justiciary can do the job of deciding to depart from European case law. Should the Government wish to extend that to some other courts, perhaps to appeal courts, they will probably find sympathy and support in the House, but should they try to bring forward proposals by way of regulations of the kind that were widely discussed by very experienced colleagues around the House, they will meet resistance at that stage.