Crown Estate Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Livermore and Baroness Vere of Norbiton

3rd reading
Monday 18th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, the core objectives of this Bill were of course supported by all sides of your Lordships’ House, and there has been a bit of progress on so many fronts. There are a number of issues where I still have some concerns, and I know that there is some unease on these Benches. I hope that the Government will deliberate further.

I note the improvements relating to environmental concerns that were raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman. They were somewhat addressed by the Government. I am sure that she would have liked them to go further, but it was progress none the less. I hope that the Government do not seek to reverse the changes relating to salmon that were spearheaded by my noble friend Lord Forsyth.

I remain disappointed that sensible checks on unconstrained borrowing did not make it into the Bill. They garnered significant support from these Benches, but sadly we did not get that vote over the line. I appreciate the Minister’s comments about the sale of certain assets, particularly the seabed, which all noble Lords should be concerned about.

I am grateful to the Minister, his Bill team and all noble Lords who participated on the Bill. On a personal note, after more than 3,000 spoken contributions in eight years, this is my last outing at the Dispatch Box. I look forward to serving your Lordships’ House from the Back Benches.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken today. My noble friend Lord Berkeley will know that only the King’s consent is required for this Bill. Once again, I thank all noble Lords for their efforts on the Bill and thank the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, for all her exchanges from both sides of this Dispatch Box over the past year. She has always been ferocious in this House but friendly outside it, which has been the perfect combination. I wish her well in what she does next.

Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Livermore and Baroness Vere of Norbiton

3rd reading
Tuesday 12th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I also thank the officials and other noble Lords, the Minister and, notable among those who did most of the heavy lifting, the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Vere and Lady Noakes. This Bill contains useful measures improved by amendments but is notable for diverting private bank money to addressing a matter of public interest in place of public funds. For that reason, I hope that the Government will reflect on the wisdom of keeping the amendment limiting the mechanism to small banks.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I am pleased that this Bill leaves your Lordships’ House to wend its way to the House of Commons for further consideration. The Bill has widespread support and has been somewhat improved by the deliberations in your Lordships’ House over the last few months.

I am extremely grateful to the core crack team pulled together specifically for this Bill: my noble friend Lady Noakes, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, whose expertise—far greater than mine—ensured that the roughest edges were smoothed away. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lady Penn, who so skilfully stepped up for Second Reading, and to the new opposition research team for their support.

Last but certainly not least, I am enormously grateful to the Minister and his officials, who were as accommodating as they felt able to be in improving the Bill. All noble Lords will share my hope that this mechanism is never, ever used but if it is, the statutory framework is now there to support one or more small banks through the resolution process and ensure that the first port of call is not taxpayers’ funds.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

I thank again all noble Lords who have participated in debates on the Bill. I look forward to working together in the future on similar issues.

Crown Estate Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Livermore and Baroness Vere of Norbiton

Report stage
Tuesday 5th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Livermore) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions from all noble Lords on this group of amendments. As I set out in Committee, the Government recognise that the matter of controls on borrowing is an important consideration for noble Lords.

I listened carefully to the concerns raised at previous stages of the Bill. I found the arguments put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, to be particularly compelling. As such, I committed to sharing the underpinning memorandum of understanding, which sets out the parameters and controls relating to the power to borrow, as well as the original business case and the framework document. Following on from my commitment, these documents were shared with noble Lords and have been deposited in the Library. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her words just now.

The memorandum of understanding set out that borrowing by the Crown Estate will be limited to a maximum of 25% loan to value, defined as net debt-to-asset value, and that any borrowing within that limit can be undertaken only with the consent of the Treasury.

The framework document will be amended, as I have shared, to include references to borrowing powers, and the original business case produced by the Crown Estate makes the argument for the Crown Estate being able to borrow with the consent of the Treasury, in line with its peers, to ensure that it can continue to operate sustainably and drive maximum returns to the Exchequer.

I trust that having sight of these documents has been useful for noble Lords and has provided an additional opportunity for scrutiny of the proposed borrowing. Let me be clear that the Government agree that controls on borrowing must be in place. As I have set out previously, borrowing can be undertaken only with the consent of the Treasury and, as outlined in the memorandum of understanding, borrowing is not to exceed 25% of loan to value, defined as net debt-to-asset value. This is a clear and carefully chosen guard rail to ensure that sufficient limits are in place. The proposed powers will enable the Crown Estate to draw on its cash holdings first and, as such, it is not envisaged that these borrowing powers will be used in the short term.

Amendment 1, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Howard, would require the Secretary of State to limit borrowing by the Crown Estate by affirmative regulations, and for the first set of regulations to set the limit at 25% net debt-to-asset value.

As debated in Committee, the principle here is whether a specific cap should be in statute. The Government’s view remains that the limit is better placed outside of legislation. The primary control, set out in the Bill, is the requirement for Treasury consent to be obtained prior to undertaking any borrowing. In addition to this important safeguard, we are retaining the requirement for the Crown Estate commissioners to maintain and enhance the value of the estate, while having due regard to the requirements of good management as set out in the 1961 Act.

Taken together, these two elements maintain and strengthen the existing and important fiduciary duty of the commissioners not to take decisions that could endanger the estate. The Government believe that these safeguards and the limits set out in the memorandum of understanding provide clear guard rails to the powers set out in the Bill.

The 1961 Act also contains a power of direction. This power is not altered by the Bill. It remains open to the Government to use in extremis; if, for example, there were concerns that the commissioners were endangering the core statutory purpose of the Crown Estate.

As I have set out previously, the Crown Estate is a commercial business, independent from government. It operates for profit and competes in the commercial markets for investment opportunities. To ensure that it can compete effectively, it needs the ability to borrow as its competitors can. Imposing a legislative cap on borrowing would likely place additional restrictions on the Crown Estate that its competitors in the private sector do not face. This would not be consistent with the Government’s vision for the Crown Estate: to ensure that it has flexibility to invest in activities that will drive increases in its revenues and, consequently, its returns to the public purse.

As set out in the Crown Estate’s original business case, which I have shared with noble Lords, the limit of 25% loan to value is consistent with its peers. I hope this demonstrates to noble Lords that these plans have been considered carefully.

Let me also be clear that any request by the Crown Estate to draw down on debt will be carefully considered by the Treasury in the context of the fiscal position and in line with our fiscal rules. As the Chancellor set out in the Budget, the Government have set out our robust fiscal rules alongside a set of responsible reforms to the fiscal framework to improve certainty, transparency and accountability. The stability and investment rules will put the public finances on a sustainable path while allowing the step change needed in investment to drive long-term growth.

I hope that these explanations are useful and reassure the House that the Crown Estate’s power to borrow will be carefully monitored and controlled within these parameters. I hope I have provided some clarity on the Government’s position and that as a result the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, feels able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his response and to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, although I am sorry to hear that she will not be able to support the amendment. Noble Lords will not be surprised to hear that I do not agree with her.

While I agree with the noble Baroness’s assessment of the documents that were published by the Minister—it was helpful to see the memorandum of understanding, the draft framework and the business case—that is not really the point, because they do not go far enough. Those documents can be amended by this or any future Government. As the Minister referred to, and as I tried to explain in my opening remarks, this is the original business case, but there is no business case that currently sets out what the relationship with GB Energy looks like and what it will do to borrowing.

GB Energy is going to invest billions of pounds. How much of that is going to come from GB Energy and how much from the Crown Estate? No one knows. It is important that we make sure that it is impossible for the Crown Estate to ramp up borrowing without at least some oversight from Parliament. The Minister said, “It’s okay—the maximum is 25%”, but of course this Government or any future Government can change that unilaterally.

The Minister mentioned that competitors somehow do not have any caps on borrowing. Of course they do; they are commercial businesses, so the caps on their borrowing will be set by their banks. If the Minister looks at the original business case that he shared with us, he will see that all the competitors sit around the same sort of level of loan to value.

To go back to the original point, this is a sensible, simple and reasonable amendment. It would put in place just two checks: first, whether the Crown Estate should be borrowing now, and up to 25%, with the assessment done on a new business case, including GB Energy; and, secondly, another check, at some point long in the future, if ever, should the Crown Estate ever want to go above 25%. I think our nation’s assets need that sort of protection, and I therefore wish to test the opinion of the House.

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[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I entirely agree with my noble friend Lord Forsyth. In tabling Amendment 5, the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, has hit upon something here; it is a report that would be worth doing. When I was having discussions about the Bill between Second Reading and Committee, I spoke to people in the port sector and they were very concerned that, if there is to be investment in ports in one part of the country, that investment should be equally likely to happen in another part of the country—namely, Scotland. It is an important opportunity, and I am sure that the Minister will respond in a positive fashion, as far as he can.

Turning to government Amendment 3, I am grateful to the Minister, who listened to concerns from all sides of the House about ensuring that sufficient information is forthcoming about the relationship between Crown Estate and Great British Energy. I am somewhat disappointed that we never saw the partnership document. I still suspect that that is because it does not exist, so I am not entirely sure what the partnership is; but let us put that to one side. I am looking forward to seeing information come through on the results of this partnership as we go forward.

I note what the noble Earl, Lord Russell, said about the intention behind his Amendment 8. Any noble Lord who has looked at the Crown Estate annual report will know that it is already quite detailed, and I appreciate that a lot of work has been put into sharing information about the organisation with stakeholders. I suspect that his amendment is too detailed to be wholly useful, but I am sure that he has picked out various elements that the Crown Estate will no doubt take note of and include in future reporting.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. Let me once again say that I am particularly grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, for her constructive engagement prior to today in relation to Amendment 3, tabled by the Government. It is important that certain details on the partnership between the Crown Estate and Great British Energy are publicly available on an ongoing basis, and I trust that this amendment meets the concerns raised on this matter by the noble Baroness and others across this House.

Amendment 8, tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Russell, would create a new reporting requirement on the Crown Estate commissioners, requiring them to publish an annual report, to be sent to the Environmental Audit Committee of the House of Commons, which must consider the commissioners’ activity in the contribution to supporting local communities and economies, the achievement of the United Kingdom’s climate and environmental targets, the relationship with Great British Energy, a just transition to green energy, a jobs and skills transition into the green economy, the promotion of animal welfare in aquaculture on the Crown Estate, the protection of the foreshore on the Crown Estate and the protection of the seabed in the Crown Estate. It would also require the commissioners to appear before the Environmental Audit Committee if requested.

I thank the noble Earl for his constructive engagement on this matter prior to today. I agree with him that these are important areas and, as a result, we have agreed with the Crown Estate that we will make a further update to its public framework document to clarify that its annual report must continue to include a report on the Crown Estate’s activities in terms of sustainable development, covering the impact of its activities on the environment, society and the economy.

It is important that this Bill stands the test of time and that, as new, relevant areas of concern on the environment, society and the economy emerge over the coming decades, these are covered in the Crown Estate’s annual report too. The proposed changes to the framework document, which also directly address other concerns, have been made deliberately broad in an attempt to cover the wide range of specific concerns the House has raised, including those raised by the noble Earl. On Great British Energy specifically, as I have set out, the Government have also now tabled an amendment that creates a reporting requirement for the Crown Estate to cover in their existing annual report a summary of its activities in relation to Great British Energy.

I turn next to Amendment 5, tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull. This amendment would require a report to be laid before Parliament within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, assessing any differences between the provisions made by this Act for the management of the Crown Estate in England and equivalent provisions for the management of the Crown Estate in Scotland. I am grateful to the noble Earl for his engagement on this matter. He has also raised specific concerns about ensuring that the Crown Estate and Crown Estate Scotland are in analogous positions should this Bill pass.

As I set out in Committee, Section 36 of the Scotland Act 2016 inserted a new Section 90B into the Scotland Act 1998. Subject to certain exceptions, Section 90B provided for the devolution in relation to Scotland of the commissioners’ management functions relating to property, rights or interests in land in Scotland, and rights in relation to the Scottish zone. Devolution occurred on 1 April 2017 under, and in accordance with, the Crown Estate Transfer Scheme 2017. The relevant property, rights and interests are now managed separately by Crown Estate Scotland under the Crown Estate Scotland (Interim Management) Order 2017 and the Scottish Crown Estate Act 2019, as enacted by the Scottish Parliament. They do not form part of the Crown Estate as currently managed by the Crown Estate commissioners.

I share the noble Earl’s commitment in this area, and I would like to make that clear. The Crown Estate and Crown Estate Scotland hold similar operational priorities, and, naturally, the chief executives of both organisations must be, and are, in regular contact. There is also significant collaboration between the two organisations, for example on the offshore wind evidence and change programme, which is an initiative led and funded by the Crown Estate and in which Crown Estate Scotland is a key partner. The programme aims to de-risk and accelerate the delivery of offshore wind projects by funding research and data collection. Both organisations contribute to and benefit from research projects that address knowledge gaps and support the offshore wind consenting process. At a project level, Crown Estate Scotland was a partner in the predators and prey around renewable energy developments project. That focused on Scotland, particularly the Moray Firth and the Firth of Forth and Firth of Tay regions, but the project had broad relevance for the whole of the UK. The improved understanding gained from the project informs marine spatial planning and guides future offshore wind development.

The two organisations also share data on offshore activities through their partnership with the Marine Data Exchange, a digital platform established by the Crown Estate to provide a more comprehensive and integrated understanding of the UK’s seabed. Founded by the Crown Estate in 2013 as the first resource of its type, the Marine Data Exchange provides a world-leading digital platform for gathering and disseminating vital information on a wide range of offshore activities. It currently holds one of the world’s largest collections of freely available data relating to the seas around England, Wales and Northern Ireland and, thanks to the partnership with Crown Estate Scotland, is now extended to cover Scottish waters.

The two organisations also hold frequent discussions through the carbon capture utilisation and storage collocation forum, which is a collaborative effort run by the Crown Estate with input from Crown Estate Scotland and other stakeholders to explore the potential for collocating carbon capture and storage with offshore wind projects. If there are further areas of potential co-operation, I know that the Crown Estate will be more than willing to discuss them with its counterparts in Crown Estate Scotland. The Treasury is, of course, open to any request for a meeting from the Scottish Government and Crown Estate Scotland to discuss this Bill, and we are more than happy to share any policy thinking to help inform any changes they may wish to propose in the Scottish Parliament. I hope these explanations have been helpful and have provided some clarity on these points. I hope that the noble Earls, Lord Russell and Lord Kinnoull, will not press their amendments as a result.

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[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I rise only briefly to say that we on these Benches want to see the Crown Estate taking action to improve our environment, and we share the concerns of other noble Lords in this area. We note that the Government have expressed their support for the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman. I agree with her that it is all about outcomes in these circumstances. We agree that this is a sensible amendment and that it deserves the Government’s support.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate in response to the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Young of Old Scone and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman. Before I respond to the amendments relating to the environment, I reaffirm my strong support for the intention behind them. As I set out in Committee, it is right that the public and private sectors make every contribution they can to achieving our climate change targets. The Crown Estate should continue to be a national trailblazer in this regard.

The Crown Estate’s commitment to becoming a net zero carbon business by 2030, aligning with a 1.5 degree trajectory, and its commitment to prioritising activities that help enable a reduction in a national carbon emissions, such as building net-zero homes, transitioning its holdings to sustainable agricultural practices, and working in partnership with government to meet the national renewable energy targets, speaks to how seriously it is already committed to these goals.

Budget: Taxes and Borrowing

Debate between Lord Livermore and Baroness Vere of Norbiton

Monday 4th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

I 100% agree with my noble friend. It is incredibly striking that, in everything we have heard from the party opposite, not once has it apologised for the record we inherited. One of the reasons this is a once in a generation Budget is that we have had to simultaneously repair public finances and rebuild public services. That is why it is such a historic Budget. My noble friend is absolutely right that what we have not heard from those in the party opposite is an alternative. Would they not have repaired the public finances? Would they not have prioritised working people? Would they now cut funding to the NHS and schools?

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, the Labour Government are taking money from pensioners this winter, taxing family farms on the death of a loved one, and hiking taxes on the hospice and care sectors, all while handing out inflation-busting pay rises to train drivers with no strings attached. Can the Minister confirm that this practice will stop and that there will be no more above average inflation pay rises without an agreement on productivity improvements and reform?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

I can. We said exactly that in the Budget.

Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Livermore and Baroness Vere of Norbiton

Report stage
Monday 4th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for the recent letters and documents he published in relation to the Bill. It was incredibly helpful to have them for the House to scrutinise the Bill properly. I am also grateful for these sensible amendments, which clarify the persons to whom the Bill’s measures apply as they relate to expenses. They are a bit technical, but they are improvements to the Bill and I am particularly pleased that the Minister has listened to concerns from across the House, including from my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Moylan.

I listened with great interest to the points raised by my noble friend Lady Noakes, and I urge the Minister to note what she said. I hope that some of these issues might be resolved in some way, either through the code of practice or by other means, as she seemed to me to make an awful lot of sense. However, on this basis, we support the Government’s amendments.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions today and, as I said previously, in Committee. As I said at the start of this debate, the purpose of the Government’s amendments is to clarify whose expenses may be covered under the mechanism in the Bill. I hope that noble Lords will be able to accept the amendments, and I am grateful to both noble Baronesses for saying that they will.

I will respond to the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. As she said, I wrote previously to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, on this matter. I will briefly repeat some of the points I made to him. In relation to litigation being brought against the authorities themselves, the Bill allows the Bank of England to request that funds from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme cover expenses that have been incurred by it or by the Treasury, a bridge bank or an asset management vehicle in connection with the recapitalisation or the use of the stabilisation power. This may include litigation costs arising from the recapitalisation or use of the stabilisation power, such as from challenges to decisions made by the authorities.

Any decision to request Financial Services Compensation Scheme funds for these purposes would be a decision for the Bank of England to take, but I stress that, in making this decision, the Bank of England would consider all relevant factors, including the fact that the alternative may be to use public funds. I note what the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said on that point. A decision to use insolvency depends on whether the conditions for resolution action are not met. If the conditions for action are met, public funds would be the alternative for covering these costs instead of FSCS funds.

I hope that the points I have made demonstrate that the Government have engaged in good faith with the concerns raised by noble Lords and have sought to address them where it has proved possible to do so. These amendments put beyond doubt which parties’ expenses may be covered by the new mechanism, and I hope that noble Lords will support them.

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[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords, and to my noble friend Lord Eatwell for the points that he made. The scope of firms in relation to which the mechanism can be applied has been a key issue in all our deliberations to date. I am very grateful to noble Lords for their engagement on this topic since Grand Committee.

As I stated then, the Government’s policy intention is for the mechanism provided by the Bill to be used primarily to support the resolution of smaller banks. We have reaffirmed that intention by including it in the updates to the special resolution regime code of practice, drafts of which have now been published and shared with noble Lords. The Bank of England must have regard to the code of practice when exercising its resolution powers, and this is set out in statute.

The Treasury is involved in the exercise of any resolution powers, either by being required to provide a response to consultation or by consent. Nevertheless, the Government maintain that it is right for the Bill to contain some flexibility for the Bank of England to be able to use the mechanism more broadly in some circumstances. That is because firm failures can be unpredictable and there could be circumstances in which it would be appropriate to use the mechanism on other firms. To repeat the example I gave in Grand Committee, this may be especially relevant in situations where a small bank has grown but is still in the process of reaching its end-state MREL requirements. Firms in this position would have at least some MREL resources to support recapitalisation, but the new mechanism could be used to meet any remaining shortfall if judged necessary. Without the proposed mechanism, there will be a potential gap in this scenario, creating risks to public funds and financial stability.

There is, of course, a counterargument here that the scope could instead be constrained, such that firms on the glide path to their full MREL requirement remain in scope of the mechanism but firms that have met their end-state MREL are excluded. The Government note that this is the desired intent of the noble Baroness’s amendment and it is an argument that we have considered carefully.

Ultimately, noting what has been set out in the code of practice and the strong expectation that the mechanism will be used on small banks, the Government’s view is that it is still right for the tool to have additional flexibility for unpredictable circumstances. To narrow the scope would constrain the Bank of England’s optionality, particularly where it might be necessary to supplement the resources bailed in with additional capital resources.

I note that these are considered unlikely outcomes, rather than a central case. However, given the uncertainty and unpredictability of a crisis scenario, the Government consider it important to avoid constraining that optionality.

None of the Bank of England’s other stabilisation powers are constrained for use on a specific type of in-scope firm and that the choice of stabilisation option used remains a decision for the Bank of England to take, having considered the resolution conditions and objectives. The Government believe that it is right for a similar approach to be taken in relation to the new mechanism. To be clear, the Government’s clear view remains that this mechanism should be intended for smaller banks and that the Bank of England should not assume the use of this mechanism for larger firms. In that regard, I agree with the noble Baroness on the crux of the issue she is raising. The Government simply do not wish to hard-wire that principle into the Bill.

Since we last debated this issue in Grand Committee, the Bank of England has published a consultation on proposed changes to the MREL regime. These proposals include the removal of the additional MREL requirement associated with the transactional accounts threshold for being set to the transfer strategy, given the availability of FSCS funds under the mechanism in the Bill as an alternative. There are currently only a limited number of firms with a transfer strategy, and firms with such a strategy would typically be expected to have a relatively small balance sheet. As such, the proposed change to the MREL regime is modest, consistent with the policy intention for the Bill mechanism to be intended primarily for smaller banks and it has the additional benefit of seeking to ensure that the MREL regime is proportionate for growing firms.

I reiterate the message delivered in the Written Ministerial Statement I made on the day the Bank of England’s consultation was published. As I have already said, the Government and the Bank of England agree that the Bank should not assume use of the new mechanism when setting a preferred resolution strategy of bail-in and corresponding MREL requirements for larger banks.

Recognising the level of interest rightly expressed in Peers being able to scrutinise the changes to the code of practice before the Bill begins its passage in the other place, the Government published updates of that document on 15 October. Notably, on the issue of scope, these updates to the code of practice explicitly state that the Bank of England will not assume use of the new mechanism when setting a preferred resolution strategy of bail-in and the corresponding MREL requirements for a large bank. Those updates to the code also made it clear that the Bank of England is still expected to abide by the so-called 5% and 8% rules in the case of larger banks.

I hope the explanations I have given have been helpful. Throughout the commitments I have given today and in Committee, in publishing draft updates to the code of practice, in the Written Ministerial Statement and in the engagement I have had with noble Lords, I have sought to reassure noble Lords on the question of scope, the primary intention for the mechanism in the Bill and the importance of maintaining flexibility for the Bank of England to act in the public interest. I recognise that I may not have been successful and that strong views remain, but I hope that the noble Baroness may feel able to withdraw her amendment as a result.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate, particularly those who have spoken in favour of my amendment. This has been the subject of numerous discussions with the Minister. I listened carefully to what he had to say, and I still cannot quite understand why the Government will not accept this amendment and are unfortunately still using terms such as “It is the strong expectation that it would be used for X, Y, Z-type of bank”, or “It’s primarily for smaller banks”. That does not give me comfort, as we may be storing up significant challenges for the future. Therefore, I am not encouraged by the Minister’s response, and I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, for bringing his amendment and for explaining it so well. We on these Benches are concerned that a statutory requirement to make assessment of potential clawbacks of executive pay may simply hinder the efficient use of the recapitalisation mechanism, which of course usually has to be done in a very timely fashion. Having considered his amendment, we feel that it would not be an improvement to the Bill and will not be supporting it.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Sikka replicates the one he tabled in Committee. I hope that my noble friend will therefore forgive me for repeating some of the points that I made when we discussed this amendment then.

Amendment 3 seeks to ensure that the Bank of England and the Financial Services Compensation Scheme consider whether there should be a clawback of executive pay and bonuses from a failed firm before using the new mechanism. Although the bank resolution regime does not set out powers allowing the Bank of England to claw back money from management, it does provide it with an extensive and proportionate set of powers to impose consequences on the management of a failed firm in resolution.

First, we expect that any existing shareholder equity would be cancelled or transferred when a firm is placed into resolution. This ensures that the firm’s owners bear losses, which is an important principle of the resolution regime. In many circumstances, this will affect directors and management who hold shares or other instruments of the failed firm.

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[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I am enormously grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken today. I too add my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for tabling his amendment. This group epitomises what is so good about your Lordships’ House: a lot of movement has happened to date on these issues from the Minister, and we are grateful for his engagement and for the fact that we have been able to get a little further down the road. However, like terriers with very sharp teeth, noble Lords are not quite willing to let it go just yet, and I too support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and of course those of my noble friend Lady Noakes, who has also done a fantastic job in ensuring that the issues she raised, and which most noble Lords agreed with in Committee, come to the fore. Helpfully, the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has tabled Amendment 9, which plugs a big gap, and I hope the Minister will accept that and the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, this large group includes a number of the Government’s proposed amendments to the Bill. I begin by responding to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which is intended to ensure that there is transparency about the Bank’s use of the new mechanism. It does this by creating a requirement for the Bank to report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer within 28 days on certain matters where a recapitalisation payment is made, and for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to lay these reports in Parliament.

I assure noble Lords that the Government recognise absolutely the importance of transparency and accountability regarding the new mechanism and appreciate the strength of feeling in the House. The debates at Second Reading and in Committee were helpful and constructive and have informed the Government’s approach. The Government therefore agree that there should be an explicit requirement for the Bank of England to report to the Chancellor when it uses the new mechanism. To that end, government Amendment 8 means that the Bank of England must report to the Chancellor about the use of the mechanism in any circumstances where it is used.

The Government’s amendment outlines two elements to reporting. First, it would require the Bank of England to produce a final report at a time to be specified by the Treasury. This is intended to be a comprehensive account of the use of the new mechanism and to include an assessment of the relative costs to insolvency. Secondly, the amendment would require the Bank to provide an interim report within three months of using the mechanism in the event that a final report has not been provided within that time. This would ensure a prompt initial public justification for the use of the new mechanism, even if further details would follow later.

Government Amendment 14 would require the code of practice to include guidance on what should be included in the reports. Taking these points together, the Government’s approach has a broadly similar intent to that of the noble Lord’s amendment. However, there are some points of detail where the Government have taken a different approach in order to avoid unintended consequences. In particular, while recognising the importance of clear reporting arrangements, the Government believe that it is critical that the timing and content of any reports do not complicate a successful resolution.

I would highlight two challenges with the approach set out in Amendment 5 from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. First, the Government believe that requiring an initial report as soon as 28 days after using the mechanism is likely to be too soon. As noble Lords know, the complexity of firm failures mean that they may not always be fully resolved within a short period of time. This is particularly the case when using the bridge bank tool, which is anticipated to be an interim step before an eventual sale. It is possible that a resolution process remains ongoing 28 days following a firm failure. It is therefore important that sufficient time is allowed so that the Bank can focus on its primary function of maintaining financial stability through managing the failure of the firm, before turning to the process of reporting. The Government therefore believe that providing an interim report within three months is a more proportionate approach to take, allowing the Bank more time to ensure that an interim report is as meaningful as possible while still ensuring that the Chancellor and Parliament are updated on use of the mechanism in short order.

This takes me to my second point, which is that disclosing certain information too early in the resolution process, especially information relating to the relative costs of different options such as insolvency, risks complicating a resolution because such information is either incomplete or highly sensitive. Regarding the noble Lord’s proposal to require an initial report to disclose certain costs, it is worth noting that when conducting the resolution conditions assessment, the Bank of England would make an assessment of the costs that the Financial Services Compensation Scheme may incur if the firm was placed into insolvency. However, by virtue of necessity, this would be only an initial assessment based on the information available at the time. It is therefore important that the Bank of England’s assessment of relative costs is reported on only once the resolution is fully complete. This will ensure that the Treasury, Parliament and industry are provided with a comprehensive and accurate account.

In addition, if the firm was in a bridge bank, as it may well be after just 28 days, the early disclosure of this interim financial information could complicate negotiations regarding a sale, especially if it was subsequently revised. It may also be market sensitive and increase speculation about the failed firm during a period of heightened sensitivity. Ultimately, therefore, the Government see risks in requiring the Bank to report too early and in too much detail during a highly unpredictable and sensitive situation. This is in part why the existing reporting provisions within the Banking Act in relation to resolution require reports as soon as reasonably practicable only after a year has passed.

The Government have sought to reconcile these different issues in our proposed amendment, while recognising the important substantive point of principle raised by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. First, the Government have proposed an interim report to be provided within three months. While it is possible that a resolution process may not have concluded by this point, as the FSCS is likely to levy firms within this timeframe, it seems reasonable to expect the Bank to provide a public justification of the decision to use the new mechanism by this point. I note that, alongside the notification requirement covered in government Amendment 10, which I will turn to shortly, this will ensure that the Treasury and Parliament have a prompt explanation of why resolution has been undertaken.

Secondly, the Government’s amendment means that the Bank of England must provide a separate final report, in the event that this has not already been provided within three months of using the mechanism. This final report is where the Bank would outline its assessment of the relative costs of different options. This reflects the points that I have already made, namely that the Government believe that the key reporting obligation should fall once the resolution process has concluded. This reduces the risk that disclosure frustrates that process and ensures that any report can be meaningful.

To support this approach, the Government have also tabled an amendment requiring guidance on the content of such reports to be included in the code of practice. This will ensure that there is clear public understanding of the key issues that any interim or final report is expected to cover. As I have noted, both interim and final reports would be expected to provide a justification for the use of the mechanism, and as set out in the current draft of the code of practice, the final report would need to set out an assessment of the costs if the firm had entered insolvency. The current draft updates to the code of practice also make clear that the Government expect to require the Bank of England to provide an explanation of why ancillary costs were considered reasonable and prudent.

I am grateful for the helpful engagement that I have had with the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, who has rightly emphasised the importance of the Bank of England providing a comparison of the expected and actual costs in its final reports. I am happy to reassure the noble Lord that the Government intend to request that the Bank of England include this in final reports and will ensure that the final updates to the code of practice reflect this.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has also tabled Amendment 9 to require the Bank to produce a report three months after the resolved firm has been sold or otherwise closed. I understand that the intent of this similarly reflects a desire to ensure that the Bank of England is compelled to report after a resolution process has fully concluded and provide an assessment of how the expected impacts of its actions compared to the actual events that took place in resolution. The Government of course appreciate the importance of the Bank of England reporting promptly. Reflecting on the noble Lord’s proposal, the Government intend to further update the code of practice to make clear that, where feasible and appropriate, the Treasury would expect the Bank of England to report soon after the sale or closure of the resolved firm.

The Government believe that it would be preferable not to put this expectation into legislation. This reflects the point I have already made: that the Bank of England should be required to provide final reports with the more detailed assessments only at the appropriate moment. While the Government do expect, as I have said, the Bank of England to be in the position to report soon after the end of the resolution process, this cannot always be guaranteed. For example, in the case of selling a firm, it may not have been possible in all cases to complete the full post-resolution independent valuation process within three months of a sale. I believe the Government’s approach still captures the intent of the noble Lord’s amendment, which is to ensure that full reports following the conclusion of a resolution process are presented expediently, with some discretion for the Treasury to ensure that reports are still provided only at the right moment.

I hope that, taken together, the Government’s amendments address the noble Lord’s concerns on both the timing and the content of reports, while retaining the flexibility necessary to avoid unintended consequences. On the specific additional point raised by the noble Lord’s Amendment 9, I agree of course with his intention and I will be happy to update the code of practice to this effect. However, the Government believe it would be preferable not to put this into legislation. I would be happy to consider this matter further and discuss it with my honourable friend the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, but I cannot give any firm additional commitments at this stage.

Turning to government Amendment 10, on notifying Parliament when using the power, I note that both the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the Government tabled similar amendments on the theme of parliamentary scrutiny. I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness for raising this issue and for her engagement on the matter; I am especially grateful to her for agreeing to withdraw her original amendment. The Government’s amendment reflects the point made by noble Lords in Grand Committee concerning parliamentary notification and the creation of the Financial Services Regulation Committee in your Lordships’ House as a result of passing the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023.

Building on that innovation in parliamentary scrutiny and accountability, the Government’s amendment seeks to harness the role played by that committee, as well as the Treasury Select Committee. It requires the Bank of England to notify the chairs of both committees as soon as reasonably practicable after the new mechanism under the Bill has been used. It includes provisions to future-proof this requirement following use of the new mechanism, such that if the names or functions of those committees change, the requirement for the Bank of England to notify the relevant committees by which those functions are exercisable would still stand.

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has rightly argued that the Government’s amendment requires some tweaking, in particular to refer to the Financial Services Regulation Committee in the House of Lords by name. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for bringing this to my attention, and I note her amendments to the Government’s amendment—Amendments 11, 12 and 13—which attempt to address this point. I am of course very happy to agree to those amendments being made.

I hope that the Government’s approach across all the issues debated in this group demonstrates that the issue of accountability to Parliament is being taken seriously, ensuring that there will be transparency in use of the new mechanism. In particular, I hope that the Government’s amendments on the new reporting requirements address the noble Lord’s concerns on both the timing and content of the reports, while retaining the flexibility necessary to avoid unintended consequences. On the basis of these points, I hope noble Lords will be able to support both the Government’s amendments and those tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and I respectfully ask the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I rise briefly to speak to Amendment 7 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, and Amendment 16 in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes.

On Amendment 7, I will not reiterate the points raised. I deeply appreciated the explanation by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, as to how she got to her supportive position. From our perspective, we feel that Amendments 7 is a reasonable objective that would ensure the Bank facilitates the international competitiveness of the UK economy and economic growth in the medium term—that is very clear. It also has the ability to look at the level of risk within the banking sector over the medium term. Given the Government’s stated objective of focusing on economic growth, I am very interested to hear the Minister’s view on these amendments.

Amendment 16 in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes, which I have signed, seeks to minimise the net costs recouped from the banking sector via this mechanism. Again, it is a very sensibly drafted amendment that would improve the Bill, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by noting that the Government fully understand the concerns raised by noble Lords regarding the objectives the Bank of England should adhere to when taking resolution action.

Amendments 6 and 7 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, seek to ensure that the Bank of England considers growth and competitiveness when using the new mechanism, by introducing a new objective that the Bank of England would need to consider. In the case of Amendment 6 this would be alongside the existing special resolution objectives, while in the case of Amendment 7 it would be a secondary objective. This objective would be to facilitate the competitiveness and growth of the UK economy, subject to aligning with relevant international standards.

I appreciate wholly the intent of the noble Baroness’s amendments. The Government have reflected carefully on this issue in the weeks running up to Report. Growth and competitiveness are, of course, fundamental priorities for this Government. The Government are resisting these amendments because, while we understand and appreciate their intent, they would pose challenges within the specific context of this Bill. I intend to make three main points—about the wider context of the Bill; the particular challenges a new objective may pose in the case of the new mechanism; and the steps the Government are taking to ensure that costs to industry are properly considered.

First, I note that the aim of the Bill is to enhance the resolution regime, but in a way that avoids making more fundamental changes to the regime or to the way in which the Bank of England exercises its resolution powers. This reflects a key conclusion from the Government’s consultation, which is that the regime already broadly works well. This was demonstrated by the successful resolution of Silicon Valley Bank UK.

As noble Lords are aware, the resolution regime has been developed over a number of years to align with international best practice. The relevant authorities have invested considerable time and energy in contingency planning to use the existing powers within their existing framework of objectives. As it stands, the regime therefore reflects a carefully calibrated judgment about the key priorities that should be considered in what is an emergency, firm-specific failure scenario.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I wholeheartedly support the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, in his work in this area. Over the course of our scrutiny of the Bill, we have had some happy and quite nerdy discussions around this amendment. It is clear to me that it is a complicated situation. There is clearly an issue to be solved, but unfortunately the issue may not be exactly the same for each case of resolution that one might be addressing, so it needs further thought.

I am pleased that we will not be voting on this, but I impress upon the Minister that if there is something we can do in this area, whether that be in the code of practice or by other mechanisms, it is important. It is unconscionable to me that, because a particular entity goes down the route of resolution rather than insolvency, certain creditors could be significantly better off. That cannot happen and we must do something about it.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, seeks to give the Financial Services Compensation Scheme rights with respect to the recapitalisation payment, in the event that the firm in resolution is subsequently placed into insolvency or wound up, by then requiring it to be treated as a debt. It also seeks to grant the Financial Services Compensation Scheme super-preferred status in the creditor hierarchy with respect to that debt, enabling it to recover that claim in an insolvency process before other unsecured creditors, uncovered depositors and shareholders.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for the constructive engagement that I have had with him on this matter prior to this debate, and I am especially grateful for his time and expertise on it. I assure him that my officials and I have spent considerable time considering the concerns that he raises, and I shall set out the Government’s position.

The Government’s concern about the amendment is that it could frustrate the primary intention of the Bill to achieve recapitalisation in a way that restores financial stability and, as such, could potentially result in the resolution failing. The Government’s view is that the amendment could create uncertainty as to how such a payment would be perceived by the market when a firm was operating, rather than only in the unlikely circumstance of the firm winding up.

The effect of the amendment would be to create a shadow claim on the recapitalisation. Potential purchasers, investors and unsecured lenders to the firm would be aware that in the event of insolvency a new debt would materialise above them in the creditor hierarchy. Indeed, the shadow claim would follow the firm in perpetuity for as long as it was a going concern, even after the resolution was complete and the firm had been sold to a buyer.

It would also follow the firm even where the original shareholders and creditors were no longer involved with the business, creating a series of risks. That raises a number of potential issues. First, it could inhibit the sale of the firm in resolution. While the insolvency position would not be a primary consideration for potential buyers, it would naturally be part of the potential purchaser’s due diligence to understand the risk to its investment in a subsequent failure. That risk may be substantially greater with the existence of this debt, which may in turn impact potential interest in purchasing the firm and any purchase price.

Secondly, both while the firm was in the bridge bank and once it had been sold, current and potential future creditors and investors in the firm could be deterred from investing in and engaging with the firm for similar reasons. That would frustrate a key goal of the resolution, which is to maintain continuity. For example, uncovered depositors would have an additional incentive to withdraw deposits as they may perceive a potential risk to the seniority of their claim in insolvency. Thirdly, it could potentially undermine restoring market confidence in the resolved firm.

As a result of the issues that I have outlined, the amendment could make it more expensive to run the firm, putting it at a competitive disadvantage. It may perpetuate the circumstances that the resolution is intended to address; namely, uncertainty around how and to whom potential future losses would fall. It may also make it difficult to secure the agreement of directors, who may not be comfortable running a firm under such a shadow while it was in a bridge bank.

In addition, existing legislation means that instruments may currently be classified only as common equity tier 1, the highest form of capital, if they are not subject to any arrangement, contractual or otherwise, that enhances the seniority of claims in insolvency or liquidation. The noble Lord’s amendment would mean that a capital injection arising from a recapitalisation payment under the Bill may not count as the highest form of capital, as it creates a seniorised claim for the Financial Services Compensation Scheme in the event of a subsequent insolvency. That brings into doubt whether it would have the desired effect of restoring market confidence in the firm.

Overall, the effect of granting the Financial Services Compensation Scheme a super-preferred claim over the recapitalisation payment, even if only at the point of insolvency, would be to increase the risk of the resolution not achieving its objectives. Therefore, while the Government absolutely understand the noble Lord’s concerns, we have concluded, for the reasons I have outlined, that the amendment may end up doing more harm than good.

I appreciate that this is a matter that the noble Lord feels extremely strongly about, but I hope this explanation has provided some clarity over the risks attached to the amendment and that as a result he feels able to withdraw it.

Employment: Tax Policy

Debate between Lord Livermore and Baroness Vere of Norbiton

Thursday 31st October 2024 Grand Committee

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Razzall. I agreed with some of what he had to say, which is a bonus for me today, so I am enormously grateful for his contribution. I am also grateful to my friend Lord Leigh for tabling this debate. Who knew that it was going to be so well timed? Like many others, I too will fall into the trap of focusing on the Budget because it is top of mind at the moment, and not in a good way.

I have to say, from listening to my noble friend Lord Leigh’s opening remarks, that he brings extraordinary expertise of commerce and the private sector, as of course do many other speakers in this short debate today, notably my noble friend Lord Petitgas and of course the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria. Unfortunately, that is more than can be said of the current Chancellor and indeed the wider Cabinet—I think some analysis has been done, and private sector experience is somewhat lacking—so I hope that the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, that some of the Labour Peers are promoted to positions of greatness such that they can share their private sector expertise, is taken up. It is definitely the case that there is private sector expertise on the Labour Benches; it just does not seem to have got up to the top levels.

Yesterday the new Labour Government raised the tax burden to the highest level in our country’s history. Despite making an outright promise not to raise taxes on people, they raised taxes on working people. In hiking the employers’ national insurance contributions—NICs for short—to raise a headline figure of £25 billion, the Government have committed a straightforward breach, according to the IFS, of their manifesto. Furthermore, there are numerous examples of the now Prime Minister and Chancellor promising before the election not to hike taxes. Can the Minister give the Committee any insight into how the discussions went when drafting the section of the manifesto about no increase in taxes on working people? Was it a cunning sleight of hand that left the words “national insurance contributions” unencumbered by the “employees’” qualifier, or was it just incompetence?

The noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, made an excellent contribution. I appreciate his comments about the last Government. As a Conservative, I can say that no one wants to see taxes go up—it is just not in our DNA.

I remember many debates when I was a Treasury Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, in opposition, would slam me for tax rises. I was going to come up with various quotes today about the number of times he has previously slammed me for tax rises, but I thought that would be really cruel.

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Livermore) (Lab)]

Could the noble Baroness not be bothered to do so?

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

No; my speech is already six minutes long, but I will do it next time.

Of course, at that time, we were dealing with the pandemic and its fallout, and the fallout from the energy price support we had given. Therefore, we had a very firm footing on which to raise taxes.

The Minister will try to bring out his fictitious black hole; I sincerely hope that he will not, given what the OBR has now said about it—I am starting to feel a bit embarrassed for him. Plainly and simply, promises have been broken, and we need to now think about what we can do to ensure growth in the private sector. The views of the private sector on this are now well known. Can the Minister share with me whether anyone in the private sector thinks the rise in employer NI is a good idea?

I want also to look at what the OBR has to say in its economic and fiscal outlook. My noble friend Lord Elliott is right. It is like beer, which is going down by 1p in a pint—that is huge, is it not?—and wine: the more you tax it, the less you get. The noble Lord, Lord Razzall, was very helpful in this regard. If you tax the film and creative industries less, they grow more. Unfortunately, we have seen taxes go up, so—surprise, surprise—the labour supply is forecast to come down by 0.2%. I do not know whether the Minister is happy with this, but I wonder what the Government will do to mitigate for those people who would otherwise have been in a good job.

But it is worse than that. Real earnings will then stall in 2026 and 2027, as firms rebuild their margins and pass on the costs of higher employer NICs. Real wages are not expected to resume growing in line with productivity until beyond the forecast horizon. What interventions will the Minister set out in terms of increasing productivity such that we can get some sort of real wage growth going?

It is not just the OBR that has an issue here; it is also HMRC, which reflects that 940,000 employers will lose an average of £800 per employee. This is not good news for employment, and it is not good news for growth. Labour’s No. 1 mission is to secure the highest sustained growth in the G7. I am an optimist, but this Budget literally has the forecasts for growth coming down. I cannot see how that is compatible with Labour’s No. 1 mission.

The noble Lord, Lord Razzall, asked for alternatives. I will give him two that are still on the table. First, if we increased productivity to pre-pandemic levels, we would get £20 billion a year. Secondly, reforms to adult welfare would save £34 billion a year. That was our plan; we did have a plan but, unfortunately, we were not able to put it in place.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, on securing this debate and on his opening speech. I thank all noble Lords for their contributions.

The manifesto this Government were elected on promised to invest in our public services and prioritise working people. Keeping those promises was at the core of yesterday’s Budget. Many noble Lords focused today on specific tax decisions made in the Budget, and the impact and analysis of those decisions as set out by the independent Office for Budget Responsibility. It may be helpful to noble Lords if I begin by explaining the background to the decisions we made.

First, in July, as the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, kindly mentioned, the Chancellor exposed a £22 billion black hole at the heart of the previous Government’s plans—a series of promises they made but had no money to deliver. This Government yesterday published a line-by-line breakdown of that £22 billion black hole, and the OBR published its own review of the circumstances surrounding the Spring Budget forecast.

For the benefit of the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, the OBR’s report says that the previous Government “did not provide” them “with all the information” that was available and that, had the OBR known about these

“undisclosed … pressures that have since come to light”,

its spring forecast would have been “materially different”.

Secondly, the country inherited not just broken public finances but broken public services too, with NHS waiting lists at record levels, schools literally crumbling, and rivers filled with waste. Yet, since 2021, there had been no spending review—no detailed plans for departmental spending set out beyond this year.

Thirdly, the previous Government had failed to budget for costs which they knew would materialise, including funding for compensation schemes for the infected blood scandal and the Post Office Horizon scandal.

Put together, these three things—the black hole in our public finances, the compensation payments which they did not fund and their failure to assess the scale of the challenges facing our public services—meant that, in order to meet our first fiscal rule, yesterday’s Budget needed to raise taxes by £40 billion.

So, we had in yesterday’s Budget some very difficult decisions to take in order to rebuild our public finances and our public services. In doing so, we made an important choice: to keep every single commitment we made on tax in our manifesto. We did not raise taxes on working people—their income tax, their national insurance or VAT—and we were able to go further, by not increasing fuel duty and by not extending the last Government’s freeze of income tax thresholds, which hit working people so hard, as the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, mentioned.

Of course, in the circumstances I describe, any responsible Chancellor would need to take difficult decisions to raise the revenue required to fund our public services and to repair our public finances. So, in yesterday’s Budget, the Chancellor announced an increase in employers’ national insurance contributions by 1.2 percentage points to 15% from April, and that the secondary threshold would be reduced from £9,100 per year to £5,000.

We know that it is particularly important to protect our smallest companies, so we also increased the employment allowance from £5,000 to £10,500, meaning that 865,000 employers will not pay any national insurance at all next year, and over 1 million will pay the same or less than they did previously. In the Budget, we also increased the lower rate of capital gains tax from 10% to 18%, and the higher rate from 20% to 24%, which means that the UK will continue to have the lowest capital gains tax rate of any European G7 country.

Alongside these changes to the headline rates of capital gains tax, we are also maintaining the lifetime limit for business asset disposal relief at £1 million, to encourage entrepreneurs to invest in their businesses. Business asset disposal relief will remain at 10% this year before rising to 14% in April and 18% from 2026-27, maintaining a significant gap compared with the higher rate of capital gains tax.

We also published a Corporate Tax Roadmap, which confirms our commitment to cap the rate of corporation tax at 25%—the lowest in the G7—for the duration of this Parliament, while maintaining full expensing and the £1 million annual investment allowance and keeping the current rates for research and development reliefs to drive innovation.

The Budget also set out additional tax measures, including reforming inheritance tax and measures on tobacco duty, vehicle excise duty, air passenger duty and alcohol duty.

We also delivered on our other commitments, which some noble Lords addressed during this debate: to abolish the non-dom tax regime and replace it with a new residence-based scheme; a new approach to the way carried interest is taxed; reforms to the stamp duty land surcharge tax for second homes, and to the energy profits levy; and we introduced VAT on private school fees. In total, these changes—alongside our measures to tackle tax avoidance—will raise over £9 billion to support our public services and restore our public finances.

We are asking businesses to contribute more, and the Chancellor acknowledged in her speech that the impacts of this measure will be felt beyond businesses, too, as the OBR has set out and as noble Lords raised in today’s debate. In addition, as my noble friend Lord Davies of Brixton observed, the employment rate will increase by 1.2 million over the forecast. These are, however, very difficult choices, and not ones that the Chancellor took lightly. But, in the circumstances we inherited, we believe they are the right choices to make.

Several noble Lords mentioned growth, and it was of course welcome that the OBR was so clear: this Budget will permanently increase the supply capacity of the economy, boosting long-term growth. However, there is of course much more to do.

It is important that we also consider in this debate the purpose of the difficult decisions we have taken on tax, which enable us not just to repair the public finances but to begin to rebuild our public services. It is worth noting that, in this debate, some noble Lords spoke in favour of some of this investment, but without supporting the taxation necessary to fund it. Because of the difficult decisions the Chancellor has taken on tax, day-to-day spending from 2024-25 onwards will grow by 1.5% in real terms, while total departmental spending, including capital spending, will grow by 1.7% in real terms.

In this, the first phase of the spending review, the Chancellor has prioritised day-to-day funding to deliver on our manifesto commitments. We will increase the core schools budget by £2.3 billion next year to support our pledge to hire thousands more teachers into key subjects; to triple investment in breakfast clubs to put them into thousands of schools; and to provide an additional £300 million to our further education colleges, while taking steps to transform the apprenticeship levy into a more flexible growth and skills levy.

We will deliver a real-terms funding increase for local government next year, including £1.3 billion of additional grant funding to deliver essential services and £200 million to tackle homelessness and rough sleeping. We are also providing funding to support public services and drive growth across Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, with the largest real-terms funding settlement since devolution delivering an additional £3.4 billion to the Scottish Government, £1.7 billion to the Welsh Government and £1.5 billion to the Northern Ireland Executive in 2025-26.

Finally, we are fixing the NHS after years of neglect. Because of the difficult decisions the Chancellor has taken on tax, which we are debating today, and because of our commitment to a new investment rule, yesterday’s Budget announced that we are now able to provide a £22.6 billion increase in the NHS budget over two years. That is the largest real-terms growth in NHS spending outside of Covid years since 2010. Many NHS buildings were left by the previous Government in a state of disrepair, so we will provide £1 billion of health capital investment next year to address the backlog of repairs and upgrades across the NHS estate. To increase capacity for tens of thousands more procedures next year, we are providing a further £1.5 billion for new beds in hospitals across the country and more than 1 million additional diagnostic tests, as well as new surgical hubs and diagnostic centres, so that the people waiting for treatment can get it as quickly as possible. Because of this record injection of funding, the thousands of additional beds that we will secure and the reforms that we are delivering in our NHS, we can now begin to bring waiting lists down more quickly and move towards our target of an 18-week waiting time by delivering our manifesto commitment for 40,000 extra elective appointments a week.

The difficult decisions on tax that we made in yesterday’s Budget, which have been debated here today, were made for a purpose. We made choices to rebuild the public finances and our public services, to invest in the national interest and to keep our manifesto commitment to prioritising working people. It is perfectly possible to make different choices, of course, but noble Lords should keep in mind that, at the last election, the country voted for change. They did not reject the previous Government so overwhelmingly because they thought the choices they had made were the right ones; they gave this Government a mandate to fix the foundations of our economy and to deliver the change they voted for.

As the noble Lord, Lord Razzall, observed, we did not hear very much about any credible alternative during this debate. We believe that any responsible Chancellor would have had to take action in the circumstances we faced, but, of course, it was possible to choose not to act. Some noble Lords may think that it would have been better to choose the path of irresponsibility and ignore the problems in the public finances altogether. If that is their choice, they should say so. I believe that the choices the Chancellor set out at the Budget are the right choices for our country, to repair our public finances, to protect working people, to fix our NHS and to rebuild Britain.

Other choices could have been made, of course, but let me be clear: not making the choices that we have made would make it impossible to protect working people; not funding public services in the way that we have would mean cuts to schools and hospitals; not supporting our investment rule would mean delaying or cancelling thousands of projects that drive growth across our country. We have made our choices—the only responsible choices—to protect working people, to fix the foundations of our economy and to invest in Britain’s future.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

Before the Minister sits down, if I may say so—he has a minute left—I am concerned that he is answering the wrong exam question, as he did not seem to mention employment. However, he did mention the NHS and the £22 billion for it. How much of that sum is the RDEL compensation for the public sector, which will not have to pay employers NI?

Also, I would like the Minister to write, if possible, to cover the question from my noble friend Lord Petitgas about any sector-by-sector analysis of the impact of this tax policy on employment.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

I am very happy to write. I did mention employment: I set out that there would be an increase of 1.2 million over the course of the forecast. That is the question I was asked.

Fiscal Rules

Debate between Lord Livermore and Baroness Vere of Norbiton

Tuesday 29th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

Does the Minister agree that the Labour Party manifesto was, in essence, just smoke and mirrors? There are smoke and mirrors surrounding not only the fiscal rule—I am still trying to understand his sentence about changing your own fiscal rules, but I will leave that there—but what a “working person” is. When one writes a manifesto, one does not do it such that one can get things round the British people; one should do it with clarity. I suspect that there is a certain lack of clarity in the Labour Party manifesto.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

I fully sympathise with the noble Baroness that she struggles to understand the concept of keeping manifesto commitments. She will see in the Budget tomorrow that we will keep every manifesto commitment we made to the British people.

Crown Estate Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Livermore and Baroness Vere of Norbiton

Committee stage
Tuesday 22nd October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak briefly on this group. I note that the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, is not in this place and so was unable to speak to his amendment. I understand why the noble Earl, Lord Russell, has tabled his amendment, and I am grateful to him for his exposition of the background to it. On these Benches, we recognise the unusual role that the Crown Estate has in the stewardship of the assets held in the right of the Crown. We recognise, too, that the revenues from the assets do not belong to the sovereign, nor is any part of them payable directly to the monarch.

The issue here is one of communication. It must be—it is absolutely essential—that there be no perception of any direct financial link between the sovereign and any amounts received under the sovereign grant and the amount of revenue generated by the Crown Estate. Upon the announcement of the partnership with GB Energy, there was a perception from some of the more excitable end of the media that the sovereign was somehow party to, and specifically approving of, the arrangement. I encourage the Minister and commissioners of the Crown Estate to ensure that information in the public domain about the operation of the Crown Estate, but also any further partnerships that may come down the track, cannot possibly suggest any direct involvement from the sovereign and, therefore, that there should be no undue benefit accrued.

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Livermore) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for his amendment and I will seek to address some of the points that he has raised. This amendment would require the Government, within one year of the passing of this Act and annually thereafter, to lay before Parliament a report into the effect of this Act on the size of the sovereign grant. The Government agree that it is important that there is transparency in how the sovereign grant is affected by changes in Crown Estate profits. Indeed, the Sovereign Grant Act 2011 includes a number of requirements that provide for regular effective review and reporting to Parliament.

As the noble Earl observed, under the Act, the grant for each financial year is set by reference to the profits of the Crown Estate. In broad terms, under Section 6 of the Sovereign Grant Act it is currently the higher of 12% of the Crown Estate profits two years previously or the previous year’s grant. For example, the level of the grant for 2025-26 will be set at 12% of the profits the Crown Estate reported in its annual accounts for 2022-23, published in July.

Section 7 of the Sovereign Grant Act provides for regular reviews of the percentage used in calculation of the grant to ensure the grant remains at an appropriate level. These reviews are conducted by the three royal trustees—the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Keeper of the Privy Purse. The trustees must lay a copy of the report of their review before Parliament. The last review concluded in July last year and concluded that the reference rate should be reduced from 25% to 12%, reflecting an expected increase in the Crown Estate’s profits. The next review will commence in 2026, with a view to making any change to the grant calculation for 2027-28 onwards. As with previous reviews, it will consider both the future funding needs of the Royal Household and the likely future path of Crown Estate profits—including, of course, the effect of the Crown Estate Bill that we are debating today on those profits—to determine the appropriate percentage to use.

I should note in this context that the grant for 2026-27 will include the final tranche of funding for the current 10-year programme of reservicing of Buckingham Palace’s infrastructure. The percentage for 2027-28 onwards will therefore need to reflect the significant downward adjustment to the household’s funding requirements. The Sovereign Grant Act currently restricts the level of the grant itself being reduced from one year to the next. That provision was written into the Sovereign Grant Act to reflect the view that many of the duties of the Head of State cannot be abruptly stopped, and therefore it would not be appropriate to significantly reduce funding in response to a sudden drop in Crown Estate profits. That will, however, constrain the ability to reduce the grant by the likely appropriate amount once the reservicing of Buckingham Palace is complete. In 2016, when the previous Government agreed to provide funding for the resurfacing programme, they noted an intention to bring forward legislation to reset the level of the sovereign grant to an appropriate level once the reservicing works have been completed. I can confirm that it is also the intention of this Government.

Those statutory reviews therefore provide Parliament with a report of the impact of this Bill on the sovereign grant. They also provide a mechanism to ensure that additional Crown Estate profits do not lead to excessive funding for the Royal Household. Where that is not possible under the Sovereign Grant Act, the Government will legislate accordingly.

On reporting requirements, the Sovereign Grant Act also requires two further reports on the grant to be produced and laid before Parliament each year. First, Section 5 requires the royal trustees to produce a report annually stating the level of the grant for the following financial year and how that has been determined in line with a prescribed method set out in Section 6 of the Act. This report must be laid before Parliament. Secondly, Section 2 requires the Keeper of the Privy Purse to produce annual accounts relating to the Royal Household, including the use of the sovereign grant. In common with other central government bodies, the accounts are prepared in accordance with an accounts direction issued by the Treasury, audited by the National Audit Office and laid in Parliament. The Crown Estate Act 1961 also contains a requirement for the Crown Estate to produce an annual report and accounts.

The Government therefore agree that it is important that there is regular reporting to Parliament on how the changes in this Bill will impact the sovereign grant. As I have detailed, there is already a considerable set of statutory requirements in this respect and beyond.

Independent School Fees: VAT

Debate between Lord Livermore and Baroness Vere of Norbiton

Monday 21st October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

The noble Lord asks about the assumptions we are making. As I said, we will set out our assessment of the expected impacts of this policy in the normal way by publishing a tax information impact note at the time of the Budget. At that point he can judge those assumptions for himself.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

According to the Government, VAT is a tax on consumption and therefore falls on the parents. Yet the Minister keeps saying that this consumption tax will be absorbed by the producer—the schools. Many noble Lords have pointed out today that schools cannot simply magic up lots of cash to mitigate against this consumption tax on the parents. Has he considered that he is undermining what a tax on the consumer actually is?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

The noble Baroness will know that how schools will fund this additional cost is a commercial decision for each school. Some schools have already announced a very wide range of fee increases, from zero to 5%, to 10%, up to, for example, Eton at 20% above the average expected VAT liability. This reflects the Government’s expectation that private schools will take steps to absorb a significant proportion of the new VAT liability.

Crown Estate Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Livermore and Baroness Vere of Norbiton

Committee stage
Monday 14th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I am enormously grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken before me in this debate today. Predominantly, this is obviously around the devolution of powers over the Crown Estate in Wales to the Welsh Government. On these Benches, we have thought long and hard about this, and I hear the concerns of some noble Lords about how the devolved powers differ between Wales and Scotland and, indeed, Northern Ireland. But this is not a unique situation and I have concluded that I would encourage the Minister to resist any change at this time.

A number of noble Lords have raised certain challenges as to why this might be a good or a bad idea, and I look at this in a purely practical sense. If I look at the documents that have been provided and are available not only for the Crown Estate but also the Crown Estate’s relationship with GB Energy—the enormous commitment that the Crown Estate has made in terms of the amount of seabed licences it wishes to grant to enable energy generation by 2030—I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that change is coming and coming very significantly for the Crown Estate. In 10 years’ time, it is not going to look the same as it does now. Therefore, I think that we would introduce risk into what is already a very ambitious target set down by the Government to develop offshore wind should we be sidetracked by the desire to devolve limited powers over the Crown Estate at this time.

It is also worth bearing in mind that the Crown Estate is very clear in its documents—and I think the Committee will discuss this a bit more later—that it is an independent business and competes against the private sector. Splitting it at this time and taking out a chunk of the assets and going through all the procedures as to how you recognise those assets—as pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley—and how you think about which revenue streams go where would be a sideshow.

I note the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, but I am going to run with it slightly. At the moment, the Labour-run Welsh Government do not have the best record of governance. Of course, that might improve in the future and progress may well be made, so I conclude by saying that we encourage the Minister to resist these amendments and we believe that they would be unwise at this time.

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Livermore) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate in response to the amendments from the noble Lords, Lord Wigley and Lord Hain, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Smith and Lady Humphreys. I hope to be able to explain the Government’s rationale for retaining the existing structure of the Crown Estate.

First, let me set out how the Crown Estate currently operates and why the Government believe this remains the best approach. The Crown Estate Act 1961 requires the Crown Estate commissioners to manage the Crown Estate as a commercial enterprise to enhance long-term value and generate profit and to do so with due regard to the requirements of good management. A key purpose of the 1961 Act was to repeal various detailed statutory provisions that had built up over 150 years previously which were hampering the effective management of the estate. By focusing the commissioners’ duties on enhancing the estate’s value and the returns generated, the commissioners have a clear objective for which they can be held to account.

While the Crown Estate has goals which under its own strategy align with wider national policy objectives, the 1961 Act provides the Crown Estate with independence and autonomy to set and achieve its goals. The Government believe that the Crown Estate should continue to operate in this way, as a commercial business independent from government, because it has shown itself to be a trusted and successful organisation, with a proven track record in effective management.

The Crown Estate is multibillion-pound public corporation, which is required to pay its profits into the UK Consolidated Fund each year, worth more than £4 billion over the past decade. Those revenues are then allocated to public service priorities by the Government, subject to the usual parliamentary controls. That is a valuable outcome, which we need to be careful not to undermine.

I turn to the amendments that deal with devolving the Crown Estate in Wales. I fully recognise that there are now two Labour Governments in the UK. While I believe that there is greater benefit for the people of Wales and the wider United Kingdom in retaining the Crown Estate’s current form, I shall of course continue to discuss these issues with the First Minister and the Secretary of State for Wales to ensure that Wales sees the full benefits of the Crown Estate and other forms of investment.

In response to the arguments made by noble Lords during this debate, I make a number of points. First, devolving the Crown Estate to Wales would most likely require the creation of a new entity to take on the role of the Crown Estate in Wales. This by definition would not benefit from the Crown Estate’s current substantial capability, capital and systems abilities. As my noble friend Lord Hain and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, referred to, this would indeed further fragment the UK energy market by adding an additional entity and, as a consequence, it would risk damaging international investor confidence in UK renewables and disrupting the National Energy System Operator’s grid connectivity reform, which is taking a whole-systems approach to the planning of generation and network infrastructure. That reform aims to create a more efficient system and reduce the waiting times for generation projects to connect to the grid. The cumulative impact of these effects would likely delay the pathway to net zero by decades.

Furthermore, the Crown Estate’s marine investments are currently made on a portfolio-wide basis across England and Wales. To devolve to Wales would disrupt these existing investments, since they would need to be restructured to accommodate a Welsh-specific entity. Let me give two examples. The first is the Crown Estate’s £50 million supply chain accelerator, which will match-fund early stage projects related to offshore wind leasing round 5, and the £50 million investment in the offshore wind evidence and change programme, which brings together government bodies, the industry and key stakeholders from across the UK to better understand environmental impacts of offshore wind.

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[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments on the investment and borrowing powers in the Bill for the most part seeks to put in place limits on borrowing by the Crown Estate. I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Russell, who introduced the group, and I agree with him that there should be a limit on the borrowing powers that the Government intend to extend to the Crown Estate commissioners.

I also associate myself with the comments made by both the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, about the absence of the business case and the draft framework agreement. This is not the first Treasury Bill where accompanying documents have not appeared, but this is a new Government.

I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising for his Amendment 8—I understand that the Committee will come back to his Amendment 9 separately—which seeks to probe the Government’s intention on borrowing. My noble friend made his points clearly: it is not just about this current Government, or the subsequent Government, but any future Government under whom there may need to be checks and balances in place to prevent the overleveraging of a very important group of national assets run by an independent company or organisation.

Extending the borrowing powers was planned by the previous Conservative Government, and we absolutely support the principle of the Bill. As I said on the previous group, the Crown Estate will be a very different organisation in 10 years and so has to do a lot of things very quickly. It is going to need money and there is an opportunity here. However, I am struggling to figure out how its relationships with GB Energy, on which I still lack clarity, and—one step removed—the national wealth fund, which I understand does not have as much money as was originally planned, will all fit together. Therefore, to protect the integrity of the Crown Estate it is important that a borrowing limit is put in place.

Previously, the Crown Estate commissioners were constrained by the 1961 Act, but we support other noble Lords who have spoken today on considering what the mechanism might be. Different noble Lords have proposed different mechanisms. I appreciate that the noble Earl, Lord Russell, picked a number, and I accept that that might be an outcome, but of course it is not really inflation-proofed; it would be in the Bill and therefore it might not be helpful in due course. I went away and thought about having 2% of total assets as the limit. If one looks at the portfolio as it stands for 2022-23—£15.5 billion—one sees that a 2% cap would represent a cash limit of around £310 million. That would be a more generous cap than that proposed by the noble Earl, Lord Russell, but it is broadly equivalent to the “hundreds of millions”—I think that was the phrase—envisaged by the Minister. We are just trying to be helpful here, by putting a statutory footing underneath the Minister’s intention in any event.

Another thought I had was not only doing this as a percentage of total assets but giving Parliament some sort of say over a five-year horizon. I think this was the point that the noble Lord, Lord Macpherson, was making, but in a separate way. I was not actually aware that borrowing forecasts appear in documents relating to the Crown Estate—maybe they do, and in any event it would be worthwhile to have a look at them. There is a significant loss of parliamentary oversight in this Bill. There is very little parliamentary oversight at all of the Crown Estate anyway, despite it holding some of our national assets, but the Bill takes even more of that parliamentary oversight away, which I will come to in a subsequent group.

I believe that there is an opportunity to add some oversight, and therefore I came up with the idea that Parliament should be required to pass regulations that set out, by year, a five-year borrowing cap. Parliament could do that every year quite simply. That would obviously give flexibility, and it would enable debates to happen about the Crown Estate and whether it was heading in the right direction. The Treasury could be challenged about its involvement—apparently there is a transparent relationship between the Treasury and the Crown Estate, although I have found no notes relating to that which would indicate such transparency. That was my other idea.

There are many ways that the House might decide on Report to put a limit on borrowings. I am happy to hear the views of the Minister; I very much hope that he will appreciate that many noble Lords are trying to help.

Briefly, my Amendment 10 picks up the point made by my noble friend Lord Howard about the situation where the Treasury is going to be lending to the Crown Estate, and that will be down as an asset, and then that money could circulate back and go into day-to-day government spending. To me, that seems slightly odd. It would be good to get some sort of commitment to ensure that that sort of mechanism is somehow broken.

I am grateful to all noble Lords, especially my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond. I might come to his element about additionality when we come on to the reporting of the investment strategy of the Crown Estate in a later group.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions from all noble Lords on this group of amendments. I recognise that the issue of controls on borrowing is an important consideration, and I hope to offer some reassurance. I agree with very many of the points raised during this debate, in particular that controls on borrowing by the Crown Estate must be in place. I assure noble Lords that such controls will be set out in the memorandum of understanding that will be in place between the Crown Estate and the Treasury, and will be set at a loan to value ratio not to exceed 25%.

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[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

It is a very good question, and I shall endeavour to find the answer and write to my noble friend.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords. That was an excellent debate and a lot of ground was covered. My favourite line of the debate came from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. She put her finger on it when she said that the Crown Estate was not a “cuddly organisation”. It does not need to be—it does not report to anybody, apart from its commissioners, and that is at the heart of the issue that I think many noble Lords are grappling with. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, was pleased with my recent conversion to pre-appointment scrutiny. I cannot guarantee that that will continue. I understand a new leader is in the offing in my party, so who knows what will happen?

The amendment that I put down was a useful way of probing some thinking around why the number of commissioners had to go from eight to 12. The response from the Minister was the sort of management jargon I used to learn at business school about 25 years ago. I am not much the wiser, but I will go back to Hansard and study his words carefully. Pre-appointment scrutiny, for the chair in particular, would be a very small but important change, particularly as we are dealing not with a cuddly organisation but with one which happens to own and manage some very important and valuable national assets. Therein lies the tension, and that is my concern.

Turning to the points raised by my noble friend Lord Young, it was a forensic analysis. I am sure many noble Lords learned much from it, not least how to structure a really good argument, which has stumped the Minister. I am pleased that he is stumped because I am sure that he will go away and look at it—indeed, I implore him to do so, such that we do not have to return to this, at length, on Report.

I hope that my noble friend Lord Holmes feels satisfied by the Minister’s response to his amendments. On the point raised by the noble Earl, Lord Russell, I presume that both he and I are pleased that the Crown Estate can already do what he wants it to do. I agree with him that it sounds completely obvious.

I am afraid that I am not happy with the Minister’s response on the question of disposals; in fact, I am probably more concerned by his response than I was beforehand. I am not sure that the nation would expect the complexion of the assets held by the Crown Estate to significantly change, so we may well come back to that. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to this group on the objectives and duties of the Crown Estate. Many of the amendments relate to climate change and nature, and many noble Lords have spoken who are much more knowledgeable about these topics than I am, so I do not propose to add further to those points. As set out in today’s list, one must follow the rules, but I look forward to hearing the thoughts of the Minister on that.

My Amendments 37A to 37C look at another important aspect of potential disruption caused by investments by the Crown Estate, which is to local economies and national economies when it comes to shipping. I am looking to the Minister to reassure me and your Lordships’ House that very important local and national economic activities are considered appropriately by the Crown Estate, and that it does not look at what it does in a narrow and short-term way but thinks about making the cake bigger for everybody over the longer term.

The noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, made several points about the impact on commercial fishing: it should be quantified, consulted on and mitigated where possible, and I say the same for commercial shipping. Some 90% of our goods arrive by sea, and ports are often quite specialised in the goods they handle. Sadly, you cannot move a port, so you have to be quite careful not to obstruct well-established shipping lanes and ensure that the proximity of offshore developments does not cause excessive risk to vessels, particular larger vessels, were they ever to get into trouble. Comments on that would be greatly appreciated.

I did not put down an amendment on this, but it is strongly related. Where ports want to expand and they are surrounded by Crown Estate land, the balance of power is sometimes a little one sided. I would like some reassurance that the Crown Estate will act not only in its self-interest for short-term gain but will think about the longer term and growing the pie for the whole economy and the Crown Estate within that. I do not propose to add anything further at this point, and I look forward to hearing the views of the Minister.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

I thank all noble Lords for their powerful arguments made during this debate. I will address the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Holmes, Lord Teverson and Lord Young, the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayman, Lady Young and Lady Vere, and the noble Earl, Lord Russell, which all seek to make changes to the Crown Estate’s objectives and duties.

Before I move on, I will address two specific questions from the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, which I may not pick up in my subsequent remarks. He asked about conflicts of interest with leasing rounds. Under UK habitats regulations, the Crown Estate is deemed to be a competent authority for offshore wind leasing rounds. As such, it has a legal obligation to carry out a plan-level habitats regulation assessment for planned activities such as an offshore wind leasing round. It could be challenged through legal action if it fails to do this in line with the prescribed requirements.

The noble Lord also asked about the marine delivery route map’s interaction with the offshore wind report. The marine delivery route map gives the holistic context across sectors and sea users to support and inform individual sector delivery planning, while the offshore wind report offers technical insights and data, with both working in concert to ensure that offshore land development is efficient, sustainable and aligned with national and environmental goals.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, also asked about a point of clarification. I will go away and check the questions she raises. Obviously, I apologise if I have inadvertently confused the two things she mentioned.

Amendments 14 and 28, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Holmes and Lord Teverson, and the noble Earl, Lord Russell, seek to introduce new duties for the Crown Estate to protect the condition of the seabed. Amendment 14 would require the Crown Estate commissioners to take steps to protect the seabed, which forms part of the Crown Estate, and would include a prohibition on all activities, business practices, leisure pursuits and other actions that permanently or temporarily cause damage to the seabed.

Crown Estate Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Livermore and Baroness Vere of Norbiton

Committee stage
Monday 14th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond for introducing his amendment, which leads this group, which is fundamentally concerned with the generation of energy on assets owned by the Crown Estate. This is even more important now that there is a formal relationship with GB Energy, which has been announced, although I accept that details of the relationship are quite thin on the ground. I entirely support the intention of my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond to require the publication of a report on the potential for energy generation on the Crown Estate, and I draw attention to my Amendment 35, which would ensure that no new electricity generation licences are granted without confirmation that a corresponding grid connection exists.

The problem of grid capacity, connection and storage is real and important. In May of this year, a House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee report found that in order to achieve net zero targets,

“the transmission and distribution network must develop and expand alongside the growth in supply and demand”.

It concluded that renewable energy generation may be stunted by “slow grid connections” and “limited grid capacity”. That is the issue I am trying to fix, and that all noble Lords are very much focused on. The Government must continue to look at it urgently if they are to build on the previous Conservative Government’s progress toward our clean energy targets. However, it is not an easy task. Even Green Party parliamentarians have been known to be vociferously opposed to measures to boost national grid capacity. I hear a Liberal Democrat laughing, and I am not entirely sure that that is appropriate. However, in the face of that kind of opposition, I ask the Minister to reassure the House that the Government have a plan to get on with increasing our national grid capacity.

At this point, I think it worth pushing the Minister, although we will come back to this on a later group, on the partnership with Great British Energy, which was announced to great fanfare a few months ago. I am still at a loss to explain how the new partnership between the two organisations, the Crown Estate and Great British Energy, will work and what difference it will make; indeed, this is the point of my amendment.

When the previous Conservative Government announced in the 2023 Autumn Statement plans to work with the Crown Estate to increase offshore wind capacity, that was predicted to unlock a further 20 to 30 gigawatts of new offshore wind seabed rights by 2030—great; that seems very fair. The Government have claimed that this new partnership will

“cut the time it takes to get offshore wind projects operating and delivering power to homes by up to half”.

Okay, but their press release of 25 July 2024 stated:

“The Crown Estate estimates this partnership will lead to up to 20-30GW of new offshore wind developments reaching seabed lease stage by 2030”.


To coin a phrase, nothing has changed. What difference does the partnership with GB Energy actually make, or did the Crown Estate get it wrong when it was working with the previous Government? Noble Lords can see the issue I have here: I do not understand how the tie-up with GB Energy is going to benefit that organisation, the Crown Estate and, indeed, the nation.

That, among other reasons, is why I tabled Amendment 34, which also requires a report on the energy generation supported by the Crown Estate. Its scope is wider than Amendment 16 and it facilitates greater oversight via reporting. It requires the Crown Estate commissioners to report annually on not only the expected impact of the relationship between the Crown Estate and GB Energy, but the actual impact. It would also include the investment strategy for capital investment in the infrastructure, including port infrastructure. This is where I am confused, because when I speak to the port sector, it tells me that finances are not particularly an issue. In a report published last month, the British Ports Association recognised that the sheer scale and speed of the investment needed to meet the ports’ offshore energy ambitions is significant. However, it called for a carefully managed investment in ports that fills gaps in ports’ supply chains that cannot be met by the private sector. These gaps can be filled by, for example, the national wealth fund, the Crown Estate or Great British Energy. Can the Minister explain who is managing, and which organisation will be investing how much in what, and when? I, for one, am confused. It is right to get some insight into this now, and to monitor progress in the future.

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Livermore) (Lab)]

My Lords, I will address the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, and the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, both of which touch on the topic of energy. I will start by addressing Amendment 16, tabled by the noble Lord.

This amendment would require the Crown Estate to publish a report within 12 months on the potential for energy generation on the Crown Estate, covering onshore and offshore wind grid capacity and energy pricing. While the Government are not in principle opposed to the Crown Estate producing specific reports on energy generation on its own estate, it is not within its remit or ability to report on grid capacity or pricing. As I have set out previously, the national grid and relevant transmission and distribution network operators are responsible for the UK-wide strategy on grid connectivity, and the new National Energy Systems Operator will be responsible for creating a strategic spatial energy plan, which will provide future clarity on grid connectivity.

The Crown Estate has already published, in September, a 53-page report entitled Future of Offshore Wind: Considerations for Development and Leasing to 2030 and Beyond, which looks at, among other things, the prime areas of opportunity for new wind farms. It has also recently published a Marine Delivery Routemap, which sets out its vision for the seabed and coastline.

Amendment 34, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, would require the Government to publish a report on the scope, nature and expected impact of the relationship between the Crown Estate and Great British Energy within six months of the passing of the Act, and thereafter publish an annual report. The Government have no principled objection to such a report, but the timing might be more usefully linked to the passing of the Great British Energy Bill, currently in the other place, rather than the Bill we are discussing today.

UK Economy: Capital Gains Tax

Debate between Lord Livermore and Baroness Vere of Norbiton

Wednesday 9th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for his expertise on this matter. At the risk of repeating myself, he knows I would not be able to comment on speculation about other specific taxes, but we must rebuild our public finances, including by addressing the £22 billion black hole inherited from the previous Government.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, can the Minister define a “working person”?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

A working person is someone who goes out to work.

Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Livermore and Baroness Vere of Norbiton

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th September 2024 Grand Committee

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, there is not an awful lot more to say. This is a very elegant amendment from my noble friend Lady Noakes, and it was very elegantly explained. I am the sole member of this Committee today who is not a member of the Financial Services Regulation Committee—no, neither is the Minister—and I am sorry about that. All noble Lords involved in getting the committee set up have an enormous amount of experience in the field of financial services regulation and, looking at the inquiries that it is already doing, I think it will be a very valuable part of our regulatory infrastructure. I look on this amendment with warmth and favourability and I should imagine that the Minister will do so, too.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, focuses on the important theme of how the Bank of England is accountable to Parliament. As I have said in response to other amendments, the Government agree that it is right that the Bank of England is held to account for the actions it takes in resolution. That includes being accountable, as appropriate, to Parliament, so I do look warmly, in the words of my noble friend Lord Eatwell, at the intent of this amendment. I also stress that it is right that the Bank of England can act quickly and decisively when exercising its powers. That is particularly important in a crisis situation.

That said, the Government expect that the Bank of England would engage with Parliament after taking resolution action, including when the mechanism under the Bill is used. Specifically, under the existing provisions of the Banking Act, when the Bank of England exercises its resolution powers it must provide a copy of the relevant legal instrument to the Treasury. The Treasury must then lay that instrument in Parliament and the Bank of England must also publish it. This will continue to apply under the new mechanism and ensure that Parliament is notified when resolution action is undertaken. I shall give one specific example. In the case of SVB, the Bank sent to the Treasury the copy of the legal instrument the same morning as it exercised its power. The Treasury then laid the relevant document in Parliament on the very same day.

I also reiterate points I have made elsewhere about the Government’s commitment to require the Bank of England to produce reports in the event that the mechanism is used. The Government strongly expect such reports to be made public and laid in Parliament unless there are clear public interest grounds for not doing so, such as issues of commercial confidentiality. I hope this provides some comfort to the noble Baroness and, on that basis, I respectfully ask her to withdraw her amendment.

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[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I also support the sentiment in the amendment from my noble friend Lady Noakes. I think all noble Lords here, including the Minister, would agree that this has the right intention but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, mentioned, there will be edge cases which we cannot foresee at this time. The question is: should such a statement of intent be in the special resolution objectives and, if not, where should it go? I do not know—perhaps in a code of practice, or perhaps not. I am interested to hear what the Minister has to say.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, seeks to introduce a new objective into the special resolution regime. The new objective would state that the costs in using the new mechanism should not exceed those that would be incurred in the counterfactual of placing the firm into insolvency. This amendment therefore touches on an important point raised both in consultation and during Second Reading, which is whether there should be a formal test or objective that seeks to prevent the use of the new mechanism, or make its use significantly more challenging, where the cost is higher than insolvency.

I also note that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, raised similar points on the first day of Committee, which he alluded to today, making the case that the Bank of England should be required to present an assessment of costs in reports to the Treasury and to Parliament.

The Government carefully considered the case for inclusion of various forms of such a safeguard, sometimes referred to as a least-cost test, in response to feedback received during the consultation. In considering this matter, it is important to strike the right balance between ensuring that the Bank of England can respond quickly and flexibly to a firm failure and ensuring that costs to industry are properly considered. Having considered this, the Government concluded that the existing public interest test and special resolution regime objectives remained the appropriate framework for deciding whether the mechanism in this Bill could be used.

Adding a specific objective for the Bank of England to ensure that the costs to industry from using the new mechanism do not exceed insolvency could prevent it taking the most appropriate action to advance its broader resolution objectives. Those objectives include protecting financial stability, certain depositors and public funds. It is right that these aims are prioritised at a time of significant risk, which is part of the reason why the Government have not proposed changes to the broader resolution framework.

There is also the potential for such a change to impose important practical challenges. Resolution would likely take place in an uncertain and fast-paced context. Estimating the costs of different approaches during this period will be highly challenging and could change over time. There is therefore a risk that such an objective could create legal uncertainty around any resolution action, which in turn may undermine the usability and effectiveness of the new mechanism in situations where it is justified. This could have significant and undesirable consequences, including crystallising a set of indirect costs for the financial services sector and the wider economy. Further, it should be borne in mind that the alternative if the new mechanism is not available may be to use public funds.

However, I appreciate the intent behind the noble Baroness’s amendment and hope that I can provide some reassurance by reiterating previous points on the subject of the scrutiny and transparency of the Bank of England’s actions. As I have noted, the Bank of England is required under the Banking Act 2009 to report to the Treasury when exercising some of its stabilisation powers and, as was set out in response to the consultation, it is the Government’s clear intention to use these existing reporting mechanisms to ensure that the Bank of England is subject to appropriate scrutiny when using the mechanism provided by the Bill. However, I take the point that the noble Baroness made in response to my earlier point.

The Government have committed to updating the code of practice to provide further details on how these reporting requirements will apply when the mechanism is used. I reaffirm that the Government intend to include confirmation in the code that, after the new mechanism has been used, the Bank of England would be required to disclose the estimated costs to industry of the options considered, including the comparison with insolvency. The Government consider that using the code of practice in this way, rather than putting these requirements in the Bill, is the best approach to hold the Bank of England to account for its actions.

The Bank of England is legally required to have regard to the code and the Government are required to consult the Banking Liaison Panel, made up of regulatory and industry stakeholders, when updating it. Using the code will therefore ensure that a full and thorough consultation is taken on the approach. Given the complex and potentially fast-moving nature of bank failures, this will also ensure that any approach is sufficiently nuanced to account for the range of possible outcomes under insolvency or through the use of other resolution tools.

As I have previously said, the Government will share drafts of the updates to the code of practice as soon as practicable and provide sufficient opportunity for industry stakeholders to be consulted on them. The noble Baroness also made the case that insolvency should be a preferred strategy for small banks and I stress that this is the case. I hope that I have provided some helpful explanation to her of the Government’s position on this matter and respectfully ask that she withdraws her amendment.

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[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I added my name to the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes about the code of practice because it is important that we have this debate. I recognise what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, says, but it slightly struck fear into my heart because it is about those circumstances where there is not sufficient guidance or a code of practice. Essentially, this is not necessarily just for the Bank of England; it is for all those stakeholders who will be involved in the other side of a resolution. A lot of people will read the code of practice and internalise it. When it is needed, it will therefore already be in their hearts because they will have read it, so I am not as concerned as the noble Lord is about putting in too much detail. The simple fact is that we have not seen anything, so we do not really know what we are dealing with.

It struck me that in the slight rush to bring forward some legislation to keep Parliament occupied, perhaps, the Government are not providing all the information that the House needs to consider this Bill fully. It is complex, and as noble Lords go through it, it is clear that we are all picking up new nuances that we consider might be of concern in the future. The code of practice makes up an important component of the regime and the Committee is slightly flying blind, having not seen a draft of the changes—not only a draft of what would happen as a result of the Bill, but also potentially to fill gaps that we know are not going to be part of the Bill. We know that the code is potentially the only protection between anybody who uses banks—essentially, the taxpayer—and the Bank being able to perform maximum adaptation to a situation. There has to be something in the middle that stops that happening.

I am warming to my noble friend Lady Noakes’s suggestion that the Bill should not come into force until the code of practice is finalised, but I sense that that might be a little churlish. The amendment itself is a little anodyne. I think all noble Lords agree that the Government will, of course, make changes to the code of practice, but I would appreciate hearing more information from the Minister about what changes are anticipated—specifically, what will be left out—and the timing for any code of practice because while it remains outstanding, even in draft form, there is a significant lack of clarity.

At Second Reading, the Minister stated that the update will happen in due course. How many times have I used that phrase? I know exactly what it means. It means “when we are sort of ready”. We need to be a bit more ambitious than that. Can the Minister give any further guidance on timing? If he cannot, would it be helpful if I tabled an amendment on Report that required the code of practice to be updated within, say, three months and subject to approval by both Houses? I am happy to do that if it is helpful.

As my noble friend Lady Noakes and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, pointed out, the Minister has referred to these things being addressed in the code of practice. Many of the elements in the reporting are also supposed to be in that code. My concern is that six weeks have now passed since the Minister said “in due course” and the House rises at the end of the week for Conference Recess. I presume that the Treasury is still working, so that would be a further window during which progress on a draft code of practice could be made. Therefore, I very much hope that the Minister can commit to having a draft document available for review before Report stage is scheduled. I look forward to hearing from the Minister.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I should state at the outset that the Government have no objections to the principle under discussion. Indeed, the Government have already stated publicly in our response to the consultation on these proposals that we intend to update the code of practice to reflect the measures in the Bill. I have already committed to share a draft of the proposed updates at the earliest opportunity, and I am happy to reaffirm that commitment today. I am aware that this is not the answer that the Committee is looking for, but I am afraid that I cannot commit to providing that before Report. However, I expect it to be available before the Bill comes into force.

As set out in the Government’s consultation response, the updates to the code will do three things: first, they will ensure that the code appropriately reflects the existence of the new mechanism; secondly, they will set out that the Bank is expected to set out estimates of the costs of the options considered and, as noted elsewhere, this is expected to include the case of insolvency; and thirdly, they will set out the expectation that any use of the mechanism is subject to the ex post scrutiny arrangements that I have described elsewhere.

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, perfectly fairly asked for a series of clarifications of what the code will include. She asked about two points specifically. The first was whether the code will confirm the mechanisms intended for small banks and the expenses covered? Yes, it is the intention that it will. She also asked whether the code will cover multiple uses of the mechanism. Yes, the code will cover that. I will answer other specific questions in writing.

In preparing these updates, the Government are mindful to ensure that they are done efficiently and carefully to ensure that they achieve the intended effect within the wider resolution framework, for instance, ensuring that the right set of costs is considered on the appropriate basis.

The Government will ensure sufficient opportunity for industry stakeholders to be consulted on these proposed updates to the code of practice. In particular, the final wording of any proposed updates would be subject to review by a cross-section of representatives from the authorities and the industry on the statutory Banking Liaison Panel, which advises the Treasury on the resolution regime. As noted, the Government will aim to progress these updates and make the proposed changes available for consultation with industry as soon as practicable.

Finally, I note that the Banking Act 2009 already imposes an implicit requirement on HM Treasury to update the code of practice, even without this amendment. Addressing the operation of the new mechanism would therefore already fall within the scope of this requirement.

I know that this explanation may not be sufficient, but I respectfully ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

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[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I simply make the same point. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, was absolutely right to summarise the principle which I think all noble Lords on the Committee feel is the purpose of the Bill. There cannot be any circumstances by which there is MREL or whatever it might be left, yet money is going in from FSCS to ensure the resolution of the bank. I cannot see any circumstance in which that would happen—perhaps Treasury officials would be able to think of one—but I think all noble Lords are agreed on the need for some clarity on what would happen.

I appreciated the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I got about 60% of them, so I was really proud of myself; the other 40% went way over my head. I am going to try to understand her points. We are in quite a difficult situation, but the way that she has been so forensic about it has allowed the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, to state what the principle is. It is about combining those two things—the forensic attitude to “This is what the Bill could say if read in a certain way” versus “Just tell us whether the Bill abides by the very simple principle that basically FSCS money should be a last resort, not there for anybody else, but just to prop up a bank to make sure it gets through to the other side of resolution, for the public interest and no more”.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, in response to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, I reassure her that the Bill does not seek to introduce measures to bail out shareholders. I note that she raised concerns about this point on the first day in Committee, about which I am about to write to her. I hope my response will provide the clarification she is seeking pending that letter and the worked examples that we have discussed.

The amendment relates to a subsection of the Bill that would amend Section 12AA of the Banking Act 2009. This sets out the definition of the shortfall amount, which is a figure calculated by the Bank of England when using the bail-in resolution tool. The shortfall amount determines how much of a firm’s resources need to be bailed in to restore its capital ratio to the extent necessary to sustain sufficient market confidence and enable it to continue to meet the conditions for authorisation for at least one year and to continue to carry out its authorised activities. The methodology for determining the shortfall amount is not changed by the Bill, and it remains the case that when using the bail-in tool a firm’s own resources and eligible liabilities—its shareholders and creditors—would bear losses.

The relevant provision is not intended as a means of reducing the amount of MREL that should be used when bailing in a firm. Instead, it is intended to ensure that, in the event the mechanism is used alongside the bail-in tool, funds from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme are taken into account and used rather than the Bank of England having to bail in other creditors further up the creditor hierarchy. As an example, without this provision, if a firm had insufficient MREL to meet its shortfall amount without being able to take into account Financial Services Compensation Scheme funds, it may need to bail in creditors, such as uncovered depositors. Retaining this provision therefore ensures that the Bank of England may exercise some discretion in not bailing in other liabilities beyond a firm’s MREL, such as uncovered deposits, where to do so might risk further destabilising the business of the firm, other participants in the banking sector or other sectors, or reducing wider confidence in the financial system. Therefore, the Government consider it important to maintain flexibility to respond to the relevant circumstances.

In this context, I also note that funds provided by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme under the new mechanism can be used to cover the costs of recapitalising the failed firm, the operating costs of a bridge bank, and Bank of England and HM Treasury costs in relation to the resolution.

It is important to note that Sections 6A, 6B and 12AA of the Banking Act 2009 require the Bank of England to ensure that shareholders and creditors bear losses when a banking institution fails. This is an important principle that will continue to apply where the new mechanism is used.

I can reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, that the regime provides an extensive and proportionate set of powers to the Bank of England to impose consequences on the shareholders of a failed firm in resolution. The bail-in tool specifically enables the Bank of England to impose losses on shareholders and to write down certain unsecured creditors. This is an important principle that ensures the firm’s owners and investors must bear losses in the case of failure.

This is of course a highly technical area, and I understand the noble Baroness’s concerns. To that end, I am happy to explore whether there is further material that the Government can make available, such as worked examples, to help illustrate how this approach may work in practice. I hope these points can reassure the noble Baroness and I respectfully ask her to withdraw this amendment.

Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Livermore and Baroness Vere of Norbiton

Committee stage
Thursday 5th September 2024 Grand Committee

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to be back in this Room—sadly, standing on this side. Nevertheless, it is an interesting experience being in opposition and doing my first Committee—a learning experience. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have participated in scrutinising the Bill. I recognise that we are at the beginning of the Session and sometimes it takes a while for things to get into place. There has been quite a lot of work done and I think we have made some very good progress. I, too, did not speak on Second Reading, and I blame that entirely on the Prime Minister, because he extended Parliament and I was already on holiday, so therefore I could not do that. I am very grateful and put on record my thanks to my colleague, my noble friend Lady Penn, who did it in my stead.

The Bill was originally developed by the previous Government and was waiting for parliamentary time, so I think my role today is to test the thinking of the new Government to make sure that they are still on the same page. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for kicking off this debate so eloquently and knowledgeably. I note her concerns about the scope of the Bill. I would love to say that she did not slightly lose me, but she did, so I will come back to that if it seems to be a problem that we need to look at.

I want to go back—to be helpful, possibly to me—to first principles on this. Having listened to the contributions that have gone before me, I think I have got it right that there are three groups of financial institutions. I am going to call them “banks”, because “financial institutions” is long and it takes a while to get my tongue around.

The first group are the MREL—the big eight banks. These are the ones that have been directed by the Bank of England to hold MREL, and they must also submit a resolvability assessment framework, or RAF, to regulators. The RAF is structured so that these firms can think about how their business works and what capabilities they need to achieve the three resolvability outcomes: having adequate financial resources; being able to continue business through resolution restructuring; and effective communication and co-ordination.

I read somewhere that the 2024 assessment of these documents was due to be published in September, and I should like an update as to whether it has been published. Can the Minister comment on the outcomes of this scrutiny: is the system working? I understand that one bank was not quite there yet. Let us see whether we are going to try to exclude the largest banks from the scheme or whether we follow the suggestion of my noble friend Lady Noakes of getting the involvement of the Treasury. We need to test whether those banks which are deemed too big to fail have a coherent and funded plan in place should they get into financial difficulty. If that were the case, there would be some argument for potentially excluding them from the Bill, but there should at least be some safeguards in place.

Then there is the second group. This was raised with me by UK Finance, and this is why my amendment is slightly different to those of other people. There are those banks in the second group that are on the glide path to full MREL status. These institutions will get there, but it would be helpful to get an update from the Minister as to how many institutions make up this second group so that we can consider further whether there is a substantial risk and where that risk might reasonably lie—and so how long they will take to reach their destination.

Finally, there is the third group. These are the important ones. They are the ones that the Bill should be focused on. These are the smaller banks, and they are often innovative, they are often very high growth and sometimes that in itself can lead to challenges. It is these banks that the Bill seeks to target. Indeed, it was my understanding, as it was that of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that they would exclusively benefit from this scheme.

If things start to go awry, due to either a business-specific issue or wider market turmoil, these proposed powers would create this mechanism where the banking sector itself, in its entirety—all three groups—would fund the recapitalisation of the relevant bank or banks, and the taxpayer would be relieved of that burden. So that all makes perfect sense to me.

Then we come to the reasonable worst-case scenario, which I think is what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, was referring to. It is not beyond our imagination that things could get very bad very quickly, with a number of small or even medium-sized banks getting into trouble at the same time. The first group would, I hope, have their MREL in place; they would have their plan, which has been approved by the regulators to make sure that they continue.

I am slightly less clear what would happen to the second group—those on the glide path to MREL—were there to be a market-wide event. These are significant institutions and if they are to be included in this mechanism, we get into issues of how the banking sector then repays that through the levy, which I will come on to. There might well be a situation where one, two or more quite substantial institutions need recapitalisation from the FSCS in the same financial year. Have the Minister’s officials done any sort of assessment of how bad that could possibly get and any thinking about what the plan would be if it were to get that bad? Also, what would the hurdle be for declaring this sort of state of emergency?

While the FSCS might have a looming potential liability from the second group, there is also the third group to be considered. These ones are the potential future lifeblood of our financial sector in the United Kingdom and they would most likely need a relatively small amount of recapitalisation funding to get them through the turmoil. This is why parity is needed around the applicability of the scheme proposed in the Bill, but also the circumstances in which the scheme would reasonably and rationally be used—and, frankly, the circumstances in which it would not be, because it would just not work. In a reasonable worst-case scenario, how is anyone going to decide which ones get saved and which do not? One has to rely upon the amount of funding that could be affordable over several years of a levy applied to the UK banking sector, but that is not going to be enough money. How would that resolve itself and what would that process look like?

As mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, which I picked up in one of the briefings as well, the FSCS will have significant powers to apply the levy, not only in the financial year when the event or events take place but in subsequent financial years. If I am in the UK banking sector and things have gone pretty bad, and I suddenly have this massive weight of a levy going over several years to repay the events of one financial year, that to me is concerning.

It is also concerning because, of course, things are done differently in the EU, so you would get a slight mismatch from a competitiveness perspective. I would be worried about that. Has the Minister done an assessment of the impact of this potential multiyear hit, once we have an idea of the reasonable size and then the potential maximum size? Has he assessed the competitiveness of the UK banking sector, should this multiyear levy suddenly be required? How much could the UK’s system cost our banking sector and over what period of time? Are there circumstances, and in which circumstances, when rationally there is a systemic failure and the only person who could step in would be the taxpayer? I do not want the taxpayer to step in, trust me, but that would prevent permanent damage to one of our most important sectors.

The other key consideration is the impact on the FSCS and its ability to meet its obligations under the deposit guarantee insurance scheme, because if that has all gone to recapitalisation funding, there will be nothing left. I believe we will come on to that later in Committee.

This is a range of thoughtful amendments tabled by noble Lords and I am grateful for them. As many noble Lords pointed out, they very much go along the same sorts of lines. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to them. I will not go into a great amount of detail on them, but I note that my Amendment 8 takes into account those on the glide path, which we need to recognise. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for the fine case she made for Amendment 22; I will move quickly on from that.

That brings me to the remaining amendment in the group: Amendment 18, which is in my name. Here, in essence, I am probing whether the Minister is content with the current imbalance between the banks liable to pay the levy versus the ones that, realistically, will make use of the new powers. Does he feel it is fair that the entire banking sector pays to recapitalise what, I feel, the Committee hopes will be smaller banks only? Does he accept and is he comfortable with the largest banks paying twice, in essence—particularly as they will have to have limited or no input in or influence on many of the events that might cause a resolution event or events? These largest banks will pay twice: once for their MREL and associated requirements, and again in the event of a resolution event or events of which they would not be able to take advantage.

Context is important here. We will come back to costs again but banks already pay a plethora of taxes, levies and charges, both to regulators and directly to Treasury funds. There is the bank levy, the bank corporation tax surcharge, the economic crime levy, the FSCS levy and the FCA/PRA fees. That is a lot—and let us recall that these costs are never borne by the banks themselves; they will always be borne by the businesses and consumers who use them.

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Livermore) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for taking part in this debate on the first group of amendments. I note that the scope of the mechanism is a key and central issue, both for noble Lords and for the wider banking sector. I hope to offer some reassurance to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and other noble Lords regarding this concern.

I start by addressing Amendment 1, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which would prevent a recapitalisation payment involving a bank that has issued minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities, otherwise known as MREL. I stress that the Government’s strong policy intention is for the mechanism provided by the Bill to be used primarily to support the resolution of small banks. The Government therefore do not generally expect the mechanism set out in this Bill to be used on the type of firms that these amendments would seek to exclude.

The principal issue here is whether that intention should be set out in the Bill. The Government’s considered view is that it is right for the Bill to contain some flexibility for the Bank of England to be able to use the mechanism more broadly in some circumstances. That is because firm failures can be unpredictable and there could be circumstances in which it would be appropriate to use the mechanism on such firms.

For example, this may be relevant in situations where a small bank has grown but is still in the process of reaching its end-state MREL requirements. Firms in this position would have at least some MREL resources to support recapitalisation but the new mechanism could be used to meet any remaining shortfall if judged necessary. Without the proposed mechanism, there would be a potential gap in this scenario, creating risks to public funds and financial stability.

Ultimately, the decision to use the mechanism would rest with the Bank of England, having assessed the resolution conditions. The Bank of England is required by statute to consult the Treasury before any use of resolution tools, providing an effective and legally binding window for the Treasury to raise concerns if it had any.

I also point out that, during the Government’s consultation period, more respondents were in favour of the scope set out in the Bill than opposed. I appreciate noble Lords’ concerns about this issue and am happy to commit to exploring how to provide further reassurance on the Government’s intent via the code of practice.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked whether the Bank of England should reduce MREL requirements in the knowledge that it could instead use FSCS funds. The Bank of England sets MREL requirements independently of government but within a framework set out in legislation. Any changes to firms’ MREL requirements would therefore be a decision for the Bank of England. The Bank of England will consider, in the light of this Bill and wider developments, whether any changes to its approach to MREL would be appropriate.

I turn briefly to Amendment 8, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, which similarly aims to exclude from the new mechanism those firms that are required to hold MREL. I hope that I have already fully responded to her concerns in that regard; the Government are clear that this Bill is primarily intended for small banks, but that it is right to retain flexibility.

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[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

It may be best if I write to noble Lords to clarify this point.

Amendment 11, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, would exclude from the scope of the new mechanism those firms whose MREL requirement exceeds their minimum capital requirement. This would include both firms expected to be transferred to a private sector purchaser and those bailed in when they fail.

I stress to the noble Lord, as I have to others, that the Government’s intention is for the mechanism to be used primarily for small banks. That is ultimately central to the Bill’s purpose, but I emphasise the importance of having flexibility in the legislation for the Bank of England’s ability to respond effectively in a crisis. As I have noted, this may, for example, be relevant if a firm is still in the process of building up its MREL requirements to be able to fully implement a bail-in strategy.

I also note the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which intends to ensure that, if the Bank of England seeks to use the new mechanism on a bank required to hold bail-in liabilities, it must first get the consent of the Treasury.

I am conscious that there are other amendments related to the subject of Treasury approval for the use of the Bank of England’s powers and that we will turn to this matter more substantively later. What I will say now to the noble Baroness is that the Government consider it important for the Bank of England to be able to take decisions in a resolution independently and decisively.

I will mention two important safeguards. First, as required by statute, the Treasury will always be consulted as part of the Bank of England’s formal assessment of the resolution conditions. Secondly, if using the mechanism on larger banks had implications for public funds, such as requiring the use of the National Loans Fund, this would be subject to Treasury consent. But I repeat that the Government’s strong policy intention is ultimately for the mechanism to be used primarily on small banks.

Amendment 18 was tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Vere. It seeks to clarify the rationale for the scope of financial institutions liable to pay the levy for the new mechanism delivered by the Bill, given the expectation that the new mechanism would apply primarily to small banks. The Government believe there to be benefits to mirroring the existing process for recouping the costs of paying out depositors in insolvency and maintaining a broad-based levy. In particular, as noted in the Government’s cost-benefit analysis, the exclusion of larger banks would raise concerns about the affordability of the levy for other banks, which would in turn increase risks to public funds and the overall viability of the new mechanism.

In addition, in cases where the new mechanism may be used, the counterfactual would be for the failed bank to enter insolvency. As a result, the sector would already be liable to contribute to the costs of a small bank failure. As set out in the Government’s cost-benefit analysis, while highly case-specific, the upfront costs of an insolvency are generally expected to be greater than those under the new mechanism delivered by the Bill. The Government therefore feel it is right to mirror the arrangements in place for an insolvency and to maintain a broad-based levy.

The noble Baroness asked about the Bank’s resolvability assessment framework. I am told that the latest update was published in August. She asked how many firms were on the glide path. I will write to her with specific details, and if any of her other questions are not answered in my speech today, I will write to her also on those points.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

One concern was raised in the document that has been published, so I would be grateful for the Minister’s comments on that.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

I will write to the noble Baroness on that point.

I turn finally to Amendment 22 in this group, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which concerns the use of the bail-in resolution tool. Section 12AA of the Banking Act 2009 sets out the principles by which the Bank of England calculates the shortfall amount when the bail-in tool is used and, as a consequence of that calculation, how much of a failed firm’s resources needs to be bailed in. The addition to Section 12AA in Clause 4, which this amendment seeks to prevent, ensures that any available funds from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme via the new mechanism could be taken into account when calculating the shortfall amount and, as a consequence, how much of a firm’s resources would need to be bailed in when the new mechanism is used alongside the bail-in tool.

This change to Section 12AA is important as there are some circumstances where bail-in may be the preferred tool for the Bank of England to use as a precursor to transfer of the firm to a bridge bank or private sector purchaser, even if the bank is small. This is because the bail-in tool permits the writing down of subordinated debt or other liabilities, to which mandatory reduction under the bridge bank or private sector purchaser tools does not apply. There may be circumstances in which it is appropriate to write down the subordinated debt or other liabilities of a small bank. The intention is therefore for the bail-in tool to be available alongside use of the new mechanism.

In such circumstances, this amendment would preclude the Bank of England, when calculating the shortfall amount, from being able to take into account any funds that were available from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme under the new mechanism. As a consequence, when determining how much of the firm’s subordinated debt and other liabilities should be bailed in, the Bank of England would be obliged not to factor in those external funds and would have to write down more of the firm’s resources than it needed to. In certain circumstances this would be undesirable and could undermine the wider goals of a resolution process. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, suggested worked examples. We will of course take that idea away for further consideration ahead of Report.

I hope that these explanations have been helpful and that I have provided some reassurance on these points. I will of course write where I have indicated that I will do so. In the circumstances, I hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

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[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I rise only to celebrate the fact that my noble friend Lady Noakes had so much time during recess in which to draft all these marvellous amendments because they certainly get the little grey cells going. I appreciate her eloquent explanation of her amendment and the very practical example of what could happen that was provided by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. This goes back to a topic that was raised earlier about there being a certain feeling of a blank cheque in terms of certain elements of the scheme and wanting to ensure that there are appropriate guard-rails.

I will not go much further; I will come on to my observations about the sharing of powers and responsibilities between Ministers and regulators in due course. I look forward to hearing from the Minister.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I note that this amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, is one of several concerning whether Treasury consent is needed when the Bank of England is exercising its powers—in this case, when the mechanism is used more than once for a particular institution.

Addressing the specific case of the amendment, although I think we can agree that it would usually be desirable to have to use the mechanism only once in respect of a particular institution, this may not always be the case. As an example, if a failed bank is transferred to a bridge bank, there is a risk of further deterioration in its balance sheet over time. It is foreseeable that, if that were the case, the Bank of England may need to use the mechanism again in order to recapitalise the institution; this would allow the Bank of England to maintain confidence in the firm, promoting financial stability.

The Government believe that it is important for the Bank of England to have reasonable flexibility to do so, reflecting that the full implications of a bank failure are hard to anticipate in advance. In addition, if further approvals are required, this may undermine market confidence in the original resolution action given that such approvals cannot be presumed in advance.

However, I note a few important pieces of context to this broader position. First, as required by statute, the Treasury is always consulted as part of the Bank of England’s formal assessment of the resolution conditions assessment. In practice, there is also frequent and ongoing dialogue between the authorities. Therefore, the Government are confident that there are proper and robust channels by which it could raise concerns if it had any.

Secondly, given that the new mechanism is ultimately funded by industry, we would expect the Bank of England to consult the Prudential Regulation Authority on any additional request to use the new mechanism. This is important as the Prudential Regulation Authority determines what is considered affordable to be levied on the sector in any given year.

Finally, if additional use of the mechanism had implications for public funds, such as requiring use of the National Loans Fund, provision of this additional funding would be subject to Treasury consent. Overall, the Government believe that this strikes the right balance in preserving the Bank of England’s freedom of action while ensuring the appropriate level of Treasury input into decision-making.

I hope that this provides some comfort to the noble Baroness and respectfully ask that she withdraw her amendment.

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[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I rise briefly to build on the comments made by previous speakers. This is an important issue. Again, it is worth recalling that this will not just be the recapitalisation funding; there might also be associated expenses. I note the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, about the Basel accord and it being a subsidiary et cetera, but it strikes me that this is of a different level of political salience than a purely domestic collapse might be, where one has established structures. It could get incredibly uncomfortable for the Government if we do not have a better and fuller understanding of what safeguards exist already to make sure that banks are appropriately capitalised by their parents abroad and of how we avoid the perception of the Bank of England acting in interests which are not necessarily aligned with those of Daily Mail readers—let us put it that way. It is not that they have to align with Daily Mail readers, but one might imagine that this could be very problematic.

I would like some reassurance about what we would do if it were to be a significant amount rather than the very small amount for Silicon Valley Bank and how we would seek to address the concerns that would inevitably arise from the general public.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, in response to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I hope I can provide some clarification on how the resolution regime operates currently with respect to subsidiaries of international banks, and therefore how the Government have approached the design of the new mechanism with respect to those banks.

One of the strengths of the UK’s banking sector is that a number of international banks seek to operate within the UK, including by setting up subsidiaries. These are often providers of critical banking services, such as current accounts, business accounts and sources of working capital to businesses. It is therefore important that a robust system of regulation is in place to ensure that such subsidiaries can operate safely within the UK. This includes ensuring that in the event of their failure they can be managed in an orderly way. The resolution regime does not currently make a distinction between domestic UK banks and subsidiaries of international banks in terms of which authority is responsible for taking resolution action in the UK. In all cases, this responsibility falls to the Bank of England, except where there are implications for public funds. The Government continue to believe this is appropriate.

While the failure of banks is rare, the most recent example, and the genesis of this Bill, was Silicon Valley Bank UK, itself a subsidiary of an international bank. The Government consider that there were two key lessons from that event. First, it is critical that the Bank of England has the flexibility to move decisively during a crisis. Secondly, it is important to introduce the new mechanism delivered by the Bill in those cases where there is not a willing buyer. The Government do not therefore believe that there is a strong justification for treating subsidiaries differently from domestic UK banks and requiring a further set of approvals. To do so would create additional obstacles to efficient resolution decisions, which recent experience suggests can be necessary.

The noble Baroness asked whether the Bank would have used the mechanism on SVB. I cannot comment on an individual case or decision that it may have taken, but the case showed the usefulness of the option of having a mechanism provided to the Bank.

The noble Baroness also asked whether this issue will be covered in the code. The code updates will cover a broad range of issues following the Bill’s passage. We will progress and publish that code swiftly.

The noble Baroness further asked whether a parent company should be able to support the failure of a subsidiary. While the parent company may be able to recapitalise its subsidiary outside of resolution, there may be circumstances where that is not possible, as was the case with SVB UK. It is important that the Bank of England has the necessary tools to deal with a failing firm regardless of its home jurisdiction. In practice, the mechanism uses the Bank of England’s transfer and writedown powers, so the parent company would suffer losses on its investment in a subsidiary.

I therefore respectfully ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

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[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and to my noble friend Lady Noakes for thinking carefully about reporting and tabling amendments accordingly. I had to support one of these amendments and I am afraid that I picked the noble Lord’s on this occasion. This is not favouritism; I was purely trying to spread the love a little. But as we approach Report, we might want to go back and check that whatever we end up putting into the Bill is future-proofed.

Sometimes one can put in too much detail, then people can slide round the edges by saying, “Oh, you didn’t tell us to do that”. Alternatively, there is being too broad, when people slide round another edge by not putting in the detail that you want to see. There is a balance, but this is certainly worth taking forward and looking at. Obviously, the accountability element is key here.

Another thought I had around this was on timing. Again, sometimes one can go too far and have a report too far in the distance, so by the time it comes out no one remembers what the problem was in the first place. The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, says “three months”; I was thinking “as soon as practical” or, in any event, within six months. I do not know, but in very complicated and complex circumstances there might still be issues and context to resolve to produce a report that is relevant in timing terms, but also incorporates everything that stakeholders wish to see.

When I was a Minister, my heart would sink when an amendment was put down about producing a report. I would think, “Another report—are we really going to read it?” To me, the question is: we might produce a timely report in a good fashion and with the right amount of detail, et cetera, but how do we then ensure the scrutiny of that report? It goes back to the issue of expenses which, as we agreed, could be quite significant. But who is going to look at those expenses and suck their teeth? Will they look at the legal fees of firm XYZ and say, “Do you know what? That’s too much”. Who is going to do that? Is there any body at all—not anybody—which would be able to look at it and do that? It has been suggested to me that the National Audit Office might occasionally pay attention to this sort of thing. This is about trying to get us beyond “Just produce a report”. Well, just produce a report and then somebody can look at it. I am sure that these are going to be great reports, but even so it is a concern.

I am looking forward to the response of the Minister. I believe that this should be our last group today, fingers crossed, but I am not sure that many of us want to go outside, given the weather.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I fully understand the substantial focus on the reporting requirements that will apply when the new mechanism is used. I shall start by addressing Amendment 12 on this point, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux.

The Government agree that, should the new mechanism be used, it is right for there to be a reporting mechanism to hold the Bank of England to account for its decisions, and that this should encompass estimates of the costs of different options. However, the Government intend to achieve the principles of scrutiny and transparency in a different way; namely, through the existing requirements placed on the Bank of England under the Banking Act 2009. As set out in their response to the consultation, it is the Government’s intention to use these existing reporting mechanisms to ensure that the Bank of England is subject to appropriate scrutiny when using the mechanism. The Government have committed to updating their code of practice to provide further details on how these reporting requirements will apply when the mechanism is used; I can re-confirm that the Government intend to include in the code confirmation that, after the new mechanism has been used, the Bank of England will be required to disclose the estimated costs that were considered as part of these reports.

The Government consider that using the code of practice is an appropriate approach to hold the Bank of England to account for its actions, rather than putting these requirements in the Bill. The Bank of England is legally required to have regard to the code and the Government are required to consult the Banking Liaison Panel, made up of regulatory and industry stakeholders, when updating it. Using the code will therefore ensure that a full and thorough consultation is taken on the approach. Given the complex and potentially fast-moving nature of bank failures, this is important to ensure that any approach is sufficiently nuanced to account for the range of possible outcomes under insolvency or through the use of other resolution tools. The Government believe that amendments to the code of practice are more likely to be successful in achieving this outcome. As I committed at Second Reading, the Government will share drafts of these updates to the code of practice as soon as is practicable and will provide sufficient opportunity for industry stakeholders to be consulted on them.

I acknowledge the further amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—Amendment 24—which would make such reports available to Parliament when the new mechanism was used to facilitate a transfer to another buyer. It is the Government’s clear intention that any such reports required under the Banking Act, following the use of the mechanism, will be made public and laid before Parliament. The Government would not make reports public only if there were clear public interest grounds not to do so, such as commercial confidentiality reasons. This may particularly be the case when exercising the power to sell a failing bank to a commercial buyer. While such cases would hopefully be limited, it is important that they are allowed for.

I appreciate the intent of Amendment 14 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which would require the Bank of England to report to the Treasury more swiftly than under the current requirements. The use of resolution powers is complex; in some cases, the Bank of England may be executing a resolution over a long period, particularly when placing a firm into a bridge bank. It is therefore sensible for the Bank of England to report a reasonable period of time after exercising its powers, ensuring that its report provides a full and meaningful assessment. On reporting more broadly, I repeat the points made in response to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux.

Finally, Amendment 25 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, would require the Chancellor to assess in the light of the Bill the appropriateness of the thresholds used by the Bank of England to determine which firms are required to hold additional loss-absorbing resources, known as MREL. As before, I should start by noting that the Government recognise the important role played by smaller and specialist banks in supporting the UK economy. I appreciate the concerns raised by the noble Baroness at Second Reading.

The Government have carefully considered the perspective of such banks in developing the mechanism in the Bill, which is intended to be a proportionate solution. On MREL, the Bank of England is responsible for determining MREL requirements for individual firms within a framework set out in legislation; that is an important principle, as the resolution authority, the Bank of England, is ultimately best placed to judge what resources banks should hold so that they can fail safely. I point out to the noble Baroness that, as set out in the Government’s consultation response, the Bank of England has committed to consider the potential case for changes to its indicative thresholds. Specifically, it has noted that it will consider whether any changes are appropriate in light of this Bill and other wider developments.

I hope that these points provide reassurance to noble Lords. On that basis, I respectfully ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.